Why I Am Not a Buddhist
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Why I Am Not a Buddhist
by Evan Thompson
3.92 · Rating details · 179 ratings · 32 reviews
A provocative essay challenging the idea of Buddhist exceptionalism, from one of the world’s most widely respected philosophers and writers on Buddhism and science
Buddhism has become a uniquely favored religion in our modern age. A burgeoning number of books extol the scientifically proven benefits of meditation and mindfulness for everything ranging from business to romance. There are conferences, courses, and celebrities promoting the notion that Buddhism is spirituality for the rational, compatible with cutting‑edge science, indeed, “a science of the mind.” In this provocative book, Evan Thompson argues that this representation of Buddhism is false.
In lucid and entertaining prose, Thompson dives deep into both Western and Buddhist philosophy to explain how the goals of science and religion are fundamentally different. Efforts to seek their unification are wrongheaded and promote mistaken ideas of both. He suggests cosmopolitanism instead, a worldview with deep roots in both Eastern and Western traditions. Smart, sympathetic, and intellectually ambitious, this book is a must‑read for anyone interested in Buddhism’s place in our world today. (less)
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Hardcover, 240 pages
Published January 28th 2020 by Yale University Press (first published 2020)
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Paul Oppenheimer
Feb 17, 2020Paul Oppenheimer rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
Opened new lines of inquiry
This book opened new lines of inquiry. The application of moderate cosmopolitanism to dialogue between traditions is an approach worth further investigation.
Evan Thompson is a lifelong meditator, a good friend to Buddhism, and one of the pioneers of the three-way conversation among Buddhism, academic philosophy in the broadly European sphere, and the special sciences, especially neuroscience. Much of his body of work is devoted to making philosophical ideas from Buddhism available to philosophers and scientists reading and writing in English and other European languages. In this book he is arguing for a moderate cosmopolitanism that is fully honest about the differences between different traditions of inquiry. He's arguing against a certain strategy for promoting Buddhism that downplays its religious aspects, discounts other players in the wider Sanskrit cosmopolis, and assimilates neuroscience and Buddhism to each other in a philosophically careless way. He wants Buddhism, science, and philosophy to take each other seriously in a way that doesn't paper over differences. He wants Buddhism to be read in its wider Asian philosophical and religious context. There are profound differences between the public, reproducible, third-person approach of science and the first-person approaches of Asian meditative traditions, the phenomenological traditions of Europe, and other first-person approaches. Thompson has been committed all his life to trying to build bridges between third-person and first-person approaches to questions of life, mind, consciousness, self, and so on. In this book, he's arguing that a moderate cosmopolitanism is the most promising approach to continuing to make progress in this project. (less)
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Kaj Sotala
Feb 13, 2020Kaj Sotala rated it liked it · review of another edition
Recommended to Kaj by: Michael Taft
Decently written, but felt like it was generally either arguing against views which I didn't hold (e.g. that one can easily derive a purely psychological interpretation of Buddhism from the original suttas, that it can be reconstrued as a form of "first-person science" with no religious elements, or that it is exceptionally scientific when compared to other religions), or arguing pretty theoretical-seeming considerations without making clear what their practical relevance was (e.g. that attention and mindfulness are not only in the brain), so I didn't get much out of it. I did appreciate the way that it hammered on the point that the claim of meditation revealing objective truths about the brain is doubtful, as there is a definite process of actively reshaping the mind as well. (less)
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Eugene Pustoshkin
Mar 17, 2020Eugene Pustoshkin rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
Shelves: varela, buddhism, mindfulness, meditation, enactive-paradigm, thompson-evan
At first I was skeptical about that book due to its strange choice of words in the title. It reminded of Bertrand Russel’s famous Why I Am Not a Christian. But once I started to read the book, I immediately recognized very good literature. We even recorded a podcast in Russian about the contents of that book for our Eros & Kosmos online magazine.
I won’t be going into the details of Evan Thompson’s arguments (probably, other reviews describe his theses), but it is really difficult to disagree with most if not all of them. I think this book is very compatible with Ken Wilber’s idea of the necessity of a Fourth Turning of the Dharma Wheel to happen. Wilber describes it in his books Integral Buddhism (aka The Fourth Turning) and The Religion of Tomorrow. While Thompson is great at deconstructing some of the flaws of Buddhist modernism, Ken Wilber is great at constructing a holistic, integral, and post-metaphysical vision based on wholeness.
I recommend Why I Am Not a Buddhist to anyone who is interested not just in Buddhism but also in other traditions, especially as they’re related to meditation and spirituality. Well-written, though not uncomplicated (there are some difficult topics discussed there—which I totally loved, but I know that some people might find parts of the text difficult . . . but it is such a short book, really). (less)
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Jessica Zu
Jun 22, 2020Jessica Zu rated it liked it
Oh, btw, I need to credit him for following Sheldon Pollock's footsteps by pushing forward Buddhist cosmopolis in conjunction with Sanskrit cosmopolis. I'm on board with this project. Western cultures do not have a monopoly on cosmopolitan thinking, Chinese and Indians offer awesome thinkings on these issues.
I think this book should be more properly titled "why I am not a white Buddhist." as for his critique of Buddhist modernisms, though very incisive, especially on the philosophical inconsistencies, I think it should be more properly contextualized as critiques of white Buddhist modernisms. Throughout this book and his critiques of white Buddhist modernisms, I fail to see any scholarly engagement with socially engaged Buddhism (mostly led by Asian, African teachers). I'm interested in his philosophical analysis of teachings such as Ruth King's Mindfulness of Race, Lama Rod Owen's Love and Rage, and angel Kyodo Williams's Radical Dharma.
My 2cents ... Just another white philosopher automatically assuming whiteness as the norm and white people's interpretation of Buddhism as the universal experience of Buddhism and only paying attention to minorities who appeal to white sensitivity ... I'm not surprised. As he recounts his contacts with Buddhism, it's such a typical white encounter with Buddhism ... That is why American Buddhism is still largely a racist Buddhism.
If you wanna know more about Asian and African American versions of Buddhism, try those books I mentioned earlier and also try Duncan Williams's The American Sutra.
This also explains why I am determined not to become a philosopher ... the whole field is so white ... so male ... no room for colored women like me ... their loss not mine.
