2020/04/06

Panentheism - Wikipedia

Panentheism - Wikipedia



Panentheism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to navigationJump to search
Not to be confused with pantheism.
Part of a series on
God
Panentheism (meaning "all-in-God", from the Greek πᾶν pân, "all", ἐν en, "in" and Θεός Theós, "God")[1] is the belief that the divine pervades and interpenetrates every part of the universe and also extends beyond space and time. 
The term was coined by the German philosopher Karl Krause in 1828 to distinguish the ideas of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) about the relation of God and the universe from the supposed pantheism of Baruch Spinoza.[1] 
Unlike pantheism, which holds that the divine and the universe are identical,[2] 
panentheism maintains an ontological distinction between the divine and the non-divine and the significance of both.
  • In panentheism, God is viewed as the soul of the universe, the universal spirit present everywhere, which at the same time "transcends" all things created.
  • While pantheism asserts that "all is God", panentheism claims that God is greater than the universe. Some versions of panentheism suggest that the universe is nothing more than the manifestation of God. In addition, some forms indicate that the universe is contained within God,[2] like in the Kabbalah concept of tzimtzum. Also much Hindu thought is highly characterized by panentheism and pantheism.[3][4] The basic tradition however, on which Krause's concept was built, seems to have been Neoplatonic philosophy and its successors in Western philosophy and Orthodox theology.

In philosophy[edit]

Ancient Greek philosophy[edit]

The religious beliefs of Neoplatonism can be regarded as panentheistic. Plotinus taught that there was an ineffable transcendent God ("the One", to En, τὸ Ἕν) of which subsequent realities were emanations. From "the One" emanates the Divine Mind (Nous, Νοῦς) and the Cosmic Soul (Psyche, Ψυχή). In Neoplatonism the world itself is God (according to Plato's Timaeus 37). This concept of divinity is associated with that of the Logos (Λόγος), which had originated centuries earlier with Heraclitus (c. 535–475 BC). The Logos pervades the cosmos, whereby all thoughts and all things originate, or as Heraclitus said: "He who hears not me but the Logos will say: All is one." Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus attempted to reconcile this perspective by adding another hypostasis above the original monad of force or Dunamis (Δύναμις). This new all-pervasive monad encompassed all creation and its original uncreated emanations.

Modern philosophy[edit]

Baruch Spinoza later claimed that "Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived."[5] "Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner."[6] Though Spinoza has been called the "prophet"[7] and "prince"[8] of pantheism, in a letter to Henry Oldenburg Spinoza states that: "as to the view of certain people that I identify god with nature (taken as a kind of mass or corporeal matter), they are quite mistaken".[9] For Spinoza, our universe (cosmos) is a mode under two attributes of Thought and Extension. God has infinitely many other attributes which are not present in our world.
According to German philosopher Karl Jaspers, when Spinoza wrote "Deus sive Natura" (God or Nature) Spinoza did not mean to say that God and Nature are interchangeable terms, but rather that God's transcendence was attested by his infinitely many attributes, and that two attributes known by humans, namely Thought and Extension, signified God's immanence.[10] Furthermore, Martial Guéroult suggested the term "panentheism", rather than "pantheism" to describe Spinoza's view of the relation between God and the world. The world is not God, but it is, in a strong sense, "in" God. Yet, American philosopher and self-described panentheist Charles Hartshorne referred to Spinoza's philosophy as "classical pantheism" and distinguished Spinoza's philosophy from panentheism.[11]
In 1828, the German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832) seeking to reconcile monotheism and pantheism, coined the term panentheism (from the Ancient Greek expression πᾶν ἐν θεῷ, pān en theṓ, literally "all in god"). This conception of God influenced New England transcendentalists such as Ralph Waldo Emerson. The term was popularized by Charles Hartshorne in his development of process theology and has also been closely identified with the New Thought.[12] The formalization of this term in the West in the 19th century was not new; philosophical treatises had been written on it in the context of Hinduism for millennia.[13]
Philosophers who embraced panentheism have included Thomas Hill Green (1839–1882), James Ward (1843–1925), Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856–1931) and Samuel Alexander (1859–1938).[14] Beginning in the 1940s, Hartshorne examined numerous conceptions of God. He reviewed and discarded pantheism, deism, and pandeism in favor of panentheism, finding that such a "doctrine contains all of deism and pandeism except their arbitrary negations". Hartshorne formulated God as a being who could become "more perfect": He has absolute perfection in categories for which absolute perfection is possible, and relative perfection (i. e., is superior to all others) in categories for which perfection cannot be precisely determined.[15]

In religion[edit]

Hinduism[edit]

The earliest reference to panentheistic thought in Hindu philosophy is in a creation myth contained in the later section of Rig Veda called the Purusha Sukta,[16] which was compiled before 1100 BCE.[17] The Purusha Sukta gives a description of the spiritual unity of the cosmos. It presents the nature of Purusha or the cosmic being as both immanent in the manifested world and yet transcendent to it.[18] From this being the sukta holds, the original creative will proceeds, by which this vast universe is projected in space and time.[19]
The most influential[20] and dominant[21] school of Indian philosophy, Advaita Vedanta, rejects theism and dualism by insisting that "Brahman [ultimate reality] is without parts or attributes...one without a second."[22] Since Brahman has no properties, contains no internal diversity and is identical with the whole reality it cannot be understood as an anthropomorphic personal God.[23] The relationship between Brahman and the creation is often thought to be panentheistic.[24]
Panentheism is also expressed in the Bhagavad Gita.[24] In verse IX.4, Krishna states:
By Me all this universe is pervaded through My unmanifested form.
All beings abide in Me but I do not abide in them.
Many schools of Hindu thought espouse monistic theism, which is thought to be similar to a panentheistic viewpoint. Nimbarka's school of differential monism (Dvaitadvaita), Ramanuja's school of qualified monism (Vishistadvaita) and Saiva Siddhanta and Kashmir Shaivism are all considered to be panentheistic.[25] Chaitanya Mahaprabhu's Gaudiya Vaishnavism, which elucidates the doctrine of Achintya Bheda Abheda (inconceivable oneness and difference), is also thought to be panentheistic.[26] In Kashmir Shaivism, all things are believed to be a manifestation of Universal Consciousness (Cit or Brahman).[27] So from the point of view of this school, the phenomenal world (Śakti) is real, and it exists and has its being in Consciousness (Cit).[28] Thus, Kashmir Shaivism is also propounding of theistic monism or panentheism.[29]
Shaktism, or Tantra, is regarded as an Indian prototype of Panentheism.[30] Shakti is considered to be the cosmos itself – she is the embodiment of energy and dynamism, and the motivating force behind all action and existence in the material universe. Shiva is her transcendent masculine aspect, providing the divine ground of all being. "There is no Shiva without Shakti, or Shakti without Shiva. The two ... in themselves are One."[31] Thus, it is She who becomes the time and space, the cosmos, it is She who becomes the five elements, and thus all animate life and inanimate forms. She is the primordial energy that holds all creation and destruction, all cycles of birth and death, all laws of cause and effect within Herself, and yet is greater than the sum total of all these. She is transcendent, but becomes immanent as the cosmos (Mula Prakriti). She, the Primordial Energy, directly becomes Matter.

Taoism[edit]

Taoism says that all is part of the eternal tao, and that all interact through qi. Chapter 6 of the Tao Te Ching describes the Tao thus: "The heart of Tao is immortal, the mysterious fertile mother of us all, of heaven and earth, of every thing and not-thing."[32]

Christianity[edit]

Panentheism is also a feature of some Christian philosophical theologies and resonates strongly within the theological tradition of the Orthodox Church.[33] It also appears in process theology. 
Process theological thinkers are generally regarded in the Christian West as unorthodox. Furthermore, process philosophical thought is widely believed to have paved the way for open theism, a movement that tends to associate itself primarily with the Evangelical branch of Protestantism, but is also generally considered unorthodox by most Evangelicals.

Eastern Orthodoxy[edit]

See also: Omnipresence
In Christianity, creation is not considered a literal "part of" God, and divinity is essentially distinct from creation (i.e., transcendent). There is, in other words, an irradicable difference between the uncreated (i.e., God) and the created (i.e., everything else). This does not mean, however, that the creation is wholly separated from God, because the creation exists in and from the divine energies. 
In Eastern Orthodoxy, these energies or operations are the natural activity of God and are in some sense identifiable with God, but at the same time the creation is wholly distinct from the divine essence.[citation needed] God creates the universe by His will and from His energies. It is, however, not an imprint or emanation of God's own essence (ousia), the essence He shares pre-eternally with His Word and Holy Spirit. Neither is it a directly literal outworking or effulgence of the divine, nor any other process which implies that creation is essentially God or a necessary part of God.
 The use of the term "panentheism" to describe the divine concept in Orthodox Christian theology is problematic for those who would insist that panentheism requires creation to be "part of" God.
God is not merely Creator of the universe, as His dynamic presence is necessary to sustain the existence of every created thing, small and great, visible and invisible.[34] That is, God's energies maintain the existence of the created order and all created beings, even if those agencies have explicitly rejected him. His love for creation is such that He will not withdraw His presence, which would be the ultimate form of annihilation, not merely imposing death, but ending existence altogether. By this token, the entirety of creation is fundamentally "good" in its very being, and is not innately evil either in whole or in part. This does not deny the existence of spiritual or moral evil in a fallen universe, only the claim that it is an intrinsic property of creation. Sin results from the essential freedom of creatures to operate outside the divine order, not as a necessary consequence of having inherited human nature.

