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Journal of Toegye Studies Volume 4 Number 2
(Vol.4, No.2, 2021)∣pp.7~18
https://doi.org/10.33213/jts.
2021.4.2.7
===
Heaven and Spirituality in Toegye 1)
Sung-Hwan Jo*
Sung–Hwan Jo achieved his Ph.D. degree at Sogang University, majoring in Korean philosophy. He has studied at Waseda University for 6 years, majoring in Chines Daoism, and currently served as an assistant professor at Wonkwang University. He is the author Hangug Geundaeui Tansaeng (The Birth of Korean Modernity) (2018) and co-author of Gaebyeogpaseon-eon (The Declaration of Gaebyok Party) (2019).
(Received Jul. 20, 2021: Revised Jul. 30, 2021: Accepted Dec. 8, 2021)
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Abstract
The discussion so far can be summarized as follows.
If the emptiness (虛心) is a state in which ‘the principle of creation‘ (生理) of the mind (心) is active by eliminating desires and attachments,
then ‘self-emptying’ (自虛) is a humble attitude to empty oneself in front of the Heavenly Emperor (上帝).
While the former expresses the “Zhuziological” spirituality, the latter expresses the characteristics of the “Toegyeological” spirituality. Toegyehak (退溪學) adds or reinforces the spirituality of Heavenly mandate to the spirituality of Heavenly Li. This is the characteristic of Toegyehak (退溪學), which is different from Zhujiahak (朱子學), and this characteristic was developed in earnest in Donghak (東學) at the end of the 19th century.
Key Words: Toegye (退溪), Heaven (天), Spirituality (靈性), Toegyehak (退溪學), Emptiness (虛心),
Self-emptying (自虛), Zhujiahak (朱子學), Donghak (東學)
* hansowon70@nate.com
The Journal of Toegye Studies Volume 4 Number 2
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1. The Concept of Spirituality (靈性) in East Asian Tradition
The Chinese character ‘Língxìng’ (靈性, spirituality) literally refers to ‘divine power or nature’. Here, “divine” means “mysterious things that cannot be explained rationally.” For example, a mysterious natural phenomenon, a mysterious human ability, or a special religious experience. So, when ‘Língxìng’ is used for human ability, it refers to a different level of ability than ‘reason’ (理性).
However, we can use the word ‘Spirituality’ (靈性) not only for human abilities, but also for divine objects or mysterious events. For example, when we say, “I feel spiritual in the mountains”, the spiritual can be expressed as ‘spirituality’ (靈性). Of course, the human ability to feel spiritual can also be said to be ‘spirituality’. So, when ‘haneulnim’ (heaven) is called ‘cheonlyeong’ (天靈, heavenly spirit) in Donghak (東學, Eastern Learning) in 19th century Korea, ‘Lyeong’ (靈, spirit) can be understood as the divine attribute of God, that is, ‘spirituality’ (靈性), ‘Sinlyeong’
(神靈) in ‘Naeyusinlyeong Oeyugihwa’ (內有神靈 外有氣化) can be understood as the spirituality (靈性) within human beings.
However, there are many things that humans cannot understand rationally or explain rationally, such as magic, supernatural powers, extrasensory perception (ESP), or genius powers. In this article, in particular, I would like to think of ‘spirituality’ (靈性) by limiting it to what I considered “the most ultimate” or “the most fundamental” in the history of philosophy and religion.
For example, if Koreans saw ‘heaven’ (天) as the most ultimate being—in that it creates all things and presides over human affairs, and in that respect, everyone should revere—and among the essential properties of heaven, if there is a quality of a dimension different from one which can be grasped rationally, we can call it ‘spirituality’. In addition, human ability to grasp and acquire such heavenly spirituality can also be said to be ‘spirituality’.
Chinese people considered Dao (道) to be the ultimate since zhū zǐ bǎi jiā (諸子百家,
Hundred Schools of Thought). Among the attribute or effect of Dao, if there are parts that cannot be explained rationally—for example, in 『Laozi』 (老子), as “dào
kĕ dào fēicháng dào” (道可道非常道, Dao embodied in words is not the original
Dao) says—we will call it spirituality here. And I would like to call human tendencies and abilities to become aware of the spiritual aspect of the ‘Dao’ and become one with human spirituality.
