Showing posts with label Ibn Arabi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ibn Arabi. Show all posts

2022/05/03

Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P2.Ch02 II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction


Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics



In the preceding chapter I indicated in a preliminary way the possi-
bility of there being a very strong connection between Taoist
philosophy and shamanism. 

I suggested that the thought or world-
view of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu may perhaps be best studied
against the background of the age-old tradition of the shamanic
spirit in ancient China. 

The present chapter will be devoted to a
more detailed discussion of this problem, namely, the shamanic
background of Taoist philosophy as represented by the Tao Tê
Ching and Chuang-tzü.

In fact, throughout the long history of Chinese thought there runs
what might properly be called a 'shamanic mode of thinking'. We
observe this specific mode of thinking manifesting itself in diverse
forms and on various levels in accordance with the particular cir-
cumstances of time and place, sometimes in a popular, fan tas tic
form, often going to the limit of superstition and obscenity, and
sometimes in an intellectually refined and logically elaborated form.

We observe also that this mode of thinking stands in sharp contrast
to the realistic and rationalistic mode of thinking as represented by
the austere ethical world-view of Confucius and his followers.

Briefly stated, I consider the Taoist world-view of Lao-tzu and
Chuang-tzu as a philosophical elaboration or culmination of this
shamanic mode of thinking; as, in other words, 
a particular form of philosophy which grew out of the persona! existential experience peculiar to persons endowed with the capacity of seeing things on a
supra-sensible plane of consciousness through an ecstatic encounter
with the Absolute and through the archetypal images emerging out
of it.
The Taoist philosophers who produced works like the Tao Tê
Ching and Chuang-tzü were 'shamans' on the one hand, as far as
concerns the experiential basis of their world-vision, 
but they were on the other, intellectual thinkers who, not content to remain on the primitive level of popular shamanism, exercised their intellect in
order to elevate and elaborate their original vision into a system of
metaphysical concepts designed to expIain the very structure of Being.

[301]

Lao-tzu talks about shêng-jên 1 or the 'sacred man'. It is one of the
key-concepts of his philosophical world-view, and as such plays an
exceedingly important rôle in his thought. The 'sacred man' is a man
who has attained to the highest stage of the intuition of the Way, to
the extent of being completely unified with it, and who behaves
accordingly in this world following the dictates of the Way that he
feels active in himself. He is, in brief, a human embodiment of the
Way. In exactly the same sense, Chuang-tzu speaks of chên-jên2 or
the 'true man', chih-jên3 or the 'ultimate man', shên-jên4 or the
'divine (or super-human) man'. The man designated by these vari-
ous words is in reality nothing other than a philosophical shaman, or
a shaman whose visionary intuition of the world has been refined
and elaborated into a philosophical vision of Being.

That the underlying concept has historically a close connection
with shamanism is revealed by the etymological meaning of the
word shêng here translated as 'sacred'. The Shuo Wên Chieh Tzü,
the oldest etymological dictionary ( compiled in 100 A.D.), in its
explanation of the etymological structure of this word states: 'Shêng
designates a man whose orifices of the ears are extraordinarily
receptive' .5 

In other words, the term designates a man, endowed
with an unusually keen ear, who is capable of hearing the voice of a
super-natural being, god or spirit, and understands directly the will
or intention of the latter. In the concrete historical circumstances of
the ancient Yin Dynasty, such a man can be no other than a divine
priest professionally engaged in divination.
It is interesting to remark in this connection that in the Tao Tê
Ching the 'sacred man' is spoken of as the supreme ruler of astate,
or 'king', and that this equation (Saint= King) is made as if it were a
matter of common sense, something to be taken for granted. We
must keep in mind that in the Yin Dynasty6 shamanism was deeply
related to poli tics. In that dynasty, the civil officiais of the higher
ranks who possessed and exercised a tremendous power over the
administration of the state were all originally shamans. And in the
earliest periods of the same dynasty, the Grand Shaman was the
high priest-vizier, or even the king himself.7

This would seem to indicate that behind the 'sacred man' as the
Taoist ideal of the Perfect Man there is hidden the image of a
shaman, and that under the surface of the metaphysical world-view
of Taoism there is perceivable a shamanic cosmology going back to
the most ancient times of Chinese history.

For the immediate purposes of the present study, we do not have to
go into a detailed theoretical discussion of the concept of shaman-
ism.8 We may be content with defining it in a provisional way by
saying that it is a phenomenon in which an inspired seer in a state of
ecstasy communes with supernatural beings, gods or spirits. As is
well known, a man who has a natural capacity of this kind tends to
serve in a primitive society as an intermediary between his tribes-
men and the unseen world. 

As one of the most typical features of the shamanic mentality we
shall consider first of all the phenomenon of mythopoiesis. 
Shamans are by definition men who, in their ecstatic-archetypal visions per-
ceive things which are totally different from what ordinary people
see in their normal states through their sensible experiences, and

this naturally tends to induce the shamans to interpret and structuralize the world itself quite differently from ordinary people. That which characterizes their reality experience in the most remarkable way is that things appear to their 'imaginai' consciousness in symbolic and mythical forms. The world which a shaman sees in the state of trance is a world of 'creative imagination', as Henry Corbin
has aptly named it, however crude it may still be. On this level of
consciousness, the things we perceive around us leave their natural,
common-sense mode of existence and transform themselves into images and symbols. And those images, when they become systematized and ordered according to the patterns of development which are inherent in them, tend to produce a mythical cosmology.

The shamanic tradition in ancient China did produce such a
cosmology. In the Elegies of Ch'u to which reference was made in
the preceding chapter, we can trace almost step by step and in a very
concrete form the actual process by which the shamanic experience
of reality produces a peculiar, 'imaginai' cosmology. And by com-
paring, further, the Elegies ofCh'u with a book like Huai Nan Tzu, 9

we can observe the most intimate relationship that exists between
the shamanic cosmology and Taoist metaphysics. There one seessur
le vif how the mythical world-view represented by the former
develops and is transformed into the ontology of the Way.
Another fact which seems to confirm the existence of a close
relationship, both essential and historical, between the Taoist
metaphysics and the shamanic vision of the world is found in the
history of Taoism after the Warring States period. In fact, the
development of Taoism, after having reached its philosophical
zenith with Lao-tzii and Chuang-tzii, goes on steadily describing a
curve of 'degeneration' - as it is generally called - even under a
strong influence of the Tao Tê Ching and Chuang-tzu, and returns to
its original mythopoeic form, revealing thereby its shamanic basis,
until it reaches in the Later Han Dynasty a stage at which Taoism
becomes almost synonymous with superstition, magic and witch-
craft. The outward structure of Taoist metaphysics itself discloses
almost no palpable trace of its shamanic background, but in the
philosophical description of the tao by Lao-tzii, for instance, there is
undeniably something uncanny and uncouth that would seem to be
indicative of its original connection with shamanism.303

Lao-tzii depicts, as we shall see later in more detail, the Way (tao) as
Something shadowy and dark, prior to the existence of Heaven and
Earth, unknown and unknowable, impenetrable and intangible to
the degree of only being properly described as Non-Being, and yet
pregnant with forms, images and things, which lie latent in the midst
of its primordial obscurity. The metaphysical Way thus depicted has
an interesting counterpart in the popular mythopoeic imagination

as represented by Shan Hai Ching, 10 in which it appears in a fantas-
tic form.