Panentheism in other Christian confessions[edit]

Many Christians who believe in universalism – mainly expressed in the Universalist Church of America, originating, as a fusion of Pietist and Anabaptist influences, from the American colonies of the 18th century – hold panentheistic views of God in conjunction with their belief in apocatastasis, also called universal reconciliation.[citation needed] Panentheistic Christian Universalists often believe that all creation's subsistence in God renders untenable the notion of final and permanent alienation from Him, citing Scriptural passages such as Ephesians 4:6 ("[God] is over all and through all and in all") and Romans 11:36 ("from [God] and through him and to him are all things") to justify both panentheism and universalism.[citation needed] Panentheism was also a major force in the Unitarian church for a long time, based in part on Ralph Waldo Emerson's concept of the Over-soul (from the synonymous essay of 1841).[citation needed]
Panentheistic conceptions of God occur amongst some modern theologians. Process theology and Creation Spirituality, two recent developments in Christian theology, contain panentheistic ideas. Charles Hartshorne (1897–2000), who conjoined process theology with panentheism, maintained a lifelong membership in the Methodist church but was also a Unitarian. In later years he joined the Austin, Texas, Unitarian Universalist congregation and was an active participant in that church.[35] Referring to the ideas such as Thomas Oord's ‘theocosmocentrism’ (2010), the soft panentheism of open theism, Keith Ward's comparative theology and John Polkinghorne's critical realism (2009), Raymond Potgieter observes distinctions such as dipolar and bipolar:
The former suggests two poles separated such as God influencing creation and it in turn its creator (Bangert 2006:168), whereas bipolarity completes God’s being implying interdependence between temporal and eternal poles. (Marbaniang 2011:133), in dealing with Whitehead’s approach, does not make this distinction. I use the term bipolar as a generic term to include suggestions of the structural definition of God’s transcendence and immanence; to for instance accommodate a present and future reality into which deity must reasonably fit and function, and yet maintain separation from this world and evil whilst remaining within it.[36]
Some argue that panentheism should also include the notion that God has always been related to some world or another, which denies the idea of creation out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo). Nazarene Methodist theologian Thomas Jay Oord (* 1965) advocates panentheism, but he uses the word "theocosmocentrism" to highlight the notion that God and some world or another are the primary conceptual starting blocks for eminently fruitful theology. This form of panentheism helps in overcoming the problem of evil and in proposing that God's love for the world is essential to who God is.[37]
The Christian Church International also holds to a panentheist doctrine. The Latter Day Saint movement teaches that the Light of Christ "proceeds from God through Christ and gives life and light to all things."[38]

Gnosticism[edit]

Main article: Gnosticism
"Gnosticism" is a modern name for a variety of ancient religious ideas and systems prevalent in the first and second century AD. The teachings of the various gnostic groups were very diverse. In his Dictionary of Gnosticism, Andrew Phillip Smith has written that some branches of Gnosticism taught a panentheistic view of reality,[39] and held to the belief that God exists in the visible world only as sparks of spiritual "light". The goal of human existence is to know the sparks within oneself in order to return to God, who is in the Fullness (or Pleroma).
Gnosticism was panentheistic, believing that the true God is simultaneously both separate from the physical universe and present within it.[citation needed] As Jesus states in the Gospel of Thomas, "I am the light that is over all things. I am all ... . Split a piece of wood; I am there. Lift up the stone, and you will find me there."[40] This seemingly contradictory interpretation of gnostic theology is not without controversy, since one interpretation of dualistic theology holds that a perfect God of pure spirit would not manifest himself through the fallen world of matter.
Manichaeism, being another gnostic sect, preached a very different doctrine in positioning the true Manichaean God against matter as well as other deities, that it described as enmeshed with the world, namely the gods of Jews, Christians and pagans.[41] Nevertheless, this dualistic teaching included an elaborate cosmological myth that narrates the defeat of primal man by the powers of darkness that devoured and imprisoned the particles of light.[42]
Valentinian Gnosticism taught that matter came about through emanations of the supreme being, even if to some this event is held to be more accidental than intentional.[43][citation needed] To other gnostics, these emanations were akin to the Sephirot of the Kabbalists and deliberate manifestations of a transcendent God through a complex system of intermediaries.[citation needed]

Judaism[edit]

While mainstream Rabbinic Judaism is classically monotheistic, and follows in the footsteps of Maimonides (c. 1135–1204), the panentheistic conception of God can be found among certain mystical Jewish traditions. A leading scholar of Kabbalah, Moshe Idel[44] ascribes this doctrine to the kabbalistic system of Moses ben Jacob Cordovero (1522–1570) and in the eighteenth century to the Baal Shem Tov (c. 1700–1760), founder of the Hasidic movement, as well as his contemporaries, Rabbi Dov Ber, the Maggid of Mezeritch (died 1772), and Menahem Mendel, the Maggid of Bar. This may be said of many, if not most, subsequent Hasidic masters. There is some debate as to whether Isaac Luria (1534–1572) and Lurianic Kabbalah, with its doctrine of tzimtzum, can be regarded as panentheistic.
According to Hasidism, the infinite Ein Sof is incorporeal and exists in a state that is both transcendent and immanent. This appears to be the view of non-Hasidic Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, as well. Hasidic Judaism merges the elite ideal of nullification to a transcendent God, via the intellectual articulation of inner dimensions through Kabbalah and with emphasis on the panentheistic divine immanence in everything.[45]
Many scholars would argue that "panentheism" is the best single-word description of the philosophical theology of Baruch Spinoza.[46] It is therefore no surprise, that aspects of panentheism are also evident in the theology of Reconstructionist Judaism as presented in the writings of Mordecai Kaplan (1881–1983), who was strongly influenced by Spinoza.[47]

Islam[edit]

Further information: Tawheed
Several Sufi saints and thinkers, primarily Ibn Arabi, held beliefs that have been considered panentheistic.[48] These notions later took shape in the theory of wahdat ul-wujud (the Unity of All Things). Some Sufi Orders, notably the Bektashis[49] and the Universal Sufi movement, continue to espouse panentheistic beliefs. Nizari Ismaili follow panentheism according to Ismaili doctrine. Nevertheless, some Shia Muslims also do believe in different degrees of Panentheism.
Al-Qayyuum is a Name of God in the Qur'an which translates to "The Self-Existing by Whom all subsist". In Islam the universe can not exist if Allah doesn't exist, and it is only by His power which encompasses everything and which is everywhere that the universe can exist. In Ayaẗ al-Kursii God's throne is described as "extending over the heavens and the earth" and "He feels no fatigue in guarding and preserving them". This does not mean though that the universe is God, or that a creature (like a tree or an animal) is God, because those would be respectively pantheism, which is a heresy in traditional Islam, and the worst heresy in Islam, shirk (polytheism). God is separated by His creation but His creation can not survive without Him.

In Pre-Columbian America[edit]

The Mesoamerican empires of the Mayas, Aztecs as well as the South American Incas (Tahuatinsuyu) have typically been characterized as polytheistic, with strong male and female deities.[50] According to Charles C. Mann's history book 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus, only the lower classes of Aztec society were polytheistic. Philosopher James Maffie has argued that Aztec metaphysics was pantheistic rather than panentheistic, since Teotl was considered by Aztec philosophers to be the ultimate all-encompassing yet all-transcending force defined by its inherit duality.[51]
Native American beliefs in North America have been characterized as panentheistic in that there is an emphasis on a single, unified divine spirit that is manifest in each individual entity.[52] (North American Native writers have also translated the word for God as the Great Mystery[53] or as the Sacred Other[54]) This concept is referred to by many as the Great Spirit. Philosopher J. Baird Callicott has described Lakota theology as panentheistic, in that the divine both transcends and is immanent in everything.[55]
One exception can be modern Cherokee who are predominantly monotheistic but apparently not panentheistic;[56] yet in older Cherokee traditions many observe both aspects of pantheism and panentheism, and are often not beholden to exclusivity, encompassing other spiritual traditions without contradiction, a common trait among some tribes in the Americas. In the stories of Keetoowah storytellers Sequoyah Guess and Dennis Sixkiller, God is known as ᎤᏁᎳᏅᎯ, commonly pronounced "unehlanv," and visited earth in prehistoric times, but then left earth and her people to rely on themselves. This shows a parallel to Vaishnava cosmology.

Sikhism[edit]

The Sikh gurus have described God in numerous ways in their hymns included in the Guru Granth Sahib, the holy scripture of Sikhism, but the oneness of the deity is consistently emphasized throughout. God is described in the Mool Mantar, the first passage in the Guru Granth Sahib, and the basic formula of the faith is:
(Sri Guru Granth Sahib Ji, Ang 1) in Punjabi — ੴ ਸਤਿ ਨਾਮੁ ਕਰਤਾ ਪੁਰਖੁ ਨਿਰਭਉ ਨਿਰਵੈਰੁ ਅਕਾਲ ਮੂਰਤਿ ਅਜੂਨੀ ਸੈਭੰ ਗੁਰਪ੍ਰਸਾਦਿ ॥
Punjabi in Latin script
Ik Oankar Satnaam KartaaPurakh Nirbhau Nirvair AkaalMoorat Ajooni Saibhan GurPrasad
English translation
One primal being who made the sound (oan) that expanded and created the world. Truth is the name. Creative being personified. Without fear, without hate. Image of the undying. Beyond birth, self existent. By Guru's grace~
Guru Arjan, the fifth guru of Sikhs, says, "God is beyond colour and form, yet His/Her presence is clearly visible" (Sri Guru Granth Sahib, Ang 74), and "Nanak's Lord transcends the world as well as the scriptures of the east and the west, and yet He/She is clearly manifest" (Sri Guru Granth Sahib, Ang 397).
Knowledge of the ultimate Reality is not a matter for reason; it comes by revelation of the ultimate reality through nadar (grace) and by anubhava (mystical experience). Says Guru Nanak; "budhi pathi na paiai bahu chaturaiai bhai milai mani bhane." This translates to "He/She is not accessible through intellect, or through mere scholarship or cleverness at argument; He/She is met, when He/She pleases, through devotion" (GG, 436).
Guru Nanak prefixed the numeral one (ik) to it, making it Ik Oankar or Ek Oankar to stress God's oneness. God is named and known only through his Own immanent nature. The only name which can be said to truly fit God's transcendent state is SatNam ( Sat Sanskrit, Truth), the changeless and timeless Reality. God is transcendent and all-pervasive at the same time. Transcendence and immanence are two aspects of the same single Supreme Reality. The Reality is immanent in the entire creation, but the creation as a whole fails to contain God fully. As says Guru Tegh Bahadur, Nanak IX, "He has himself spread out His/Her Own “maya” (worldly illusion) which He oversees; many different forms He assumes in many colours, yet He stays independent of all" (GG, 537).

Bahá'í Faith[edit]

Further information: God in the Bahá'í Faith
In the Bahá'í Faith, God is described as a single, imperishable God, the creator of all things, including all the creatures and forces in the universe. The connection between God and the world is that of the creator to his creation.[57] God is understood to be independent of his creation, and that creation is dependent and contingent on God. Accordingly, the Bahá'í Faith is much more closely aligned with traditions of monotheism than panentheism. God is not seen to be part of creation as he cannot be divided and does not descend to the condition of his creatures. Instead, in the Bahá'í understanding, the world of creation emanates from God, in that all things have been realized by him and have attained to existence.[58] Creation is seen as the expression of God's will in the contingent world,[59] and every created thing is seen as a sign of God's sovereignty, and leading to knowledge of him; the signs of God are most particularly revealed in human beings.[57]

Konkōkyō[edit]

In Konkōkyō, God is named “Tenchi Kane no Kami-Sama” which can mean “Golden spirit of the universe.” Kami (God) is also seen as infinitely loving and powerful.