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Blaine
Feb 03, 2021Blaine rated it it was ok
Recommends it for: those interested in Buddhism, cognitive science, philosophy, contemporary culture
Shelves: buddhism, cultural-studies, general-science, western-philosophy
Buddhism: Exceptional or Useful? A Review of Evan Thompson’s Why I Am Not a Buddhist
I’m a huge fan of philosopher Evan Thompson and have followed his work for nearly three decades. His efforts to establish an embodied mind approach in cognitive science over the last 30 years is groundbreaking and promises to point the way to an effective resolution of the age-old mind/nature conundrum in Western thought. He continues a lineage of thinkers who established mid-century systems theory and cybernetics from Wiener, Von Bertalanffy, Ashby, McColloch, Von Foerster, and Bateson, to Maturana and Varela whose autopoiesis theory led to the establishment of the enactivist approach and eventually to the so-called “4e View” in cognitive science which sees mind and life as emergent, embedded, embodied, and enactive (see my “Embodied Cognition” book list on Goodreads.com). Thompson has also been at the forefront of the encounter between the sciences and consciousness studies which has often included dialogue between science and Buddhism. I give Thompson’s books and views the highest ratings. But as a student of Buddhism for four decades, I find Why I’m Not a Buddhist to be an uneven work and rather unfair to Buddhism.
Echoing Bertrand Russell’s 1927 essay Why I Am Not a Christian (and numerous other Why I Am/Am Not books), Why I Am Not a Buddhist is part autobiography and part cultural critique. In it, Thompson explains why he cannot identify as a Buddhist due largely to what he sees as a widespread favoritism of Buddhism among many scientists and academics. He calls this favoritism “Buddhist exceptionalism” and describes it as a set of beliefs and ideas such as “Buddhism is superior among the world’s religions in being inherently rational and empirical,” or “it isn’t so much a religion as it is a philosophy or way of life,” or “it’s an applied mind science” (24-25). Primary to this Buddhist exceptionalism is the idea that Buddhism, among the world’s religions, is uniquely suited to engage with science.
Thompson presents his Buddhist exceptionalism as the most conspicuous aspect of (what is called) Buddhist modernism, a historical amalgam of Western cultural influences and traditional Buddhist ideas and practices that has developed over the past 200 years of cultural interaction between Western and Buddhist countries (see McMahan’s 2012, The Making of Buddhist Modernism). Contemporary Buddhism whether Zen, Tibetan, Insight, Theravadin, or other, is of a mix of modernist and traditional Buddhist ideas and values. Much of the book aims to show how these subcultures of Buddhist modernism are full of misguided and confused ideas, particularly regarding relations between science and religion. Here’s Thompson explaining the relations between a) modern Buddhism, b) Buddhist modernism, c) Buddhist exceptionalism, and d) Buddhist fundamentalism:
Modern Buddhism is caught up in these bad extremes, from Buddhist fundamentalism in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand to universalizing Buddhist modernism across the world. Modern Buddhism became cosmopolitan through Buddhist modernism, which opposed itself to local and traditional forms of Asian Buddhism. Buddhist modernism, however, is mired in philosophical confusions, especially about religion and science, as we’ve seen. Its partisan Buddhist exceptionalism undermines its universalizing rhetoric (172).
Mutual Validation or Mutual Challenge?
One of the book’s goals is the reframing of Buddhism as more a religion than a philosophical system, which is his attempt to counteract the historical reverse emphasis among scientists, intellectuals, and Buddhist teachers and scholars. Thompson wants everyone to think that Buddhism is primarily grounded in religious belief and that, although it is also a sophisticated system of philosophy, ultimately it relies on nonscientific religious beliefs rather than empirical and objective knowledge. The fact that he sees it as ultimately grounded in religious belief runs counter to his identity as a philosopher and scientist and so contributes to his inability to identify as Buddhist.
To paint a simplistic picture of Buddhism as similar to other leap-of-faith religions is unfair. In fact, what Thompson doesn’t say is that Buddhism could just as well be described as being grounded in direct first-person experience that is based in rigorous dialectical reasoning and analysis rather than in “religious belief.” At the entry level it is true that Buddhism, like all religions, requires faith and belief. But as one progresses, Buddhist study and practice become more and more about the wisdom that issues from complete relinquishing of all faith, beliefs, ideas, and concepts whatsoever – all mental grasping – including the concepts of “enlightenment,” “nirvana,” “perfection,” even “Buddha” himself. It is the only “religion” with a philosophical psychology whose goal is to meticulously deconstruct the ego and its self-defeating desires, including the desire to believe in its founder. What other religion teaches the wisdom of a phrase such as, “If you see [Buddha] on the road, kill him”? It also promotes its own psychology-based self-obsolescence such as when it teaches its followers that eventually the entirety of the teachings will be rendered obsolete, that they must be mentally released and left behind (as in the parable of The Raft)? These and other aspects of Buddhist philosophy show the folly of trying to categorize Buddhism as merely a faith-based religion. They also show why, to many westerners, it does seem exceptional.
The book contains many examples of what Thompson considers Buddhist exceptionalism and he uses them to show how people try to use science and Buddhism to confirm, prove, or validate each other. He devotes a whole chapter to pointing out the problems in Robert Wright’s book, Why Buddhism is True, and calls out numerous other teachers for their Buddhist exceptionalism such as B. Alan Wallace, Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, Nyanaponika Thera, S.N. Goenka, Sam Harris, and even the Dalai Lama. Thompson does make some significant points, but in each case, he wants the reader to see how each of these teachers utilizes science to confirm, prove, or otherwise validate Buddhist ideas. Therein lies Thompson’s main target: the specific ways in which such favoritism is inappropriate.
Thompson’s criticism of Buddhist exceptionalism goes like this: you cannot equate religion with science; you cannot use science to validate, justify, or prove Buddhism or vice versa. The modes of knowing and validation in science and religion are fundamentally incommensurable. However, since Buddhism is clearly more than a religion, and since it is also a sophisticated rational philosophy that is unlike anything in Western religion, Thompson does accept that we can use Buddhism as a means to challenge science. That is, we can use Buddhism and science to challenge or inform each other. This is exactly what he has been doing much of his professional life. Thus, we have two modes of science-Buddhism dialogue: 1) mutually validating engagement and 2) mutually challenging engagement. For Thompson, the latter is acceptable while the former is not. Here are two examples from the text discussing these forms of dialogue:
[Robert] Wright takes scientific naturalism for granted and uses it to explain and justify modern mindfulness meditation (my emphasis). He doesn’t use Buddhism to scrutinize philosophical assumptions about science. We use Buddhism to recast our understanding of science and the world it investigates. Our guiding image is that of a ‘circulation’ between Buddhism and cognitive science where each one flows into and out of the other, and back again. Each one affects and draws forth changes from the other. (72)
Buddhists uses science to embellish Buddhist teachings, and scientists use Buddhism to embellish scientific theories. And both Buddhists and scientists—and especially Buddhist scientists—use science to justify Buddhism. (185)
Although Thompson doesn’t identify it as such, his mutual validation criticism is part of a convergence model of science and Buddhism that is assumed by many who engage in such mutual validation. Others have also argued against the convergence model (See Bernard Faure’s “A Gray Matter: Another look at Buddhism and neuroscience,” Tricycle, Winter 2012 ). I happen to agree that, along with the incommensurability argument, whatever people think convergence is –establishing common ground, agreement, mutual validation, perhaps eventual unification, etc. – the better model is the “circulation” one that Thompson advocates in the quote above. I also agree that human knowledge is better served when these two modes of knowing remain separate but can challenge the assumptions of the other.
