Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved
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"It's the animal in us," we often hear when we've been bad. But why not when we're good? Primates and Philosophers tackles this question by exploring the biological foundations of one of humanity's most valued traits: morality.
In this provocative book, primatologist Frans de Waal argues that modern-day evolutionary biology takes far too dim a view of the natural world, emphasizing our "selfish" genes. Science has thus exacerbated our reciprocal habits of blaming nature when we act badly and labeling the good things we do as "humane." Seeking the origin of human morality not in evolution but in human culture, science insists that we are moral by choice, not by nature.
Citing remarkable evidence based on his extensive research of primate behavior, de Waal attacks "Veneer Theory," which posits morality as a thin overlay on an otherwise nasty nature. He explains how we evolved from a long line of animals that care for the weak and build cooperation with reciprocal transactions. Drawing on both Darwin and recent scientific advances, de Waal demonstrates a strong continuity between human and animal behavior. In the process, he also probes issues such as anthropomorphism and human responsibilities toward animals.
Based on the Tanner Lectures de Waal delivered at Princeton University's Center for Human Values in 2004, Primates and Philosophers includes responses by the philosophers Peter Singer, Christine M. Korsgaard, and Philip Kitcher and the science writer Robert Wright. They press de Waal to clarify the differences between humans and other animals, yielding a lively debate that will fascinate all those who wonder about the origins and reach of human goodness.
The University Center for Human Values Series.
(less)The University Center for Human Values Series.
Hardcover, 209 pages
Published September 25th 2006 by Princeton University Press (first published 2006)
Showing 1-30
Feb 20, 2017Bob Nichols rated it liked it
De Waal sets up his ethical argument by describing what he calls veneer theory: humans are basically bad (self-oriented), and civilized behavior is superficial and fragile. De Waal’s theory in contrast is that we are by nature good. Drawing from his work with primates, he anchors moral behavior in our natural inclinations and desires. (1) To this De Waal adds a cognitive layer, empathy, which enables us to “adopt the other’s viewpoint,” leading us to assist others by following golden rule-like precepts. Because we are good natured, we seek to help when we recognize that others are in need. (2) Here, de Waal draws on Mencius’s example of our natural tendency to help, without any thought of reward, a child who has fallen into a well as the “distress at the sight of another’s pain is an impulse over which we exert little or no control.” In other words, altruism is pure. De Waal correctly outlines our cooperative and other-regarding social nature. He goes on to acknowledge that this is “very much an in-group phenomenon,” and writes that “Universally, humans treat outsiders far worse than members of their own community.”
This where de Waal gets stuck. He offers no argument for why or how we might transcend our tribalism. How might de Waal’s theory be extended beyond the in-group? A good many people are other-regarding by nature, just as de Waal believes. In contrast to de Waal, though, compassion (caring for others) can extend to non-group members, to humankind, and even, for some, to life itself. This can be validated, daily, in our own lives. With these individuals, an argument can also be made that the motive force is, in the end, self-interest as “pain” (broadly construed as caring) is experienced as one’s own pain. (3)
For those who don’t feel the pain of others in this way, they can nevertheless act in an other-regarding way toward non-group members because they see that it’s in their interest to do so. This is a good form of utilitarianism. The motive force is not the good, caring nature as de Waal would have it but, rather, a pragmatic recognition that it’s in our interest to respect others. When the social order unravels through a free for all, the interest of each is compromised and harms our own interests in the long run. This is also the point of the Golden Rule that de Waal mentions. It can and should govern our social relationships in a trans-tribal way because in the end, and over all, it is good for us.