See also[edit]

People associated with panentheism:
  • Gregory Palamas(1296–1359), Byzantine Orthodox theologian and hesychast
  • Baruch Spinoza(1632–1677), Dutch philosopher of Sephardi-Portuguese origin
  • Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), English mathematician, philosopher, and father of process philosophy
  • Charles Hartshorne(1897–2000), American philosopher and father of process theology
  • Arthur Peacocke(1924–2006), British Anglican theologian and biochemist
  • John B. Cobb (* 1925), American theologian and philosopher
  • Mordechai Nessyahu (1929–1997), Jewish-Israeli political theorist and philosopher of Cosmotheism
  • Sallie McFague(1933–2019), American feminist theologian, author of Models of Godand The Body of God
  • William Luther Pierce (1933–2002), American political activist and self-proclaimed cosmotheist
  • Rosemary Radford Ruether (* 1936), American feminist theologian, author of Sexism and God-Talk and Gaia and God
  • Jan Assmann (* 1938), German Egyptologist, theorist of Cosmotheism
  • Leonardo Boff (* 1938), Brazilian liberation theologian and philosopher, former Franciscan priest, author of Ecology and Liberation: A New Paradigm
  • Matthew Fox (* 1940), American theologian, exponent of Creation Spirtuality, expelled from the Dominican Order in 1993 and received into the Episcopal priesthood in 1994, author of Creation Spirituality, The Coming of the Cosmic Christ and A New Reformation: Creation Spirituality and the Transformation of Christianity
  • Marcus Borg(1942-2015), American New Testament scholar and theologian. Prominent member of the Jesus Seminar, author of The God We Never Knew
  • Richard Rohr (* 1943), American Franciscan priest and spiritual writer. Author of Everything Belongsand The Universal Christ
  • Carter Heyward (* 1945), American feminist theologian and Episcopal priest, author of Touching our Strength and Saving Jesus from Those Who Are Right
  • Norman Lowell (* 1946), Maltese writer and politician, self-proclaimed cosmotheist
  • John Philip Newell(* 1953), Canadian-born minister ordained in the Church of Scotland, spiritual writer, author of numerous books including The Rebirthing of God: Christianity's Struggle for New Beginnings
  • John Polkinghorne(* 1960), English theoretical physicist and theologian
  • Michel Weber (* 1963), Belgian philosopher
  • Thomas Jay Oord(* 1965), American theologian and philosopher

References[edit]

  1. ^ Jump up to:a b John Culp (2013): “Panentheism”, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 March 2014.
  2. ^ Jump up to:a b Erwin Fahlbusch; Geoffrey William Bromiley; David B. Barrett (2005). The Encyclopedia of Christianity. 4. William B. Eerdmans. p. 21. ISBN 978-0-8028-2416-5.
  3. ^ “Pantheism and Panentheism in non-Western cultures”, in: Britannica.
  4. ^ Whiting, Robert. Religions for Today. Stanley Thomes, London 1991, p. viii. ISBN 0-7487-0586-4.
  5. ^ Ethics, part I, prop. 15.
  6. ^ Ethics, part I, prop. 25S.
  7. ^ Picton, J. Allanson, "Pantheism: Its Story and Significance", 1905.
  8. ^ Fraser, Alexander Campbell, "Philosophy of Theism", William Blackwood and Sons, 1895, p. 163.
  9. ^ Correspondence of Benedict de Spinoza, Wilder Publications, 2009, ISBN 978-1-60459-156-9, letter 73.
  10. ^ Karl Jaspers, Spinoza (Great Philosophers), Harvest Books, 1974, ISBN 978-0-15-684730-8, pp. 14 and 95.
  11. ^ Charles Hartshorne and William Reese, Philosophers Speak of God, Humanity Books, 1953, ch. 4.
  12. ^ Smith, David L. (2014). Theologies of the 21st Century: Trends in Contemporary Theology. Eugene OR: Wipf and Stock. p. 228. ISBN 978-1625648648. Retrieved 29 September 2015.
  13. ^ Southgate, Christopher (2005). God, Humanity and the Cosmos: A Companion to the Science-Religion Debate. London: T&T Clark. pp. 246–47. ISBN 978-0567030160. Retrieved 29 September 2015.
  14. ^ John W. Cooper Panentheism, the other God of the philosophers: from Plato to the presentBaker Academic, 2006, ISBN 0-8010-2724-1.
  15. ^ Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism (1964) ISBN 0-208-00498-X p. 348; cf. Michel Weber, Whitehead’s Pancreativism. The Basics. Foreword by Nicholas Rescher, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt am Main and Paris, 2006.
  16. ^ Nigal, Sahebrao Genu (2009). Vedic Philosophy of Values. New Delhi: Northern Book Centre. p. 81. ISBN 978-8172112806. Retrieved 1 October 2015.
  17. ^ Oberlies (1998:155) gives an estimate of 1100 BC for the youngest hymns in book 10. Estimates for a terminus post quem of the earliest hymns are more uncertain. Oberlies (p. 158) based on 'cumulative evidence' sets wide range of 1700–1100
  18. ^ The Purusha Sukta in Daily Invocations by Swami Krishnananda
  19. ^ Krishnananda, Swami. A Short History of Religious and Philosophic Thought in India. Divine Life Society. P. 19
  20. ^ "Consciousness in Advaita Vedānta ," By William M. Indich, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1995, ISBN 81-208-1251-4.
  21. ^ "Gandhi And Mahayana Buddhism". Class.uidaho.edu. Retrieved 2011-06-10.
  22. ^ Wainwright, William. "Concepts of God". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 1 October 2015.
  23. ^ Wainwright, William, "Concepts of God", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
  24. ^ Jump up to:a b Southgate, Christopher. God, Humanity, and the Cosmos. T&T Clark Int'l, New York. P. 246. ISBN 0567030164.
  25. ^ Sherma, Rita DasGupta; Sharma Arvind. Hermeneutics and Hindu Thought: Toward a Fusion of Horizons. Springer, 2008 edition (December 1, 2010). P. 192. ISBN 9048178002.
  26. ^ Chaitanya Charitamrita, A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, Bhaktivedanta Book Trust
  27. ^ The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism, By Mark S. G. Dyczkowski, p.44
  28. ^ Ksemaraja, trans. by Jaidev Singh, Spanda Karikas: The Divine Creative Pulsation, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, p.119
  29. ^ The Trika Śaivism of Kashmir, Moti Lal Pandit
  30. ^ Vitsaxis, Vassilis. Thought and Faith: The concept of divinity. Somerset Hall Press. P. 167. ISBN 978-1-935244-03-5.
  31. ^ Subramanian, V. K., Saundaryalahari of Sankaracarya: Sanskrit Text in Devanagari with Roman Transliteration, English Translation, Explanatory Notes, Yantric Diagrams and Index. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi, 1977; 6th ed. 1998). P. ix.
  32. ^ "Tao Te Ching (Daodejing) (translated Brian Browne Walker)". Retrieved 2018-12-12.
  33. ^ Nesteruk, Alexei V. (2004). "The Universe as Hypostaic Inherence in the logos of God: Panentheism in the Eastern Orthodox Perspective", in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific World, edited by Philip Clayton and Arthur Robert Peacocke. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans. pp. 169–83. ISBN 978-0802809780. Retrieved 23 March 2018.
  34. ^ St. Symeon in Practical & Theological Discourses, 1.1: “When men search for God with their bodily eyes they find Him nowhere, for He is invisible. But for those who ponder in the Spirit He is present everywhere. He is in all, yet beyond all.”
  35. ^ About Charles Hartshorne Archived 2007-11-14 at the Wayback Machine.
  36. ^ Potgieter, R., 2013, ‘Keith Ward’s soft panentheism’, In die Skriflig/In Luce Verbi 47(1), Art. #581, 9 pages. https://dx.doi.org/10.4102/ ids.v47i1.581
  37. ^ Baker, Vaughn W. (2013). Evangelism and the Openness of God: The Implications of Relational Theism. Eugene OR: Wipf and Stock. pp. 242–43. ISBN 9781620320471. Retrieved 1 October 2015.
  38. ^ "Light of Christ", churchofjesuschrist.org.
  39. ^ Smith, Andrew Phillip (2014). A Dictionary of Gnosticism. Wheaton IL: Quest Books. p. 186. ISBN 9780835608695. Retrieved 1 October 2015.
  40. ^ Gospel of Thomas, saying 77.
  41. ^ “Now, he who spoke with Moses, the Jews, and the priests he says is the archont of Darkness, and the Christians, Jews, and pagans (ethnic) are one and the same, as they revere the same god. For in his aspirations he seduces them, as he is not the god of truth. And so therefore all those who put their hope in the god who spoke with Moses and the prophets have (this in store for themselves, namely) to be bound with him, because they did not put their hope in the god of truth. For that one spoke with them (only) according to their own aspirations.” And elsewhere: “Now God has no part in this cosmos nor does he rejoice over it.” Classical Texts: Acta Archelai, p. 76 ([www.fas.harvard.edu/~iranian/Manicheism/Manicheism_II_Texts.pdf pdf online]). Cf. The Mystica an Dualism.
  42. ^ "But the blessed One [...] sent, through his beneficent Spirit and his great mercy, a helper to Adam, luminous Epinoia which comes out of him, who is called Life. [...] And the luminous Epinoia was hidden in Adam, in order that the archons might not know her, but that the Epinoia might be a correction of the deficiency of the mother. And the man came forth because of the shadow of the light which is in him. [...] And they took counsel with the whole array of archons and angels. [...] And they brought him (Adam) into the shadow of death, in order that they might form (him) again from earth [...] This is the tomb of the newly-formed body with which the robbers had clothed the man, the bond of forgetfulness; and he became a mortal man. [...] But the Epinoia of the light which was in him, she is the one who was to awaken his thinking. ([1])
  43. ^ https://www.iep.utm.edu/gnostic/. Missing or empty |title= (help)
  44. ^ Hasidism: Between Ecstacy and Magic, SUNY, 1995, p. 17 f.
  45. ^ Ariel, David S. (2006). Kabbalah: The Mystic Quest in Judaism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 184–85. ISBN 978-0742545649. Retrieved 17 August 2015.
  46. ^ Diller, Jeanine and Asa Kasher (2013). Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities. Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media. pp. 425–26. ISBN 978-94-007-5218-4. Retrieved 1 October 2015.
  47. ^ Scult, Mel (2013). The Radical American Judaism of Mordecai M. Kaplan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 7–8. ISBN 978-0-253-01075-9. Retrieved 1 October 2015.
  48. ^ Minai, Asghar Talaye (2003). Mysticism, aesthetics, and cosmic consciousness: a post-modern worldview of unity of being. N.Y.: Global Academic Pub. p. 250. ISBN 978-1586842499.
  49. ^ Abiva, Huseyin. "Bektashi Thought & Practice". Bektashi Order of Dervishes. Retrieved 1 October 2015.
  50. ^ Murphy, John (2014). Gods & Goddesses of the Inca, Maya, and Aztec Civilizations. New York: Rosen Education Service. ISBN 978-1622753963. Retrieved 17 August 2015.
  51. ^ Maffie, James (2013). Aztec Philosophy: Understanding a World in Motion. Boulder: University Press of Colorado. ISBN 9781607322238. Retrieved 17 August 2015.
  52. ^ Solomon, Robert C. and Kathleen M. Higgins (2003). From Africa to Zen: An Invitation to World Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 51–54. ISBN 978-0742513495. Retrieved 17 August 2015.
  53. ^ Russell Means, Where White Men Fear To Tread (Macmillan, 1993), pp. 3–4, 15, 17.
  54. ^ George Tinker, Spirit and Resistance: Political Theology and American Indian Liberation, 2004, p. 89. He defines the Sacred Other as "the Deep Mystery which creates and sustains all Creation".
  55. ^ Earth's Insights: A Multicultural Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1994. p. 122. ISBN 9780520085602. Retrieved 17 August 2015.
  56. ^ The Peoples of the World Foundation. Education for and about Indigenous Peoples: The Cherokee People, retrieved 2008-03-24.
  57. ^ Jump up to:a b Smith, Peter (2000). "God". A concise encyclopedia of the Bahá'í Faith. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. p. 116. ISBN 978-1-85168-184-6.
  58. ^ `Abdu'l-Bahá (1981) [1904–06]. Some Answered Questions. Wilmette, Illinois, USA: Bahá'í Publishing Trust. pp. 202–203. ISBN 978-0-87743-190-9.
  59. ^ Smith, Peter (2000). "creation". A concise encyclopedia of the Bahá'í Faith. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. pp. 164–165. ISBN 978-1-85168-184-6.

