2022/08/21

Strained, Breathless, and Hurried: Learning from the Life of Thomas R. Kelly - Friends Journal

Strained, Breathless, and Hurried: Learning from the Life of Thomas R. Kelly - Friends Journal

Strained, Breathless, and Hurried: Learning from the Life of Thomas R. Kelly
May 1, 2011

By Chad Thralls

The breakneck pace of our over-scheduled lives often serves as an obstacle to the cultivation of spiritual wisdom. For some, the lessons of the spiritual life are learned the hard way. The life of Quaker writer Thomas R. Kelly demonstrates that those lessons, while transformative, can come at a steep price. In the end, the wisdom Kelly gained was not what he originally sought, and the suffering that facilitated it was devastating to him and to his family.

Thomas Kelly (1893-1941) eloquently describes the stress and anxiety many of us feel today in the final chapter of his spiritual classic, A Testament of Devotion. He writes, "The problem we face today needs very little introduction. Our lives in a modern city grow too complex and overcrowded. Even the necessary obligations which we feel we must meet grow overnight, like Jack’s beanstalk, and before we know it we are bowed down with burdens, crushed under committees, strained, breathless, and hurried, panting through a never-ending program of appointments."

Kelly wrote of this kind of life from experience. The strain he put himself through stemmed from his passionate desire to make a name for himself as a scholar. Kelly finished his PhD in philosophy at Hartford Theological Seminary in 1924 and began his teaching career at Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana, the next year. Though he grew up in the Midwest, he desperately wanted to find a position that to him carried more prestige. To make himself more attractive to potential employers, he started a second PhD. This time he sought out the finest Philosophy department in the world and enrolled at Harvard University. While studying at Harvard, he served as a visiting professor at Wellesley College in 1931-32. Though he hoped his study at Harvard and experience at Wellesley would yield a teaching position in the East for the fall of 1932, the Depression was on and no suitable opportunities arose. This forced him to return to Earlham, and as Douglas Steere reports, this retreat back to the Midwest "almost crushed" him. In the spring of 1935, he was offered a position at University of Hawaii. He found the opportunity to teach in Hawaii an attractive one because it would allow him to teach and conduct research on the philosophies of China and India. It felt like progress.

In the spring of 1936, Thomas Kelly’s wish was granted. Haverford College in Philadelphia invited him to join the faculty of their Philosophy department, yet he had not reached his goal of teaching at a prestigious Eastern college unscathed. As he spent the summers of 1932-1934 in libraries working on his Harvard dissertation, his health deteriorated; kidney stones, nervous exhaustion, depression, and a severe sinus condition plagued him at various times in the mid-1930s. Steere notes that during the spring semester of 1935, Kelly "got out of bed only to go to his classes and returned at once to rest again." In February 1936, he had surgery to correct a sinus condition that was exacerbated by the humidity in Hawaii. On top of his exhaustion, he and his family accumulated significant debt by moving across the country four times in 11 years.

After several years of hard work, Kelly paid to have his Harvard dissertation published in the summer of 1937. Though he had secured an attractive job and added a technical philosophical monograph to his CV, he still wanted the second PhD, perhaps feeling that a Harvard degree would grant him the scholarly prestige he sought for so long.

Then, at the very moment that would have validated all of his hard work, tragedy struck. During his oral exams in the fall of 1937, he had an anxiety attack. His mind went blank— just as it had at the defense of his first dissertation at Hartford. While he was given another chance at Hartford, this second time he would not be so fortunate. The Harvard committee, which included Alfred North Whitehead, failed him partly out of concern for his health, and informed him he would not be given a second chance to defend his dissertation. Kelly was devastated and sank to such a low place his wife worried that he might try to take his own life.