Three hundred and fifty miles further to the West there is a mountain
called Heaven Mountain. The mountain produces much gold and
jade. lt produces also blue sulphide. And the River Ying takes its rise
therefrom and wanders southwestward until it runs into the Valley of
Boiling Water. Now in this mountain there lives a Divine Bird whose
body is like a yellow sack, red as burning tire, who has six legs and
four wings. lt is strangely amorphous, having no face, no eyes, but it is
very good at singing and dancing. In reality, this Bird is no other than
the god Chiang.
In the passage here quoted, two things attract our attention. One is
the fact that the monster-bird is described as being good at singing
and dancing. The relevance of this point to the particular problem
we are now discussing will immediately be understood if one
remembers that 'singing and dancing', i.e., ritual dance, invariably
accompanies the phenomenon of shamanism. Dancing in ancient
China was a powerful means of seeking for the divine Will, of
inducing the state of ecstasy in men, and of 'calling down' spirits
from the invisible world. The above-mentioned dictionary, Shuo
Wên, defines the word wu (shaman) as 'a woman who is naturally fit
for serving the formless (i.e., invisible beings) and who, by means of
dancing call down spirits' .11 It is interesting that the same dictionary
explains the character itself which represents this word, IB , by
saying that it pictures a woman dancing with two long sleeves
hanging down on the right and the left. In the still earlier stage of its
development, 12 it represents the figure of a shaman holding up jade
with two hands in front of a spirit or god.
It is also significant that the monster is'said to be a bird, which is
most probably an indication that the shamanic dancing here in
question was some kind of feather-dance in which the shaman was
ritually ornamented with a feathered headdress.
The second point to be noticed in the above-given passage from
the Shan Hai Ching - and this point is of far greater relevance to the
==
present study than the first - is the particular expression used in the

description of the monster's visage, hun tun, 13 which 1 have provi-
sionally translated above as 'strangely amorphous'. lt means a

chaotic state of things, an amorphous state where nothing is clearly
delineated, nothing is clearly distinguishable, but which is far from
being sheer non-being; it is, on the contrary, an extremely obscure
'presence' in which the existence of something - or some things, still
undifferentiated - is vaguely and dimly sensed.
The relation between this word as used in this passage and
Chuang-tzu's allegory of the divine Emperor Hun Tun has been

noticed long ago by philologists of the Ch'ing dynasty. The com-
mentator of the Shan Hai Ching, Pi Yüan, for instance, explicitly

connects this description of the monster with the featureless face of
the Emperor Hun Tun.
The allegory given by Chuang-tzu reads as follows:' 4
The Emperor of the South Sea was called Shu, the Emperor of the
North Sea was called Hu, 15 and the Emperor of the central domain
was called Hun Tun. 16 Once, Shu and Hu met in the domain of Hun
Tun, who treated both of them very well. Thereupon, Shu and Hu
deliberated together over the way in which they might possibly repay
his goodness.
'All men', they said, 'are possessed of seven orifices for seeing,
hearing, eating, and breathing. But this one (i.e., Hun Tun) alone
does not possess any (orifice). Come, let us bore some for him.'
They went on boring one orifice every day, until on the seventh day
Hun Tun died.

This story describes in symbolic terms the destructive effect exer-
cised by the essentialist type of philosophy on the Reality. lt is a

merciless denunciation of this type of philosophy on behalf of a
peculiar form of existentialist philosophy which, as we shall see
later, Chuang-tzu was eager to uphold. Shu and Hu, symbolizing the
precariousness of human existence, met in the central domain of
Hun Tun; they were very kindly treated and they became happy for
a brief period of time as their names themselves indicate. This event
would seem to symbolize the human intellect stepping into the
domain of the supra-sensible world of 'un-differentiation', the
Absolute, and finding a momentary felicity there - the ecstasy of a
mystical intuition of Being, which, regrettably, lasts but for a short
time. Encouraged by this experience, the human intellect, or
Reason, tries to bore holes in the Absolu te, that is to say, tries to
mark distinctions and bring out to actuality all the forms that have
remained latent in the original undifferentiation. The result of

'boring' is nothing but the philosophy of Names (ming) as rep-
resented by Confucius and his school, an essentialist philosophy,

where all things are clearly marked, delineated, and sharply disting-
From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics 305 uished from one another ori the ontological level of essences. But the moment orifices were bored in Hun Tun's face, he died. This means that the Absolu te can be brought into the grasp of Reason by 'essential' distinctions being made in the reality of the Absolute, and becomes thereby something understandable; but the moment it becomes understandable to Reason, the Absolute dies. lt is not time yet for us to go into the details of the existentialist position taken by Chuang-tzu. 1 simply wanted to show by this example how closely the shamanic mythopoeic imagination was originally related with the birth of Taoist philosophy, and yet, at the same time, how far removed the latter was in its philosophical import from the former. This sense of distance between shamanism and philosophy may be alleviated to a considerable extent if we place between the two terms of the relation the cosmogonical story - a product of the mythopoeic mentality - which purports to explain how Heaven and Earth came into being. lt is not exactly a 'story'; it is a 'theory' and is meant to be one. lt is a result of a serious attempt to describe and explain theoretically the very origin of the world of Being and the process by which all things in the world have corne to acquire the forms with which we are now familiar. The cosmogony constitutes in this sense the middle term - structurally, if not historically - between the crude shamanic myth and the highly developed metaphysics of the Way. Here we give in translation the cosmogony as formulated in the above-mentioned Huai Nan Tzü: 11 Heaven and Earth had no form yet. lt was astate of formless ftuidity; nothing stable, nothing definite. This state is called the Great Begin- ning. The Great Beginning produced 18 a spotless void. The spotless void produced the Cosmos. The Cosmos produced (the all- pervading) vital energy. 19 The vital energy had in itself distinctions. That which was limpid and light went up hovering in thin layers to form Heaven, while that which was heavy and turbid coagulated and became Earth. The coming together of limpid and fine elements is naturally easy, while the coagulation of heavy and turbid elements is difficult to occur. For this reason, Heaven was the first to be formed, then Earth became established. Heaven and Earth gathered together the finer elements of their vital energy to form the principles of Negative (Yin) and Positive (Yang), and the Negative and Positive gathered together the finer elements of their vital energy to constitute the four seasons. The four seasons scattered their vital energy to bring into being the ten thousand things. The calorie energy of the Positive principle, having been accumulated, gave birth to fire, and the essence of the energy of fire became the sun. The energy of coldness peculiar to the Negative principle, having been accumulated became water, and the essence of
===
the energy of water became the moon. The overflow of the sun and
the moon, having become refined, turned into stars and planets.
Heaven received the sun, moon, stars, and planets. Earth received
water, puddles, dust, and soil.

In the passage her quoted we encounter again that undifferen-
tiated, featureless Something, the primordial Chaos, this time as a

cosmogonie principle or the Great Beginning, representing the state
of affairs before the creation of the world. The Great Beginning is
certainly different from the mythical monster of the Shan Hai Ching
and the metaphysical principle of the Tao Tê Ching. But it is evident
at the same time that these three are but different 'phenomena' of
one and the same thing.
Similarly in a different passage20 in the same book we read:
Long long ago, when Heaven and Earth were still non-existent, there
were no definite figures, no definite forms. Mysteriously profound,

opaque and dark: nothing was distinguishable, nothing was fathom-
able; limitlessly remote, vast and void; nobody would have discerned

its gate.
Then there were born together two divinities, and they began to rule
Heaven and to govern Earth. lnfinitely deep (was Heaven), and no
one knew where it came to a limit. Vastly extensive (was Earth), and
no one knew where it ceased.
Thereupon (Being) divided itself into the Negative and the Positive,
which, then, separated into the eight cardinal directions.
The hard and the soft complemented each other, and as a result the
ten thousand things acquired their definite forms. The gross and
confused elements of the vital energy produced animais (including
beasts, birds, reptiles and fish). The finer vital energy produced man.
This is the reason why the spiritual properly belongs to Heaven, while
the bodily belongs to Earth.
Historically speaking, this and similar cosmogonical theories seem

to have been considerably inflùenced by Taoism and its metaphys-
ics. Structurally, however, they furnish a connecting link between

myth and philosophy, pertaining as they do to both of them and yet
differing from them in spirit and structure. The cosmogony discloses
to our eyes in this sense the mythopoeic background of the
metaphysics of the Way as formulated by Lao-tzii and Chuang-tzii.
In a similar fashion, we can bring to light the subjective - i.e.,
epistemological - aspect of the relationship between shamanism
and Taoist philosophy by comparing the above-mentioned Elegies
of Ch'u and the books of Lao-tzii and Chuang-tzii. The possibility of
obtaining an interesting result from a comparative study of Ch'ü
Yüan, the great shaman-poet of the state of Ch'u, and the