Bibliography[edit]

  • Ankur Barua, "God’s Body at Work: Rāmānuja and Panentheism," in: International Journal of Hindu Studies, 14,1 (2010), pp. 1–30.
  • Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacock (eds.), In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being; Panentheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific World, Eerdmans (2004)
  • Bangert, B.C. (2006). Consenting to God and nature: Toward a theocentric, naturalistic, theological ethics, Princeton theological monograph ser. 55, Pickwick Publications, Eugene.
  • Cooper, John W. (2006). Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers, Baker Academic ISBN 9780801027246
  • Davis, Andrew M. and Philip Clayton (eds.) (2018). How I Found God in Everyone and Everywhere, Monkfish Book Publishing ISBN 9781939681881
  • Thomas Jay Oord (2010). The Nature of Love: A Theology ISBN 978-0-8272-0828-5.
  • Joseph Bracken, "Panentheism in the context of the theology and science dialogue", in: Open Theology, 1 (2014), 1–11 (online).
  • Marbaniang, Domenic (2011). Epistemics of Divine Reality. POD. ISBN 9781105160776.

External links[edit]

Posted by at
Labels: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Design Arguments for the Existence of God | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy



Design Arguments for the Existence of God | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy



Design Arguments for the Existence of God

Design arguments are empirical arguments for the existence of God. These arguments typically, though not always, proceed by attempting to identify various empirical features of the world that constitute evidence of intelligent design and inferring God’s existence as the best explanation for these features. Since the concepts of design and purpose are closely related, design arguments are also known as teleological arguments, which incorporates “telos,” the Greek word for “goal” or “purpose.”

Design arguments typically consist of (1) a premise that asserts that the material universe exhibits some empirical property F; (2) a premise (or sub-argument) that asserts (or concludes) that F is persuasive evidence of intelligent design or purpose; and (3) a premise (or sub-argument) that asserts (or concludes) that the best or most probable explanation for the fact that the material universe exhibits F is that there exists an intelligent designer who intentionally brought it about that the material universe exists and exhibits F.

There are a number of classic and contemporary versions of the argument from design. This article will cover seven different ones. Among the classical versions are: (1) the “Fifth Way” of St. Thomas Aquinas; (2) the argument from simple analogy; (3) Paley’s watchmaker argument; and (4) the argument from guided evolution. The more contemporary versions include: (5) the argument from irreducible biochemical complexity; (6) the argument from biological information; and (7) the fine-tuning argument.
Table of Contents
The Classical Versions of the Design Argument
Scriptural Roots and Aquinas’s Fifth Way
The Argument from Simple Analogy
Paley’s Watchmaker Argument
Guided Evolution
Contemporary Versions of the Design Argument
The Argument from Irreducible Biochemical Complexity
The Argument from Biological Information
The Fine-Tuning Arguments
The Argument from Suspicious Improbability
The Confirmatory Argument
The Scientifically Legitimate Uses of Design Inferences
References and Further Reading
1. The Classical Versions of the Design Argument
a. Scriptural Roots and Aquinas’s Fifth Way

The scriptures of each of the major classically theistic religions contain language that suggests that there is evidence of divine design in the world. Psalms 19:1 of the Old Testament, scripture to both Judaism and Christianity, states that “The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handywork.” Similarly, Romans 1:19-21 of the New Testament states:


For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made. So they are without excuse.

Further, Koran 31:20 asks “Do you not see that Allah has made what is in the heavens and what is in the earth subservient to you, and made complete to you His favors outwardly and inwardly?” While these verses do not specifically indicate which properties or features of the world are evidence of God’s intelligent nature, each presupposes that the world exhibits such features and that they are readily discernable to a reasonably conscientious agent.

Perhaps the earliest philosophically rigorous version of the design argument owes to St. Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas’s Fifth Way:


We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Article 3, Question 2).

It is worth noting that Aquinas’s version of the argument relies on a very strong claim about the explanation for ends and processes: the existence of any end-directed system or process can be explained, as a logical matter, only by the existence of an intelligent being who directs that system or process towards its end. Since the operations of all natural bodies, on Aquinas’s view, are directed towards some specific end that conduces to, at the very least, the preservation of the object, these operations can be explained only by the existence of an intelligent being. Accordingly, the empirical fact that the operations of natural objects are directed towards ends shows that an intelligent Deity exists.

This crucial claim, however, seems to be refuted by the mere possibility of an evolutionary explanation. If a Darwinian explanation is even coherent (that is, non-contradictory, as opposed to true), then it provides a logically possible explanation for how the end-directedness of the operations of living beings in this world might have come about. According to this explanation, such operations evolve through a process by which random genetic mutations are naturally selected for their adaptive value; organisms that have evolved some system that performs a fitness-enhancing operation are more likely to survive and leave offspring, other things being equal, than organisms that have not evolved such systems. If this explanation is possibly true, it shows that Aquinas is wrong in thinking that “whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence.”
b. The Argument from Simple Analogy

The next important version of the design argument came in the 17th and 18th Centuries. Pursuing a strategy that has been adopted by the contemporary intelligent design movement, John Ray, Richard Bentley, and William Derham drew on scientific discoveries of the 16th and 17th Century to argue for the existence of an intelligent Deity. William Derham, for example, saw evidence of intelligent design in the vision of birds, the drum of the ear, the eye-socket, and the digestive system. Richard Bentley saw evidence of intelligent design in Newton’s discovery of the law of gravitation. It is noteworthy that each of these thinkers attempted to give scientifically-based arguments for the existence of God.

David Hume is the most famous critic of these arguments. In Part II of his famous Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume formulates the argument as follows:


Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: you will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.

Since the world, on this analysis, is closely analogous to the most intricate artifacts produced by human beings, we can infer “by all the rules of analogy” the existence of an intelligent designer who created the world. Just as the watch has a watchmaker, then, the universe has a universe-maker.

As expressed in this passage, then, the argument is a straightforward argument from analogy with the following structure:
The material universe resembles the intelligent productions of human beings in that it exhibits design.
The design in any human artifact is the effect of having been made by an intelligent being.
Like effects have like causes.
Therefore, the design in the material universe is the effect of having been made by an intelligent creator.

Hume criticizes the argument on two main grounds. First, Hume rejects the analogy between the material universe and any particular human artifact. As Hume states the relevant rule of analogy, “wherever you depart in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty” (Hume, Dialogues, Part II). Hume then goes on to argue that the cases are simply too dissimilar to support an inference that they are like effects having like causes:


If we see a house,… we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect (Hume, Dialogues, Part II).

Since the analogy fails, Hume argues that we would need to have experience with the creation of material worlds in order to justify any a posteriori claims about the causes of any particular material world; since we obviously lack such experience, we lack adequate justification for the claim that the material universe has an intelligent cause.

Second, Hume argues that, even if the resemblance between the material universe and human artifacts justified thinking they have similar causes, it would not justify thinking that an all-perfect God exists and created the world. For example, there is nothing in the argument that would warrant the inference that the creator of the universe is perfectly intelligent or perfectly good. Indeed, Hume argues that there is nothing there that would justify thinking even that there is just one deity: “what shadow of an argument… can you produce from your hypothesis to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world” (Hume Dialogues, Part V)?
c. Paley’s Watchmaker Argument

Though often confused with the argument from simple analogy, the watchmaker argument from William Paley is a more sophisticated design argument that attempts to avoid Hume’s objection to the analogy between worlds and artifacts. Instead of simply asserting a similarity between the material world and some human artifact, Paley’s argument proceeds by identifying what he takes to be a reliable indicator of intelligent design:


[S]uppose I found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think … that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for [a] stone [that happened to be lying on the ground]?… For this reason, and for no other; namely, that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, if a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it (Paley 1867, 1).

There are thus two features of a watch that reliably indicate that it is the result of an intelligent design. First, it performs some function that an intelligent agent would regard as valuable; the fact that the watch performs the function of keeping time is something that has value to an intelligent agent. Second, the watch could not perform this function if its parts and mechanisms were differently sized or arranged; the fact that the ability of a watch to keep time depends on the precise shape, size, and arrangement of its parts suggests that the watch has these characteristics because some intelligent agency designed it to these specifications. Taken together, these two characteristics endow the watch with a functional complexity that reliably distinguishes objects that have intelligent designers from objects that do not.

Paley then goes on to argue that the material universe exhibits the same kind of functional complexity as a watch:


Every indicator of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. I mean that the contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtilty, and curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if possible, do they go beyond them in number and variety; yet in a multitude of cases, are not less evidently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less evidently accommodated to their end, or suited to their office, than are the most perfect productions of human ingenuity (Paley 1867, 13).

Since the works of nature possess functional complexity, a reliable indicator of intelligent design, we can justifiably conclude that these works were created by an intelligent agent who designed them to instantiate this property.

Paley’s watchmaker argument is clearly not vulnerable to Hume’s criticism that the works of nature and human artifacts are too dissimilar to infer that they are like effects having like causes. Paley’s argument, unlike arguments from analogy, does not depend on a premise asserting a general resemblance between the objects of comparison. What matters for Paley’s argument is that works of nature and human artifacts have a particular property that reliably indicates design. Regardless of how dissimilar any particular natural object might otherwise be from a watch, both objects exhibit the sort of functional complexity that warrants an inference that it was made by an intelligent designer.

Paley’s version of the argument, however, is generally thought to have been refuted by Charles Darwin’s competing explanation for complex organisms. In The Origin of the Species, Darwin argued that more complex biological organisms evolved gradually over millions of years from simpler organisms through a process of natural selection. As Julian Huxley describes the logic of this process:


The evolutionary process results immediately and automatically from the basic property of living matter—that of self-copying, but with occasional errors. Self-copying leads to multiplication and competition; the errors in self-copying are what we call mutations, and mutations will inevitably confer different degrees of biological advantage or disadvantage on their possessors. The consequence will be differential reproduction down the generations—in other words, natural selection (Huxley 1953, 4).