While one can agree with the incommensurability argument and with the inappropriateness of using science and Buddhism to validate each other, Thompson’s criticism doesn’t stop there. The exceptionalism offense in his view goes beyond mutual validation to choosing Buddhism in the first place since, as Thompson argues, other religions are equally capable of challenging science:
Although it’s unquestionably true that Buddhism possesses a vast and sophisticated literature on the mind, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam also possess sophisticated philosophical and contemplative writings about the mind. These writings build on the rich and intricate heritage of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic thought. Buddhist texts aren’t less metaphysical than the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic ones. (37)
Buddhist modernism presents Buddhism as uniquely suited to the modern world, but we can sanitize any religion in this modernist way. Consider Christian humanism, which stresses the humanity of Jesus, unites Christian ethics with humanist principles, promotes science, calls attention to the Judeo-Christian and ancient Greek sources of scientific ideas such as the ‘laws of nature.’ Or consider Liberal Judaism, which regards the Torah as written by human beings, not written by God and given to Moses on stone tablets and emphasizes the progressive Jewish Intellectual tradition. (29)
If other religions are equally fit to challenge science, then why are scientists and philosophers uniquely attracted to Buddhism as a partner? Could it be that there are good reasons it is exceptional? Rather than explain why Buddhism has become the chosen partner for philosophy and cognitive science, rather than discuss what is special about Buddhist philosophy such that it has the ability to challenge science and western thought unlike any other world religion, Thompson criticizes those who use science to prove the validity of Buddhism while allowing his own use of Buddhism to dialogue with science. Since he criticizes the exceptionalism of others while engaging in his own, his charge borders on hypocrisy. This is especially so since, after equating Buddhism with other world religions as all having “rich philosophical traditions,” he has singled out and worked with Buddhism for most of his career. What’s not exceptional about that? Where’s all his work with Christianity and science? The issue shouldn’t be whether Buddhism (or any system) is exceptional or not but rather, is it useful? Clearly Buddhism is useful to science, or it wouldn’t have become the worthy partner to science that so many, including Thompson, have made it.
Reclaiming Autonomy
Beyond Thompson’s issues over the science-Buddhism engagement, the autobiographical part of the book suggests some personal reasons for his disowning of a Buddhist identity. Judging from the life experiences he recounts and the peculiar mix of criticism and admiration he expresses for Buddhism, implicit in his essay appears to be a personal renunciation of Buddhism, seemingly as a result of having it handed to him in childhood by his parents and the spirituality of their Lindisfarne community, of pre-defined space and opportunity to explore on his own, of influences of having been surrounded by scholar-intellectuals who in effect preselected Buddhism for him, but also, later, of observing various unhealthy expressions of Buddhism such as those of Chogyam Trungpa and the embrace thereof by his mentor Francisco Varela (ch.6, note 34, 215-216). Proclaiming his disidentification with Buddhism thus has a dual purpose: to call attention to what he sees as unhealthy favoritism but also to regain his spiritual autonomy. The life experiences he shares coupled with the book’s praise-and-disparage language around Buddhism make it difficult not to notice this.
Discomfort With Nondual Enlightenment
Further evidence of Thompson’s disconnect with Buddhism is revealed in his disjointed presentation of Buddhist nonduality, the central and paradoxical philosophical principle-insight of Mahayana Buddhism, otherwise known as the philosophy of emptiness and The Doctrine of the Two Truths. If there is any aspect of Buddhism that makes it exceptional from the perspective of western thought, it is the philosophy of nonduality.
Based on views expressed in this and his previous book, Waking Dreaming and Being, Thompson appears comfortable with conceptual nonduality (73-75) expressed as a philosophical principle but uncomfortable and critical of experiential nonduality (144-145) when expressed as first-person nonconceptual insight or wisdom. His criticism of first-person nonconceptual insight or transcendent wisdom is rather odd considering that he has worked so long and hard to include the validity of first-person phenomenological consciousness into cognitive science.
Thompson’s charge that the idea of enlightenment is incoherent since it is unverifiable by science is the most conspicuous example in the book of his own science exceptionalism, suggesting that (at least in this part of the book) science is the ultimate arbiter of valid knowledge. Since the core claim of enlightened mind is direct (first-person) apprehension of nondual emptiness in addition to indirect conceptual understanding of the nonconceptuality of emptiness (i.e., of philosophical paradox), what Buddhist philosophers would say to Thompson’s incoherence charge is that nondual awakening stands beyond the ken of the worldframe of science and its ability to judge, and that it only appears incoherent because science and western philosophy don’t have the range to judge beyond dualistic concepts:
I think the Buddhist modernist concept of enlightenment is incoherent. Either you embrace faith in awakening and nirvana, which, according to the tradition, transcend conceptual thought—and hence can’t be legitimized (or delegitimized) by science—or, you choose to believe only in what can be made scientifically comprehensible, in which case you have to give up the idea of enlightenment as a nonconceptual intuitive realization of the ‘fullness of being’ or the ‘suchness of reality,’ for these aren’t scientific concepts. You can’t have it both ways. Religion and science may be able to coexist, depending on the attitude they take to each other, but science can’t legitimize religion, and they can’t be merged into one. (144)
“You can’t have it both ways” only if you’re a science fundamentalist. If you are a cosmopolitan as he later advocates, or if you are a nondualist, then other validation-legitimation avenues are available for making coherent that which science cannot. The Tibetan tradition for example is unbelievably rich and nuanced with regard to teaching, confirming, and validating what is paradoxically unverifiable (in a dualistic sense). They have tried and true ways of verifying nondual cognition or awakening. Further evidence of his discomfort with the idea of enlightenment is when he claims it contributes to anti-intellectualism and irrationalism or that appeals to Buddha’s original teachings are akin to religious fundamentalism:
Buddhist modernist rhetoric of enlightenment as a nonconceptual experience outside language and tradition has reinforced anti-intellectualism and irrationalism. (188-189)
Trying to go back to the ‘original teachings of the Buddha’ is a typical Buddhist modernist move (and one that Buddhist modernism shares with the equally modern phenomenon of religious fundamentalism). (20)
Seriously? He’s saying that one of the world’s most highly refined philosophical critiques of the human mind equates with the irrationality and fanaticism of monotheistic fundamentalism? Such an outrageous conflation is an indication that he feels any form of nonduality is an existential threat to one’s identity as a philosopher who operates in the world of dualistic concepts. And, with statements like the following, even his understanding of enlightenment as conceptual nonduality seems somewhat shaky:
If enlightenment is supposed to be a psychological state, then its content must be clearly specifiable, but there’s no consensus in Buddhism about exactly what the content of the awakening experience is… (145).