From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics 307
philosophers of Taoism was noted long ago by Henri Maspero,21
although death prevented him from fully developing his idea.
ln the Li Sao22 and the Yüan Yu, 23 the shaman-poet describes in
detail the process of visionary states through which a soul in an
ecstatic state, helped and assisted by various gods and spirits,
ascends to the heavenly city where the 'etemal beings' live. This is in
reality nothing but a description of a shamanic unio mystica. And
the shamanic ascension is paralleled by a visionary ascension of a
similar structure in the Chuang-tzu, the only essential difference
between the two being that in the latter case the experience of the
spiritual joumey is refined and elaborated into the form of a
metaphysical contemplation. Just as the shaman-poet experiences
in his ecstatic oblivion of the ego a kind of immortality and eternity,
so the Taoist philosopher experiences immortality and 'long life' in
the midst of the etemal Way, by being unified with it. lt is interesting
to notice in this respect that the poet says in the final stage of his
spiritual experience that he 'transcends the Non-Doing,24 reaches

the primordial Purity, and stands side by si de with the Great Begin-
ning' .25 In Taoist terminology, we would say that the poet at this

stage 'stands side by side with the Way', that is, 'is completely
unified with the Way', there being no discrepancy between them.
In the Li Sao the poet does not ascend to such a height. Standing
on the basic assumption that both the Li Sao and Yüan Yu are
authentic works of Ch'ü Yüan, Maspero remarks that the Li Sao
represents an earlier stage in the spiritual development of the poet,
at which he, as a shaman, has not yet attained to the final goal,
whereas the Yüan Yu represents a later stage at which the poet 'has
already reached the extremity of mysticism'.
Such an interpretation is of course untenable if we know for
certain that the Yüan Yu is a work composed by a later poet and
surreptitiously attributed to Ch'ü Yüan. In any case, the poem in its

actual form is markedly Taoistic, and some of the ideas are undeni-
ably borrowings from Lao-tzii and Chuang-tzii. Here again,

however, the problem of authenticity is by no means a matter of
primary importance tous. For even if we admit that the poem - or
some parts of - it is a Han Dynasty forgery, it remains true that the
very fact that Taoist metaphysics could be so naturally transformed
- or brought back - into a shamanic world-vision is itself a proof
of a real congeniality that existed between shamanism and
Taoism.

A detailed analytic comparison between the Elegies of Ch'u and
the books of Lao-tzii and Chuang-tzii is sure to make an extremely
fruitful and rewarding work. But to do so will take us too far afield
beyond the main topic of the present study. Besides, we are going to
describe in detail in the first chapters of this book the philosophical
version of the spiritual journey which has just been mentioned. And
this must suffice us for our present purposes.308 

Let us now leave the problem of the shamanic origin of Taoism,
and turn to the purely philosophical aspects of the latter. Our main
concern will henceforward be exclusively with the actual structure
of Taoist metaphysics and its key-concepts.


Notes
1. IRA.
2. •A·
3. "'!P.A. i.e., a man who has attained to the furthest limit (of perfection).
4. 4if!A. We may note that this and the preceding words ail refer to one and the same
concept which is the Taoist counterpart of the concept of insân kâmil or the Perfect
Man, which we discussed in the first part of this study.
5. J: Miî::E§îJ.
6. Reference has been made in the preceding chapter to the possible historical
connection between the Yin dynasty and the spirit of the state of Ch'u.
7. For more details about the problem of the shaman ( (.JP; wu) representing the
highest administrative power in the non-secularized state in ancient China, see for
example Liang Ch' i Ch' ao: A History of Political Thought in the Periods Prior to the
Ch'in Dynasty 1923, Shanghai, Ch. II.
8. 1 would refer the reader to Mircea Eliade's basic work: Shamanism, Archaic
Techniques of Ecstasy, English tr., London, 1964.
9. lrltlîîTJ, an eclectic work compiled by thinkers of various schools who were
gathered by the king of Huai Nan, Liu An j!J'i(, at his court, in the second century B.C.
The book is of an eclectic nature, but its basic thought is that of the Taoist school.
1 O. one of the most important source-books for Chinese mythology, giving
a detailed description of ail kinds of mythological monsters living in mountains and
seas. The following quotation is taken from a new edition of the book,
(11$.li-*iUl), with a commentary by Pi Yüan of the Ch'ing dynasty,

Tai Pei, 1945, p. 57.
11.
12. The character it appears in the oracle-bones is: fR or /ti.
13. Plfi(. The word is written in the Chuang-tzu iaiflti.
14. Chapter VII entitled 'Fit to be Emperors and Kings', p. 309.
15. Bo th shu ( fl) and hu ( %!. ) lite rail y mean a brief span of time, symbolizing in this
allegory the precariousness of existence.
309
16. Important to note is the fact that hun tun, the' undifferentiation' is placed in the
center. It means that hun tun represents the true 'reality' of Being, bordering on both
sides on 'precariousness'. The philosophical implication of all this will be elucidated
in a later chapter.
17. lf'ltiîîî-J, III, T'ien Wên ::RXlllil.

18. The received text as it stands is apparently unintelligible. Following the emenda-
tion suggested by Wang Yin Chih ( 3:%Z) 1 read: l;J&B:kAHifH!f1Tf!IJri· ..... 1.

19. The' all-pervading vital energy' is a clumsy translation of the Chinese word ch'i
which plays an exceedingly important rôle in the history of Chinese thought. lt is a
'reality', proto-material and formless, which cannot be grasped by the senses. It is a
kind of vital force, a creative principle of ail things; it pervades the whole world, and
being immanent in everything, molds it and makes it grow into what it really is.
Everything that has a 'form', whether animate or inanimate, has a share in the ch'i.
The concept of ch'i has been studied by many scholars. As one of the most detailed
analytic studies of it we may mention Teikichi Hiraoka: A Study of Ch'i in Huai Nan
Tzu,Zf'IMJmii Tokyo 1969.
20. ibid., VII, mij]lj!itfll.
21. ibid., III.
22.
23. l:&i!J. Many scholars entertain serious doubts-with reason, 1 think - as to the
authenticity of this important and interesting work. Most probably it is a product of
the Han Dynasty (see #Jillflm nUU1îtt3l<litJ), composed in the very atmosphere of
a, fully developed philosophy of Taoism.
24. wu-wei one of the key-terms of Taoist philosophy, which we shall analyze
in a la ter passage. 'Non-Doing' means, in short, man's abandoning ail artificial,
unnatural effort to do something, and identifying himself completely with the activity
of Nature which is nothing other than the spontaneous self-manifestation of the Way
itself. Here the poet daims that at the final stage of his spiritual development he goes
even beyond the level of 'non-activity' and of being one with Nature, and steps

further into the very core of the Way. In his consciousness - or in his 'non-
consciousness', we should rather say





Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P2.Ch01 I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi
1 Dream and Reality
II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
III The Self-knowledge of Man
IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion
V Metaphysical Perplexity
VI The Shadow of the Absolute
VII The Divine Nam es
VIII Allah and the Lord
IX Ontological Mercy
X The Water of Life
XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute
XII Permanent Archetypes
XIII Creation
XIV Man as Microcosm
XV The Perfect Man as an Individual
XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reflection 

I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===


Ch 1. Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu


The book called Tao Tê Ching is now world-famous, and is being
widely read in the West in various translations as one of the most
important basic texts of Oriental Wisdom. It is generally - or
popularly, we should say - thought to be a philosophico-mystical
treatise written by an ancient Chinese sage called Lao-tzu, a senior
contemporary of Confucius. In more scholarly circles no one today
takes such a view.

In fact, since the Ch'ing Dynasty when the question of the author-
ship of the book was first raised in China, 1 it has been discussed by so
many people, it has provoked such an animated controversy not
only in China but in Japan, and even in the West, and so divergent
are the hypotheses which have been put forward, that we are left in
utter darkness as to whether the Tao Tê Ching is a work of an
individual thinker, or even whether a man called Lao-tzu ever
existed in reality. We are no longer in a position to assign a proper
chronological place to the book with full confidence.

For our particular purposes, the problem of authorship and the
authenticity of the work is merely of peripheral importance.
Whether or not there once existed as a historical person a sage
called Lao-tzu in the state of Ch'u, who lived more than one
hundred and sixty years,2 whether or not this sage really wrote the
Tao Tê Ching - these and similar questions, whether answered
affirmatively or negatively, do not affect at all the main contention
of the present work. What is of fondamental importance is the fact
that the thought is there, and that it has a very peculiar inner
structure which, if analyzed and understood in a proper way, will
provide an exceedingly interesting Chinese counterpart to the
'Unity of Existence' (walJ,dah al-wujüd) type of philosophy as rep-
resented by Ibn' Arabï in Islam. ·

Lao-tzu is a legendary, or at the very most, semi-legendary figure, of
whom it is an obvious understatement to say that nothing certain is
known tous. For, even on the assumption that there is an historical
core in his so-called biography, we must admit that the popular
imagination has woven round it such a fantastic tapestry of imposs-
ible events and unbelievable incidents that no one can ever hope to
disentangle the intricate web of legends, myths and focts.[288]

Even the most sober and most dependable of all Chinese his-
torians in ancient times, and the earliest to attempt a description of
Lao-tzu's life and adventures in his Book of History, 3 Ssu Ma Ch'ien
of the Han Dynasty (the beginning of the lst century B.C.), had to
be content with giving a very inconsistent and unsystematic narrative made up of a number of staries stemming from heterogeneous origins.