Over time, the replication of genetic material in an organism results in mutations that give rise to new traits in the organism’s offspring. Sometimes these new traits are so unfavorable to a being’s survival prospects that beings with the traits die off; but sometimes these new traits enable the possessors to survive conditions that kill off beings without them. If the trait is sufficiently favorable, only members of the species with the trait will survive. By this natural process, functionally complex organisms gradually evolve over millions of years from primordially simple organisms.

Contemporary biologist, Richard Dawkins (1986), uses a programming problem to show that the logic of the process renders the Darwinian explanation significantly more probable than the design explanation. Dawkins considers two ways in which one might program a computer to generate the following sequence of characters: METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL. The first program randomly producing a new 28-character sequence each time it is run; since the program starts over each time, it incorporates a “single-step selection process.” The probability of randomly generating the target sequence on any given try is 2728 (that is, 27 characters selected for each of the 28 positions in the sequence), which amounts to about 1 in (10,000 x 1,000,0006). While a computer running eternally would eventually produce the sequence, Dawkins estimates that it would take 1,000,0005 years—which is 1,000,0003 years longer than the universe has existed. As is readily evident, a program that selects numbers by means of such a “single-step selection mechanism” has a very low probability of reaching the target.

The second program incorporates a “cumulative-step selection mechanism.” It begins by randomly generating a 28-character sequence of letters and spaces and then “breeds” from this sequence in the following way. For a specified period of time, it generates copies of itself; most of the copies perfectly replicate the sequence, but some copies have errors (or mutations). At the end of this period, it compares all of the sequences with the target sequence METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL and keeps the sequence that most closely resembles it. For example, a sequence that has an E in the second place more closely resembles a sequence that is exactly like the first except that it has a Q in the second place. It then begins breeding from this new sequence in exactly the same way. Unlike the first program which starts afresh with each try, the second program builds on previous steps, getting successively closer to the program as it breeds from the sequence closest to the target. This feature of the program increases the probability of reaching the sequence to such an extent that a computer running this program hit the target sequence after 43 generations, which took about half-an-hour.

The problem with Paley’s watchmaker argument, as Dawkins explains it, is that it falsely assumes that all of the other possible competing explanations are sufficiently improbable to warrant an inference of design. While this might be true of explanations that rely entirely on random single-step selection mechanisms, this is not true of Darwinian explanations. As is readily evident from Huxley’s description of the process, Darwinian evolution is a cumulative-step selection method that closely resembles in general structure the second computer program. The result is that the probability of evolving functionally complex organisms capable of surviving a wide variety of conditions is increased to such an extent that it exceeds the probability of the design explanation.
d. Guided Evolution

While many theists are creationists who accept the occurrence of “microevolution” (that is, evolution that occurs within a species, such as the evolution of penicillin-resistant bacteria) but deny the occurrence of “macroevolution” (that is, one species evolving from a distinct species), some theists accept the theory of evolution as consistent with theism and with their own denominational religious commitments. Such thinkers, however, frequently maintain that the existence of God is needed to explain the purposive quality of the evolutionary process. Just as the purposive quality of the cumulative-step computer program above is best explained by intelligent design, so too the purposive quality of natural selection is best explained by intelligent design.

The first theist widely known to have made such an argument is Frederick Robert Tennant. As he puts the matter, in Volume 2 of Philosophical Theology, “the multitude of interwoven adaptations by which the world is constituted a theatre of life, intelligence, and morality, cannot reasonably be regarded as an outcome of mechanism, or of blind formative power, or aught but purposive intelligence” (Tennant 1928-30, 121). In effect, this influential move infers design, not from the existence of functionally complex organisms, but from the purposive quality of the evolutionary process itself. Evolution is, on this line of response, guided by an intelligent Deity.
2. Contemporary Versions of the Design Argument

Contemporary versions of the design argument typically attempt to articulate a more sophisticated strategy for detecting evidence of design in the world. These versions typically contain three main elements—though they are not always explicitly articulated. First, they identify some property P that is thought to be a probabilistically reliable index of design in the following sense: a design explanation for P is significantly more probable than any explanation that relies on chance or random processes. Second they argue that some feature or features of the world exhibits P. Third, they conclude that the design explanation is significantly more likely to be true.

As we will see, however, all of the contemporary versions of the design inference seem to be vulnerable to roughly the same objection. While each of the design inferences in these arguments has legitimate empirical uses, those uses occur only in contexts where we have strong antecedent reason for believing there exist intelligent agents with the ability to bring about the relevant event, entity, or property. But since it is the very existence of such a being that is at issue in the debates about the existence of God, design arguments appear unable to stand by themselves as arguments for God’s existence.
a. The Argument from Irreducible Biochemical Complexity

Design theorists distinguish two types of complexity that can be instantiated by any given structure. As William Dembski describes the distinction: a system or structure is cumulatively complex “if the components of the system can be arranged sequentially so that the successive removal of components never leads to the complete loss of function”; a system or structure is irreducibly complex “if it consists of several interrelated parts so that removing even one part completely destroys the system’s function” (Dembski 1999, 147). A city is cumulatively complex since one can successively remove people, services, and buildings without rendering it unable to perform its function. A mousetrap, in contrast, is irreducibly complex because the removal of even one part results in complete loss of function.

Design proponents, like Michael J. Behe, have identified a number of biochemical systems that they take to be irreducibly complex. Like the functions of a watch or a mousetrap, a cilium cannot perform its function unless its microtubules, nexin linkers, and motor proteins are all arranged and structured in precisely the manner in which they are structured; remove any component from the system and it cannot perform its function. Similarly, the blood-clotting function cannot perform its function if either of its key ingredients, vitamin K and antihemophilic factor, are missing. Both systems are, on this view, irreducibly complex—rather than cumulatively complex.

According to Behe, the probability of evolving irreducibly complex systems along Darwinian lines is sufficiently small that it can be ruled out as an explanation of irreducible biochemical complexity:


An irreducibly complex system cannot be produced … by slight, successive modifications of a precursor system, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing a part is by definition nonfunctional…. Since natural selection can only choose systems that are already working, if a biological system cannot be produced gradually it would have to arise as an integrated unit, in one fell swoop, for natural selection to have anything to act on (Behe 1996, 39; emphasis added).

Since, for example, a cilium-precursor (that is, one that lacks at least one of a cilium’s parts) cannot perform the function that endows a cilium with adaptive value, organisms that have the cilium-precursor are no “fitter for survival” than they would have been without it. Since chance-driven evolutionary processes would not select organisms with the precursor, intelligent design is a better explanation for the existence of organisms with fully functional cilia.

Though Behe states his conclusion in categorical terms (that is, irreducibly complex systems “cannot be produced gradually”), he is more charitably construed as claiming only that the probability of gradually producing irreducibly complex systems is very small. The stronger construction of the conclusion (and argument) incorrectly presupposes that Darwinian theory implies that every precursor to a fully functional system must itself perform some function that makes the organism more fit to survive. Organisms that have, say, a precursor to a fully functional cilium are no fitter than they would have been without it, but there is nothing in Darwinian theory that implies they are necessarily any less fit. Thus, there is no reason to think that it is logically or nomologically impossible, according to Darwinian theory, for a set of organisms with a precursor to a fully functional cilium to evolve into a set of organisms that has fully functional cilia. Accordingly, the argument from irreducible biochemical complexity is more plausibly construed as showing that the design explanation for such complexity is more probable than the evolutionary explanation.

Nevertheless, this more modest interpretation is problematic. First, there is little reason to think that the probability of evolving irreducibly complex systems is, as a general matter, small enough to warrant assuming that the probability of the design explanation must be higher. If having a precursor to an irreducibly complex system does not render the organism less fit for survival, the probability a subspecies of organisms with the precursor survives and propagates is the same, other things being equal, as the probability that a subspecies of organisms without the precursor survives and propagates. In such cases, then, the prospect that the subspecies with the precursor will continue to thrive, leave offspring, and evolve is not unusually small.

Second, the claim that intelligent agents of a certain kind would (or should) see functional value in a complex system, by itself, says very little about the probability of any particular causal explanation. While this claim surely implies that intelligent agents with the right causal abilities have a reason for bringing about such systems, it does not tell us anything determinate about whether it is likely that intelligent agents with the right causal powers did bring such systems about—because it does not tell us anything determinate about whether it is probable that such agents exist. As a logical matter, the mere fact that some existing thing has a feature, irreducibly complex or otherwise, that would be valuable to an intelligent being with certain properties, by itself, does not say anything about the probability that such a being exists.

Accordingly, even if we knew that the prospect that the precursor-subspecies would survive was “vanishingly small,” as Behe believes, we would not be justified in inferring a design explanation on probabilistic grounds. To infer that the design explanation is more probable than an explanation of vanishingly small probability, we need some reason to think that the probability of the design explanation is not vanishingly small. The problem, however, is that the claim that a complex system has some property that would be valued by an intelligent agent with the right abilities, by itself, simply does not justify inferring that the probability that such an agent exists and brought about the existence of that system is not vanishingly small. In the absence of some further information about the probability that such an agent exists, we cannot legitimately infer design as the explanation of irreducible biochemical complexity.
b. The Argument from Biological Information

While the argument from irreducible biochemical complexity focuses on the probability of evolving irreducibly complex living systems or organisms from simpler living systems or organisms, the argument from biological information focuses on the problem of generating living organisms in the first place. Darwinian theories are intended only to explain how it is that more complex living organisms developed from primordially simple living organisms, and hence do not even purport to explain the origin of the latter. The argument from biological information is concerned with an explanation of how it is that the world went from a state in which it contained no living organisms to a state in which it contained living organisms; that is to say, it is concerned with the explanation of the very first forms of life.

There are two distinct problems involved in explaining the origin of life from a naturalistic standpoint. The first is to explain how it is that a set of non-organic substances could combine to produce the amino acids that are the building blocks of every living substance. The second is to explain the origin of the information expressed by the sequences of nucleotides that form DNA molecules. The precise ordering of the four nucleotides, adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine (A, T, G, and C, for short), determine the specific operations that occur within a living cell and is hence fairly characterized as representing (or embodying) information. As Stephen C. Meyer puts the point: “just as the letters in the alphabet of a written language may convey a particular message depending on their sequence, so too do the sequences of nucleotides or bases in the DNA molecule convey precise biochemical instructions that direct protein synthesis within the cell” (Meyer 1998, 526).

The argument from biological information is concerned with only the second of these problems. In particular, it attempts to evaluate four potential explanations for the origin of biological information: (1) chance; (2) a pre-biotic form of natural selection; (3) chemical necessity; and (4) intelligent design. The argument concludes that intelligent design is the most probable explanation for the information present in large biomacromolecules like DNA, RNA, and proteins.