A third category of behavior, though, undermines de Waal’s fundamental premise that we are inherently good, and this is a chronic source of intra- as well as inter-group conflict. De Waal charges that veneer theorists do not have an explanation for our clearly evident good, social nature. But the same argument can be made about de Waal’s perspective as well—how to explain our equally clear “bad” nature, as seen daily and throughout human history. There are a good many who are neither compassionate by nature nor motivated to restrict their own behavior out of deference to others (within the group as well as outside the group). These are the egoistic people who are willing to assert themselves at the expense of others if that’s what it takes to get to success. (4) In the end, it could be that the dichotomy that de Waal sets up--that we are either good natured or bad natured--is false. Humankind is both. We see both poles at work and everything in between. And both poles, it can be argued, are consistent with the (genetic) variation that lies at the heart of Darwinian theory and each has their own strong survival benefits. (5)
The book ends with comments by various theorists on what de Waal has put forward. The main counter-argument comes from Christine Korsgaard who argues that only humans can be moral beings since moral beings act on principles that are cognitive by nature, which is missing in animals. In making her case this way, she eliminates a biological foundation for ethics. With Kant, she asserts that we should respect others as Ends. A counter question is, “Why?” and the answer to that question, it can be argued, can be traced back to biology: it’s in our own self-interest to respect the freedom of others (their ends) because the alternative is a free-for-all and social disorder that compromises the freedom of all. To bolster her argument, Korsgaard calls opposing theories and perspectives “laughable,” “absurd,” and “rather silly.” These are rank words and they are annoying to see in what should be a serious and respectful discussion.
(1) De Waal contrasts his perspective with that of Hobbes and Rawls who, he believes, argue that our social nature occurred only by a social contract whereby each agreed to restrain the self’s freedom in deference to the freedom of all. A social contract, de Waal writes, is a “rational decision by inherently asocial creatures.”
(2) De Waal writes that “Reciprocity is of course…at the heart of the Golden Rule, which remains unsurpassed as a summary of human morality.” Against de Waal, it can be argued that understanding another’s situation through empathy does not lead ipso facto to a desire to help alleviate their situation. In fact, some argue that empathy cuts both ways as the capacity to understand another’s situation enables one to better manipulate others.
(3) De Waal endorses the more or less standardized explanation among evolutionary biologists for other-regarding behavior in his discussion of kin-selection (we favor our kin in our actions to promote our common genes) and reciprocal altruism (since we obviously favor non-kin as well, other-regarding behavior is explained in terms of tit-for-tat benefits). But de Waal strikes me as ambivalent on the motive force for other-regarding behavior. He sees our social tendencies as naturally altruistic, devoid of self-interest. But he also relies on “reciprocal altruism” as the theoretical foundation for extending other-regarding behavior to non-kin group members, even though “reciprocal” altruism has by definition a fundamental self-interested component.
Kin selection and reciprocal altruism are better viewed as products that flow from a much deeper evolutionary need that ties the individual to the group. And an argument can be made that both of these have a self-interested component because, as Darwin highlighted about the origins of our tribal nature, individual survival occurs via the group. Within a group, the individual survives; without a group, the individual dies. Ultimately, the motive force for social behavior in de Waal’s sense is the self’s survival and de Waal himself implies this when he writes of Darwin that “Evolution favors animals that assist each other if by doing so they achieve long-term benefits of greater value than the benefits derived from going it alone and competing with others.” But de Waal cannot put “self-interest,” broadly construed, at the core of “altruistic and sympathetic” tendencies because he believes that these are inherently “other-regarding.” De Waal, rather, relies on these purified tendencies as the motive force underlying good (social) behavior.
(4) And the implication of this view is that protecting one’s self-interest through the application of power against those who abuse their freedom is necessary, as much as we wish it would not be the case.
(5) To be a member in good standing within a group promotes survival – in a “good for one, good for all” way. Being self-oriented at the expense of others within a group, when combined with deceit, manipulation, power, etc., also has survival value.(less)
This where de Waal gets stuck. He offers no argument for why or how we might transcend our tribalism. How might de Waal’s theory be extended beyond the in-group? A good many people are other-regarding by nature, just as de Waal believes. In contrast to de Waal, though, compassion (caring for others) can extend to non-group members, to humankind, and even, for some, to life itself. This can be validated, daily, in our own lives. With these individuals, an argument can also be made that the motive force is, in the end, self-interest as “pain” (broadly construed as caring) is experienced as one’s own pain. (3)
For those who don’t feel the pain of others in this way, they can nevertheless act in an other-regarding way toward non-group members because they see that it’s in their interest to do so. This is a good form of utilitarianism. The motive force is not the good, caring nature as de Waal would have it but, rather, a pragmatic recognition that it’s in our interest to respect others. When the social order unravels through a free for all, the interest of each is compromised and harms our own interests in the long run. This is also the point of the Golden Rule that de Waal mentions. It can and should govern our social relationships in a trans-tribal way because in the end, and over all, it is good for us.