Though he provides no personal account of what happened after his crushing failure, by January a definite change was apparent in his writing and lecturing. His biographer writes that in November or December of 1937 he was "shaken by the experience of Presence— something that I did not seek, but that sought me." As Kelly hit rock bottom, he realized that he could not reach perfection and completeness through his ability and intense drive for success. His essay, titled "The Eternal Now" in A Testament of Devotion, is his attempt to explain the experience of the presence of God. He writes more personally in a letter to his wife from Germany the following summer: "In the midst of the work here this summer has come an increased sense of being laid hold on by a Power, a gentle, loving, but awful Power. And it makes one know the reality of God at work in the world. And it takes away the old self-seeking, self-centered self, from which selfishness I have laid heavy burdens on you, dear one." Later in the same letter, he writes, "I seem at last to be given peace. It is amazing."

Kelly articulated the anxiety and strain of modern life so well because he lived it. In "The Simplification of Life," the final chapter of A Testament of Devotion, he describes how his feverish existence was transformed into a life of "peace and joy and serenity." In this essay, he insists that the number of distractions in our environment is not the cause of the complexity of our lives. He confesses that he brought his intensity with him to Hawaii. Even in that idyllic environment, Kelly could not let go of his habit of trying to do too much.

The solution to the habit of trying to "do it all" is not found in isolating ourselves from our responsibilities in the world. The problem is a lack of integration in our lives. Kelly compares the voices within that pull us in multiple directions to a variety of selves that simultaneously reside within us. As Kelly describes it, "There is the civic self, the parental self, the financial self, the religious self, the society self, the professional self, the literary self." To make matters worse, the various selves within us are not interested in cooperating. Each of them shouts as loudly as it can when decision-time comes. Instead of integrating the various voices, Kelly claims that we generally make a quick choice that does not satisfy them all. Thus, instead of our decisions focusing us on what we need to do, we wear ourselves out trying to fulfill the desires of each one of the voices.

The remedy that Kelly offers to our unintegrated lives is not a simplification of environment but a life lived from the center. For Kelly, the Spirit speaks to us from our deepest center. God speaks through the heart. The key to a life without strain or tension is attending to the Spirit of God within us and submitting to the guidance we receive. This is the "simplification of life" to which the title of his essay refers. Kelly attests that when we take the many activities that currently seem important to us down into this center, a revaluation of priorities occurs.

Living an integrated life of peace and serenity from the divine center of the self is not easy. It entails falling in love with God in a much deeper way. It means making God’s plans for our lives the determining factor for action rather than our own will. It means being able to say no to some of the important things we are called on to do. For Kelly, learning to say no is not a means of retreating from the responsibilities of life. It reflects a passionate desire to center one’s life on the leadings of God. As he writes, "We cannot die on every cross, nor are we expected to."

Kelly learned from hard experience the toll that pushing one’s self to the limit can take. Though his life was changed through a profound mystical experience, the damage had been done; Kelly died of a heart attack at age 47. Because of his radical transformation, however, he provides us with a beautiful witness to a life lived from the center. Kelly assures us that God "never guides us into an intolerable scramble of panting feverishness." He shows us that a life of peace can be ours if we attend to God at the center of ourselves and yield to the Spirit’s leading.

Spiritual wisdom came at a steep price for Thomas Kelly. He did not take up the practice of surrendering to the Spirit willingly. After his crushing defeat at Harvard he sank to his lowest point, and from there he was forced to examine his goals and drive for perfection. When he could no longer avoid looking at his failure, when he abandoned his own striving, God became more real to him than ever before. In the end, God gave him the gift of peace that he was searching for in all the wrong places.

====

Chad Thralls
Chad Thralls is currently a visiting professor of Christian Spirituality at Fordham University's Graduate School of Religion and Religious Education. A Presbyterian with a soft spot for Quaker authors Rufus Jones, Thomas Kelly, and Douglas Steere, he was awarded a Gest Fellowship from Haverford Library Special Collections to conduct research on Thomas Kelly. He can be reached at chadthralls@ yahoo.com.

