본질 위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전.
본질(本質)은 그것이 그것으로서 있기 위해 없어서는 안 되는 것을 말한다.
인간과 삼각형이 다른 점은 형체라든가 모습만이 아니다. 보다 더 근본적으로 묻고 설명하지 않으면 알 수 없는 것이 있다. 그것은 인간이란 무엇이냐는 질문의 해답에서 '무엇'에 해당한다. 제각기의 것이 지니는 그 무엇이다. 본체(本體)이며, 인간의 경우에는 그 정의(定義)이다. 이것은 현대의 실존과는 대립된다.
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본질 출처 : J "Wikipedia (Wikipedia)"
본질 (정말, 희 : ουσια (ousia),羅: substantia / essentia )이란, 어떤 것을 그것으로 하는 자성, 또는 그러한 특성으로 이루어지는 진실재 를 말하는 경우도 있다.
개요 [ 편집 ]
어떤 어떠한 대상을 율할 때 충당하는 로고스를 '무성( 성 [ 요염함 회피 ] 이라도)' 등이라고 부르며, 이 호칭을 본질로 간주하는 것이 관습이다. 그러므로 동일성 또는 유형 학종 차이는 이러한 파생이다.
이와 대조적으로, 성에 의해 부가되거나 결여되어, 그것을 일으키는 (필연성의 결재) 부대적인 성향을, 우유 (성)라고 부르는다.
구어나 속어에 있어서의 광의적인 용법에 있어서, 「체재」에 대한 개념으로서의 「원현상」이나 「진수」 등 「현재의 기초가 되는 형이상적으로 해서 진정한 「성질」의 어의로서 사용되는 경향에 있다 .
사상사 [ 편집 ]
중세성기 스코라학 이후로는, essentia(본질 존재)는 실존 (현실 존재 엑시스텐티아 exsistentia)의 대 개념으로 되어 왔다.
원래 아리스토텔레스 의 우시아 는 '존재하는 것'이라는 단어 구성을 가지고 있는 단어로 '정말 실재하는 것'을 의미했고, 그에게는 우선 그것은 아이디어 가 아닌 구체적인 개인이었다. 이 형상 과 질료 로 이루어지는 개체는, 술어 로서 이용될 수 있는 보편자로서의 「제2 실체」에 대비된 경우, 주어 로서 밖에 이용되지 않는 기체로서의 「제1 실체」라고 불린다. 여기에서 또, 그 개인의 소재인 「질료 퓌레」가 아니라, 그 「형상 에이드스」야말로, 물건의 진정한 실재성을 담당하고 있다고 생각했을 때, 개개의 것의 본질로서는 질료와 대비 된 형상 쪽이 제일의 실체라고 설해진다. 즉, 그에게 우시아라는 말 은 실체 라는 함의와 본질로서의 형상이라는 함의를 모두 가지고 있었다.
이것이 라틴어 로 번역되었을 때, substantia와 essentia라는 두 개의 번역어가 이루어졌다. substantia는 우시아와 동의어로 사용되고 있던 휴포스타시스「아래에 서 있는 것」(나중에 기독교 신학 의 문맥에서는 우시아와 휴포스타시스는 구별되게 되었다. 이 경우의 번역어는 persona)의 직역으로 기질 로서의 실체라는 관점에서의 번역어였고, essentia는 「어느 곳의 것」이라는 관점에서의 우시아의 번역어였다.
아리스토텔레스적 틀에 서는 한 양자는 구별되지 않고 번역어의 차이에 지나지 않았지만, 중세 성기 스콜라학, 구체적으로는 토마스 아퀴나스 이후, 실체 substantia와 본질 essentia는 구별되게 되었다. 다만 이때에도 근대철학과 달리 본질이 실재라는 관념론적 인 틀은 유지되었다. 존재는 본질로서 개념적으로 존재하는 실체와 본질에 현실 존재(existia)가 플러스된 현실적으로 존재하는 실체로 구분된 것이다.
덧붙여 개념이 본질 존재한다( 개념 으로서 존재한다)는 것은, 단순히 문법적·형식적인 이유로 명목적으로 표현 가능하다고 할 뿐만 아니라, 논리적 모순 없이 상정 가능하다는 것을 가리킨다. 언어 부족으로 모호하거나 모순 되는 개념 이 고려될 수 있다. 그러나, 그러한 명목적 개념은 그 명사에 대응하는 실체를 갖지 않는 것으로 생각되었다. 그러나, 이것은 반드시 그 개념에 대응하는 것이 현실 존재한다는 것을 보장하지 않는다. 개념에서 최고 존재의 현 존재를 증명하는 실체론적 증명을 물리친 자에게는 칸트 가 있다( 순수 이성 비판 ).