A third category of behavior, though, undermines de Waal’s fundamental premise that we are inherently good, and this is a chronic source of intra- as well as inter-group conflict. De Waal charges that veneer theorists do not have an explanation for our clearly evident good, social nature. But the same argument can be made about de Waal’s perspective as well—how to explain our equally clear “bad” nature, as seen daily and throughout human history. There are a good many who are neither compassionate by nature nor motivated to restrict their own behavior out of deference to others (within the group as well as outside the group). These are the egoistic people who are willing to assert themselves at the expense of others if that’s what it takes to get to success. (4) In the end, it could be that the dichotomy that de Waal sets up--that we are either good natured or bad natured--is false. Humankind is both. We see both poles at work and everything in between. And both poles, it can be argued, are consistent with the (genetic) variation that lies at the heart of Darwinian theory and each has their own strong survival benefits. (5)
The book ends with comments by various theorists on what de Waal has put forward. The main counter-argument comes from Christine Korsgaard who argues that only humans can be moral beings since moral beings act on principles that are cognitive by nature, which is missing in animals. In making her case this way, she eliminates a biological foundation for ethics. With Kant, she asserts that we should respect others as Ends. A counter question is, “Why?” and the answer to that question, it can be argued, can be traced back to biology: it’s in our own self-interest to respect the freedom of others (their ends) because the alternative is a free-for-all and social disorder that compromises the freedom of all. To bolster her argument, Korsgaard calls opposing theories and perspectives “laughable,” “absurd,” and “rather silly.” These are rank words and they are annoying to see in what should be a serious and respectful discussion.
(1) De Waal contrasts his perspective with that of Hobbes and Rawls who, he believes, argue that our social nature occurred only by a social contract whereby each agreed to restrain the self’s freedom in deference to the freedom of all. A social contract, de Waal writes, is a “rational decision by inherently asocial creatures.”
(2) De Waal writes that “Reciprocity is of course…at the heart of the Golden Rule, which remains unsurpassed as a summary of human morality.” Against de Waal, it can be argued that understanding another’s situation through empathy does not lead ipso facto to a desire to help alleviate their situation. In fact, some argue that empathy cuts both ways as the capacity to understand another’s situation enables one to better manipulate others.
(3) De Waal endorses the more or less standardized explanation among evolutionary biologists for other-regarding behavior in his discussion of kin-selection (we favor our kin in our actions to promote our common genes) and reciprocal altruism (since we obviously favor non-kin as well, other-regarding behavior is explained in terms of tit-for-tat benefits). But de Waal strikes me as ambivalent on the motive force for other-regarding behavior. He sees our social tendencies as naturally altruistic, devoid of self-interest. But he also relies on “reciprocal altruism” as the theoretical foundation for extending other-regarding behavior to non-kin group members, even though “reciprocal” altruism has by definition a fundamental self-interested component.
Kin selection and reciprocal altruism are better viewed as products that flow from a much deeper evolutionary need that ties the individual to the group. And an argument can be made that both of these have a self-interested component because, as Darwin highlighted about the origins of our tribal nature, individual survival occurs via the group. Within a group, the individual survives; without a group, the individual dies. Ultimately, the motive force for social behavior in de Waal’s sense is the self’s survival and de Waal himself implies this when he writes of Darwin that “Evolution favors animals that assist each other if by doing so they achieve long-term benefits of greater value than the benefits derived from going it alone and competing with others.” But de Waal cannot put “self-interest,” broadly construed, at the core of “altruistic and sympathetic” tendencies because he believes that these are inherently “other-regarding.” De Waal, rather, relies on these purified tendencies as the motive force underlying good (social) behavior.
(4) And the implication of this view is that protecting one’s self-interest through the application of power against those who abuse their freedom is necessary, as much as we wish it would not be the case.
(5) To be a member in good standing within a group promotes survival – in a “good for one, good for all” way. Being self-oriented at the expense of others within a group, when combined with deceit, manipulation, power, etc., also has survival value.(less)
Nov 30, 2018Kent Winward rated it really liked it
de Waal and other philosophers arguing over how morality in humans evolved, but the human monkeys mostly split philosophical hairs while agreeing in generalities. Great stuff if you are a primate that digs that kind of discussion.