If spirituality is defined in this way, when modern researchers often say the ideal of Confucianism as ‘unity of heaven and man’ (天人合一), the ‘unity’ (合一) means unity not only in the rational dimension, but also in the spiritual dimension. For example, in Neo-Confucianism, Heaven (天) is interpreted as Li (理), so the unity of heaven and man means rational and spiritual ‘unification with Li’. And if discipline is essential for this unity, it can be seen that spirituality is inextricably linked with the self-cultivation theory in East Asian philosophy. This is why this article introduces a concept of spirituality (靈性) that is different from reason (理性).
2. The Spirituality (靈性) of Zhuzi (朱子)
Having defined spirituality in this way, let’s consider the problem of spirituality in the doctrines of Chu-tzu (朱子學). As is well known, Chinese neo-Confucian scholar Zhuzi (朱子, 1130~1200) views the ultimate value as ‘In’ (仁, benevolence) following the tradition of Confucianism. Unlike Confucius (孔子) and Mencius (孟子), Zhuzi
(朱子) puts ‘benevolence’ (仁) on the cosmological level. Zhuzi defines ‘benevolence’ (仁) as “Cheonjisaengmuljisim” (天地生物之心, the mind with which Heaven and
Earth give birth to all things). Here, ‘benevolence’ (仁) is not the emotion of love between human beings itself (仁者人也) as described in Confucian analects (論語), but is being upgraded to a cosmological principle that creates all things.
Specifically, “Cheonjisaengmuljisim” (天地生物之心) refers to the “desire for creation” or “will to create” (生意) of the universe. All things are created because there is a will, purpose, or mind (意思) to create in the universe. According to the doctrines of Chu-tzu (朱子學), the most fundamental property of the universe is ‘a will to generate’ (生意). And this ‘will to generate’ (生意) can be confirmed through the life phenomenon, such as “a kite flies in the sky and a fish soars” (鳶飛魚躍), according to Zhuzi (朱子).
Therefore, ‘a will to generate’ (生意) refers to ‘the nature’s life force’ itself.
On the other hand, Zhuzi (朱子) also said that ‘仁’ (benevolence) is ‘Saeng-li’ (生理, the principle of creation), because he thought ‘a will to generate’ is ‘a reason’ to make creation possible (所以然之所), and there is ‘an order’ (條理) in its creation action. The ‘order’ of creation is that humans are born from humans and dogs from dogs. Therefore, the word ‘the principle of creation’ (生理) has two meanings: “the reason for creation” and “the order of creation”.
Let’s look briefly at the meaning of ‘Li’ (理) here. The original word ‘Li’ (理) means ‘grain or texture’ (결) or ‘logic’ (條理). Before it was used as an abstract noun, ‘Li’ (理) was used as a verb such as ‘to cut (according to the grain of jade)’ or ‘to divide (field)’. This usage still remains in the classical and modern Chinese word such as ‘Li-guk’ (理國, to rule the country) and and ‘Lijae’ (理財, to manage wealth) and in Korean, ‘Li-bal’ (理髮, cut hair)2)
When ‘Li’ (理) is used as a verb like this, it means ‘to order’ or ‘to rule’ according to one’s nature. When ‘Li’ (理) is used as a verb or a noun, its meaning is basically limited to the realm that can be grasped by human reason. For example, in Korean, “그럴 리 (理)가 없다” (It cannot be possible) or “그것은 무리 (無理)다” (It is unreasonable) refer to phenomena that cannot be understood or explained by human cognitive abilities.
In the word ‘the principle of creation’ (生理), the orderly aspect of creation, for example, a scientific law or an ethical order, is a domain that can be rationally understood and grasped, such as in genetic laws that humans are born from humans and dogs from dogs. or in ethical order that incest is prohibited. However, the volitional aspect of creation (生意) and the realm of vitality as its manifestation cannot be known simply through rational inquiry or ethical norms. In order to reach it, ‘cultivation’ in East Asian thought should be accompanied. For example, it requires discipline to get rid of selfishness, temperance to maintain godliness, or humility to humble oneself. Because in Chinese thought, the reason Heaven and Earth (天地) can create all things is because “Heaven and Earth are not selfish (無私)”. Therefore,
2) For the meaning of ‘Li’ (理) in the history of Chinese thought, see the following books; Brook Ziporyn, Ironies of Oneness and Difference : Coherence in Early Chinese Thought; Prolegomena to the Study of Li, (State University of New York Press, 2012) ; Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents, (State University of New York Press, 2014)
we can become one with Heaven and Earth only when we have the same mind as they have. Here, I would like to define these areas as ‘spirituality’ (靈性). In other words, the will or mind of the universe to create all things, and the vitality that is expressed by it is the spirituality (靈性) ) of the universe, and the human ability to acquire and manifest it is also spirituality (靈性). Zhuzi (朱子) thought that human beings can respond rationally to world affairs only when they reach this spiritual dimension.