2022/08/20

Hermann Lotze - Wikipedia

Hermann Lotze - Wikipedia

Hermann Lotze

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Hermann Lotze
Lotze Falckenberg1901.jpg
Born21 May 1817
Died1 July 1881 (aged 64)
Alma materLeipzig University
Era19th-century philosophy
RegionWestern philosophy
SchoolGerman idealism[1]
Neo-Kantianism[2]
InstitutionsLeipzig University
University of Göttingen
Theses
Academic advisorsErnst Heinrich Weber
Alfred Wilhelm Volkmann
Gustav Fechner
Christian Hermann Weisse
Doctoral studentsCarl Stumpf
Anton Marty
Other notable studentsJames Ward
Josiah Royce
Main interests
Philosophical logicmetaphysics
Notable ideas
Teleological idealism (principle of teleomechanism)[3]
Regressive analysis
Metaphysics has for its parts ontologycosmology, and phenomenology
Influences
Influenced

Rudolf Hermann Lotze (/ˈlɔːtsə/German: [ˈlɔtsə]; 21 May 1817 – 1 July 1881) was a German philosopher and logician. He also had a medical degree and was well versed in biology. He argued that if the physical world is governed by mechanical laws, relations and developments in the universe could be explained as the functioning of a world mind. His medical studies were pioneering works in scientific psychology.

Biography[edit]

Lotze was born in Bautzen (Budziszyn), SaxonyGermany, the son of a physician. He was educated at the grammar school of Zittau; he had an enduring love of the classical authors, publishing a translation of SophoclesAntigone into Latin verse in his middle life.[9]

He attended the University of Leipzig as a student of philosophy and natural sciences, but entered officially as a student of medicine when he was seventeen. Lotze's early studies were mostly governed by two distinct interests: the first was scientific, based upon mathematical and physical studies under the guidance of E. H. Weber,[10] Alfred Wilhelm Volkmann, and Gustav Fechner.[10] The other was his aesthetic and artistic interest, which was developed under the care of the speculative theist Christian Hermann Weisse.[11][10] Weisse also influenced his later anti-psychologistic approach[12] to the historiography of philosophy.[5] He was attracted both by science and by the German idealism of Johann Gottlieb FichteFriedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

Lotze's first work was his dissertation De futurae biologiae principibus philosophicis, with which he gained in July 1838 the degree of doctor of medicine. In 1840 he gained the degree of doctor of philosophy with his dissertation De summis continuorum. He laid the foundation of his philosophical system in his Metaphysik (Leipzig, 1841) and his Logik (1843), short books published while still a junior lecturer at Leipzig University, whence he moved to Göttingen, succeeding Johann Friedrich Herbart in the chair of philosophy.

His two early books remained unnoticed by the reading public. He first became known to a larger circle through a series of works which aimed at establishing the study of both the physical and mental phenomena of the human organism. He applied the same general principles which had been adopted in the investigation of inorganic phenomena. These later works considered the human organism in its normal and diseased states. They included his Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische Naturwissenschaften (1842, 2nd ed., 1848), the articles "Lebenskraft" (1843) and "Seele und Seelenleben" (1846) in Rudolf Wagner's Handwörterbuch der Physiologie, his Allgemeine Physiologie des Körperlichen Lebens (1851), and his Medizinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele (1852).

When Lotze published these works, medical science was still under the influence of Schelling's philosophy of nature. The mechanical laws, to which external things were subject, were conceived as being valid only in the inorganic world. Mechanism was the unalterable connexion of every phenomenon a with other phenomena bcd, either as following or preceding it; mechanism was the inexorable form into which the events of this world are cast, and by which they are connected. The object of those writings was to establish the all-pervading rule of mechanism. But the mechanical view of nature is not identical with the materialistic. In the last of the above-mentioned works the question is discussed at great length how we have to consider mind, and the relation between mind and body; the answer is we have to consider mind as an immaterial principle, its action, however, on the body and vice versa as purely mechanical, indicated by the fixed laws of a psycho-physical mechanism.

These doctrines of Lotze, though pronounced with the distinct and reiterated reservation that they did not contain a solution of the philosophical question regarding the nature of mechanism, were nevertheless by many considered to be the last word of the philosopher, a decisive rejection of the reveries of Schelling and the idealistic theories of Hegel. Published as they were during the years when the modern school of German materialism was at its height, these works of Lotze were enrolled in the opposing camp of empirical philosophy.