이것은 가능이나 불가능 등 양상 을 문제로 하는 장면에서 특히 문제가 되었고, 또 현대에서는 하이데거 나 실존주의에 의해 존재 한다는 것이 물건의 본질이나 속성 에 포함되지 않는다는 점에서 주목되었다. 확실히 데카르트 등에 있어서는, 예를 들면 하나님은 그 완전성 가운데 존재를 포함한 것이었다. 그러나, 존재하는 것으로서만 그 본질을 생각할 수 없다( 스피노자 ), 라고 하는 것만으로는, 역시 그 자체는 현실 존재라고는 할 수 없다고의 비판이 예를 들면 칸트 등으로부터 이루어지고 있다. 즉, 술어로서 생각했을 때에 「존재한다」라는 술어는, 다른 술어에는 없는 특이한 위치를 차지한다.
덧붙여 아리스토텔레스의 상술의 논의를 계승한 중세의 보편 논쟁 에 있어서는, 실재하는 것은 개인이라고 하는 입장에 단 유명론 과, 보편(형상)이야말로 실재인 실재론 이 대립했다.
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Essence
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Essence (Latin: essentia) is a polysemic term, used in philosophy and theology as a designation for the property or set of properties that make an entity or substance what it fundamentally is, and which it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity.
Essence is contrasted with accident: a property that the entity or substance has contingently, without which the substance can still retain its identity.
The concept originates rigorously with Aristotle (although it can also be found in Plato),[1] who used the Greek expression to ti ên einai (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι,[2] literally meaning "the what it was to be" and corresponding to the scholastic term quiddity) or sometimes the shorter phrase to ti esti (τὸ τί ἐστι,[3] literally meaning "the what it is" and corresponding to the scholastic term haecceity) for the same idea. This phrase presented such difficulties for its Latin translators that they coined the word essentia (English "essence") to represent the whole expression.
For Aristotle and his scholastic followers, the notion of essence is closely linked to that of definition (ὁρισμός horismos).[4]
In the history of Western philosophy, essence has often served as a vehicle for doctrines that tend to individuate different forms of existence as well as different identity conditions for objects and properties; in this logical meaning, the concept has given a strong theoretical and common-sense basis to the whole family of logical theories based on the "possible worlds" analogy set up by Leibniz and developed in the intensional logic from Carnap to Kripke, which was later challenged by "extensionalist" philosophers such as Quine.
Etymology[edit]
The English word essence comes from Latin essentia, via French essence. The original Latin word was created purposefully, by Ancient Roman philosophers, in order to provide an adequate Latin translation for the Greek term οὐσία (ousia). Stoic philosopher Seneca (d. 65 AD) attributed creation of the word to Cicero (d. 43 BC), while rhetor Quintilian (d. 100 AD) claimed that the word was created much earlier, by writer Plautus (184 BC). Early use of the term is also attested in works of Apuleius (d. 170 AD) and Tertullian (d. 240 AD). During Late Antiquity, the term was often used in Christian theology, and through the works of Augustine (d. 430), Boethius (d. 524) and later theologians, who wrote in Medieval Latin, it became the basis for consequent creation of derived terms in many languages.[5]
Philosophy[edit]
Ontological status[edit]
In his dialogues Plato suggests that concrete beings acquire their essence through their relations to "Forms"—abstract universals logically or ontologically separate from the objects of sense perception. These Forms are often put forth as the models or paradigms of which sensible things are "copies". When used in this sense, the word form is often capitalized.[6] Sensible bodies are in constant flux and imperfect and hence, by Plato's reckoning, less real than the Forms which are eternal, unchanging and complete. Typical examples of Forms given by Plato are largeness, smallness, equality, unity, goodness, beauty and justice.
Aristotle moves the Forms of Plato to the nucleus of the individual thing, which is called ousia or substance. Essence is the ti of the thing, the to ti en einai. Essence corresponds to the ousia's definition; essence is a real and physical aspect of the ousia (Aristotle, Metaphysics, I).
According to nominalists (Roscelin of Compiègne, William of Ockham, Bernard of Chartres), universals aren't concrete entities, just voice's sounds; there are only individuals: "nam cum habeat eorum sententia nihil esse praeter individuum [...]" (Roscelin, De gener. et spec., 524). Universals are words that can to call several individuals; for example the word "homo". Therefore, a universal is reduced to a sound's emission (Roscelin, De generibus et speciebus).
John Locke distinguished between "real essences" and "nominal essences". Real essences are the thing(s) that makes a thing a thing, whereas nominal essences are our conception of what makes a thing a thing.[7]
According to Edmund Husserl essence is ideal. However, ideal means that essence is an intentional object of consciousness. Essence is interpreted as sense (E. Husserl, Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, paragraphs 3 and 4).