Aug 21, 2008Joshua Nomen-Mutatio rated it it was amazing
Recommends it for: Anyone interested in ethics, evolution, animal behavior, psychology, philosophy
From a blog I wrote early on in my reading of this book (I'll be writing more about the rest later on):
"Climbed to the Highest Point on the Tree and the Empathy Therein"
I'm reading a book right now that's quite impressive called Primates & Philosophers by the primatologist Frans de Waal which is mostly about the evolution of morality. The book is finished with a series of exchanges between philosophers (like Peter Singer for instance) so basically like a conversation in essay form about the subject of evolutionary ethics among other things. De Waal critiques what he calls "Veneer Theory" which posits that human morality exists as a thin layer on top of our amoral core. According to de Waal, and I agree, this model just doesn't add up when we look to the empirical evidence provided by evolution and the rich sources of information we currently have on animal behavior studies. Anyway, I suggest that people check it out. It argues very well for the idea that nature and culture, human nature and moral reasoning are not at odds but rather are so intertwined that the Veneer Theory (culture as a layer on top of biology) just breaks down and falls apart. It's really interesting and has some great descriptions of non-human primate behavior and non-primates (such as dolphins with their relevant presence of higher levels of cognition). One very moving and interesting story is an account of a bonobo attempting to care for an injured bird and help it fly again:
"Here is another story about Bonobo empathy: Betty Walsh, an animal caretaker, observed the following incident involving a 7 year old female Bonobo named Kuni at Twycross Zoo in England. One day, Kuni captured a starling. Out of fear that she might hurt the bird, the keeper urged Kuni to let it go. Kuni took the bird and gently set it on its feet, right side up. When it didn't move, Kuni tossed it in the air. However, it returned to sitting on the earth, probably because it was too stunned or terrified to fly. Kuni then picked it up, climbed to the highest point on the highest tree, wrapped her legs around the trunk so that she had both hands free and carefully unfolded the bird's wings and spread them wide open on her palm and then threw the bird into the air as hard as she could. Unfortunately, it was still too stunned to make it over the barrier, so it sat on the edge of the moat where Kuni guarded it for a long time from the juveniles until it finally flew away."
-an excerpt from from another review of the book(less)
"Climbed to the Highest Point on the Tree and the Empathy Therein"
I'm reading a book right now that's quite impressive called Primates & Philosophers by the primatologist Frans de Waal which is mostly about the evolution of morality. The book is finished with a series of exchanges between philosophers (like Peter Singer for instance) so basically like a conversation in essay form about the subject of evolutionary ethics among other things. De Waal critiques what he calls "Veneer Theory" which posits that human morality exists as a thin layer on top of our amoral core. According to de Waal, and I agree, this model just doesn't add up when we look to the empirical evidence provided by evolution and the rich sources of information we currently have on animal behavior studies. Anyway, I suggest that people check it out. It argues very well for the idea that nature and culture, human nature and moral reasoning are not at odds but rather are so intertwined that the Veneer Theory (culture as a layer on top of biology) just breaks down and falls apart. It's really interesting and has some great descriptions of non-human primate behavior and non-primates (such as dolphins with their relevant presence of higher levels of cognition). One very moving and interesting story is an account of a bonobo attempting to care for an injured bird and help it fly again:
"Here is another story about Bonobo empathy: Betty Walsh, an animal caretaker, observed the following incident involving a 7 year old female Bonobo named Kuni at Twycross Zoo in England. One day, Kuni captured a starling. Out of fear that she might hurt the bird, the keeper urged Kuni to let it go. Kuni took the bird and gently set it on its feet, right side up. When it didn't move, Kuni tossed it in the air. However, it returned to sitting on the earth, probably because it was too stunned or terrified to fly. Kuni then picked it up, climbed to the highest point on the highest tree, wrapped her legs around the trunk so that she had both hands free and carefully unfolded the bird's wings and spread them wide open on her palm and then threw the bird into the air as hard as she could. Unfortunately, it was still too stunned to make it over the barrier, so it sat on the edge of the moat where Kuni guarded it for a long time from the juveniles until it finally flew away."
-an excerpt from from another review of the book(less)
Richard Dawkins and others have fallen into the trap that somehow Biological Evolution leads to Social Darwinism. In the same vein, these biologists claim that morality is a construct unique to humans and we use it to counter our selfish animal tendencies. Animals less sophisticated than humans allegedly allow natural selection to take out the weak. Not only is the quote "Survival of the Fittest" mis-attributed to Darwin, but so is the concept of such brutal views of natural selection.