3. 'Li' (理) of Toegye
Toegye (1501~1570), a neo-Confucian scholar in Joseon, claimed to be a scholar of the doctrines of Chu-tzu (朱子學) and naturally inherited the definition of ‘Li’ (理) in the study of Zhuzi (朱子).
Through the continuous beating of the pulse, we can see the will of Heaven and Earth (天地) that ‘benevolence’ (仁) is full, radiated and constantly creates all things.
Through taking pity on a young chick, we can understand the meaning of Heaven and Earth that ‘benevolence’ (仁) as ‘the principle of creation‘ (生理) is full in this universe filled with love and pity on all things. )
Here, Toegye explains like Zhuzi (朱子) that the will to life (仁=理) in the universe can be confirmed from the life phenomena of nature (氣), and that this will to life is expressed through emotions as love (愛). This is the general understanding of ‘Li’ (理) in the study of Zhuzi, as can be seen from the words of Zhuzi, “‘benevolence’ (仁) is the Li (理) of love (愛)”. However, the characteristic of Toegye‘s thought is that he emphasizes the ‘spiritual’ of Li (理).
(1) Zhuzi (朱子) said: “Spirit (神) is that Li (理) comes in and goes out of
Qi (氣).” In my opinion, when we say ‘Sinmyeong’ (神明), we can see the subtlety of Spirit (神) only when we look at it like this. Understanding Spirit (神) by relying solely on the concept of Qi (氣) is not perfect.5)
(2) Spiritual things are the original Qi (氣). But how can Qi (氣) be divine by itself? It can be divine because it is unified with Li (理).6)
In (1), Toegye, citing the words of Zhuzi (朱子), thought the action of Shinmyeong (神明) as the role of Li (理). In (2), he said that the divine action of Qi (氣) is due to the help of Li (理). The word Shinmyeong is an expression used by Zhuzi (朱子) to describe the workings of the mind7), and ‘sprituality of Qi’ (气之靈) also refers to the subtle cognitive capacity of the mind which can be seen from the expression, “the mind is empty, spiritual, and illuminated (虛靈不昧)”. Therefore, it can be seen that Li (理) in (1) and (2) is ‘Li of mind’, that is, Li (理) related to the mind.
The reason why Toegye said that Li (理) is ‘spiritual’ or what makes things spiritual is because he has in mind the spiritual aspect of Li (理) that works in the mind. For example, when Toegye said, “The four virtues” (四端) are the manifestation of heavenly principle (天理),” it means that the moral emotion of the four virtues (四端) is a direct expression of the will to create (生意) of the universe, and a pure manifestation of the life order (生理) of the universe.
Referring to this, the meanings of (1) and (2) can be understood as follows: Only when the will to create (生意) or the life order (生理) is accompanied, Qi (氣) can function properly as Qi (氣). In other words, the action of Qi can only be exhibited when accompanied by the spirituality of Li (理). Here, the action of Qi refers to the mind’s mysterious ability to perceive (虛靈不昧) or the pure manifestation of the four virtues (四端).
In neo-Confucianism, ‘mind training’ (心學) refers to the effort of the mind and
5) 朱子曰: “神是理之乘氣而出入者.” 滉謂神明之神, 須作如此看, 方得其妙. 全靠氣字, 便粗了些子. ibid., 110. 6) 靈固氣也. 然氣安能自靈? 緣與理合, 所以能靈. ibid., 95.
