Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch17XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

===

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect

Man

Ibn 'Arabi recognizes in the Perfect Man a particular kind of magi-

cal power. This is hardly to be wondered at, because the Perfect

Man, as a 'knower' ('arif), is by definition a man with an unusually

developed spiritual power. His mind naturally shows an extraordi-

nary activity.

This extraordinary power is known as himmah, meaning a con-

centrated spiritual energy. According to Ibn' Arabi, a 'knower' can,

if he likes, affect any abject by merely concentrating all his spiritual

energy upon it; he can even bring into existence a thing which is not

actually existent. In brief, a 'knower' is able to subjugate anything to

his will. He is endowed with the power of taskhir. 1

The word taskhir reminds us of King Salomon. It is widely known

and accepted in Islam that Salomon was in possession of a super-

natural power by which he could dominate Nature and move it at

will. He could, for instance, cause winds to blow in whatever direc-

tion he wished. He is said to have been able to contrai at will

invisible beings.

According to Ibn 'Arabi, however, Salomon did not exercise his

contrai over Nature by his himmah. In this respect, Salomon

occupies a very special place. It was a special favor of God granted

to him in a peculiar way. For, in order to work miracles, he did not

have to have recourse to the particular concentration of mind

known as himmah. He had only to 'command' ( amr). Whatever was

commanded by him to do anything, moved immediately as it was

commanded. This kind of taskhir is, in the judgment of Ibn' Arabi, a

degree higher than the taskhir by himmah, because the former is a

direct working upon the abject.

The taskhïr which was peculiar to Solomon, which made him superior

to others, and which God had given him as (an essential) part of the

kingship never to be given to anybody after him - this taskhïr was

characterized by its being exercised by his 'command'. God says:

'Thus have We subjugated to him (i.e., Solomon) the wind so that it

might blow by his command (XXI, 81) (That which is really

lii1

11

1

11

1

276 Sufism and Taoism

characteristic of Solomon' s case) is not the simple fact that he could

exercise taskhir. For God says concerning ail of us without any

discrimination: 'And We have subjugated to you ail that are in

heaven and in earth' (XXXI, 20). Thus He speaks of having put

under our control winds, stars, and others. But (in our case) the

taskhir occurs not by our command, but by the Command of God. So

you will find by reflection that what was peculiar to Solomon was (not

the taskhïr itself) but in fact that (the taskhïr) could be exercised by

his own command. In order to do that, he did not need any mental

concentration or himmah; ail he had to do was to 'command'.

I mention this point specifically because we ail know that the things of

the world can be affected and influenced by a particular kind

of mental force when the latter happens to be in a heightened state of

concentration. I have witnessed this phenomenon in my own (mysti-

cal) life. Solomon, however, had only to pronounce the word of

command to anything he wanted to control, without there being any

need for himmah and concentration. 2

What kind of thing, then, is this spiritual concentration called him-

mah? It may be most easily understood if we try to conceive it on the

analogy of our ordinary experience of imagination. We can produce

in imagination anything we like, even things that are not existent in

the outside world. Such an imagined abject exists only within our

minds. In a somewhat similar way, a true 'knower' who has attained

to the stage of walayah is able to produce by his concentrated

spiritual power things that are not actually there, with this differ-

ence, however, that he produces the object in the outer world of

reality. This is obviously a kind of 'creation' (khalq). But it should

not be identified or confused with the Divine act of creation.

Anybody can create within his mind by means of his faculty of

imagination things that have no existence except in imagination

itself. This is a matter of common experience. But the 'knower'

creates by himmah things that do have existence outside the place of

the himmah (i.e., outside the mind).

(However, the object thus created by himmah continues to exist)

only as long as the himmah maintains it without being weakened by

the keeping of what it has created. As soon as the concentration

slackens and the mind of the 'knower' becomes distracted from the

keeping of what it has created, the object created disappears. This,

however, does not apply to those special cases in which a 'knower'

has obtained a firm control over ail the Presences ( ontological levels

of Being) so that his mind never loses sight of them ail at the same

time. In fact, the mind of such a man ( even if it loses sight of the

Presences, does not lose sight of ail together); there surely remains at

least one Presence present to his mind. 3

We must recall at this juncture the five Presences of Being to which

reference was made in the first chapter. The Presences are classified

variously. One of the classifications, to give an example of

The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 277

classification which is a little different from the one explained in the

first chapter, makes the whole world of Being consist of ( 1) the

Presence of the senses (i.e., the plane of the sensible experience),

(2) the Presence of Images-Exemplars, (3) the Presence of the

Spirits (arwah ), ( 4) the Presence of the Intellects ('uqül), and the

Presence of the Essence. But the way in which the Presences are

classified is not very important in the present context. What is of

primary importance is to know that the world of Being is structured

in terms of levels or planes and that these planes are related to each

other in an organic way. This means that anything that exists in the

plane of sensible experience, for instance, has a corresponding

existence also in the higher planes in a particular form peculiar to

each plane, so that ultimately it goes back to the very Essence of the

Absolute as its ontological ground.