According to one of those legends, Lao-tzu was a native of the
state of Ch'u.4 He was an official of the royal Treasury of Chou,
when Confucius came to visit him. After the interview, Confucius is
related to have made the following remark to his disciples about
Lao-tzu. 'Birds fly, fishes swim, and animals run -this much 1 know
for certain. Moreover, the runner can be snared, the swimmer can
be hooked, and the flyer can be shot down by the arrow. But what
can we do with a dragon? We cannot even see how he mounts on
winds and clouds and rises to heaven. That Lao-tzu whom 1 met
to-day may probably be compared only to a dragon!'
The story makes Lao-tzu a senior contemporary of Confucius
(551-479 B.C.). This would naturally mean that Lao-tzu was a man
who lived in the 6th century B.C., which cannot possibly be a
historical fact.

Many arguments have been brought forward against the histori-
city of the narrative which we have just quoted. One of them is of
particular importance to us; it is concerned with examining this and
similar narratives philologically and in terms of the historical
development of philosophical thinking in ancient China. 

I shall give
here a typical example of this kind of philological argument.
Sokichi Tsuda in his well-known work, The Thought of the Taoist
School and its Development,5 subjects to a careful philological
examination the peculiar usage of some of the key technical terms in
the Tao Tê Ching, and arrives at the conclusion that the book must
be a product of a period after Mencius (372-289 B.C.). 

This would
imply of course that Lao-tzu - supposing that he did exist as a
historical person - was a man who came after Mencius.
Tsuda chooses as the yardstick of his judgment the expression
jen-i which is found in Chap. XVIII of the Tao Tê Ching,6 and which
is a compound of two words jen and i. These two words, jen
{'humaneness' with particular emphasis on 'benevolence') and i
('righteousness'), properly speaking, do not belong to the vocabul-
ary of Lao-tzu; they are key-terms of Confucianism. As represent-
ing two of the most basic human virtues, they play an exceedingly
important rôle in the ethical thought of Confucius himself.[289] 

But in the mouth of Confucius, they-remain two independent words; they
are not compounded into a semantic unit in the form of jen-i
corresponding almost to a single complex concept. The latter
phenomenon is observed only in post-Confucian times.

Tsuda points out that the thinker who first emphasized the con-
cept of jen-i is Mencius. This fact, together with the fact that in the
above-mentioned passage Lao-tzu uses the terms jen and i in this
compound form, would seem to suggest that the Tao Tê Ching, is a
product of a period in which the Confucian key-term jen-i has
already been firmly established, for the passage in question is most
evidently intended to be a conscious criticism of Confucian ethics.

Lao-tzu, in other words, could use the expression with such an
intention only because he had before his eyes Mencius and his
ethical theory.
Moreover, Tsuda goes on to remark, Mencius vehemently attacks
and denounces everything incompatible with Confucianism, but
nowhere does he show any conscious endeavour to criticize Lao-tzu
or Tao Tê Ching in spite of the fact that the teaching of the latter is
diametrically opposed to his own doctrine; he does not even men-
tion the name Lao-Tzü. This is irrefutable evidence for the thesis
that the Tao Tê Ching belongs to a period posterior to Mencius.
Since, on the other hand, its doctrines are explicitly criticized by
Hsün-tzü ( c. 315-236 B.C.), it cannot be posterior to the latter.
Thus, in conclusion, Tsuda assigns to the Tao Tê Ching a period
between Mencius and Hsün-tzu.

Although there are some problematic points in Tsuda's argument, he is, I think, on the whole right. In fact, there are a number of passages in the Tao Tê Ching which cannot be properly understood unless we place them against the background of a Confucian philosophy standing already on a very firm basis. 

And this, indeed, is the crux of the whole problem, 
at least for those to whom the thought itself of Lao-tzu is the major concern. 

The very famous opening lines of the Tao Tê Ching, for instance, 
in which the real Way and the real Name are mentioned in sharp contrast to an
ordinary 'way' and ordinary 'names' ,7 do not yield their true meaning except when we realize that 
what is meant by this ordinary 'way' is nothing but the proper ethical way of living as understood and taught by the school of Confucius, and that what is referred to by these ordinary 'names' are but the Confucian 'names', i.e., the highest ethical categories stabilized by means of definite 'names', i.e., key-terms.

The Tao Tê Ching contains, furthermore, a number of words and
phrases that are - seemingly at least - derived from various other
sources, like Mo-tzu, Yang Chu, Shang Yang, and even Chuang-
tzu, Shên Tao, and others.[290]  

And there are some scholars who, basing themselves on this observation, 
go farther than Tsuda and assert that the Tao Tê Ching belongs to a period after Chuang-tzu and Shên Tao. 
 Yang Jung Kuo, a contemporary scholar of Peking, to give one example, takes such a position in his History of Thought in Ancient China. 8

Some of these alleged 'references' to thinkers who have traditionally been considered later than Lao-tzu may very well be explained as due to the influence exercised by the Tao Tê Ching itself upon those thinkers who, in writing their books, may have 'borrowed' ideas and expressions from this book. 
Besides, we have to remember that the text of this book as we have it to-day has
evidently passed through a repeated process of editing, re-editing,
and re-arranging in the Han Dynasty. Many of the 'references' may
simply be later additions and interpolations.

Be this as it may, it has to be admitted that the Tao Tê Ching is a controversial work. And at least it is definitely certain that the formation of its thought presupposes the existence of the Confucian school of thought.

Turning now to another aspect of Lao-tzu, which is more important
for the purposes of the present work than chronology, we may begin
by observing that the Biography of Lao-tzu as given by Ssu Ma
Ch'ien in his Book of History makes Lao-tzu a man of Ch'u. 9 Thus
he writes in one passage, 'Lao-tzu was a native of the village Ch'ü
Jên, in Li Hsiang, in the province of K'u, in the state of Ch'u'. In
another passage he states that according to a different tradition,
there was a man called Lao Lai Tzu in the time of Confucius; that he
was a man of Ch'u, and produced fifteen books in which he talked
about the Way. Ssu Ma Ch'ien adds that this man may have been the
same as Lao-tzu.
All this may very well be a mere legend. And yet it is, in my view,
highly significant that the 'legend' connects the author of the Tao Tê
Ching with the state of Ch'u. This connection of Lao-tzu with the
southern state of Ch'u cannot be a mere coïncidence. For there is
something of the spirit of Ch'u running through the entire book. By
the 'spirit of Ch'u' 1 mean what may properly be called the shamanic
tendency of the mind or shamanic mode of thinking. Ch'u was a
large state lying on the southern periphery of the civilized Middle
Kingdom, a land of wild marches, rivers, forests and mountains, rich
in terms of nature but poor in terms of culture, inhabited by many
people of a non-Chinese origin with variegated, strange customs.
There all kinds of superstitious beliefs in supernatural beings and
spirits were rampant, and shamanic practices thrived. [291]
But this apparently primitive and 'uncivilized' atmosphere could
provide an ideal fostering ground for an extraordinary visionary
power of poetic imagination, as amply attested by the elegies writ-
ten by the greatest shaman-poet the state of Ch'u has ever pro-
duced, Ch'ü Yüan. 10 The same atmosphere could also produce a
very peculiar kind of metaphysical thinking. This is very probable
becausè the shamanic experience of reality is of such a nature that it
can be refined and elaborated into a high level of metaphysical
experience. In any case, the metaphysical depth of Lao-tzu's
thought can, 1 believe, be accounted for to a great extent by relating
it to the shamanic mentality of the ancient Chinese which can be
traced back to the oldest historie times and even beyond, and which
has flourished particularly in the southern part of China throughout
the long history of Chinese culture.

In this respect Henri Maspero11 is,1 think, basically right when he
takes exception to the traditional view that Taoism abruptly started
in the beginning of the fourth century B.C. as a mystical metaphys-
ics with Lao-tzu, was very much developed philosophically by 
Chuang-tzu toward the end of that century and vulgarized to a
considerable degree by Lieh-tzu and thenceforward went on the
way of corruption and degeneration until in the Later Han Dynasty
it was completely transformed into a jumble of superstition, anim-
ism, magic and sorcery. Against such a view, Maspero takes the
position that Taoism was a 'personal' religion - as contrasted with
the agricultural communal type of State religion which has nothing
to do with persona! salvation - going back to immemorial antiquity.