De Waal is one of the most respected primatologists second to only Jane Goodall. In Primates and Philosophers, De Waal uses several accounts of primate behavior to show that morality is as continuous with other Great Apes, Chimpanzees and Bonobos in particular, as is our genome.
It turns out these primates most close to us genetically, show a myriad of the building blocks for morality. They are capable of empathy, sympathy, reciprocity, peacemaking and retaliation. Quick to answer charges of anthropomorphism, De Waal convincingly argues that any other answers for these behaviors would be more cognitively complicated and therefore less plausible.
Unique to humans however are two qualities. The impartial spectator that Adam Smith describes, and the ability to reason and judge between two conflicting moral decisions. While significant, it hardly amounts to the gaping hole between our social behavior and that of wild animals that others have suggested.
An excellent read for anyone pondering the origins of morality
or the true implications of Darwinism on a social species. (less)
De Waal is one of the most respected primatologists second to only Jane Goodall. In Primates and Philosophers, De Waal uses several accounts of primate behavior to show that morality is as continuous with other Great Apes, Chimpanzees and Bonobos in particular, as is our genome.
It turns out these primates most close to us genetically, show a myriad of the building blocks for morality. They are capable of empathy, sympathy, reciprocity, peacemaking and retaliation. Quick to answer charges of anthropomorphism, De Waal convincingly argues that any other answers for these behaviors would be more cognitively complicated and therefore less plausible.
Unique to humans however are two qualities. The impartial spectator that Adam Smith describes, and the ability to reason and judge between two conflicting moral decisions. While significant, it hardly amounts to the gaping hole between our social behavior and that of wild animals that others have suggested.
An excellent read for anyone pondering the origins of morality
or the true implications of Darwinism on a social species. (less)
Apr 19, 2019Jim Razinha rated it really liked it
Thought provoker, but then de Waal tends to do that. I finished this a couple of days ago and still don't know if I can do this review justice, but... The basis of this is his criticism (and dismissal) of the Hobbesian view that morality is a layer (a veneer) overlaying the baser, brutish animal that humans really are. This Veneer Theory, as dubbed by de Waal, has advocates and opponents (de Waal being one) and his leading essay here outlined his positions as to why the veneerists are wrong...in his view. No, humans are not moral "by choice" as Hobbes, Huxley and, it seems, Dawkins would have...rather, morality evolved from social constructs evidenced by some of our primate cousins. Four essays respond to his, and then he responds to them...an interesting format. A civilized debate; a food network throw down for people who actually think. They want to address "why don’t we think it is good to be bad?" And none of the five feel "that there is any reason to suppose that humans are different in their metaphysical essence from other animals, or at least, none base their arguments on the idea that humans uniquely possess a transcendent soul." See? For people who think.
The editors observe that all five share the understanding that
So, to frame the argument, de Wall says
Journalist (and sociobiologist/evolutionary psychologist) Robert Wright picks at de Waal's use of anthropomorphic language in his writings and arguments. He says
Philosopher Christine Korsgaard sides with de Waal in arguing against Veneer Theory in her essay:
Peter Singer, philosopher, in his response essay "Morality, Reason, and the Rights of Animals" points out
Okay, I veneered the second half of the book (first half, too, really, but...) I need to read more de Waal, but my confirmation bias thinks he's right, whether he uses the appropriate descriptive language or attributions. (less)
The editors observe that all five share the understanding that
moral goodness is something real, about which it is possible to make truth claims. Goodness requires, at a minimum, taking proper account of others. Badness, by the same token, includes the sort of selfishness that leads us to treat others improperly by ignoring their interests or treating them as mere instruments. The two basic premises of evolutionary science and moral reality establish the boundaries of the debate over the origins of goodness as it is set forth in this book. This means that those religious believers who are committed to the idea that humans have been uniquely endowed with special attributes (including a moral sense) by divine grace alone are not participants in the discussion as it is presented here.Emphasis mine. Some of the counterarguments call out de Wall for anthropomorphizing his studies (more on that), but he has long observed enough behavior that he justifies well his "scientific anthropomorphism" (as distinguished from the Peter Rabbit-ish writings.)