The argument proceeds as follows. Pre-biotic natural selection and chemical necessity cannot, as a logical matter, explain the origin of biological information. Theories of pre-biotic natural selection are problematic because they illicitly assume the very feature they are trying to explain. These explanations proceed by asserting that the most complex nonliving molecules will reproduce more efficiently than less complex nonliving molecules. But, in doing so, they assume that nonliving chemicals instantiate precisely the kind of replication mechanism that biological information is needed to explain in the case of living organisms. In the absence of some sort of explanation as to how non-organic reproduction could occur, theories of pre-biotic natural selection fail.

Theories of chemical necessity are problematic because chemical necessity can explain, at most, the development of highly repetitive ordered sequences incapable of representing information. Because processes involving chemical necessity are highly regular and predictable in character, they are capable of producing only highly repetitive sequences of “letters.” For example, while chemical necessity could presumably explain a sequence like “ababababababab,” it cannot explain specified but highly irregular sequences like “the house is on fire.” The problem is that highly repetitive sequences like the former are not sufficiently complex and varied to express information. Thus, while chemical necessity can explain periodic order among nucleotide letters, it lacks the resources logically needed to explain the aperiodic, highly specified, complexity of a sequence capable of expressing information.

Ultimately, this leaves only chance and design as logically viable explanations of biological information. Although it is logically possible to obtain functioning sequences of amino acids through purely random processes, some researchers have estimated the probability of doing so under the most favorable of assumptions at approximately 1 in 1065. Factoring in more realistic assumptions about pre-biotic conditions, Meyer argues the probability of generating short functional protein is 1 in 10125—a number that is vanishingly small. Meyer concludes: “given the complexity of proteins, it is extremely unlikely that a random search through all the possible amino acid sequences could generate even a single relatively short functional protein in the time available since the beginning of the universe (let alone the time available on the early earth)” (Meyer 2002, 75).

Next, Meyer argues that the probability of the design explanation for the origin of biological information is considerably higher:


[O]ne can detect the past action of an intelligent cause from the presence of an information-rich effect, even if the cause itself cannot be directly observed. For instances, visitors to the gardens of Victoria harbor in Canada correctly infer the activity of intelligent agents when they see a pattern of red and yellow flowers spelling “Welcome to Victoria”, even if they did not see the flowers planted and arranged. Similarly, the specifically arranged nucleotide sequences—the complex but functionally specified sequences—in DNA imply the past action of an intelligent mind, even if such mental agency cannot be directly observed (Meyer 2002, 93).

Further, scientists in many fields typically infer the causal activity of intelligent agents from the occurrence of information content. As Meyer rightly observes by way of example, “[a]rcheologists assume a mind produced the inscriptions on the Rosetta Stone” (Meyer 2002, 94).

Meyer’s reasoning appears vulnerable to the same objection to which the argument from biochemical complexity is vulnerable. In all of the contexts in which we legitimately make the design inference in response to an observation of information, we already know that there exist intelligent agents with the right sorts of motivations and abilities to produce information content; after all, we know that human beings exist and are frequently engaged in the production and transmission of information. It is precisely because we have this background knowledge that we can justifiably be confident that intelligent design is a far more probable explanation than chance for any occurrence of information that a human being is capable of producing. In the absence of antecedent reason for thinking there exist intelligent agents capable of creating information content, the occurrence of a pattern of flowers in the shape of “Welcome to Victoria” would not obviously warrant an inference of intelligent design.

The problem, however, is that it is the very existence of an intelligent Deity that is at issue. In the absence of some antecedent reason for thinking there exists an intelligent Deity capable of creating biological information, the occurrence of sequences of nucleotides that can be described as “representing information” does not obviously warrant an inference of intelligent design—no matter how improbable the chance explanation might be. To justify preferring one explanation as more probable than another, we must have information about the probability of each explanation. The mere fact that certain sequences take a certain shape that we can see meaning or value in, by itself, tells us nothing obvious about the probability that it is the result of intelligent design.

It is true, of course, that “experience affirms that information content not only routinely arises but always arises from the activity of intelligent minds” (Meyer 2002, 92), but our experience is limited to the activity of human beings—beings that are frequently engaged in activities that are intended to produce information content. While that experience will inductively justify inferring that some human agency is the cause of any information that could be explained by human beings, it will not inductively justify inferring the existence of an intelligent agency with causal powers that depart as radically from our experience as the powers that are traditionally attributed to God. The argument from biological information, like the argument from biochemical complexity, seems incapable of standing alone as an argument for God’s existence.
c. The Fine-Tuning Arguments

Scientists have determined that life in the universe would not be possible if more than about two dozen properties of the universe were even slightly different from what they are; as the matter is commonly put, the universe appears “fine-tuned” for life. For example, life would not be possible if the force of the big bang explosion had differed by one part in 1060; the universe would have either collapsed on itself or expanded too rapidly for stars to form. Similarly, life would not be possible if the force binding protons to neutrons differed by even five percent.

It is immediately tempting to think that the probability of a fine-tuned universe is so small that intelligent design simply must be the more probable explanation. The supposition that it is a matter of chance that so many things could be exactly what they need to be for life to exist in the universe just seems implausibly improbable. Since, on this intuition, the only two explanations for the highly improbable appearance of fine-tuning are chance and an intelligent agent who deliberately designed the universe to be hospitable to life, the latter simply has to be the better explanation.

This natural line of argument is vulnerable to a cogent objection. The mere fact that it is enormously improbable that an event occurred by chance, by itself, gives us no reason to think that it occurred by design. Suppose we flip a fair coin 1000 times and record the results in succession. The probability of getting the particular outcome is vanishingly small: 1 in 21000 to be precise. But it is clear that the mere fact that such a sequence is so improbable, by itself, does not give us any reason to think that it was the result of intelligent design. As intuitively tempting as it may be to conclude from just the apparent improbability of a fine-tuned universe that it is the result of divine agency, the inference is unsound.
i. The Argument from Suspicious Improbabilitys

George N. Schlesinger, however, attempts to formalize the fine-tuning intuition in a way that avoids this objection. To understand Schlesinger’s argument, consider your reaction to two different events. If John wins a 1-in-1,000,000,000 lottery game, you would not immediately be tempted to think that John (or someone acting on his behalf) cheated. If, however, John won three consecutive 1-in-1,000 lotteries, you would immediately be tempted to think that John (or someone acting on his behalf) cheated. Schlesinger believes that the intuitive reaction to these two scenarios is epistemically justified. The structure of the latter event is such that it is justifies a belief that intelligent design is the cause: the fact that John got lucky in three consecutive lotteries is a reliable indicator that his winning was the intended result of someone’s intelligent agency. Despite the fact that the probability of winning three consecutive 1-in-1,000 games is exactly the same as the probability of winning one 1-in-1,000,000,000 game, the former event is of a kind that is surprising in a way that warrants an inference of intelligent design.

Schlesinger argues that the fact that the universe is fine-tuned for life is improbable in exactly the same way that John’s winning three consecutive lotteries is improbable. After all, it is not just that we got lucky with respect to one property-lottery game; we got lucky with respect to two dozen property-lottery games—lotteries that we had to win in order for there to be life in the universe. Given that we are justified in inferring intelligent design in the case of John’s winning three consecutive lotteries, we are even more justified in inferring intelligent design in the case of our winning two dozen much more improbable property lotteries. Thus, Schlesinger concludes, the most probable explanation for the remarkable fact that the universe has exactly the right properties to sustain life is that an intelligent Deity intentionally created the universe such as to sustain life.

This argument is vulnerable to a number of criticisms. First, while it might be clear that carbon-based life would not be possible if the universe were slightly different with respect to these two-dozen fine-tuned properties, it is not clear that no form of life would be possible. Second, some physicists speculate that this physical universe is but one material universe in a “multiverse” in which all possible material universes are ultimately realized. If this highly speculative hypothesis is correct, then there is nothing particularly suspicious about the fact that there is a fine-tuned universe, since the existence of such a universe is inevitable (that is, has probability 1) if all every material universe is eventually realized in the multiverse. Since some universe, so to speak, had to win, the fact that ours won does not demand any special explanation.

Schlesinger’s fine-tuning argument also appears vulnerable to the same criticism as the other versions of the design argument (see Himma 2002). While Schlesinger is undoubtedly correct in thinking that we are justified in suspecting design in the case where John wins three consecutive lotteries, it is because—and only because—we know two related empirical facts about such events. First, we already know that there exist intelligent agents who have the right motivations and causal abilities to deliberately bring about such events. Second, we know from past experience with such events that they are usually explained by the deliberate agency of one or more of these agents. Without at least one of these two pieces of information, we are not obviously justified in seeing design in such cases.

As before, the problem for the fine-tuning argument is that we lack both of the pieces that are needed to justify an inference of design. First, the very point of the argument is to establish the fact that there exists an intelligent agency that has the right causal abilities and motivations to bring the existence of a universe capable of sustaining life. Second, and more obviously, we do not have any past experience with the genesis of worlds and are hence not in a position to know whether the existence of fine-tuned universes are usually explained by the deliberate agency of some intelligent agency. Because we lack this essential background information, we are not justified in inferring that there exists an intelligent Deity who deliberately created a universe capable of sustaining life.
ii. The Confirmatory Argument

Robin Collins defends a more modest version of the fine-tuning argument that relies on a general principle of confirmation theory, rather than a principle that is contrived to distinguish events or entities that are explained by intelligent design from events or entities explained by other factors. Collins’s version of the argument relies on what he calls the Prime Principle of Confirmation: If observation O is more probable under hypothesis H1 than under hypothesis H2, then O provides a reason for preferring H1 over H2. The idea is that the fact that an observation is more likely under the assumption that H1 is true than under the assumption H2 is true counts as evidence in favor of H1.

This version of the fine-tuning argument proceeds by comparing the relative likelihood of a fine-tuned universe under two hypotheses:
The Design Hypothesis: there exists a God who created the universe such as to sustain life;
The Atheistic Single-Universe Hypothesis: there exists one material universe, and it is a matter of chance that the universe has the fine-tuned properties needed to sustain life.

Assuming the Design Hypothesis is true, the probability that the universe has the fine-tuned properties approaches (if it does not equal) 1. Assuming the Atheistic Single-Universe Hypothesis is true, the probability that the universe has the fine-tuned properties is very small—though it is not clear exactly how small. Applying the Prime Principle of Confirmation, Collins concludes that the observation of fine-tuned properties provides reason for preferring the Design Hypothesis over the Atheistic Single-Universe Hypothesis.

At the outset, it is crucial to note that Collins does not intend the fine-tuned argument as a proof of God’s existence. As he explains, the Prime Principle of Confirmation “is a general principle of reasoning which tells us when some observation counts as evidence in favor of one hypothesis over another” (Collins 1999, 51). Indeed, he explicitly acknowledges that “the argument does not say that the fine-tuning evidence proves that the universe was designed, or even that it is likely that the universe was designed” (Collins 1999, 53). It tells us only that the observation of fine-tuning provides one reason for accepting the Theistic Hypothesis over the Atheistic Single-Universe Hypothesis—and one that can be rebutted by other evidence.