7) For example, “The mind is a person’s Shinmyeong (神明). So, with all the Li (理), you can respond to any situation” (心者, 人之神明. 所以具衆理, 而應萬事者也). Mengzi Jizhu Daquan jìnxīn Jìnxīn(shàng) (孟子集註) 「盡心(上)」
body to maximize the action of Qi (氣) by letting the spirituality of Li (理), that is, the spiritual aspect of the mind be exerted. According to the doctrines of Chu-tzu (朱子學), Li (理) is well expressed when the mind is in an empty state, and thus the emotions of the four virtues (四端) are revealed without any blockage. In response, Toegye thought that it should go one step further from ‘emptying the mind’ (虛心) and reach the level of ‘emptying oneself’ (自虛).
4. Toegye’s ‘Self-emptying’ (自虛)
As a Confucian scholar, Toegye accepted HoalInSimBang (活人心方), a Chinese
Taoist health book, and practiced it in his daily life. One of the reasons is that the problems of life (生), mind (心), emptiness (虛) and Li (理) that Toegye was interested in were condensed in it.
(1) Basically, the state in which the mind becomes clear and clean, as when water does not fluctuate for a long time and the bottom can be clearly seen, is called ‘emptiness light’ (虛明). When the mind is quiet, the energy can be strengthened, so that no disease will occur. So you can live a long life. )
(2) Qú xiān (臞僊) said: The mind is the house where Shinmyeong (神明) dwells. It is hollow inside and only an inch in size, but it is inhabited by Shinmyeong (神明). The action of the mind as if sliding on an object is like catching a tangled thread (如理亂棼) and crossing a sudden surge of water.9)
The interpretation of these two paragraphs in conjunction with the discussion so far is as follows. First, (1) means that the vitality of the body (元氣) becomes stronger when the mind is empty. In other words, when the mind is empty, the work of spirituality (生理) becomes active. This is said in Xin-Jing-Fu-Zhu (心經附註),
“Nursing life and nourishing the mind are the same principle.” ) Here, ‘nourishing one’s mind’ (養心) means ‘empty one’s mind’ (虛心).
8) 蓋心如水之不擾久而澄淸, 洞見其底, 是謂虛明. 宜乎靜, 可以固元氣則萬病不生. 故能長久. Donghan Li, (translated and edited), HoalInSimBang (活人心方), (Gyoyuggwahagsa, 2011) 137.
9) 臞仙曰: 心者神明之舍. 中虛, 不過徑寸而神明居焉. 事物之滑, 如理亂棼, 如涉驚浸. ibid., 132.
10) 蓋養生養心同一法也. Baeghyo Seong, (translated), Xin-Jing-Fu-Zhu (心經附註), (Jeontongmunhwayeonguhoe,
And in (2), ‘Li’ (理) in catching a tangled thread (如理亂棼) is Li (理) as a verb, meaning ‘to keep in order.’ In other words, it means that when dealing with foreign objects, it treats with respect and order. Therefore, this sentence can be understood as meaning that it is possible to put foreign things in order (理) because the mind is full with Shinmyeong (神明), that is, spirituality. In other words, it means that the work of Li (理) of the mind is by spirituality.
The above shows the relationship between emptiness (虛心) and spirituality (靈性) in neo-Confucianism. The characteristic of Toegye is that it goes one step further from the state of emptiness (虛心) and demands the state of emptying oneself (自虛).
The wise rulers of all ages have always humbled themselves and bowed down, taken humility, reverence, and self-emptying as Dao (道).11)
Here, emptiness (虛) is a dimension of ‘self-emptying’ that goes beyond simple ‘emptying one’s mind’. In other words, the states of humility and politeness that come from forgetting oneself are modesty (謙恭) and self-emptying (自虛). In that sense, it is closer to Zhuangzi’s (莊子) ‘emptiness of the mind’ (虛心) rather than Zhuzi’s (朱子) ‘Heolyeongbulmae’ (虛靈不昧) and Toegye’s ‘Heosim’ (虛心). If ‘Heo’
(虛) of the mind in Neo-Confucianism is the state in which personal selfishness and obsession are gone, ‘Heo’ (虛) in Zhuangzi (莊子) is ‘Osang-a’ (吾喪我, I lost myself), the state of forgetting even ‘self-consciousness’. The characteristic of Toegye is that he applies the object to empty even to ‘self’, beyond to desire or obsession. He speaks of non-selfness (無我) that transcends non-selfishness (無私).