The point is that de Waal’s evidence, quantitative and anecdotal, for primate emotional response is based entirely on observations of actual behavior. De Waal must base his account of primate morality on how primates do in fact act because he has no access to their “ought” stories about what moral reason might ideally demand of them, or to how they suppose they ought to act in a hypothetical situation.So there seems to be a risk of comparing apples and oranges: contrasting primate behavior (based on quantitative and anecdotal observation) with human normative ideals.(their emphasis) Important distinction. There is no anthropomorphism in that. Humans want to project "ought" and it is the duty of the impartial scientific observer to maintain a distance.
So, to frame the argument, de Wall says
Hobbes and Rawls create the illusion of human society as a voluntary arrangement with self-imposed rules assented to by free and equal agents. Yet, there never was a point at which we became social: descended from highly social ancestors—a long line of monkeys and apes—we have been group-living forever. Free and equal people never existed. Humans started out—if a starting point is discernible at all—as interdependent, bonded, and unequal.Our evolution didn't spontaneously pop out a "moral" product.
For a human characteristic, such as empathy, that is so pervasive , develops so early in life, and shows such important neural and physiological correlates as well as a genetic substrate, it would be strange indeed if no evolutionary continuity existed with other mammals. The possibility of empathy and sympathy in other animals has been largely ignored, however.I don't know how anyone can deny that some animals have empathy and either it developed independently (which has happened for multiple many features) or has passed down from some earlier species. de Wall argues that Veneer Theory "lacks any sort of explanation of how we moved from being amoral animals to moral beings. The theory is at odds with the evidence for emotional processing as driving force behind moral judgment." de Waal:
If human morality could truly be reduced to calculations and reasoning, we would come close to being psychopaths, who indeed do not mean to be kind when they act kindly.Extreme? perhaps, but it bears thought. He notes this on morality:
It should further be noted that the evolutionary pressures responsible for our moral tendencies may not all have been nice and positive. After all, morality is very much an in-group phenomenon. Universally, humans treat outsiders far worse than members of their own community: in fact, moral rules hardly seem to apply to the outside.This is lost on so many people! Racism, xenomisia, nationalism...hello!
Morality likely evolved as a within-group phenomenon in conjunction with other typical within-group capacities, such as conflict resolution, cooperation, and sharing.This makes sense, no? de Waal:
The first loyalty of every individual is not to the group, however, but to itself and its kin. With increasing social integration and reliance on cooperation, shared interests must have risen to the surface so that the community as a whole became an issue.
Obviously, the most potent force to bring out a sense of community is enmity toward outsiders. It forces unity among elements that are normally at odds. This may not be visible at the zoo, but it is definitely a factor for chimpanzees in the wild, which show lethal intercommunity violence. In our own species, nothing is more obvious than that we band together against adversaries. In the course of human evolution, out-group hostility enhanced in-group solidarity to the point that morality emerged. Instead of merely ameliorating relations around us, as apes do, we have explicit teachings about the value of the community and the precedence it takes, or ought to take, over individual interests. Humans go much further in all of this than the apes, which is why we have moral systems and apes do not.Still. the fringe elements supported and promoted by the current US administration seem to have a closer connection to the cousins...
Journalist (and sociobiologist/evolutionary psychologist) Robert Wright picks at de Waal's use of anthropomorphic language in his writings and arguments. He says
There are two broad categories of anthropomorphic language. First, there is emotional language: We can say that chimpanzees feel compassionate, outraged, aggrieved, insecure, et cetera. Second, there is cognitive language, language that attributes conscious knowledge and/or reasoning to animals: We can say that chimpanzees remember, anticipate, plan, strategize, et cetera.His beef with de Waal seems to be that "It isn’t always clear from the behavioral evidence alone which kind of anthropomorphic language is in order." and that de Waal seems to prefer cognitive anthropomorphism. de Waal does tend to impart a more human reasoning to explain some of his (many) observations of simian behavior, the cognitive anthropomorphism, but then he does have decades of behaviors observed!
Philosopher Christine Korsgaard sides with de Waal in arguing against Veneer Theory in her essay:
There are a number of problems with Veneer Theory. In the first place, despite its popularity in the social sciences, the credentials of the principle of pursuing your own best interests as a principle of practical reason have never been established. [...]She then looks at de Waal's consideration of intent as he establishes the primacy of the bases for the evolution of our morality.
In the second place, it is not even clear that the idea of self-interest is a well-formed concept when applied to an animal as richly social as a human being.[...]
So the idea that we can clearly identify our own interests as something set apart from or over against the interests of others is strained to say the least.