These are typical wrong ideas about enlightenment: a) that it is a state and b) that it has specifiable content, but also c) that there is no consensus around it. If, as Mahayana Buddhism teaches, enlightenment is nondual, then no single state or mark or characteristic, quality, or aspect can indicate or specify it. This is exactly what the Heart Sutra teaches. It has no specific content, except all content. By being non-specifiable, it is specified. It is ironic, paradoxical, nonconceptual, trans-conceptual, post-conceptual. It is both/and: ultimate-conventional, pure-impure, infinite-finite, form-formless, intelligible-ineffable, being-nonbeing, nothing-everything, emptiness-fullness, affirmation-negation, even dual-nondual. Nondual realization is not for the faint of heart – rather, it is the ultimate conceptual endgame. Don’t take my word for it, ask Uncle Ludwig (Wittgenstein, that is).
Think for a moment: is the state of all states itself a state? Enlightenment-as-ultimate cannot be a specifiable state; it turns on itself; it has no specific content other than self-referential nonspecifiability-ineffability-nonconceptuality. That, paradoxically, IS its specific content. And, it necessarily has to be like this: if enlightenment were specifiable, it wouldn’t be “Ultimate” because anything specifiable is already delimited by conditions, metaphysical or otherwise. Thus...
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Felix
Dec 29, 2020Felix rated it liked it
Shelves: spirituality, american, philosophy, science
This book is primarily a criticism of Buddhist Modernism, a trend in New Age thinking which seems to be very popular across the western world, but particularly in the United States. To be honest, I think I learned more about Buddhist Modernism from this book than from anywhere else - it's not a movement that I've ever put a great deal of thought into. It's always seemed to me to be an example of contemporary New Age transformation of traditional thinking, a trend which likes to tidy up up complex historical belief systems into neat packages which can be easily consumed in a Capitalist context. The historical flaws in Buddhist modernism (as the term is defined in this book) seem quite obvious to me, and much of the discussion on the topic of history consists of arguments that I could and would readily make myself.
However, this book fundamentally has a scientific rather than historical focus. The author spends the majority of the book tackling the scientific claims of Buddhist Modernism, namely that their religion is uniquely scientifically accurate, in a way that Christianity, Hinduism, Islam et al, simply is not. To me, this conception of Buddhist exceptionalism is patently absurd, but I think it is still somewhat widely accepted, and this book does a great job at summarising scientific rebuttals to the idea. I did often found myself feeling a little bogged down in some of the discussions. For example, discussions on things like the validity or lack thereof, of various models of Evolutionary Psychology. But if you're more into scientific details than I generally am, they might well be your favourite part of the book. Personally, I preferred the historical discussions. (less)
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Steve
Sep 18, 2020Steve rated it really liked it
Interesting book. About Buddhism and especially some modern variants, told with great knowledge about eastern religions, philosophy, and science. I didn’t get it all, and I felt a bit skeptical about Thompson’s interest in “embodied cognition” but the book was challenging and thought-provoking. It was written partly in response to Robert Wright’s book “Why Buddhism is True” which is a book I also enjoyed, although Thompson makes some valid criticisms of it.
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M Spiering
Feb 17, 2020M Spiering rated it it was amazing
If Buddhism were a person, it couldn't ask for a better friend and critic than the author of "Why I Am Not a Buddhist," Evan Thompson. As the reader delves into the pages of this (fairly short) book, it quickly becomes clear that the author wishes Buddhism (in its broadest sense) to be well and thriving.
To that end, Thompson realizes that he needs to gently (and sometimes not quite so gently, but never antagonistically) tweak some noses, especially of those who consider themselves Buddhist modernists. This group includes scholars, scientists, and practitioners who seek to fit Buddhist practice and tradition to Western cultural norms and values, which obviously are vastly different from those that existed when Buddhism first appeared more than 2,000 years ago.
Thompson is deeply steeped in Eastern philosophy, being both a meditator and a scholar (having studied with Robert Thurman and Francisco Varela, among others), and very much wants Buddhist intellectual and philosophical traditions to be part of a 21st century cosmopolitan dialogue among philosophers, scientists, and other scholars.
His main focus of criticism is American/Western Buddhism (though, he also cautions against elevating Asian Buddhism without considering that its practitioners, e.g., in mid-20th century Japan and 21st century Myanmar have not always lived up to the ideals of the religion they’ve been espousing).
In particular, he probes the proposition of "Buddhist exceptionalism," which holds that Buddhist philosophy and practice uniquely and almost seamlessly align with (Western) science. He lays out several strands of reasoning explaining as to why, from his perspective, this view is fraught and contradictory.
Thompson is a very eloquent and clear writer, and the book is a fairly quick read, so I'm not going to try summarize its content. I'm also not going to go into some (slight) disagreements I have with a few of the author's assertions--I think that many of them simply stem from my own ignorance of Eastern philosophies and traditions. I truly enjoyed and am very grateful for having several of my views challenged.
The main take-home message for me was that in trying to make Buddhism into a "science of the mind" or as being congruent with findings in fields like evolutionary psychology, Buddhist (and non-Buddhist) scholars and practitioners run the risk of losing sight that Buddhist philosophy has much more to offer. This includes its rich contemplative and ethical/moral instructions and traditions that don't need to be evaluated with the tools of science to see their value for lived experience and flourishing.
The author’s discussion of the many problems that arise from trying to align Buddhist thought with science makes it very clear that (Buddhist) philosophy/practice and science reap fruits that are harvested from different fields, even though they are eaten at the same table. Trying to grow them in the same plot may end up diminishing the flavour and zest of both.
One does not need to be a Buddhist to appreciate the author's take on and well-meaning advice for Buddhist modernists and other followers of the tradition or of Buddhist religion. It’s a very insightful and stimulating read for anyone interested in Eastern philosophy and its role in what is sometimes called the “mindfulness movement.”