The school of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, he main tains, was a particu-
lar branch or se.ction within this wide religious movement, a particu-
lar branch characterized by a marked mystical-philosophical ten-
dency.

These observations would seem to lead us back once again to the
problem of the authorship of Tao Tê Ching and the historicity of
Lao-tzu. Is it at all imaginable that such a metaphysical refinement
of crude mysticism should have been achieved as a result of a
process of natural development, without active participation of
an individual thinker endowed with an unusual philosophical
genius? 1 do not think so. Primitive shamanism in ancient China
would have remained in its original crudity as a phenomenon of
popular religion characterized by ecstatic orgy and frantic 'posses-
sion', if it were not for a tremendous work of elaboration done in the
course of its history by men of unusual genius. Thus, in order to
produce the Elegies of Ch'u the primitive shamanic vision of the
world had to pass through the mind of a Ch'ü Yüan. Likewise, the
same shamanic world-vision could be elevated into the profound
metaphysics of the Way only by an individual philosophical genius.
292 

When we read the Tao Tê Ching with the preceding observation
in mind, we cannot but feel the breath, so to speak, of an extraordi-
nary man pervading the whole volume, the spirit of an unusual
philosopher pulsating throughout the book. With all the possible
later additions and interpolations, which I readily admit, I cannot
agree with the view that the Tao Tê Ching is a work of compilation
consisting of fragments of thought taken from various heterogene-
ous sources. For there is a certain fondamental unity which strikes
us everywhere in the book. And the unity is a persona! one. In fact,
the Tao Tê Ching as a whole is a unique piece of work distinctly
colored by the personality of one unusual man, a shaman-
philosopher. Does he not give us a self-portrait in part XX of the
book?

The multitude of men are blithe and cheerful as though they were
invited to a luxurious banquet, or as though they were going up a high
tower to enjoy the spring scenery.

1 alone remain silent and still, showing no sign of activity. Like a
new-born baby 1 am, that has not yet learnt to smile. Forlorn and
aimless 1 look, as if 1 had no place to return.

All men have more than enough. I alone seem to be vacant and blank.
Mine indeed is the mind of a stupid man! Dull and confused it is! The
vulgar people are all clever and bright, I alone am dark and obtuse.
The vulgar people are all quick and alert, I alone am blunt and tardy.
Like a deep ocean that undulates constantly 1 am, like a wind that
blows never to rest.

All others have some work to do, while 1 alone remain impractical I
and boorish. 1 alone am different from all others because 1 value
being f ed by the Mother .12

Similarly in another passage (LXVII), he says of himself:
Everybody under Heaven says that 11 3 am big, but look stupid. Yea, I
look stupid because I am big. If I were clever 1 would have diminished
long ago.

And again in LXX, we read:
My words are very easy to understand and very easy to practise. Yet
no one under Heaven understands them; no one puts them into ·
practice.

My words come out of a profound source, and my actions come out of
a high principle. But people do not understand it. Therefore they do
not understand me.

Those who understand me are rare. That precisely is the proof that 1
am precious. The sage, indeed, wears clothes of coarse cloth, but
carries within precious jade.  
The passages just quoted give a picture of a very original mind, an
image of a man who looks gloomy, stupid and clumsy, standing
aloof from the 'clever' people who spend their time in the petty
pleasures of life. He takes such an attitude because he is conscious
of himself as utterly different from ordinary men. The important
question we have to raise about this is: Whence does this difference
come? The Tao Tê Ching itself and the Chuang-tzu seem to give a
definite answer to this question. The man feels himself different
from others because he is conscious that he alone knows the real
meaning of existence. And this he knows due to his metaphysical
insight which is based on what Chuang-tzu calls tso wang 'sitting in
oblivion', that is, the experience of ecstatic union with the Absolute,
the Way. The man who stands behind the utterances which we have
quoted above is a philosopher-mystic, or a visionary shaman turned
into a philosopher.

It is highly significant for our specific purpose to note that the
spirit of a philosophically developed shamanism pervades the whole
of the Tao Tê Ching. It is, so to speak, a living persona! 'center'
round which are co-ordinated all the basic ideas that we find in the
book, whether the thought concerns the metaphysical structure of
the universe, the nature of man, the art of governing people, or the
practical ideal of life. And such an organic unity cannot be
explained except on the assumption that the book, far from being a
compilation made of fragmentary and disparate pieces of thought
picked up at random from here and there, is in the main the work of
a single author.

In studying a book like the Tao Tê Ching it is more important than
anything else to grasp this persona! unity underlying it as a whole,
and to pinpoint it as the center of co-ordination for all its basic ideas.
For, otherwise, we would not be in a position to penetrate the subtle
structure of the symbolism of the Tao Tê Ching and analyze with
precision the basic ideas of its metaphysics.
Turning from Lao-tzu to Chuang-tzu, we feel ourselves standing on
a far more solid ground. For, although we are no better informed
about his real life and identity, at least we know that we are dealing
with an historical person, who did exist in about the middle of the
fourth century B.C., as a contemporary of Mencius, the great
shaman-poet Ch'ü Yüan of Ch'u to whom reference has been made,
and the brilliant dialectician Hui Shih or Hui-tzu14 with whom he
himself was a good match in the mastery of the art of manipulating
logical concepts.

According to the account given by Ssu Ma Ch'ien in the above-
mentioned Book of History, Chuang-tzu or Chuang Chou15 was a
native of Mêng; 16 he was once an official.at Ch'i-Yüan in Mêng; he
had tremendous erudition, but his doctrine was essentially based on
the teachings of Lao-tzu; and his writing, which counted more than
100,000 words, was for the most part symbolic or allegorical.

It is significant that Mêng, which is mentioned by Ssu Ma Ch'ien
as Chuang-tzu's birthplace, is in present-day Ho Nan and was a
place in the ancient state of Sung.17 1 regard this as significant
because Sung was a country where the descendants of the ancient
Yin 18 people were allowed to live after having been conquered by
the Chou people. 19 There these descendants of the once-illustrious
people, despised by the conquerors as the 'conquered' and con-
stantly threatened and invaded by their neighbors, succeeded in
preserving the religious beliefs and legends of their ancestors. The
significance of this fact with regard to the thesis of the present study
will at once be realized if one but remembers the animistic-
shamanic spirit of Yin culture as manifested in its sacrificial cere-
monies and rites of divination as well as in the myths connected with
this dynasty. The people of Yin were traditionally famous for their
cuit of spirits and worship of the 'God-above'. From of old the
distinction between Yin and Chou was made by such a dictum as:
'Yin worships spirits while Chou places the highest value on human
culture.' 20

Quite independently of the observation of this historical relation
between the Yin Dynasty and the Sung people, Fung Yu Lang in his
History of Chinese Philosophy 21 points out - quite rightly, to my
mind - that the form of Chuang-tzu's thought is close to that of the
Ch'u people. 'We should keep in mind', he writes, 'the fact that the
state of Sung bordered Ch'u, making it quite possible that Chuang-
tzu was influenced on the one hand by Ch'u, and at the same time
was under the influence of the ideas of the Dialecticians. (Hui Shih,
it will be remembered, was a native of Sung.) Thus by using the
dialectics of the latter, he was able to put his soaring thoughts into
order, and formulate a unified philosophical system.'

Of the 'spirit of Ch'u' we have talked in an earlier passage in
connection with the basic structure of Lao-tzu's thought. Fung Yu
Lang compares the Elegies of Ch'u (Ch'u Tz'u) 22 with the Chuang-
tzu and observes a remarkable resemblance between the two in the
display of 'a richness of imagination and freeness of spirit'. But he
neglects to trace this resemblance down to its shamanic origin, so
that the 'richness of imagination and freeness of spirit' is left unex-
plained. However it may be, we shall refrain from going any further
into the details of this problem at this point, for much more will be
said in the following chapter.

The problem of the relationship between Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu
has been discussed at length by philologists. As we have already
observed the major doctrines of Chuang-tzu have traditionally been
regarded as being based upon the teachings of Lao-tzu. On this
view, Lao-tzu of course was a predecessor of Chuang-tzu in Taoist
philosophy; the main lines of thought had been laid down by the
former, and the latter simply took them over from him and
developed them in his own way into a grand-scale allegorical system
according to the dicta tes of his philosophical and literary ability.