And yet even this is not the deepest thing wrong with Veneer Theory. Morality is not just a set of obstructions to the pursuit of our interests. Moral standards define ways of relating to people that most of us, most of the time, find natural and welcome.[...]
It is absurd to suggest that this is what most human beings are like, or long to be like, beneath a thin veneer of restraint.
But it is also absurd to think that nonhuman animals are motivated by self-interest. The concept of what is in your own best interests, if it makes any sense at all, requires a kind of grip on the future and an ability to calculate that do not seem available to a nonhuman animal.
The question of intention is a question about how an episode in which an animal does something looks from the acting animal’s own point of view, whether it is plausible to think that the animal acts with a certain kind of purpose in mind. I think there is a temptation to think that the question whether we can see the origins of morality in animal behavior depends on how exactly we interpret their intentions, whether their intentions are “good” or not. I think that, at least taken in the most obvious way, this is a mistake.She has a point - interpretation is necessary, as we cannot (yet) know what animals are thinking, so care must be taken to normalize that interpretation.
Peter Singer, philosopher, in his response essay "Morality, Reason, and the Rights of Animals" points out
Once we recognize that nonhuman animals have complex emotional and social needs, we begin to see animal abuse where others might not see it [...]I didn't pull much from his counter, but I thought that worth sharing. In de Waal's response to the responses, he asks
So, we need to distinguish intentional selfishness and intentional altruism from mere functional equivalents of such behavior. Biologists use the two almost interchangeably, but Philip Kitcher and Christine Korsgaard are correct to stress the importance of knowing the motives behind behavior. Do animals ever intentionally help each other? Do humans?I submit that Daniel Kahneman answers that. Our emotional brain reacts first, much as we rational beings hate to admit it, and that emotional brain developed much earlier than the human primate overlay.
I add the second question even if most people blindly assume a affirmative answer. We show a host of behavior, though, for which we develop justifications after the fact.
Okay, I veneered the second half of the book (first half, too, really, but...) I need to read more de Waal, but my confirmation bias thinks he's right, whether he uses the appropriate descriptive language or attributions. (less)
Nov 29, 2015Alfredo González rated it it was ok
I consider this book more appropriate for scholars than the lay person. I just finished reading a book about the same subject: The Quest of a Moral Compass by Keenan Malik, and the author does not mention primates nor any other animal, his quest took a different path altogether, he looked in the Bible, in Religion and Philosophy, no wonder he could not find any morality there, anyone that reads the history of the Popes gets the message very clear, they were not guided by morality.
My feeling is that De Waal is in the right track, but I was hoping for a more clear path, perhaps is my lack of scholarship that did not grasp all that is in the book. However, I did find many sections very enlightening and very well worth reading. (less)
My feeling is that De Waal is in the right track, but I was hoping for a more clear path, perhaps is my lack of scholarship that did not grasp all that is in the book. However, I did find many sections very enlightening and very well worth reading. (less)
Primates and Philosophers is offering us to analyse the origins of morality, but focuses on one of the subject: whether human morality goes deep into our evolutionary past or is new with the arrival of our evolving brains and cultures. The answer depends on how morality is defined.
Oct 02, 2017Paul rated it really liked it · review of another edition
This is an interesting book that deals with the question of whether morality is inherent in primates. The author cites humans, bonobos, and dolphins as capable of moral behavior. Chimpanzees, on the other hand, have no sense of morality, and one particularly rascal female chimp at his primate research center will see visitors, go get a mouthful of water from a spigot, then spray the visitors from her mouth. Clearly no morality there. On the other hand, I once wrote a story on two dolphins in Hawaii who were being taught English word recognition. The dolphins resided in a pool that had a step-down enclosure outside the pool for observation. When I went down there, one of the dolphins swam over and spit a huge spray of water over the side of the pool, drenching me. Now I question whether dolphins have any inherent moral sense.
I will say for human beings, however, never in my work life have I had a colleague fill his mouth with water and then come over and spit it all out on me. So I agree that humans have an innate sense of morality, but as far as I'm concerned, the jury is still out on dolphins. I've never interacted with bonobos, so this remains an open question. (less)
I will say for human beings, however, never in my work life have I had a colleague fill his mouth with water and then come over and spit it all out on me. So I agree that humans have an innate sense of morality, but as far as I'm concerned, the jury is still out on dolphins. I've never interacted with bonobos, so this remains an open question. (less)
Aug 18, 2013Colin Bendell rated it really liked it
A slow and dense read but a fantastic primer that I would use if I were ever to teach a Normative Philosophy class.