The confirmatory version of the fine-tuning argument is not vulnerable to the objection that it relies on an inference strategy that presupposes that we have independent evidence for thinking the right kind of intelligent agency exists. As a general scientific principle, the Prime Principle of Confirmation can be applied in a wide variety of circumstances and is not limited to circumstances in which we have other reasons to believe the relevant conclusion is true. If the observation of a fine-tuned universe is more probable under the Theistic Hypothesis than under the Atheistic Single-Universe Hypothesis, then this fact is a reason for preferring the Design Hypothesis to Atheistic Single-Universe Hypothesis.

Nevertheless, the confirmatory version of the argument is vulnerable on other fronts. As a first step towards seeing one worry, consider two possible explanations for the observation that John Doe wins a 1-in-7,000,000 lottery (see Himma 2002). According to the Theistic Lottery Hypothesis, God wanted John Doe to win and deliberately brought it about that his numbers were drawn. According to the Chance Lottery Hypothesis, John Doe’s numbers were drawn by chance. It is clear that John’s winning the lottery is vastly more probable under the Theistic Lottery Hypothesis than under the Chance Lottery Hypothesis. By the Prime Principle of Confirmation, then, John’s winning the lottery provides a reason to prefer the Theistic Lottery Hypothesis over the Chance Lottery Hypothesis.

As is readily evident, the above reasoning, by itself, provides very weak support for the Theistic Lottery Hypothesis. If all we know about the world is that John Doe won a lottery and the only possible explanations for this observation are the Theistic Lottery Hypothesis and the Chance Lottery Hypothesis, then this observation provides some reason to prefer the former. But it does not take much counterevidence to rebut the Theistic Lottery Hypothesis: a single observation of a lottery that relies on a random selection process will suffice. A single application of the Prime Principle of Confirmation, by itself, is simply not designed to provide the sort of reason that would warrant much confidence in preferring one hypothesis to another.

For this reason, the confirmatory version of the fine-tuning argument, by itself, provides a weak reason for preferring the Design Hypothesis over the Atheistic Single Universe Hypothesis. Although Collins is certainly correct in thinking the observation of fine-tuning provides a reason for accepting the Design Hypothesis and hence rational ground for belief that God exists, that reason is simply not strong enough to do much in the way of changing the minds of either agnostics or atheists.
3. The Scientifically Legitimate Uses of Design Inferences

It is worth noting that proponents are correct in thinking that design inferences have a variety of legitimate scientific uses. Such inferences are used to detect intelligent agency in a large variety of contexts, including criminal and insurance investigations. Consider, for example, the notorious case of Nicholas Caputo. Caputo, a member of the Democratic Party, was a public official responsible for conducting drawings to determine the relative ballot positions of Democrats and Republicans. During Caputo’s tenure, the Democrats drew the top ballot position 40 of 41 times, making it far more likely that an undecided voter would vote for the Democratic candidate than for the Republican candidate. The Republican Party filed suit against Caputo, arguing he deliberately rigged the ballot to favor his own party. After noting that the probability of picking the Democrats 40 out of 41 times was less than 1 in 50 billion, the court legitimately made a design inference, concluding that “few persons of reason will accept the explanation of blind chance.”

What proponents of design arguments for God’s existence, however, have not noticed is that each one of these indubitably legitimate uses occurs in a context in which we are already justified in thinking that intelligent beings with the right motivations and abilities exist. In every context in which design inferences are routinely made by scientists, they already have conclusive independent reason for believing there exist intelligent agents with the right abilities and motivations to bring about the apparent instance of design.

Consider, for example, how much more information was available to the court in the Caputo case than is available to the proponent of the design argument for God’s existence. Like the proponent of the design argument, the court knew that (1) the relevant event or feature is something that might be valued by an intelligent agent; and (2) the odds of it coming about by chance are astronomically small. Unlike the proponent of the design argument, however, the court had an additional piece of information available to it: the court already knew that there existed an intelligent agent with the right causal abilities and motives to bring about the event; after all, there was no dispute whatsoever about the existence of Caputo. It was that piece of information, together with (1), that enabled the court to justifiably conclude that the probability that an intelligent agent deliberately brought it about that the Democrats received the top ballot position 40 of 41 times was significantly higher than the probability that this happened by chance. Without this crucial piece of information, however, the court would not have been so obviously justified in making the design inference. Accordingly, while the court was right to infer a design explanation in the Caputo case, this is, in part, because the judges already knew that the right kind of intelligent beings exist—and one of them happened to have occupied a position that afforded him with the opportunity to rig the drawings in favor of the Democrats.

In response, one might be tempted to argue that there is one context in which scientists employ the design inference without already having sufficient reason to think the right sort of intelligent agency exists. As is well-known, researchers monitor radio transmissions for patterns that would support a design inference that such transmissions are sent by intelligent beings. For example, it would be reasonable to infer that some intelligent extraterrestrial beings were responsible for a transmission of discrete signals and pauses that effectively enumerated the prime numbers from 2 to 101. In this case, the intelligibility of the pattern, together with the improbability of its occurring randomly, seems to justify the inference that the transmission sequence is the result of intelligent design.

As it turns out, we are already justified in thinking that the right sort of intelligent beings exist even in this case. We already know, after all, that we exist and have the right sort of motivations and abilities to bring about such transmissions because we send them into space hoping that some other life form will detect our existence. While our existence in the universe—and this is crucial—does not, by itself, justify thinking that there are other intelligent life forms in the universe, it does justify thinking that the probability that there are such life forms is higher than the astronomically small probability (1 in 21136 to be precise) that a sequence of discrete radio signals and pauses that enumerates the prime numbers from 2 to 101 is the result of chance. Thus, we would be justified in inferring design as the explanation of such a sequence on the strength of three facts: (1) the probability of such a chance occurrence is 1 in 21136; (2) there exist intelligent beings in the universe capable of bringing about such an occurrence; and (3) the sequence of discrete signals and pauses has a special significance to intelligent beings. In particular, (2) and (3) tell us that the probability that design explains such an occurrence is significantly higher than 1 in 21136—though it is not clear exactly what the probability is.

Insofar as the legitimate application of design inferences presupposes that we have antecedent reason to believe the right kind of intelligent being exists, they can enable us to distinguish what such beings do from what merely happens. If we already know, for example, that there exist beings capable of rigging a lottery, then design inferences can enable us to distinguish lottery results that merely happen from lottery results that are deliberately brought about by such agents. Similarly, if we already have adequate reason to believe that God exists, then design inferences can enable us to distinguish features of the world that merely happen from features of the world that are deliberately brought about by the agency of God. Indeed, to the extent that we are antecedently justified in believing that God exists, it is obviously more reasonable to believe that God deliberately structured the universe to have the fine-tuned properties than it is to believe that somehow this occurred by chance.

If this is correct, then design inferences simply cannot do the job they are asked to do in design arguments for God’s existence. Insofar as they presuppose that we already know the right kind of intelligent being exists, they cannot stand alone as a justification for believing that God exists. It is the very existence of the right kind of intelligent being that is at issue in the dispute over whether God exists. While design inferences have a variety of scientifically legitimate uses, they cannot stand alone as arguments for God’s existence.
4. References and Further Reading
Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996)
Richard Bentley, A Confutation of Atheism from the Origin and Frame of the World (London: H. Mortlock, 1692-1693)
Robin Collins, “A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God,” in Michael J. Murray (ed.), Reason for the Hope Within (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999)
Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, Everyman’s Library (London: J.M. Dent, 1947)
Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design (New York: Norton Publishing, 1996; originally published in 1986)
William Dembski, The Design Inference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
William Dembski, No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot Be Purchased without Intelligence (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002)
William Derham, Physico-theology, or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God from his Works of Creation Being the Substance of XVI Sermons Preached in St. Mary le Bow-Church, London, at the Hon’ble Mr. Boyle’s Lectures in the Years 1711 and 1712 (London: W. Innys, 1713)
William Derham, Astro-theology, or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God: From a Survey of the Heavens (London: W. Innys, 1715)
Kenneth Einar Himma, “Prior Probabilities and Confirmation Theory: A Problem with the Fine-Tuning Argument,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 51, no. 4 (June 2002)
Kenneth Einar Himma, “The Application-Conditions for Design Inferences: Why the Design Arguments Need the Help of Other Arguments for God’s Existence,”International Journal for Philosophy of Religion., vol. 57, no. 1 (February 2005).
David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, edited with an introduction by Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: Social Sciences Publishers, 1948)
Julian Huxley, Evolution as Process (New York: Harper and Row, 1953).
Stephen C. Meyer, “DNA by Design: An Inference to the Best Explanation,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 4 (Winter 1998)
Stephen C. Meyer, “Evidence for Design in Physics and Biology: From the Origin of the Universe to the Origin of Life,” in Behe, Dembski, and Meyer (eds.), Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002)
William Paley, Natural Theology: Or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1867)
Del Ratzsch, Nature, Design, and Science: The Status of Design in Natural Science (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001)
John Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation Being the Substance of Some Common Places Delivered in the Chappel of Trinity-College, in Cambridge (London: Printed for Samuel Smith, 1691)
Hugh Ross, Beyond the Cosmos: What Recent Discoveries in Astronomy and Physics Reveal about the Nature of God (Colorado Springs: Nav Press, 1996)
George N. Schlesinger, New Perspectives on Old-time Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988)
Frederick Robert Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Volume 2 (1928-30)
Author Information

Kenneth Einar Himma
Email: himma@spu.edu
Seattle Pacific University
U. S. A.
Posted by at
Labels:

Divine Design: God's Complementary Roles for Men and Women by John F. MacArthur Jr. | Goodreads



Divine Design: God's Complementary Roles for Men and Women by John F. MacArthur Jr. | Goodreads



Want to Read

Rate this book
1 of 5 stars2 of 5 stars3 of 5 stars4 of 5 stars5 of 5 stars
Preview

Divine Design: God's Complementary Roles for Men and Women

by
John F. MacArthur Jr.
3.92 · Rating details · 238 ratings · 20 reviews
For decades culture has blurred the lines between men and women, all in the name of equality. Yet instead of creating harmony, this approach has caused frustration and confusion, leaving families broken and hurting. Divine Design draws reader back to God’s intention for men and women, and tackles big issues such as authority in marriage, mothers in the home, and the innate differences between males and females. Readers will discover how embracing their unique design can foster security, balance, and love in a marriage and family.

(less)

GET A COPY
Kobo
Online Stores ▾
Book Links ▾

Kindle Edition, 274 pages
Published January 1st 2010 by David C. Cook (first published August 3rd 2006)
Original Title
Divine Design: God's Complementary Roles for Men & Women (MacArthur Study)
ASIN
B005UG7TZS
Edition Language
English

Other Editions (8)






All Editions | Add a New Edition | Combine...Less DetailEdit Details





FRIEND REVIEWS
Recommend This Book None of your friends have reviewed this book yet.