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Tina Cabrera
Feb 16, 2022Tina Cabrera rated it it was amazing
Of all the world religions, Buddhism is the one I have been most drawn to for most of my life. For one, meditation has helped me in difficult times. Secondly, I find it appealing that Buddhism is not centered on a God-figure. At the same time, I've found myself hesitant to call myself a full-on Buddhist, and now that I've read Thompson's book, I think I can articulate what is behind the hesitance.
First, for his writing style, Thompson's writing is very accessible and direct. Even when handling complex philosophical material, his writing is concise and clear. He states his purpose for each chapter, then follows through, and then summarizes the main point at the end of the chapter.
His main beef is with Buddhist modernism and Buddhist exceptionalism where Buddhism is seen as superior to other religions, not really a religion but a kind of "mind science." He outlines how Buddhist modernism and its core tenets are untenable: "that Buddhism is a 'mind science,' that there is no self; that mindfulness is an inward awareness of one's own private mental theater; that neuroscience establishes the value of mindfulness practice; that enlightenment is a nonconceptual experience outside language, culture, and tradition; and that enlightenment is or can be correlated with a brain state." He offers plenty of evidence that such tenets are philosophically and scientifically indefensible. At first, because of my interest in Buddhism and meditation, I was apprehensive in accepting the evidence, but I must admit that I have struggled a lot with the concept that there is no self along with thinking of meditation as a cure-all and the right way to so-called enlightenment (he has a stunning chapter that confronts the rhetoric of enlightenment). t
One of the most compelling chapters was on "Mindfulness Mania," which markets mindfulness as in the head. His main point in this chapter is how we "need to move from focusing just on the brain to examining how cultural practices orchestrate the cognitive skills that belong to meditation," and if the science of meditation does not make this shift, it will remain complicit in the narcissism of mindfulness mania.
Thompson argues for a kind of "cosmopolitanism that appreciates the significance of the Buddhist intellectual tradition for the modern world," and using a model of conversation that "doesn't have to lead to consensus about anything, especially not values; it's enough that it helps people to get used to one another." I think this is a very useful way of conversing, especially at a time when everything appears to be polarized into two extremes.
Thompson has a rich, extensive background in Buddhism, which lends his argument merit, I think. He is a writer and professor of philosophy at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver and works on cognitive science, philosophy of the mind, phenomenology, and cross-cultural philosophy. (less)
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Craig Werner
Mar 20, 2021Craig Werner rated it it was ok
Shelves: religion-spirituality
A significant disappointment. Thompson has been an important voice in the conversations between Buddhism and neuroscience, a long-time participant in the Dalai Lama's conferences. Thompson's book Waking, Dreaming, Being is a brilliant and detailed investigation of key issues, including the brain states associated with meditation and death. So I was anticipating a measured reflection on why, despite the depth of his understanding, he chooses not to embrace Buddhism.
Unfortunately, this book reads like a petulant statement of his dissatisfaction with the phrasings employed by some participants in the discussions, specifically the claims that Buddhism isn't a religion and that there is a demonstrable "Buddhist science." Thompson labels the position he's arguing against "Buddhist exceptionalism," and clearly wants nothing to do with it. He repeatedly invokes the analogy that someone hearing the same claims about Christianity would likely dismiss them out of hand.
The problem is that he's really talking about the way the science-Buddhism conversation takes place in relation to a specific strain of Tibetan Buddhism, which clearly *is* a religion in accord with pretty much any definition. On a limited level, then, Thompson's claim is true. The Ch'an (zen) tradition, however, avoids most of the problems he locates in the Dalai Lama's sphere. Basically, there's a much broader and more interesting conversation going on concerning the neuroscience of meditation and the ways scientific insights and Buddhist psychology (not the same as neuroscience!) can enter into fruitful conversation. Richard Davison's book Altered Traits avoids all the pitfalls Thompson sees as intrinsic to the Buddhist perspective; I'm not sure whether Davison would call himself a Buddhist or not, but it really doesn't matter; he's working towards (and in) a conversation that's much less adversarial than the one in Why I Am Not.a Buddhist.
Thompson ultimately endorses a form of cosmopolitanism I'd absolutely endorse, one articulated very well by Anthony Appiah. Just wish he'd written the book that would contribute to moving this important cosmpolitan conversation ahead. (less)
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Sumanawije
Jan 22, 2021Sumanawije rated it it was amazing
This book opens up the readers to crique buddist concepts devoid of dogma.
The author has devoted several chapters in the book to justify why he does not consider himself to be adherent of Buddhism. In the 1st chapter itself, he discusses what the Buddhist intellectuals have crafted as ‘Buddhist Exceptionalism.’ His argument is that these intellectuals have failed to produce sufficient evidence in favour of this “exceptionalism”. Furthermore , it is mentioned that such assessments that they have ...more
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Jamie Alfieri
Mar 25, 2020Jamie Alfieri rated it really liked it
Interesting read that challenged many assumptions of mine. Unfortunately reads like a philosophy dissertation , one of those books written for the masses but has to defend against intellectual attacks.
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Robert Tansey
Mar 07, 2020Robert Tansey rated it liked it · review of another edition
Interesting read but frankly unless you are familiar with philosophical discourse it is a bit confusing. The author makes some good points and spends a chapter going after Robert Wright (evolutionary psychologist - "Why Buddhism is True"). I find myself more aligned with Wright. All in all the discussion was pretty much over my head. (less)
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Chula Watugala
Apr 21, 2020Chula Watugala rated it really liked it
Shelves: buddhism, philosophy, psychology
A Critical Review based on the Early Buddhist Texts
Summary:
The author argues that the popular scientific/secular buddhism has issues with its underlying philosophical assumptions. He also claims that the phenomenological view is not supported in the Buddhist texts, specifically related to the not-self teaching.
I agree that scientific/secular buddhism has philosophical issues in that it does not question the issues phenomenology uncovers in the prevaling scientific materialist view. While I also agree with the author that the traditional buddhist understanding (of all major traditions, influenced by later commentaries in claiming not-self means the self does not exist) does not sit well with the phenomenological point-of-view, I claim that he misinterprets the early buddhist texts (by that I mean the Pali Canon) and their compatibility with a phenomenological view of the not-self teaching. In that sense, I think the author is actually *more* buddhist than those who claim to be secular buddhists, since the latter are misinterpreting or cherry-picking the core teachings and have created their own unique "religion" as the author suggests. By disagreeing with the traditional (and in my opinion, inaccurate based on the early texts) view of not-self and arguing for a phenomenological self, he is unintentionally agreeing with the early buddhist texts more than he realizes.