The misinterpretations which he had suffered induced Lotze to publish a small polemical pamphlet (Streitschriften, 1857), in which he corrected two mistakes. His opposition to Hegel's formalism had induced some to associate him with the materialistic school, others to count him among the followers of Herbart. Lotze denied that he belonged to the school of Herbart. However, he admitted that the monadology of Leibniz could be considered the forerunner of Herbart's teachings and also of his own views.

Philosophical work[edit]

Lotze worked in a post-revolutionary time of transition between the idealistic and rationalist legacies of LeibnizKant and Hegel and the new materialism and scientific interpretation of reality.

He believed that everywhere in the wide realm of observation we find three distinct regions: the region of facts, the region of laws and the region of standards of value. These three regions are separate only in our thoughts, not in reality. Full understanding comes through conviction that the world of facts is the field in which those higher standards of moral and aesthetic value are being realized through the medium of laws. Such a union is, for him, only intelligible through the idea of a personal Deity, who in the creation and preservation of a world has voluntarily chosen certain forms and laws, through the natural operation of which the ends of His work are gained.

Lotze proposed a view called teleological idealism, whose central principle is the principle of teleomechanism, the idea that, in logic, metaphysics and science, mechanism is compatible with teleology.[3]

Lotze's lectures ranged over a wide field: he delivered annually lectures on psychology and on logic (the latter including a survey of the entirety of philosophical research, Encyclopädie der Philosophie), then at longer intervals lectures on metaphysics, philosophy of naturephilosophy of artphilosophy of religion, rarely on history of philosophy and ethics. In these lectures he expounded his peculiar views in a stricter form, and during the last decade of his life he embodied the substance of those courses in his System der Philosophie, of which only two volumes have appeared (vol. I Logik, 1st ed., 1874, 2nd ed., 1880; vol. II Metaphysik, 1879). The third and concluding volume, which was to treat in a more condensed form the principal problems of practical philosophy, of philosophy of art and religion, was not completed before his death.

A problem of a purely formal character for him was to try to bring unity and harmony into the scattered thoughts of our general culture. He wanted especially to investigate those conceptions which form the initial assumptions and conditions of the several sciences, and to fix the limits of their applicability.

The investigations will then naturally divide themselves into three parts, the first of which deals with

  • those to our mind inevitable forms, or laws, in which we are obliged to think about things, if we think at all (metaphysics), the second being devoted to
  • the great region of facts, trying to apply the results of metaphysics to these, specially the two great regions of external and mental phenomena (cosmology and psychology), the third dealing with
  • those standards of value from which we pronounce our aesthetic or ethical approval or disapproval.

His goal was to form some general idea how laws, facts and standards of value may be combined in one comprehensive view.

The world of many things surrounds us; our notions, by which we manage correctly or incorrectly to describe it, are also ready made. What remains to be done is, not to explain how such a world manages to be what it is, nor how we came to form these notions, but to eliminate those abstract notions which are inconsistent and jarring, or to remodel and define them so that they may constitute a consistent and harmonious view.

The course of things and their connexion is only thinkable by the assumption of a plurality of existences, the reality of which (as distinguished from our knowledge of them) can be conceived only as a multitude of relations. This quality of standing in relation to other things is that which gives to a thing its reality. And the nature of this reality again can neither be consistently represented as a fixed and hard substance nor as an unalterable something, but only as a fixed order of recurrence of continually changing events or impressions. The things themselves which exist and their changing phases must stand in some internal connexion; they themselves must be active or passive, capable of doing or suffering.