The book of Zhang Heung Geo (張橫渠), Seomyeong (Ximing, 西銘) reveals that Heaven and Earth (天地) are one family, reasoning from various aspects, because Me and Heaven and Earth have the same principle, by exposing the original state of ‘benevolence’ (仁), breaking selfness (私) of I-myself (有我), opening emptiness (公) of non-selfness (無我), letting stubborn mind like a stone release, bridging the gap between me and foreign things, don’t allow even the smallest of selfishness.12)
2010) 168.
11) 古之賢君…常以貶抑降屈, 謙恭自虛爲道. Gigeun Jang, (translated), Toegyejib (退溪集), (Myeongmundang,
2003) 170.
12) 蓋橫渠此銘, 反覆推明吾與天地萬物, 其理本一之故, 狀出仁體, 因以破有我之私, 廓無我之公, 使其頑然如石之心,
Here, non-selfness (無我) refers to the state of ‘denial of selfness’ which goes beyond the level of simple non-selfishness (無私). It is equivalent to forgetting oneself (忘我), having no name (無名) of Zhuangzi (莊子). Generally speaking, non-selfishness (無私) in Confucianism is the negation of selfishness (私欲), not denial of selfness.
The self is always an object of affirmation, and the basic structure of Confucianism is to expand and develop the affirmed selfness. Slogans such as ‘rising in the world and gaining fame’ (立身揚名) and ‘Successful Life’ (出世) show the attitude of affirmation of selfness in Confucianism. Therefore, for Confucian scholars, non-selfness (無我) and forgetting oneself (忘我) is taboo and heretical.
Then, why did Toegye emphasize non-selfness (無我)? In Buddhism, based on the idea of ‘emptiness’ (空), non-selfness (無我) denies the reality of the selfness. In Zhuangzi (莊子), non-selfness (無我) refers to ‘Osang-a’ (吾喪我, I lost myself), or ‘Mugi’ (無己, I don’t exist) in the sense that the value system is relative and pluralistic. So, what about Toegye? I think it has to do with Toegye’s concept of ‘Haneul’ (天). In other words, Heaven (天) for Toegye is not the same Heaven as Li (理) in Chinese neo-Confucianism, but as a Heaven (Haneul, 天) in a higher level, i.e., a Heavenly Emperor (上帝) with personality, the Transcendent, in front of whom non-selfness (無我) and self-emptying (自虛) become ‘self-emptying’. And I think this is the difference in meaning between 虛 (emptiness) and 敬 (respect) in the doctrines of Chu-tzu (朱子學) and Toegye Studies.
5. Toegye’s Heaven
In Toegye’s Cheonmyeongdo (天命圖), there is ‘Cheonmyeong’ (天命) at the top, and next to it the explanation “Rigimyoeung” (理气妙凝) attached. This means that Heaven (天) is not recognized as Li (理) itself, but as a whole that encompasses Li (理) and Qi (氣). This perception was shown in the early Joseon neo-Confucian scholar Kwon Geun‘s (權近, 1352–1409) Cheon-insimseongbunseogjido (天人心性分釋之圖), in which at the top, not Taegeuk (太極) or Li (理), but Heaven (天) is located, and the attributes and actions of Heaven (天) are explained dividing it into ‘一’ (one)
融化洞徹, 物我無間, 一毫私意無所容於其間, 可以見天地爲一家. ibid., 172.
and ‘大’ (great). This shows that the position of Heaven in Toegye’s Cheonmyeongdo
(天命圖) is basically an extension of Kwon Geun’s Cheon-insimseongbunseogjido
(天人心性分釋之圖). )
In this way, the tendency to place Heaven (天) on top of Li (理) can be confirmed by Toegye’s saying, “To violate ‘benevolence’ (仁) is to violate Heaven (天)” (違仁卽違天)14). According to the doctrines of Chu-tzu (朱子學), it would be more appropriate to say “To violate ‘benevolence’ (仁) is to violate Li (理).” (違仁卽違理). However, According to Toegye Studies, in which not Li (理) but Heaven (天) is perceived as the ultimate and comprehensive thing, “To violate ‘benevolence’ (仁) is to violate Heaven (天)” (違仁卽違天).
The relationship between Li (理) and Heaven (天) for Toegye can also be confirmed in the following conversation between Toegye and his disciple.