READER Q&A
Ask the Goodreads community a question about Divine Design



Be the first to ask a question about Divine Design



LISTS WITH THIS BOOK
This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Add this book to your favorite list »



COMMUNITY REVIEWS
Showing 1-30
Average rating3.92 ·
Rating details
· 238 ratings · 20 reviews





More filters
|
Sort order

Sejin, start your review of Divine Design: God's Complementary Roles for Men and Women
Write a review

Jul 28, 2017Hope rated it it was ok
Shelves: christianity, family, non-fiction
Frankly, when I downloaded this book I was expecting a book about gender differences from a biblical standpoint to shed light on the chaos of modern "gender free" culture. The opening lines, “The fact that men and women are different by design is no surprise to those who are committed to reality,” seemed to tell me I was heading the right direction. But the entire book ended up being about male headship/female submission. I have no problem with discussing these issues from a biblical viewpoint, but they were not what I was expecting.

You’ve got to hand it to MacArthur for tackling every difficult passage on male and female roles (Proverbs 31, Ephesians 5, Titus 2, 1 Peter 3, etc.). His very traditional views are hard for most modern women to hear since they (myself included) have been conditioned to feminist thinking in many areas. I agree with him that many women have put self-fulfillment outside the home above being faithful keepers of the home, but still found his cut-and-dry judgments to be irksome at times.

While mostly writing about marriage, MacArthur also addresses widowhood, singleness and women in ministry.

One quote: “Man’s authority over woman is delegated to him by God to be used for His purposes and in His way. As a fellow creature, man has no innate superiority to woman and has no right to use his authority tyrannically or selfishly. Male chauvinism is no more biblical than feminism. Both are perversions of God’s plan.” (p. 54) (less)
flag5 likes · Like · comment · see review



Mar 01, 2011Malia rated it liked it · review of another edition
Shelves: christian, nonfiction
This was recommended to me by my pastor because I have recently been raising questions about the roles of women. It's a strong exposition of scripture, mainly 2 Timothy. I was affirmed in my decision to stay home with my children and challenged to value the impact I have in supporting my husband and investing in my kids.
flag3 likes · Like · comment · see review



Nov 22, 2015Allison Anderson Armstrong rated it liked it
Not my favorite. I felt like this book should have been title "all the do's and don'ts of women in Christianity." Too dogmatic for my tastes. He also wasn't super consistent in his views on women in the home.... Lots of scripture quoted which I can use to look up later, but I didn't really like the tone of this book... But maybe I'm just a touchy feminist.
flag3 likes · Like · 2 comments · see review



Dec 25, 2019Derek rated it it was ok
This book is less about “complimentary roles between men and women” and more about how apparently women today don’t follow the gospel by having day jobs. Pretty disappointed in MacArthurs writing style here. As someone who hopes to maintain a work-life balance that can better allow my wife to not need a job, I feel he spends too much time being critical on women who choose to work and “desire more independence” without examining how this has come about from a social or economic level. It just comes off like he’s promoting rule following instead of Christ seeking.

Secondly, he doesn’t address men and their role in any sort of similar fashion. As if men somehow follow their calling exactly as its written without any mistakes with a primary focus on task instead of heart. We can use and manipulate our roles for selfish reasons, yet this is barely touched on.

At no point did I feel like this book helped me understand the roles of my wife and I to genuinely love Christ first before serving one another.

Not worth your time. Go read Chandler or Keller instead. (less)
flag1 like · Like · comment · see review



Jun 04, 2015Heather Denigan rated it liked it
Did I just criticize John MacArthur?

Meh
The chapter on singleness made it sound like having a spouse gets in the way of serving the Lord -- rather than focusing on the unique ministry of singles (especially in a world that regards chastity as inhumane), the author focused on the negatives of marriage. But I watch my momma make every word, thought, gesture, and feeling captive to the obedience of Christ, while I struggle to work for God and not for man as a single person (before I was ever in a relationship).
Also, instead of the negatives of feminism, how are the beauties of God's design so blinding so as to show how ugly feminism has been from the beginning? Pointing upwards would make better evangelism.
The first half was helpful. The section on the Proverbs 31 woman was exhausting. How do I become this woman? Mere sleep deprivation won't make me like her. His exegesis on deaconesses was interesting.
CS Lewis' That Hideous Strength, Keller's The Meaning of Marriage, and Gary Thomas' Sacred Marriage make a far more convincing case for the beauty of God's design for men and women. (less)
flag1 like · Like · comment · see review



Apr 20, 2015Gretchen rated it it was amazing
Shelves: reading-challenge-2015, womanhood, church-and-religion
As always, MacArthur brings a STRONG exposition of scripture and backs up everything that is said in the book win scriptures that aren't taken out of context but rather have been taken back to their original roots and meanings. There is no possibility of misunderstanding the intent of the Bible when discussing male/female roles after reading this book. MacArthur's Biblical stance is always the same and one hat I admire: one may not LIKE what it says, but that doesn't make it less true or one ...more
flag1 like · Like · comment · see review



Jan 23, 2019Nancy DeValve rated it it was ok
Shelves: biblical-teachings, marriage
I have very mixed feelings about this book. First, I struggle with John MacArthur and his style. He just has a tone of legalism and harshness that I don't find winning. Things are one way only and if you don't see it that way you are sinning. I think he could convince more people if he had a more winsome tone. On the other hand, he did say some things I agree with, so it's not that I hate everything he said.
I do think that he sees marriage as looking one way only: you must home school, Mom must stay at home, and if Dad isn't the main bread winner he's not doing his job. In my family, raised by very godly people, my parents were very much a team. They both worked outside the home, they both worked on chores in the home (my dad was just as likely to cook supper as my mom), they talked through every major decision together, they both gave 100% to their marriage, and they both deeply loved and respected each other. John and I are pretty much the same way. And I don't feel that a Team approach to marriage is not biblical. I think that is what God intended when he gave Eve to Adam.
Yes, it's true that Eve sinned and a tension of leadership/submission was introduced. Pain in childbirth entered the arena and work became a struggle and a toil. But just as it is not wrong to use methods in childbirth to reduce pain or methods in the work place to reduce the struggle to work, I don't think it's wrong to work in marriage to restore the Team Relationship.
I think that MacArthur also thinks that adultery happens because women in the church are not dressing modestly. One could almost believe that only immodest people have affairs. And maybe he didn't mean to make it sound like it's usually the woman's fault, but that's how it sounded to me.
I do agree that men and women aren't the same and there is no reason to try to force us to be each other. We just never will be and we are happier when we accept our differences. (less)
flagLike · 1 comment · see review
Posted by at
Labels: ,

Using Nature as Divine Design Inspiration

Using Nature as Divine Design Inspiration


10-16-09
BIOMIMICRY
Using Nature as Divine Design Inspiration

Nature never fails to produce something new and interesting. Connecting it with your craft yields inspired solutions.

BY JOE DUFFY

We’ve probably all experienced that day in our childhood, lying on the front lawn, when the clouds overhead reminded us of something–a dancing elephant, Ben Franklin’s profile, or that ’52 Packard.

For many, finding form and function inspired by nature has played a significant role in creating brilliant design. For me, nature is at the heart and soul of nearly everything I do and create, and it often provides metaphors that have led to solutions that have subtle impact.

Several years ago, I was working on a project from hell in Paris and had just left yet another depressing meeting. I was walking down a boulevard back to my hotel when I happened upon some picture perfect leaves lying on the sidewalk. Call it divine inspiration or just a vision amidst a desperate need to be cheered up, but those leaves reminded me immediately of my kids. I still can’t precisely put my finger on it. I guess it had to do with how the seasons relate to generations–maybe a family tree? Something about those beautiful leaves triggered a connection that was powerful.

I picked up an assortment and brought them home. I knew they were to become an artistic element in the portraits I had been painting of my daughter, Bridget, and my son, Joseph. I love the textures they created and the unspoken layers of meaning they provided. To this day, I continue to design many portraits with elements from nature; these elements suggest the many dimensions and characteristics of my subjects.

To me, there’s nothing like a hike, run, ski, or ride through the woods to inspire new design ideas. I go outside to be inspired. It’s some of the most enjoyable “research” I can take part in, it’s literally good for my heart, and it always inspires and fills my soul. Nature never fails to produce something new and interesting. Connecting my love for nature and for being outdoors with my craft keeps me content, fulfilled, and grounded.

For this reason, one of my design heroes is Andy Goldsworthy; his work creating design in nature is nothing less than breathtaking. If you haven’t seen this, do go out and rent it. Better yet, buy it.

Last weekend I was hiking through the woods in Northern Wisconsin and I happened upon nature in a way I had never seen it before. This happens more often than you might think. The rhythms of the elements and how they interact to create totally new visual inspiration are constantly changing and playing tricks with my expectations. It’s why I have to constantly get out and see what Mother Nature’s cooked up for my hungry brain.

At any rate, this time out I was treated to a totally new natural color spectrum. It had snowed the night before, just enough to create this random patterning with the autumn leaves that were at peak color both in the trees and along the forest floor. I had never seen autumn colors so vivid before because I had never seen them mixed with a stunning, sun-lit, super sharp white before. I snapped a few quick pics that don’t do the scene justice and got back to the studio and started mixing paint–divine inspiration!

Lastly, I’ve selected a few designs–a few of ours, but mostly from others–and the imagery of nature that I suspect served as divine inspiration.

Enjoy…and get out there, be inspired!


[Cell cuff, David & Martin; Newton Sneaker packaging, TDA Advertising; Roses on the Vine table lamp, Swarovski; Loppet poster, Duffy and Partners; Bamboo chaise, Ezri Tarazi; Birdhouse, Azul Amuchastegui Bari; Thymes Azur packaging, Duffy and Partners]

Read Joe Duffy’s blog Duffy Point of View
Browse blogs by other Expert Designers

Principal and chairman of Duffy & Partners, Joe Duffy is one of the most respected and sought after creative directors and thought leaders on branding and design in the world.
Joe’s work includes brand and corporate identity development for some of the world’s most admired brands, from Aveda to Coca-Cola to Sony to Jack in the Box to Susan G. Komen for the Cure. His work is regularly featured in leading marketing and design publications and exhibited around the world. In 2004 he founded Duffy & Partners as a new kind of branding and creativity company, partnering with clients and other firms in all communication disciplines. Also in 2004, he received the Medal from the AIGA for a lifetime of achievement in the field of visual communications. His first book–Brand Apart–was released in July 2005 and in 2006, he was recognized as one of the “Fast 50” most influential people in the future of business by Fast Company.
===

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Principal and chairman of Duffy & Partners, Joe Duffy is one of the most respected and sought after creative directors and thought leaders on branding and design in the world. Joe’s work includes brand and corporate identity development for some of the world’s most admired brands, from Aveda to Coca-Cola to Sony to Jack in the Box to Susan G
More
Posted by at
Labels:
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)