I give my reasons for this take below, with relevant sutta quotes from the Pali Canon given in abbreviated form (MN/DN/SN/AN). The complete suttas can be found free at dhammatalks.org/suttas for anyone interested in investigating further.
While the author devotes a chapter on the issues of evolutionary psychology and critiquing Robert Wright's "Why Buddhist is True," since I mostly agree with that criticism I ignore it in my analysis.
The review follows a format where I directly quote excerpts from the book (adding my own title), and then add my analysis right after.
Excerpt (Kindle Locations 1342-1387) | Not-Self View: Dis-Identify with Experience & Avoid Metaphysics:
• The Buddha rejects the question of whether there is a self together with any positive or negative answer to that question. … teaching a practical method for how to stop mistakenly identifying with anything as the self…
• He is … rejecting metaphysical questions about the existence or nonexistence of the self and instead … urging that we shouldn’t identify with anything in our experience as the self. … giving an analysis of experience … and not a metaphysical analysis of what … is outside of experience.
• It invokes a distinction between the analysis of what there is (metaphysics) and the analysis of experience (phenomenology) that seems foreign to the Nikāyas.
• The Buddha … makes claims about what exists and what doesn’t exist from the vantage point of what we can know from experience. … makes metaphysical claims, but … from an empiricist standpoint rather than a speculative one.
• The denial of the self is made on empiricist grounds (by appealing to experience). Nevertheless, as an assertion about what doesn’t exist, the no-self claim is a metaphysical one.
Analysis | Right View Means No Metaphysical Questions Arise:
• The Buddha does make the metaphysical claim that inconstant aggregates exist (SN 22:94), and that where craving for the aggregates (SN 23:2) is present, one is called a being (satta). In philosophical terms, this would be categorized to be a process metaphysics (Noa Ronkin. Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition, 2005, p. 72). Note that Nirvana is defined as being constant (nicca), so Buddhism doesn't cleanly fit the process metaphysics bill.
• But when craving for the aggregates is abandoned, notions of existing, not existing, both, or neither do not apply (SN 44:1, DN 9, MN 63, MN 72)
• For one who “sees the world with right discernment,” experience is viewed in terms of the noble truths – this involves not identifying the aggregates as self since this is the cause of dukkha
• This results in the abandoning the underlying obsession with conceit (mānānusaya) to construct a self (AN 3:32)
• Conclusion: The early texts show evidence that the Buddha recommends a phenomenological view of experience as opposed to a metaphysical one
_____________________
Excerpt (Kindle Locations 1342-1387) | Not-Self View Variation: The Goal is Transcendent Consciousness that is Self:
• The Buddha taught a practical method for how to stop mistakenly identifying with the aggregates as the self, but this method is compatible with there being a pure … consciousness that transcends the aggregates and isn’t conditioned by them.
• This interpretation would make the Buddha’s teaching in the Nikāyas consistent with the Upaniṣads, especially as interpreted by the later Vedānta philosopher Śaṅkara, for whom the true self is pure, nondual consciousness.
• The Buddha never explicitly says that there is a transcendent consciousness apart from the aggregates, so this reading goes well beyond the texts.
• Other discourses indicate that any belief in a transcendent consciousness or self is a “wrong view.”
• The reading is based on cherry picking— choosing passages and interpreting them to suit one’s position while ignoring many other passages that count against it
Analysis | Not-Self View Variation Analysis: Viññāṇaṁ Anidassanaṁ Misunderstood:
• Author is referring to viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ (consciousness without surface) when he says “transcendent consciousness”
• Even though not defined in detail in the texts, it is mentioned (MN 49, DN 11), and anidassanaṁ is also listed as an epithet for nibbāna (SN 43)
• It “is not experienced through the allness of the All” (MN 49) — so is outside the consciousness aggregate, which is defined in terms of the six sense bases
• “The All as a phenomenon is to be abandoned” (SN 35:24), and the dimension where the six sense bases ceases should be experienced (SN 35:117)
• “Consciousness-totality above, below, all-around: non-dual [advayaṁ], immeasurable” is subject to change, a perception attainment, and not the goal (AN 10:29). Therefore the goal in Advaita Vedanta is not the same as viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ
• Conclusion: Author misinterprets viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ to be non-dual consciousness, and assumes it involves a self-view – which it does not.
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Excerpt (Kindle Locations 1342-1387) | Not-Self View: Aggregates Are Not-Self Means There Is No Self:
• There is an unstated assumption or implicit premise in the “Discourse on the Characteristic of Nonself” [anattalakkhana sutta] that the five aggregates are all there is, and so if there were a self, it would have to exist among the aggregates.
• Evidence to support this interpretation can be found throughout the Nikāyas. … “Bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who regard [anything] as self in various ways all regard [as self] the five aggregates subject to clinging, or a certain one among them.”
• If whatever can be regarded as a self belongs to the five aggregates and the five aggregates are nonself, then nothing should be regarded as a self.
• The Buddha says that “the all” is the six senses and their objects. He goes on to say that anyone who declares another “all” would be mistaken and would be asserting something beyond the scope of what he or she can know.
• The implication is that “the all” is nonself and there is nothing else that could be a self.
Analysis | Not-Self View Analysis: Aggregates are Not All There Is:
• The Buddha states you should not measure yourself in terms of the aggregates because it leads to classifying yourself (SN 22:36): “But if one doesn’t stay obsessed with [the aggregates], lord, that’s not what one is measured by. Whatever one isn’t measured by, that’s not how one is classified.
• Nibbāna lies outside of the aggregates, so to presume the aggregates constitute all of reality limits yourself
• When he is asked whether there is a self or not, the Buddha did not answer because a categorical answer would involve wrong views—eternalism and annihilationism (SN 44:10)
• Conclusion: The Buddha never defines the five aggregates as what reality is constituted of. Instead they are what we cling to. They are not used as the basis for an answer to the question “is there a self? ,” which is considered inappropriate attention (ayoniso manasikāra, MN 2)
_____________________
Excerpt (Kindle Locations 1629-1646) | Phenomenology: The Constructed Sense of Self:
• From the phenomenological perspective, the self is a multifaceted construction.
• To say that the sense of self is a construction… doesn’t logically imply that there is no self or that the sense of self is the presentation of an illusion.
• Traditional Buddhist way: requires making a … distinction between “self” (attā) and “person” (pudgala)… “Self” to mean a personal essence that is the independent owner of experience and agent of action, and … “person” to refer to the multifaceted construction … , then we can say that whereas the self is an illusion or nonexistent fiction, the person exists.
• Prefers the self as being a construction, and the part of the sense of self that involves the impression of an unchanging and independent personal essence as being an illusion.