This view seems to be a natural conclusion drawn from the observa-
tion of the following two facts: ( 1) the existence of an undeniable
inner connection between the two in the very structure of their
world-view and their mystical way of thinking; (2) Chuang-tzu
himself often mentioning Lao-tzu as one of the earlier Taoist sages,
and the expressions used being in some places almost the same.
The matter, however, is notas simple as it looks at the first glance.
In fact serious questions have been raised in modern times about
this problem. The Tao Tê Ching itself, to begin with, is nowhere
referred to in the Chuang-tzu, although Lao-tzu, as a legendary
figure, appears in its pages, and his ideas are mentioned. But this
latter fact proves almost nothing conclusively, for we know that
many of the persons who are made to play important rôles in the
Chuang-tzu are simply fictitious. Similarities in language may easily
be explained away as the result either of later interpolations in the
Tao Të Ching itself, or as going back to common sources.

Yang Jung Kuo, to whom reference has been made earlier, may
be mentioned as a representative present-day scholar who not only
doubts Lao-tzu's having been a predecessor of Chuang-tzu, but
goes a step further and completely reverses the chronological order.
In an interesting chapter of his above-mentioned book, History of
Thought in Ancient China,23 he decidedly takes the position that
Chuang-tzu was nota disciple of Lao-tzu; that, on the contrary, the
latter - or, to be more exact, the Tao Të Ching - was nothing other
than a continuation and further development of the Chuang-tzü.
And the way he defends his position is strictly philological; he tries
to prove his position through an examination of some of the key-
concepts common to Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. And he concludes
that the Tao Tê Ching presupposes the prior existence of the
Chuang-tzü. For instance, the most important of ail key-concepts of
Taoism, tao (Wag) as the cosmic principle of natural growth, or
Nature, is in the Chuang-tzü not yet fully developed in its inner
structure. The concept is already there, he says, but it is as yet a
mere beginning. The Tao Tê Ching takes over this concept at this
precise point and elaborates it into an absolute principle, the abso-
lutely unknowable Source, which is pre-eternal24 and from which
emanate all things. 25 And Yang Jung Kuo thinks that this historical
relation between the two - Chuang-tzü being the initial point and
Lao-tzu representing the culmination - is observable throughout
the whole structure of Taoist philosophy.

This argument, highly interesting though it is, is not conclusive.

For the key-concepts in question allow of an equally justifiable
explanation in terms of a process of development running from
Lao-tzu to Chuang-tzu. As regards the metaphysics of tao, for
instance, we have to keep in mind that Lao-tzu gives only the
result, a definitely established monistic system of archetypal ima-
gery whose center is constituted by the absolu te Absolute, tao, which
develops stage after stage by its own 'natural' creative activity down
to the world of multiplicity. This ontology, as I have pointed out
before, is understandable only on the assumption that it stands on
the basis of an ecstatic or mystical experience of Existence. Lao-tzu,
however, does not disclose this experiential aspect of bis world-view
except through vague, symbolic hints and suggestions. This is the
reason why the Tao Tê Ching tends to produce an impression of
being a philosophical elaboration of something which precedes it.
That 'something which precedes it', however, may not necessarily
be something taken over from others.

Chuang-tzu, on the other band, is interested precisely in this
experiential aspect of Taoist mysticism which Lao-tzu leaves
untouched. He is not mainly concerned with constructing a
metaphysics of a cosmic scale ranging from the ultimate Unknow-
able down to the concrete world of variegated colors and forms. His
chief concern is with the peculiar kind of' experience' itself by which
one penetrates the mystery of Existence. He tries to depict in detail,
sometimes allegorically, sometimes theoretically, the very
psychological or spiritual process through which one becomes more
and more 'illumined' and goes on approaching the real structure of
reality hidden behind the veil of sensible experience.

His attitude is, in comparison with Lao-tzu, epistemological,
rather than metaphysical. And this difference separates these two
thinkers most fundamentally, although they share a common inter-
est in the practical effects that corne out of the supra-sensible
experience of the Way. The same difference may also be formulated
in terms of upward movement and downward movement. Lao-tzu
tries to describe metaphysically how the absolute Absolute
develops naturally into One, and how the One develops into Two,
and the Two into Three, and the Three into 'ten thousand things' .26
It is mainly a description of an ontological - or emanational -
movement downward, though he emphasizes also the importance of
the concept of Return, i.e., the returning process of all things back
to their origin. Chuang-tzu is interested in describing epistemologi-
cally the rising movement of the human mind from the world of
multiplicity and diversity up to the ontological plane where all
distinctions become merged into One.

Because of this particular emphasis on the epistemological aspect
of the experience of the tao, Chuang-tzu does not take the trouble of
developing the concept itself of tao as a philosophical system. 

This is
why bis metaphysics of tao appears imperf ect, or imperfectly
developed. This, however, does not necessarily mean that he rep-
resents chronologically an earlier stage than Lao-tzu. For, as we
have just seen, the difference between them may very well be only
the difference of emphasis.

Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch17XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu
Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi
1 Dream and Reality
II The Absolute in its Absoluteness
III The Self-knowledge of Man
IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion
V Metaphysical Perplexity
VI The Shadow of the Absolute
VII The Divine Nam es
VIII Allah and the Lord
IX Ontological Mercy
X The Water of Life
XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute
XII Permanent Archetypes
XIII Creation
XIV Man as Microcosm
XV The Perfect Man as an Individual
XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint
XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu
II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics
III Dream and Reality
IV Beyond This and That
V The Birth of a New Ego
VI Against Essentialism
VII The Way
VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders
IX Determinism and Freedom
X Absolute Reversai of Values
XI The Perfect Man
XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries
II The Inner Transformation of Man
III The Multistratified Structure of Reality
IV Essence and Existence
V The Self-evolvement of Existence
===

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect
Man

Ibn 'Arabi recognizes in the Perfect Man a particular kind of magi-
cal power. This is hardly to be wondered at, because the Perfect

Man, as a 'knower' ('arif), is by definition a man with an unusually

developed spiritual power. His mind naturally shows an extraordi-
nary activity.

This extraordinary power is known as himmah, meaning a con-
centrated spiritual energy. According to Ibn' Arabi, a 'knower' can,

if he likes, affect any abject by merely concentrating all his spiritual
energy upon it; he can even bring into existence a thing which is not
actually existent. In brief, a 'knower' is able to subjugate anything to
his will. He is endowed with the power of taskhir. 1
The word taskhir reminds us of King Salomon. It is widely known

and accepted in Islam that Salomon was in possession of a super-
natural power by which he could dominate Nature and move it at

will. He could, for instance, cause winds to blow in whatever direc-
tion he wished. He is said to have been able to contrai at will

invisible beings.
According to Ibn 'Arabi, however, Salomon did not exercise his
contrai over Nature by his himmah. In this respect, Salomon
occupies a very special place. It was a special favor of God granted
to him in a peculiar way. For, in order to work miracles, he did not
have to have recourse to the particular concentration of mind
known as himmah. He had only to 'command' ( amr). Whatever was
commanded by him to do anything, moved immediately as it was
commanded. This kind of taskhir is, in the judgment of Ibn' Arabi, a
degree higher than the taskhir by himmah, because the former is a
direct working upon the abject.
The taskhïr which was peculiar to Solomon, which made him superior
to others, and which God had given him as (an essential) part of the
kingship never to be given to anybody after him - this taskhïr was
characterized by its being exercised by his 'command'. God says:
'Thus have We subjugated to him (i.e., Solomon) the wind so that it
might blow by his command (XXI, 81) (That which is really

lii1
11
1
11
1

276 Sufism and Taoism
characteristic of Solomon' s case) is not the simple fact that he could
exercise taskhir. For God says concerning ail of us without any
discrimination: 'And We have subjugated to you ail that are in
heaven and in earth' (XXXI, 20). Thus He speaks of having put
under our control winds, stars, and others. But (in our case) the
taskhir occurs not by our command, but by the Command of God. So
you will find by reflection that what was peculiar to Solomon was (not
the taskhïr itself) but in fact that (the taskhïr) could be exercised by
his own command. In order to do that, he did not need any mental
concentration or himmah; ail he had to do was to 'command'.
I mention this point specifically because we ail know that the things of
the world can be affected and influenced by a particular kind
of mental force when the latter happens to be in a heightened state of

concentration. I have witnessed this phenomenon in my own (mysti-
cal) life. Solomon, however, had only to pronounce the word of

command to anything he wanted to control, without there being any
need for himmah and concentration. 2