[Disciple] “If you are in a dark room, you cannot see the sky, how can you face the blue sky?” (人在屋漏, 如何對蒼蒼之天)
[Toegye] “All above the earth is the sky (地上皆天).... Wherever you go, isn’t it the sky? (安往而非天乎) Generally, as in the doctrines of Chu-tzu (朱子學), the sky is Li (理) (蓋天卽理也). If you truly know that Li (理) is in all things and is always at work, you will know that the Heavenly Emperor (上帝) cannot leave even for a moment. (苟知理之無物不有, 無時不然, 則知上帝之不可須臾離也)”15)
If the proposition of the doctrines of Chu-tzu (朱子學), “The Heaven is Li” (天卽理) means reading Li (理) from Heaven (天), Toegye’s proposition means, on the one hand, accepting “The Heaven is Li” (天卽理), but on the other hand, reading Heavenly Emperor (上帝), that is, the personified Heaven from Li (理) ). In other words, Toegye’s words, “If you truly know that Li (理) is in all things and is always at work, you will know that the Heavenly Emperor (上帝) cannot leave even for a moment” derive the ubiquity of Heavenly Emperor (上帝) from the ubiquity of Li (理). This idea may have been possible because Toegye considered Heaven (天) as a more fundamental thing that encompasses Li (理).
The title of Cheonmyeongdo (天命圖) comes from the saying that, as can be seen from Zhuzi’s (朱子) interpretation of ‘Cheonmyeong’ (天命) in Chapter 1 of the doctrine of the mean (中庸), “Li (理) is given by Heaven’s Mandate (天命).” In the case of Toegye, he emphasized not the Heavenly Principle (天理) granted to human beings but the Heavenly Mandate (天命) that bestows it to human beings. In other words, in Toegye’s Heaven (天), the absoluteness of Heaven’s Mandate (天命) and the personality of the Heavenly Emperor (上帝) are emphasized in addition to the aspect of Zhuziological ‘the principle of creation‘ (生理). And ‘self-emptying’ (自虛) is requested as an attitude to accept the Heaven’s Mandate (天命) of the Heavenly Emperor (上帝).
The discussion so far can be summarized as follows. If the emptiness (虛心) is a state in which ‘the principle of creation’ (生理) of the mind (心) is active by eliminating desires and attachments, then ‘self-emptying’ (自虛) is a humble attitude to empty oneself in front of the Heavenly Emperor (上帝). While the former expresses the Zhuziological spirituality, the latter expresses the characteristics of the Toegyeological spirituality. Toegyehak (退溪學) adds or reinforces the spirituality of Heavenly mandate to the spirituality of Heavenly Li. This is the characteristic of Toegyehak (退溪學), which is different from Zhujiahak (朱子學), and this characteristic is being developed in earnest in Donghak (東學) at the end of the 19th century.
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_____________. Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents. State University of New York Press. 2014.
공공철학(公共哲學)은 최소한 두 개의 철학적 과제로 분리된다.
공공철학이라고 불리는 것 중 한 과제는 철학을 통한 공공의 중요성 문제에 역점을 두는 것으로 특히 공공정책, 도덕성, 사회적 문제에 초점을 맞추는 것이다. 이러한 의미에서 공공철학은 내용의 문제이지 스타일의 문제는 아니다. 그것은 어떤 철학적 문제와 관련되어야 하지만 어떤 행위에서도 일어날 수 있다. 공공철학이라고 불리는 것 중 두 번째 과제는 공공적 행위 중에서 철학을 적용하는 것이다. 이 견해는 Essays in Philosophy 특별판((Vol 15, issue 1, 2014)에서 볼 수 있는데 공공철학을 일반인과 함께 비학술적인 면에서 철학하는 것이라고 하였다[1]. 공공철학은 이런 면에서 보면 스타일의 문제이지 내용의 문제가 아니다.
그 것은 어떤 철학적 문제건 공공에 관한 것을 다루는 것이다. 어떤 공공철학자는 학문적인 전문가이지만 다른 이들은 가르치고 전문학술지에 논문을 쓰는 것 같은 학술활동에서 벗어난 밖에서 일을 할 수도 있다.