Existentialism[edit]
Existentialism was coined by Jean-Paul Sartre's endorsement of Martin Heidegger's statement that for human beings "existence precedes essence." In as much as "essence" is a cornerstone of all metaphysical philosophy and of Rationalism, Sartre's statement was a repudiation of the philosophical system that had come before him (and, in particular, that of Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger). Instead of "is-ness" generating "actuality," he argued that existence and actuality come first, and the essence is derived afterward. For Kierkegaard, it is the individual person who is the supreme moral entity, and the personal, subjective aspects of human life that are the most important; also, for Kierkegaard all of this had religious implications.[8]
In metaphysics[edit]
"Essence," in metaphysics, is often synonymous with the soul, and some existentialists argue that individuals gain their souls and spirits after they exist, that they develop their souls and spirits during their lifetimes. For Kierkegaard, however, the emphasis was upon essence as "nature." For him, there is no such thing as "human nature" that determines how a human will behave or what a human will be. First, he or she exists, and then comes property. Jean-Paul Sartre's more materialist and skeptical existentialism furthered this existentialist tenet by flatly refuting any metaphysical essence, any soul, and arguing instead that there is merely existence, with attributes as essence.
Thus, in existentialist discourse, essence can refer to:
- physical aspect or property;
- the ongoing being of a person (the character or internally determined goals); or
- the infinite inbound within the human (which can be lost, can atrophy, or can be developed into an equal part with the finite), depending upon the type of existentialist discourse.
Religion[edit]
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Buddhism[edit]
Within the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism, Candrakirti identifies the self as:
Buddhapālita adds, while commenting on Nagārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,
For the Madhyamaka Buddhists, 'Emptiness' (also known as Anatta or Anatman) is the strong assertion that:
- all phenomena are empty of any essence;
- anti-essentialism lies at the root of Buddhist praxis; and
- it is the innate belief in essence that is considered to be an afflictive obscuration which serves as the root of all suffering.
However, the Madhyamaka also rejects the tenets of Idealism, Materialism or Nihilism; instead, the ideas of truth or existence, along with any assertions that depend upon them, are limited to their function within the contexts and conventions that assert them, possibly somewhat akin to Relativism or Pragmatism. For the Madhyamaka, replacement paradoxes such as Ship of Theseus are answered by stating that the Ship of Theseus remains so (within the conventions that assert it) until it ceases to function as the Ship of Theseus.
In Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika Chapter XV examines essence itself.
Hinduism[edit]
In understanding any individual personality, a distinction is made between one's Swadharma (essence) and Swabhava (mental habits and conditionings of ego personality). Svabhava is the nature of a person, which is a result of his or her samskaras (impressions created in the mind due to one's interaction with the external world). These samskaras create habits and mental models and those become our nature. While there is another kind of svabhava that is a pure internal quality – smarana – we are here focusing only on the svabhava that was created due to samskaras (because to discover the pure, internal svabhava and smarana, one should become aware of one's samskaras and take control over them). Dharma is derived from the root dhr "to hold." It is that which holds an entity together. That is, Dharma is that which gives integrity to an entity and holds the core quality and identity (essence), form and function of that entity. Dharma is also defined as righteousness and duty. To do one's dharma is to be righteous, to do one's dharma is to do one's duty (express one's essence).[10]
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ^ "The Internet Classics Archive | Euthyphro by Plato". classics.mit.edu. Retrieved 12 June 2018.
- ^ Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1029b
- ^ Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1030a
- ^ S. Marc Cohen, "Aristotle's Metaphysics", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 20 April 2008.
- ^ Brown 1996, p. 275-276.
- ^ "Chapter 28: Form" of The Great Ideas: A Synopticon of Great Books of the Western World (Vol. II). Encyclopædia Britannica (1952), p. 526-542. This source states that Form or Idea get capitalized according to this convention when they refer "to that which is separate from the characteristics of material things and from the ideas in our mind."
- ^ "Locke on Real Essence". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ The Story of Philosophy, Bryan Magee, Dorling Kindersley Lond. 1998, ISBN 0-7513-0590-1
- ^ a b Translations from "The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment", Vol. 3 by Tsong-Kha-Pa, Snow Lion Publications ISBN 1-55939-166-9
- ^ Prasadkaipa.com
Sources[edit]
- Athanasopoulos, Constantinos; Schneider, Christoph, eds. (2013). Divine Essence and Divine Energies: Ecumenical Reflections on the Presence of God. Cambridge, UK: James Clarke & Co. ISBN 9780227900086.
- Aveling, Francis (1909). "Essence and Existence". The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 5. New York: Robert Appleton Company.
- Brown, Stephen F. (1996). "Theology and Philosophy". Medieval Latin: An Introduction and Bibliographical Guide. Washington, D.C.: CUA Press. pp. 267–287. ISBN 9780813208428.
- Weedman, Mark (2007). The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers. Leiden-Boston: Brill. ISBN 978-9004162242.
External links[edit]
 | Wikiquote has quotations related to Essence. |
- Maurice De Wulf: "Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism.", in: The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911.
- Robertson, Teresa; Atkins, Philip. "Essential vs. Accidental Properties". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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