What kind of thing, then, is this spiritual concentration called him-
mah? It may be most easily understood if we try to conceive it on the

analogy of our ordinary experience of imagination. We can produce
in imagination anything we like, even things that are not existent in
the outside world. Such an imagined abject exists only within our
minds. In a somewhat similar way, a true 'knower' who has attained
to the stage of walayah is able to produce by his concentrated

spiritual power things that are not actually there, with this differ-
ence, however, that he produces the object in the outer world of

reality. This is obviously a kind of 'creation' (khalq). But it should
not be identified or confused with the Divine act of creation.
Anybody can create within his mind by means of his faculty of
imagination things that have no existence except in imagination
itself. This is a matter of common experience. But the 'knower'
creates by himmah things that do have existence outside the place of
the himmah (i.e., outside the mind).
(However, the object thus created by himmah continues to exist)
only as long as the himmah maintains it without being weakened by
the keeping of what it has created. As soon as the concentration
slackens and the mind of the 'knower' becomes distracted from the
keeping of what it has created, the object created disappears. This,
however, does not apply to those special cases in which a 'knower'
has obtained a firm control over ail the Presences ( ontological levels
of Being) so that his mind never loses sight of them ail at the same
time. In fact, the mind of such a man ( even if it loses sight of the
Presences, does not lose sight of ail together); there surely remains at
least one Presence present to his mind. 3
We must recall at this juncture the five Presences of Being to which
reference was made in the first chapter. The Presences are classified
variously. One of the classifications, to give an example of

The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 277
classification which is a little different from the one explained in the
first chapter, makes the whole world of Being consist of ( 1) the
Presence of the senses (i.e., the plane of the sensible experience),
(2) the Presence of Images-Exemplars, (3) the Presence of the
Spirits (arwah ), ( 4) the Presence of the Intellects ('uqül), and the
Presence of the Essence. But the way in which the Presences are
classified is not very important in the present context. What is of
primary importance is to know that the world of Being is structured
in terms of levels or planes and that these planes are related to each
other in an organic way. This means that anything that exists in the
plane of sensible experience, for instance, has a corresponding
existence also in the higher planes in a particular form peculiar to
each plane, so that ultimately it goes back to the very Essence of the
Absolute as its ontological ground.
Because of this particular structure of Being, the' knower' can, by
concentrating his entire spiritual energy upon an object on one of
the suprasensible levels, produce the object in a sensible form on
the level of concrete reality. Also by maintaining spiritually the
form of an object on a higher level he can maintain the forms of the
same object on the lower levels of Being.
But this spiritual 'creation' is essentially different from the Divine
Creation in one vital point. When, for example, the 'knower' has
produced by himmah an object in a sensible form, the object thus
'created' on the level of sensible experience continues to subsist on
that level only during the time in which he continues to maintain his
spiritual concentration. The moment his attention becomes less
keen by the effect of drowsiness or by a different idea occurring to
his mind, the object ceases to exist on the level of the senses.
However, Ibn' Arabi adds, in the case of the highest 'knower', his
spiritual power dominating all the basic five planes of Being, there is
always at least one level on which the spiritual concentration is
maintained even if his attention becomes less keen and less intense
on other levels. In such a case, the object 'created' may be preserved
for a long period of time.
By saying this, I have disdosed a secret which the people of God (i.e.,
mystics) have always jealously guarded themselves from revealing
for fear that something might corne to light which would contradict
their daim to the effect that they are the Absolute. (Against this
daim I have disdosed the fact that) the Absolute never becomes
forgetful of anything, white man must necessarily be always forgetful
of this particular thing or that.
Only as long as a man spiritually maintains what he has 'created', is he
in a position to say, 'I am the Creator!' (ana al-f}aqq). However, his
maintaining the 'created' object is entirely different from God's
maintaining. I have just explained the difference.

278 Sufism and Taoism
As long as he becomes forgetful of even one form and its ontological
level, man is to be distinguished from the Absolu te. He is naturally to
be distinguished from the Absolu te even if he main tains all the forms
(of an object on different levels) by maintaining one of the forms on
its proper level of which he happens to be unforgetful, because this is

after alla kind of'implicit' (tacf,ammun) maintaining. God's maintain-
ing what He has created is not like this; He maintains every form

'explicitly' (i.e., He maintains all forms of the thing, each on its
proper level individually).
This is a question which no one, as far as 1 know, has even written in
any book, neither myself nor others. This is the only and the first
book in which (the secret has been disclosed). The present work is in
this sense a unique pearl of the age. Keep this well in mind!
The particular level of Being4 to which the mind of the 'knower' is
kept present, being concentrated on the form (of an object which he
has created on that ontological level), may be compared to the 'Book'
of which God says: 'We have not neglected anything in the Book (of
Decrees)' (VI, 38), so that it comprehends both what has been
actualized and what has not yet been actualized. But what 1 say here
will never be understood except by those who are themselves the
'gathering' principle ( qur' iin). 5
Thus it has been clarified that a man who can gather his himmah in
such a comprehensive way is able to do so because he 'gathers'

together in his consciousness all the levels of Being into a com-
prehensive unity. Such a man stands closest to God, with the only

difference which has just been explained. The difference, in short,
results from the furqan. And precisely because of the furqan he is
essentially distinguished from God.
The important point, however, is that this 'separating' is not an
ordinary furqan. It is the highestfurqan (arfa' furqan) 1 because it is
a furqan after the 'gathering'. In the case of an ordinary man, the
'separating' which he exercises is a pre-fana' phenomenon; he has
not yet had any experience of 'self-annihilation', that is, he has not
yet 'tasted' his essential oneness with the Absolute. The 'separating'

he exercises in such a state is an absolute, unconditional 'separa-
tion'. He is absolutely and unconditionally 'separated' and distin-
guished' from the Absolute.

The 'knower', on the contrary, is a man who has already passed
through the experience of 'self-annihilation' and, consequently,
knows through personal experience his essential oneness with the
Absolu te. He knows it, and yet distinguishes in himself between the
'Divine aspect' (lahüt) and the 'human aspect' (nasüt), i.e., between
the Absolute and the creature. This 'separating' is not a mere

'separating'; it is a 'separating' of a higher order. And this corres-
ponds to what is generally known in Sufi terminology as 'self-
subsistence' (baqa').

The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 279
Now, if we consider in the light of this conception the idea of
himmah, we are led to the following understanding of it. The highest
'knower', while he is actually exercising his himmah, is in a certain

sense a 'creator' (khaliq); all the traces of his 'servant-ness' disap-
pear from his consciousness, and he feels 'Lordship' living and

acting in himself. He f eels himself to be a 'Lord', and has the clear

consciousness that everything in the whole world is under his con-
trai. This is the stage of 'gathering' (qur' an). However, this state is

but a temporary and unstable one, because if his mind slackens and
loses its highest intensity of concentration even for a moment, he
becomes immediately conscious of his 'impotence' ('ajz) and is
necessarily faced with his own 'servantness'. And this is the stage of
'separating' (furqan). 8
We must observe also that himmah is, in its practical aspect, a free
disposai of things (taskhir al-ashya'), while in its cognitive aspect it
is an extraordinary power to penetrate the secret of Being which lies
beyond the grasp of Reason. It is significant in this respect that Ibn
'Arabï in a passage of the declares that the true reality
(IJ,aqiqah) of Being can only be known by a 'servant endowed with

himmah'. Himmah consists essentially in that a 'knower' concen-
trates all his spiritual powers upon one single point and projects his

concentrated heart (qalb) toward a certain definite direction. This
act works in two different, but closely related, ways: (1) producing
something or some state of affairs in a place where such a thing or
state of affairs does not sensibly exist, and (2) tearing apart the veil
of Reason and bringing to light the reality lying behind it.
The supernatural power of himmah being as described, the next
question that naturally arises is: Does the 'knower', i.e., the Perfect
Man, work 'miracles' (karamat) as he likes?
According to the usual theory among Sufis, a 'knower' who has
reached the stage of 'saintship' is in a position to perform 'things
that go against the customs' (khawariq-al- 'adat), i.e., 'miracles'.
Such a man is usually represented as a kind of superman who,
projecting his spiritual power to anything and an y body, affects and
changes the abject at will.
Ibn' Arabï does not accept this view. In the Qoran, he argues, 10
we find the Divine words: 'God is He who creates you of weakness'
(XXX, 54). The very root of man's creation is 'weakness' (<J,a'f).
Man is essentially and naturally 'weak' (<J,a'ïf) and 'powerless'
('ajiz). He begins with the weakness of the infant and ends with the
weakness of the old man. Of course, as the Qoran verse itself
admits, 11 the child, as he grows into a man, acquires 'strength'
(quwwah) and becomes conscious of his own strength. But this,
after ail, is a transitory state. Soon he grows old and falls into

11
1

280 Sujism and Taoism

decrepitude. Besides, the 'strength' which he obtains in the inter-
mediary stage is but an 'accidentai strength' (quwwah 'ara<J,iyah).