공공철학네트워크의 창설자 중 한 학자인 샤론 미거는 공공철학이란 단순히 공공적인 면에서 철학하는 것은 아니라고 하였다. 진정한 공공철학은 철학자가 사회지식의 학도가 되고 자신의 공공적인 일을 깊이 숙고하는 일인 것이다. 철학이 철학과 접함을 통해 공적인 것에 이득을 주는 만큼, 공공에의 접촉연계로부터 보탬이 된다는 것을 인식하는 것이라고 할 수 있다.
공적으로 일하는 철학자는 자신이 문제점을 미리 안다고 가정하지는 않는다. 그러나 자신의 지역사회에서의 경험에서 문제를 이끌어내고 정리체계화한다. 더욱이, 공개적으로 참여한 철학은 철학자 자신이 그 대중의 구성원이라는 것을 이해하면서 철학자 자신의 대중에 대한 책임을 요구한다[2] .
공공철학은 단순히 공공장소에서 수행되는 철학이라는 대안적인 견해를 가진 철학자들은 두 가지 프로젝트와 연계성을 갖고 참여하고 있다. 이 중 하나는 대중과 협력하여 공공 문제를 식별하고 해결하기 위하여 대중과 다른 이들을 교육하는 것이다. 두 번째 접근법은 존 듀이의 민주주의와 철학을 재건하는 필요성에 대한 작품에서 종종 영감을 얻는다[3]. 두 개의 접근은 서로 양립할 수 없는 것이 아니다.
예를 들면, 철학자 마이클 J. 센델은 공공철학이 두 가지 측면을 갖고 있다고 이야기한다.
첫 번째는 우리 시대의 정치적인 법적인 논쟁에서 철학적인 것을 찾아내는 것이다. 두 번째는 "현대 대중 담론에 설명을 할 수 있도록 도덕적, 정치적 철학을 가져와 적용하는 것입니다[4]
제임스 툴리는 공공철학의 역할은 공공적 문제를 해결하는 것이라고 말하지만, 이것은 여러가지 다른 방식으로 이루어질 수 있다[5]. Tully의 접근 방식은 시민권, 시민의 자유 및 비폭력이라는 경쟁 개념을 통해 실천을 강조합니다[6]. 어떤 의미에서는 공공철학은 스타일의 문제라기보다는 내용의 문제이다. 공공철학은 이런 면에서 공공장소에서 수행될 필요가 없고, 철학적인 문제의 특정부분을 다루어야 한다.
마국철학회는 2007년에 공공철학위원회를 설립하였다[7].
또한 공공철학네트워크가 2년에 한번 공공철학의 진보에 관한 학회를 개최한다[8].
다양한 개인들이 스스로 또는 다른 사람에 의해 공공철학자로 인정되고 있다.
여기에는 학자로 Cornel West, Jürgen Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Rorty,[9] 와 James Tully가 있으며, 학자가 아닌 사회활동가로는 Jane Addams[10]가 있고, 소설가로는 Ayn Rand[11]가 있다.
사사키 타케시
김태창
주요인용문헌 Wikipedia “Public Philosophy” retrieved on 19 December 2019, at 02:44.
1.^ Weinstein, Jack Russell (2014). "Public Philosophy: Introduction". Essays in Philosophy. 15 (1): 1–4. doi:10.7710/1526-0569.1485.
2.^http://api.ning.com/files/C*75Xw4bA4cU7vHOHS-zlLRmkdBskXa9IzuVBCJKtjhmSgMrQy8tWTu1s9vqumPuG2gyJfaPzwWJ1Tu4*NoJIUVYUXtPpC37/KetteringreportfinalcorrectedFeb2013.pdf
3.^ See part two of Volume I of The Essential Dewey: Pragmatism, Education, Democracy edited by Larry A Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
4.^ Sandel, Michael J. (2005). Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 5. ISBN 0-674-01928-8. OCLC 60321410.
5.^ Tully, James. Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 1, Democracy and Civic Freedom. Ideas in Context series. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 3. ISBN 978-0-521-44961-8. OCLC 316855971.
6.^ James Tully, especially Chapter 9 "On local and global citizenship: an apprenticeship manual," Public Philosophy in a New Key, Volume II: Imperialism and Civic Freedom. Ideas in Context series. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 243-309.
7.^ http://www.apaonline.org/members/group.aspx?id=110441
8.^ http://publicphilosophynetwork.ning.com/
9.^ Posner, Richard A. (2003). Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline (paperback ed.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 320–321. ISBN 0-674-01246-1. OCLC 491547976.