Because of this particular structure of Being, the' knower' can, by

concentrating his entire spiritual energy upon an object on one of

the suprasensible levels, produce the object in a sensible form on

the level of concrete reality. Also by maintaining spiritually the

form of an object on a higher level he can maintain the forms of the

same object on the lower levels of Being.

But this spiritual 'creation' is essentially different from the Divine

Creation in one vital point. When, for example, the 'knower' has

produced by himmah an object in a sensible form, the object thus

'created' on the level of sensible experience continues to subsist on

that level only during the time in which he continues to maintain his

spiritual concentration. The moment his attention becomes less

keen by the effect of drowsiness or by a different idea occurring to

his mind, the object ceases to exist on the level of the senses.

However, Ibn' Arabi adds, in the case of the highest 'knower', his

spiritual power dominating all the basic five planes of Being, there is

always at least one level on which the spiritual concentration is

maintained even if his attention becomes less keen and less intense

on other levels. In such a case, the object 'created' may be preserved

for a long period of time.

By saying this, I have disdosed a secret which the people of God (i.e.,

mystics) have always jealously guarded themselves from revealing

for fear that something might corne to light which would contradict

their daim to the effect that they are the Absolute. (Against this

daim I have disdosed the fact that) the Absolute never becomes

forgetful of anything, white man must necessarily be always forgetful

of this particular thing or that.

Only as long as a man spiritually maintains what he has 'created', is he

in a position to say, 'I am the Creator!' (ana al-f}aqq). However, his

maintaining the 'created' object is entirely different from God's

maintaining. I have just explained the difference.

278 Sufism and Taoism

As long as he becomes forgetful of even one form and its ontological

level, man is to be distinguished from the Absolu te. He is naturally to

be distinguished from the Absolu te even if he main tains all the forms

(of an object on different levels) by maintaining one of the forms on

its proper level of which he happens to be unforgetful, because this is

after alla kind of'implicit' (tacf,ammun) maintaining. God's maintain-

ing what He has created is not like this; He maintains every form

'explicitly' (i.e., He maintains all forms of the thing, each on its

proper level individually).

This is a question which no one, as far as 1 know, has even written in

any book, neither myself nor others. This is the only and the first

book in which (the secret has been disclosed). The present work is in

this sense a unique pearl of the age. Keep this well in mind!

The particular level of Being4 to which the mind of the 'knower' is

kept present, being concentrated on the form (of an object which he

has created on that ontological level), may be compared to the 'Book'

of which God says: 'We have not neglected anything in the Book (of

Decrees)' (VI, 38), so that it comprehends both what has been

actualized and what has not yet been actualized. But what 1 say here

will never be understood except by those who are themselves the

'gathering' principle ( qur' iin). 5

Thus it has been clarified that a man who can gather his himmah in

such a comprehensive way is able to do so because he 'gathers'

together in his consciousness all the levels of Being into a com-

prehensive unity. Such a man stands closest to God, with the only

difference which has just been explained. The difference, in short,

results from the furqan. And precisely because of the furqan he is

essentially distinguished from God.

The important point, however, is that this 'separating' is not an

ordinary furqan. It is the highestfurqan (arfa' furqan) 1 because it is

a furqan after the 'gathering'. In the case of an ordinary man, the

'separating' which he exercises is a pre-fana' phenomenon; he has

not yet had any experience of 'self-annihilation', that is, he has not

yet 'tasted' his essential oneness with the Absolute. The 'separating'

he exercises in such a state is an absolute, unconditional 'separa-

tion'. He is absolutely and unconditionally 'separated' and distin-

guished' from the Absolute.

The 'knower', on the contrary, is a man who has already passed

through the experience of 'self-annihilation' and, consequently,

knows through personal experience his essential oneness with the

Absolu te. He knows it, and yet distinguishes in himself between the

'Divine aspect' (lahüt) and the 'human aspect' (nasüt), i.e., between

the Absolute and the creature. This 'separating' is not a mere

'separating'; it is a 'separating' of a higher order. And this corres-

ponds to what is generally known in Sufi terminology as 'self-

subsistence' (baqa').