Moreover, this accidentai strength is not something which he pro-
duces in himself, but is a result of God's 'putting'. In reality, he

shows strength only because he happens to be at that stage a locus of
theophany in which God manifests Himself under the Name
'Powerful' ( qawiy).
What is by essence strong is the Absolute alone; man is strong
only by accident. Ordinary men do not know this. Only the true
'knower' knows that the strength (including himmah) which he feels
in himself is not his own but God's.
And since he is conscious of this, the 'knower' knows also that it is
not right for him to try to exercise at will the power of himmah. Thus
he confides its exercise to the real owner of that power, and puts
himself in the original state of the 'absolute powerlessness' ('ajz
mutfaq).

Someone may say: 'What prevents (the highest 'knower') from exer-
cising his himmah that has a positive power to affect things? Since

such a power does exist even in those mystics who merely follow the
Apostles, the Apostles must be more appropriate to possess it'.
To this 1 will answer: 'You are certainly right. But you do not know

another important point. A true "knowledge" does not allow him-
mah to be freely exercised. And the higher the knowledge, the less

possibility there is for a free exercise of himmah'.
And this for two reasons. One is that such a man fully realizes his
state of 'servant-ness' and that he is always conscious of the original

ground of his own creation (which is the above-mentioned 'weak-
ness'). The other is the oneness of the subject who exercises himmah

and the object upon which it is exercised (for both are essentially and
ultimately the Absolute, nothing else), so that he does not know upon
whom to project his himmah. This prevents him from exercising
himmah. 12
Tuen Ibn' Arabi says 13 that another reason for which the 'knower'
refrains from working 'miracles' in the world is the knowledge
about the absolute determining power of the permanent
archetypes, which we have discussed in detail in an earlier chapter.
Suppose there is in the presence of the 'knower' a man who
disobeys the commands of the Apostle and thereby disobeys God.
Why does the 'knower' not exercise his himmah upon this man so
that he might be brought back to the right road? It is because
everything, every event in the world is in accordance with what has
been eternally determined in the form of an or
archetypes. The 'knower' knows that this ontological determination
can never be changed. In the eyes of a man who has penetrated into
the depth of the structure of Being, everything follows the track

The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 281
fixed by the very nature of Being, and nothing can deviate from it. In
the light of this knowledge, even a man disobedient to God is
walking along the God-determined way. And it is not in the power
of an Apostle to bring such a man back to the 'right road', because
the man is already on the 'right road'.

A certain Sufi of the highest rank once said to Mas ter 'Abd al-
Razzâq: Go and ask Master Abü Madyan, after salutations, 'O Abü

Madyan, why is it that nothing is impossible tous, while everything is
impossible to you? And yet here we are, aspiring to your spiritual
stage, while you do not care for our spiritual stage. Why?' 14
In fact, the situation was exactly like that (i.e., Abü Madyan really
showed signs of'powerlessness') in spite of the fact that Abü Madyan
had, beside this state (i.e. the state of 'powerlessness'), the other state
(i.e., that of free disposai of things by means of himmah).
We (i.e., Ibn' Arabi himself) are even more complete as regards the
state of 'weakness' and 'powerlessness'. But ( even though Abü

Madyan did not show so much of 'weakness' as we do) the afore-
mentioned Sufi of the highest rank said to him what he said. (How

much more should we be worthy of such a remark, if the same Sufi
were to criticize us.) In any event, however, Abü Madyan's case
clearly exemplifies that kind of thing (i.e., the showing of 'weakness'
because of a deep knowledge of the truth).15
Ibn 'Arabi goes on to argue that even this state of 'weakness' or
refraining from exercising himmah should not properly be taken as
a willful act on the part of the 'knower'. The true 'knower' puts
himself entirely in the hands of God; if He commands him to
exercise his himmah he does, if He forbids him to do so he refrains
from it, and if God Himself gives him a choice between the two he
chooses refraining from the exercise of himmah.
Abu al-Su'üd (Ibn al-Shibl) once said to his followers: Verily God
gave me the power of the free disposai of things fifteen years ago. But
I have refrained from exercising that power for the sake of courtesy
(tazarrufan) toward God.
This saying implies too much bold familiarity ( toward God). I myself
do not refrain from exercising himmah for the sake of courtesy,
because such an attitude would imply a willful choice on my part. No.
I refrain from it because of the perfection of knowledge. The true

knowledge of the matter does not require refraining from the exer-
cise of himmah by way of willful choice. Whenever a 'knower' does

exercise his himmah in this world, he does soin obedience to a Divine
Command; that is to say, he does so because he is constrained to do
so, not by way of willful choice. 16
The position of an Apostle regarding this problem of 'refraining' is
somewhat more delicate than that of a Saint.17 Properly speaking
the fonction itself of' apostleship' requires his exercising himmah in

282 Sufism and Taoism
order that his being an Apostle be made clear to the people. For
only when he is accepted as such by the community, is he able to
spread the true religion of God. The Saint perse has nothing to do
with such a mission.
And yet, even the Apostle (Mul)ammad) did not try to show
prophetic 'miracles' (mu'jizat). For one thing, he refrained from
exercising his himmah because of his compassion for the people. He
did not go to extremes in ma nif esting the conclusive evidence of his
'apostleship' because it would have brought destruction to them. He
spared them by not showing them too strong evidences of his
'apostleship'. Besides this, Mul)ammad had another reason shared
by all true Saints for refraining from working miracles; namely, his
knowledge that a 'miracle' can never change the eternally fixed
course of events. Whether a man becomes a Muslim or not is
determined by his archetype; it is not something which can easily be·
changed by the Apostle accomplishing before his eyes a 'miracle'.
Thus even the most perfect of all Apostles (akmal al-rusul),

Mul)ammad, did not exercise himmah. There was actually a practi-
cal need for showing 'miracles', and he was unquestionably

endowed with such a power. And yet he did not exercise his spiritual
power in that way. For, being the highest 'knower', he knew better
than anybody else that 'miracles' were, in truth, .ineffective.
The most ideal state of the Perfect Man is a spiritual tranquility and
quietude of an unfathomable depth. He is a quiet man content with
a passivity in which he confides himself and every thing else to God's

disposai. The Perfect Man is a man who, having in himself a tre-
mendous spiritual power and being adorned with the highest know-
ledge of Being, gives the impression of a deep cairn ocean. He is

such because he is the most perf ect image, in a concrete individual
form, of the cosmic Perfect Man who comprehends and actualizes
all the Names and Attributes of the Absolute.
Notes
1. Taskhir literally means 'forcing somebody to compulsory service, controlling
something at will'. In discussing the problem of the 'compulsory' force of the
permanent archetypes we have already corne across the word taskhir in the form of a
'mutual taskhir' between the Absolute and the world.
2. Fu.!i., p. 199/158.
3. Fu$., p. 90/88-89.
4. Again Ibn' Arabï goes back to the case in which the' knower' main tains spiritually
all the forms of an object on all the levels of Being by actually concentrating on one of
the levels.

The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 283
5. Fu.!i ., p. 91189-90.
6. On the difference between 'gathering' (qur'àn) and 'separating' (fu.rqàn) see
above, Chapter II.
7. Fu.!i., p. 91190.
8. Cf. Fu.!i., p. 92/90.
9. Fu.!i., p. 148/121.
10. Fu.!i., p. 156/127.
11. The verse reads: 'God is He who creates you of weakness, then puts (ja'ala) after
weakness strength (quwwah), then again puts weakness after strength.'
12. Fu.!i., p. 157/127-128.
13. Fu.!i., pp. 157-158/128.
14. It means: We can freely accomplish 'miracles', but you apparently cannot. And
yet we want to attain to your spiritual stage, while you do not show any sign of being
desirous of attaining to our spiritual stage.
15. Fu.!i., p. 158/129.
16. Fu.!i., p. 159/129-130.
17. ibid.