Why not interpret at once and render intelligible the common conception originating in natural science, viz. that of a system of laws which governs the many things? But, in attempting to make this conception quite clear and thinkable, we are forced to represent the connexion of things as a universal substance, the essence of which we conceive as a system of laws which underlies everything and in its own self connects everything, but is imperceptible, and known to us merely through the impressions it produces on us, which we call things. Practical life as well as those of science are equally served if we deprive the material things outside of us of an independence, and assign to them merely a connected existence through the universal substance by the action of which alone they can appear to us. He traced material things through our scientific discovery of them, back to the culture which gave them reality through this science, and ultimately back to the values which established this culture. This method is known as "regressive analysis."[3]

Lotze's historical position is of much interest. Though he disclaims being a follower of Herbart, his formal definition of philosophy and his conception of the object of metaphysics are similar to those of Herbart, who defines philosophy as an attempt to remodel the notions given by experience. In this endeavor he forms with Herbart an opposition to the philosophies of Johann Gottlieb FichteFriedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel which aimed at objective and absolute knowledge, and also to the criticism of Kant, which aimed at determining the validity of all human knowledge.

What, however, with the idealists was an object of thought alone, the absolute, for Lotze cannot be defined in rigorous philosophical language; the aspirations of the human heart, the contents of our feelings and desires, the aims of art and the tenets of religious faith must be grasped in order to fill the empty idea of the absolute with meaning. These manifestations of the divine spirit again cannot be traced and understood by reducing (as Hegel did) the growth of the human mind in the individual, in society and in history to the monotonous rhythm of a speculative schematism. The essence and worth which is in them reveals itself only to the student of detail, for reality is larger and wider than philosophy. The problem, "how the one can be many", is only solved for us in the numberless examples in life and experience which surround us, for which we must retain a lifelong interest and which constitute the true field of all useful human work.

This conviction of the emptiness of terms and abstract notions, and of the fullness of individual life, led Lotze to combine in his writings the two courses into which German philosophical thought had been moving since the death of its great founder, Leibniz. We may define these courses by the terms esoteric and exoteric. The former was the academic quest to systematize everything and reduce all our knowledge to an intelligible principle. This attempt missed the deeper meaning of Leibniz's philosophy. The latter was the unsystematized philosophy of general culture which we find in the work of the great writers of the classical period, LessingWinckelmann[disambiguation needed]GoetheSchiller and Herder. All of these expressed in some degree their indebtedness to Leibniz. Lotze can be said to have brought philosophy out of the lecture-room into the market-place of life. By understanding and combining the strengths of each approach, he became the true successor of Leibniz.

The age in which Lotze lived and wrote in Germany did not appreciate the position he took up. Frequently misunderstood, yet rarely criticized, he was nevertheless greatly admired, listened to by devoted hearers and read by an increasing circle. But this circle never attained to the unity of a philosophical school.

Works[edit]

Works in Latin and German[edit]

Translations in English[edit]

Lotze's Outlines of Philosophy
Lotze's System of Philosophy
Other works

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Frederick BeiserLate German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 127.
  2. ^ Sullivan, David. "Hermann Lotze". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. Jump up to:a b c Milkov, Nikolay. "Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817 -1881)"Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 28 February 2017.
  4. ^ Woodward 2015, p. 83.
  5. Jump up to:a b Woodward 2015, p. 74–5.
  6. ^ Hermann von Helmholtz entry at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Lydia Patton
  7. ^ Basile, Pierfrancesco (25 July 2017). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). James Ward. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. ^ Robert Boyce Brandom, "Frege's Technical Concepts", in Frege Synthesized: Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of G. FregeL. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka, Synthese Library, D. Reidel, 1986, pp. 253–295
  9. ^ Sullivan, Richard. "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy"Hermann Lotze. Stanford University. Retrieved 30 July 2020.
  10. Jump up to:a b c Milkov, N. (n.d.). Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817–1881). Retrieved from https://www.iep.utm.edu/lotze/
  11. ^ Frederick BeiserLate German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 202.
  12. ^ Lotze expressed these views in his 1880 article "Die Philosophie in den letzten 40 Jahren"/"Philosophy in the Last Forty Years" (Kleine Schriften, v. 3, ed. D. Peipers, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1885–9); see Sullivan, David. "Hermann Lotze". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

References[edit]

  • William R. Woodward, Hermann Lotze: An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
  •  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domainChisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Lotze, Rudolf Hermann". Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.

External links[edit]