Throughout the book, de Waal presents 5 essays and rebuttals by other prominent thinkers. This creates a nice balance to the analysis of morality - specifically traits we think are very unique such as altruism and empathy. In general the conclusion is that we are not as unique in terms of moral characteristics as we like to think and more importantly how we define morality is mostly ambiguous and self referential. (our only reference to demonstrated moral behavior comes from our own exhibited behaviors and how that balances with our executive function of our frontal lobes)
This is the basis for the Veneer Theory which is explored in great depth. Veneer Theory proposes that culture is a layer overtop of our biology. In the end moral reasoning and human nature are not at odds but complimentary. Further, this is also found and demonstrated by looking at our fellow primates and the complex social structures and complex behaviors they exhibit. In the end, we are not alone in our moral behaviors as a species.
I'll admit I just pushed through some sections regardless of whether I fully comprehended the arguments being proposed. This made for some tough slogging and skimmed sections. Based on that reason alone, this would be a great primer for Normative philosophy class. (less)
Throughout the book, de Waal presents 5 essays and rebuttals by other prominent thinkers. This creates a nice balance to the analysis of morality - specifically traits we think are very unique such as altruism and empathy. In general the conclusion is that we are not as unique in terms of moral characteristics as we like to think and more importantly how we define morality is mostly ambiguous and self referential. (our only reference to demonstrated moral behavior comes from our own exhibited behaviors and how that balances with our executive function of our frontal lobes)
This is the basis for the Veneer Theory which is explored in great depth. Veneer Theory proposes that culture is a layer overtop of our biology. In the end moral reasoning and human nature are not at odds but complimentary. Further, this is also found and demonstrated by looking at our fellow primates and the complex social structures and complex behaviors they exhibit. In the end, we are not alone in our moral behaviors as a species.
I'll admit I just pushed through some sections regardless of whether I fully comprehended the arguments being proposed. This made for some tough slogging and skimmed sections. Based on that reason alone, this would be a great primer for Normative philosophy class. (less)
When one of Kim Stanley Robinson’s characters in Green Earth talks about humans being from the savanna, that sounds familiar because of I’ve read quite a lot of Frans De Waal, probably the most prominent primatologist alive. His Chimpanzee Politics (1982) was revolutionary for the field. To me, the biological outlook proved to be a revelation and still is something that’s liberating when talking about ethics, behavior and society. At the same time he proves time and time again that the gap between animals and humans isn’t nearly as wide as we tend to believe. De Waal’s prose is accessible, even witty at times.
A lot of De Waal’s work has some overlap, so I could have just as well listed Our Inner Ape: A Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who We Are (2005). I haven’t read his more recent books The Age Of Empathy – Nature’s Lessons For A Kinder Society (2009) and Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? (2016), but I’m sure they’ll be good entry points too.
More non-fiction recommendations & SFF reviews on Weiging A Pig... (less)
A lot of De Waal’s work has some overlap, so I could have just as well listed Our Inner Ape: A Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who We Are (2005). I haven’t read his more recent books The Age Of Empathy – Nature’s Lessons For A Kinder Society (2009) and Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? (2016), but I’m sure they’ll be good entry points too.
More non-fiction recommendations & SFF reviews on Weiging A Pig... (less)
Jun 08, 2012Juliusz Gonera rated it it was ok
The book starts with a short but informative and well referenced summary of important results in the field of animal cognition (empathy, reciprocity, consolation in chimps and capuchins). The main issue considered is the continuity between animal behaviour and human morality. As it turns out experiments show strong similarities between animal and human moral behaviour, which is of course to be expected.
Unfortunately what follows is a most inconsequential philosophical discussion by Wright, Korsgaard, Kitcher and Singer (journalist and three philosophers) of their personal interpretations of the research :-).
I cannot recommend this book. See other de Waal books for a more comprehensive treatment of the subject matter devoid of the layman philosophical babble.
Unfortunately what follows is a most inconsequential philosophical discussion by Wright, Korsgaard, Kitcher and Singer (journalist and three philosophers) of their personal interpretations of the research :-).
I cannot recommend this book. See other de Waal books for a more comprehensive treatment of the subject matter devoid of the layman philosophical babble.