Analysis | Phenomenology Analysis: I-making and My-making Stopped by Not-Self Perception:
• The terms I-making and my-making are clearly phenomenological constructions – does not mean they are illusions
• The self (attā) and person (pudgala) distinction is not found in the early Buddhist texts – this only becomes necessary when the anattā teaching is misunderstood to be metaphysical and not phenomenological in application
• Conclusion: The author correctly makes the distinction between the constructed phenomenological self and the metaphysical view of self, but because he is not well-versed in the early Buddhist teachings, assumes that this interpretation contradicts them when it is in fact in-line
• He seems unaware of the potential for the perception of not-self (anatta-saññā) to root out this constructed sense of self and stop I-making/my-making (ahaṅkāramamaṅkāra, AN 7:46) altogether to reach nibbāna: “When a monk’s awareness often remains steeped in the perception of not-self in what is stressful, his [mind] is devoid of I-making & my-making with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all themes has transcended pride, is at peace, and is well released.
Further Analysis | Two Truths Doctrine Analysis: A Distinction Not Found in the Early Buddhist Texts:
• Two truths idea probably originated in the Milindapañha, popularized through Visuddhimagga
• It states that there is a conventional truth (sammuti) of the phenomenal sense of self but the ultimate truth (paramattha) is that there is no metaphysical self
• The Buddha uses the sense of self in positive terms in terms of, self-reliance, self-esteem (AN 3:40, AN 4:159), and the way leading to discernment, without making any distinction of truths: “What, having been done by me, will be for my long-term welfare & happiness?” (MN 135), “Your own self is your own mainstay” (Dhp 160)
• This would not be possible if a no-self view is adhered to
• The two truths doctrine necessitates that the Buddha used convenient fictions in his teaching
• This is contradicted when he says his words are always true, beneficial, and timely (MN 58)
• The Buddha never said that on the ultimate level, beings (satta) do not exist. Instead, he defined beings as those who have craving for the aggregates (SN 23:2)
• After a being abandons craving, questions of existence and non-existence do not apply (SN 44:1) (less)
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szymborskalyte
Jun 16, 2021szymborskalyte rated it really liked it
Shelves: non-fiction-popular
A spectacularly sober take on Buddhism.
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Colin Davis
Sep 22, 2020Colin Davis rated it really liked it
Just short of a masterpiece. Thomson gives compelling arguments as to why scientific and Buddhist worldviews are not as compatible as they might seem.
The book does very well when it argues against specific spurious claims that have made a habit of proliferating in the modern 'Neural Buddhist' discourse. For example,
'We can naturalise religious aspects of Buddhism such as enlightenment'
or
'Buddhism is non-normative in a similar way to science.' Both of these claims, and others, are put to bed rather convincingly and quickly.
Not only that but Thompson's more nuanced views about the history and role of mindfulness/no-self in Buddhism are also a welcome change to what I'm used to consuming. This was only slightly let down by the fact that his ideas were more of an intellectual survey than a convincing argument. I'm guessing this was due to length; I would be interested to read his other books to see how deep the rabbit-hole goes.
Another treat worth mentioning was the stinging psychological critique of new-age Buddhist practitioners as merely wanting to have their secular cake and eat it religiously. The links he made between the history of Protestantism and privatized spirituality in the modern world were quite interesting.
Although I find his arguments against the above positions convincing, I also feel that he fails to account fully for what is going on when science meets Buddhism.
If we put aside the debate about what 'really' constitutes Buddhism and what 'real' science is, we can see that two powerful ways of understanding the human experience are trying to converge.
At the end of the book, the author points towards a nonchalant cosmopolitanism as the correct relationship between science and Buddhism while simultaneously saying his favourite moments are when they truly question each other's fundamental presuppositions.
I think Thompson should drop the vague appeal to cosmopolitanism and replace it with that kind of deliberative vigor I see in his work. Science and Buddhism have enough merit and insight to look at each other directly and see when and where they can make each other blink.
Cosmopolitan toleration is fine when we're talking about two world views that would struggle to get on with each other without some kind of overarching system of values to make them play nice, but Buddhism and science have enough commitment to truth and internal intellectual rigor to have a more direct, tense, and productive relationship.
I see what's happening now in the west as analogous to when Buddhism and Taoism combined to create Zen during Buddhism's transmission to China. It's a great opportunity to create a new paradigm. I think Thomson would do better to take the role of synthesizer more seriously. I've enjoyed listening to is identification on the fault lines, now I want to know how he thinks we can bridge them.
Like I said. Just short of greatness. (less)
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Hsandlin
May 17, 2021Hsandlin rated it really liked it
Essential read for anyone interested in the western Buddhist movement - be it a personal, cultural, or academic interest. It very clearly and concisely explains problem with “Buddhist modernism” that the author finds troublesome. This movement is something many reader in America and Europe are very quickly buying into, myself included. It is in good humor and at no points attacks the people who are contributing to this movement. In fact, he often commends the people associated with it but just points out parts of their thinking he find unjustified.
The writing in Why I Am Not A Buddhist is, on the whole, very simple and easy to read. Some academic works like this one can be dense - I’ll sometimes decide to move from a comfy chair to a desk to read some. This one, however, is quite a present read. Aside from a couple of chapters, it required minimum effort to follow and was even exciting. Hearing him name drop the heavy hitters in the Buddhist modernist world was exciting; he would introduce an idea of their (very thoroughly I might add and without the hint of a straw man) and the proceed to explain the faults in it. Of course, those he criticized cannot respond in the book but it did feel like a well humored fight.
This book was quite humbling as well. I recently read Why Buddhism Is True by Robert Wright and was very much convinced of the scientific “validation” of Buddhism (in fact, you can find a very generous review of Wright’s book on my GoodReads page). Not only has this book introduced me to problems people have with Buddhist modernism but it made me realized just how far from understanding the situation I was despite feeling as though I had a good grasp of it. I was previously convinced that I had to have been mostly on target seeing as “science” has “confirmed” these Buddhist ideas. Despite my efforts, I failed to notice scientific errors and philosophical errors in these findings.
Furthermore, if this short and simple book could so change my perspective so radically, surely any book could do the same. I only agree with all of Thompson’s finding being I heard out his entire explication. If Joseph Goldstein or the Dalai Lama wrote a book in response I am just as likely to change understandings again. If I am not careful and select a book by an author who is attempting to misguide (or are themselves misguided) then I could just as easily believe something untrue. I thought of myself as analytical, skeptical, and scientific but this book has prove that wrong. I think that is exactly who this book is for - those are the ones who are the most interested in neural Buddhism.