10.^ Hamington, Maurice (June 15, 2010). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Jane Addams". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved November 1, 2013.
11.^ Sciabarra, Chris Matthew (1995). Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. p. 97. ISBN 0-271-01440-7. OCLC 31133644.
시리즈『공공철학』(총20권) 사사키 타케시 김태창 공동편찬(도쿄대학출판회 2001-2006)(일서)
시리즈『이야기론』(총3권) 공동편찬(도쿄대학출판회 2007)(일서)
『공공철학을 서로 말한다』(도쿄대학출판회 2010)(일서)
『함께 공공철학 한다』(도쿄대학출판회 2010) (일서)
시리즈『공공하는 인간』전5권(도쿄대학출판회 2010-2011)(일서)
김태창 2007. 공공철학이란 무엇인가? 철학과현실 82-98. 철학문화연구소
마이클 샌들 2005. Public Philosophy.
윤용택 2011. 공공철학이란 무엇인가. 시민인문학. 20:325-340.
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Public philosophy is a label used for at least two separate philosophical projects. One project often called "public philosophy" is to address issues of public importance through philosophy, especially in the areas of public policy, morality and social issues.[citation needed] In this conception, public philosophy is a matter of content, not style.[citation needed] It must concern certain philosophical issues, but may be undertaken in any venue.[citation needed] The second project often called public philosophy is to engage in philosophy in public venues. This view is exemplified by the Essays in Philosophy special issue on public philosophy (Volume 15, issue 1, 2014), which defined public philosophy as "doing philosophy with general audiences in a non-academic setting".[1] Public philosophy, in this conception, is a matter of style not content. It must be undertaken in a public venue but might deal with any philosophical issue.
Some public philosophers are academic professionals, but others may work outside of the usual academic contexts of teaching and writing for peer-reviewed journals.
According to one of the founders of the Public Philosophy Network, Sharon Meagher, “'public philosophy' is not simply a matter of doing philosophy in public. A truly public philosophy is one that demands that the philosopher both become a student of community knowledge and reflect on his or her public engagement, recognizing that philosophy can benefit at as much from public contact as can the public benefit from contact with philosophy. The publicly engaged philosopher does not assume that he or she knows the questions in advance, but draws on his or her experiences in the community to develop and frame questions. Further, publicly engaged philosophy demands accountability on the part of the philosopher to his or her publics—understanding that philosophers are themselves members of those publics."[2]
Philosophers who hold the alternative view, that public philosophy is simply philosophy undertaken in public venues, are engaged in two projects. One of these is to educate the public and the other to engage with the public collaboratively to identify and address public problems. The second approach is often inspired by John Dewey's work on democracy and the need to reconstruct philosophy.[3] The two approaches are not exclusive. For instance, philosopher Michael J. Sandel describes public philosophy as having two aspects. The first is to "find in the political and legal controversies of our day an occasion for philosophy". The second is "to bring moral and political philosophy to bear on contemporary public discourse."[4] James Tully says, "The role of a public philosophy is to address public affairs", but this "can be done in many different ways."[5] Tully's approach emphasizes practice through the contestable concepts of citizenship, civic freedom, and nonviolence.[6] Public philosophy, in some conceptions, is a matter of content rather than style. Public philosophy, in this sense, need not be undertaken in a public venue but must deal with a particular subset of philosophical problems.
It is commonplace to argue that public philosophy promotes democracy, but Jack Russell Weinstein, director of The Institute for Philosophy In Public Life argues that this argument assumes philosophers are better citizens than non-philosophers. It also assumes, he writes, "that rational argumentation plays an essential part in democratic participation," but that "citizens consistently act on false information, skewed attitudes, gut reactions, prejudices, and malicious motives."[7]
The American Philosophical Association created a Committee on Public Philosophy in 2007.[8] Also the Public Philosophy Network has been holding conferences once every two years on advancing public philosophy.[9] A variety of individuals have been identified, either by themselves or others, as public philosophers. These include academics such as Cornel West, Jürgen Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Rorty,[10] James Tully, Jack Russell Weinstein and non-academics such as social activist Jane Addams[11] and novelist Ayn Rand.[12]