I highly recommend this book, it feels like the perfect bridge back to academics from the world of Buddhist modernism. If you are like me and recently went down the Buddhist rabbit hole, you might find this book to be a nice bookend. (less)
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Nancy
Aug 17, 2020Nancy added it
I read the book, and Evan Thompson seems to have an intellectual-only understanding of Buddhism. Buddhist teachings mention three levels of wisdom – first there is intellectual understanding, then contemplating based on this understanding, and then most importantly experientially understanding of the teachings within meditation. In other words, ultimate reality concepts like ‘no self’ and enlightenment needs to be understood gradually and EXPERIENTIALLY, rather than being dismissed through intellectual arguments.
We also need to remember that the Buddha did not deny the self when considering ‘conventional reality’ – he even referred to himself as a person. When considering ultimate reality, however he described the moment-to-moment manifestations that are constantly changing where an unchanging “I” cannot be found in any of these manifestations.
He also mentions a statement by Ven Nyanaponika and asks “How can bare attention reveal the mind if it also changes it?”- here, an ‘experiential understanding’ is needed to answer this: when one is attentive, one may notice that an emotion such as anxiety has arisen – this observation (as well as any resulting insight into its changing nature) has the capacity to subside the anxiety (change the anxiety). All this 'reveals' the mind – promoting wisdom and understanding.
Additionally ‘faith’ in Buddhism is not blind faith– it can be compared to the ‘faith’ needed to take a course in a subject like astronomy. In Buddhism, as one sharpens one’s mindfulness ability, the more one will understand and one’s faith increases.
I could write more, but I think this is a very misleading book, especially considering that he seems to only have an intellectual understanding of Buddhism.
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Bob Woodley
May 26, 2021Bob Woodley rated it really liked it
Shelves: religion-philosophy
It is a pleasure to read someone so smart, well-read and articulate challenge subtle philosophical problems at the foundation of Buddhism.
Taking aim at Buddhism is like taking aim at Western philosophy. It is as vast and has many sub-schools and lineages. It is not one thing. So Thompson is really talking about Buddhist modernism, by which he means the recent movement that claims that Buddhism is a "Science of The Mind". Pulling arguments from neuroscience and philosophical sources modern and ancient he constructs rebuttals of cherry-picked positions of this strawman (Buddhist modernism) that he has constructed.
So what's the point? Only that some would-be Buddhists might be confused. But it is not his arguments that will confuse but rather than his choice of tools. Once you admit that neuroscience has anything to say about metaphysical topics like whether there is a self, you're already in a cloud of darkness and confusion. Spiritual philosophers should heed Ramakrishna who said "One is likely to lose consciousness by contemplating material things too much." (paraphrased). In this context it means if you try to mix unconscious materialism (science) with spiritual topics you lose consciousness and won't achieve insight.
So at the end of the day, Thompson is a materialist (but so is almost everyone) so his arguments often just create darkness. But he is one smart dude. It is rare to read something this good. He is really sharp and conversant with both modern thought (philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience) as well as historical commentaries on Buddhism, Vedanta and others. Enjoy the ride, broaden your knowledge, but don't expect to learn if Buddhism is 'true'.
Also, he has met many of the people now active in Buddhism, so his bio and recollections are fun too.
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Nikko
Jan 10, 2022Nikko added it
Shelves: dharma
Despite the title, which put me off reading it for a while, this is a worthwhile book. It is not a tirade against Buddhism; rather, it is an attack on Buddhist Modernism and the critique is one that is well-laid out. While I enjoyed and got more out of reading The Making of Buddhist Modernism, this is an articulate presentation of the many problems with Buddhist modernism.
There are many things about the book I did not like - his binary that one is either a Buddhist modernist full of contradictions or you have to live in a Buddhist monastery. The lenses of science and philosophy also give off the feeling of outsiders poking at something they do not totally understand (though the author certainly knows his stuff). The discussions of self vs. not self will be of interest to some, though were not that interesting to me.
But his dissection of modernist views is an important topic that self-identifying Buddhists would do well to consider. Here is a full review in Lions Roar: https://www.lionsroar.com/the-problem...
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Pete Walton
Jun 09, 2021Pete Walton rated it really liked it
Loved seeing a clear philosophical framing to the multi-faceted and complex issues facing modern Buddhism. Provides well reasoned arguments against Buddhism as a science, but allows for a way to benefit form its deep introspective insights.
One of the highlights was how he opened up the cultural context of Buddhism’s roots, and how it shouldn’t be looked at in isolation. Hinduism, Jainism, and other South Asian traditions offered compelling dialogues on many of the principals we ascribe to Buddhism. To look at only the Buddhist part of the dialogue is to miss the conversation.
With that said, I did find he was a bit too dismissive of the benefits of modern Buddhist practice. Having religious faith is not a requirement for achieving a greater understanding of the mind via the Buddhist methods. By talking to folks who have practiced, you can see how they materially benefited. The direct accessibility without dogmatic belief is a legitimate advantage to modern Buddhism and I think he is too quick to pass over this.
Overall, very stimulating read, great critiques, and a good way to challenge how we think of Buddhism! (less)
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Chris Middleman
Aug 11, 2020Chris Middleman rated it liked it
Shelves: nonfiction
A necessary book challenging concepts taken for granted in any number of Western dharma centers you’d walk into.
Does science “prove” the Dharma to be worthy of elevation over other spiritual traditions? Is the “unconditioned mind” not just a different, maybe useful, kind of conditioning? What’s wrong with treating Buddhism as a religion rather than trying to validate it through some other, more culturally prestigious means?
Thompson’s arguments absolutely need to be entertained by practitioners. I just wish the text was a little more of a joy to read. (less)
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Alex Thompson
Jan 04, 2021Alex Thompson rated it really liked it · review of another edition
Good. Could have been shorter
Its worth a read for the different viewpoints he puts out. However I will say that I wish it were a bit more succinct. There seemed to be a lot of rehashing of points that were already made. The rehashing seemed to weaken the thrust of the chapter as the author gives you fifty ideas to chew on without clarity of focus. His main focus for the book is that Buddhist modernism (a phenomenon he specifies in detail) is theoretically inconsistent. At the end of the book I would have to say I agree. (less)
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Javier Ormeno
May 11, 2020Javier Ormeno rated it really liked it
Shelves: philosophy, body, buddhism
I just finished reading this book by Evan Thompson, who is very dear to me due to his previous writings. There are various debates about how to understand Buddhism and science, and how to approach to Buddhist and meditation practice in a critical manner. My take of the book was this and this is the reason I would recommend it to practitioners of meditation, Buddhism and religion in general.
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