The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 279

Now, if we consider in the light of this conception the idea of

himmah, we are led to the following understanding of it. The highest

'knower', while he is actually exercising his himmah, is in a certain

sense a 'creator' (khaliq); all the traces of his 'servant-ness' disap-

pear from his consciousness, and he feels 'Lordship' living and

acting in himself. He f eels himself to be a 'Lord', and has the clear

consciousness that everything in the whole world is under his con-

trai. This is the stage of 'gathering' (qur' an). However, this state is

but a temporary and unstable one, because if his mind slackens and

loses its highest intensity of concentration even for a moment, he

becomes immediately conscious of his 'impotence' ('ajz) and is

necessarily faced with his own 'servantness'. And this is the stage of

'separating' (furqan). 8

We must observe also that himmah is, in its practical aspect, a free

disposai of things (taskhir al-ashya'), while in its cognitive aspect it

is an extraordinary power to penetrate the secret of Being which lies

beyond the grasp of Reason. It is significant in this respect that Ibn

'Arabï in a passage of the declares that the true reality

(IJ,aqiqah) of Being can only be known by a 'servant endowed with

himmah'. Himmah consists essentially in that a 'knower' concen-

trates all his spiritual powers upon one single point and projects his

concentrated heart (qalb) toward a certain definite direction. This

act works in two different, but closely related, ways: (1) producing

something or some state of affairs in a place where such a thing or

state of affairs does not sensibly exist, and (2) tearing apart the veil

of Reason and bringing to light the reality lying behind it.

The supernatural power of himmah being as described, the next

question that naturally arises is: Does the 'knower', i.e., the Perfect

Man, work 'miracles' (karamat) as he likes?

According to the usual theory among Sufis, a 'knower' who has

reached the stage of 'saintship' is in a position to perform 'things

that go against the customs' (khawariq-al- 'adat), i.e., 'miracles'.

Such a man is usually represented as a kind of superman who,

projecting his spiritual power to anything and an y body, affects and

changes the abject at will.

Ibn' Arabï does not accept this view. In the Qoran, he argues, 10

we find the Divine words: 'God is He who creates you of weakness'

(XXX, 54). The very root of man's creation is 'weakness' (<J,a'f).

Man is essentially and naturally 'weak' (<J,a'ïf) and 'powerless'

('ajiz). He begins with the weakness of the infant and ends with the

weakness of the old man. Of course, as the Qoran verse itself

admits, 11 the child, as he grows into a man, acquires 'strength'

(quwwah) and becomes conscious of his own strength. But this,

after ail, is a transitory state. Soon he grows old and falls into

11

1

280 Sujism and Taoism

decrepitude. Besides, the 'strength' which he obtains in the inter-

mediary stage is but an 'accidentai strength' (quwwah 'ara<J,iyah).

Moreover, this accidentai strength is not something which he pro-

duces in himself, but is a result of God's 'putting'. In reality, he

shows strength only because he happens to be at that stage a locus of

theophany in which God manifests Himself under the Name

'Powerful' ( qawiy).

What is by essence strong is the Absolute alone; man is strong

only by accident. Ordinary men do not know this. Only the true

'knower' knows that the strength (including himmah) which he feels

in himself is not his own but God's.

And since he is conscious of this, the 'knower' knows also that it is

not right for him to try to exercise at will the power of himmah. Thus

he confides its exercise to the real owner of that power, and puts

himself in the original state of the 'absolute powerlessness' ('ajz

mutfaq).

Someone may say: 'What prevents (the highest 'knower') from exer-

cising his himmah that has a positive power to affect things? Since

such a power does exist even in those mystics who merely follow the

Apostles, the Apostles must be more appropriate to possess it'.

To this 1 will answer: 'You are certainly right. But you do not know

another important point. A true "knowledge" does not allow him-

mah to be freely exercised. And the higher the knowledge, the less

possibility there is for a free exercise of himmah'.

And this for two reasons. One is that such a man fully realizes his

state of 'servant-ness' and that he is always conscious of the original

ground of his own creation (which is the above-mentioned 'weak-

ness'). The other is the oneness of the subject who exercises himmah

and the object upon which it is exercised (for both are essentially and

ultimately the Absolute, nothing else), so that he does not know upon

whom to project his himmah. This prevents him from exercising

himmah. 12

Tuen Ibn' Arabi says 13 that another reason for which the 'knower'

refrains from working 'miracles' in the world is the knowledge

about the absolute determining power of the permanent

archetypes, which we have discussed in detail in an earlier chapter.

Suppose there is in the presence of the 'knower' a man who

disobeys the commands of the Apostle and thereby disobeys God.

Why does the 'knower' not exercise his himmah upon this man so

that he might be brought back to the right road? It is because

everything, every event in the world is in accordance with what has

been eternally determined in the form of an or

archetypes. The 'knower' knows that this ontological determination

can never be changed. In the eyes of a man who has penetrated into

the depth of the structure of Being, everything follows the track

The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 281

fixed by the very nature of Being, and nothing can deviate from it. In

the light of this knowledge, even a man disobedient to God is

walking along the God-determined way. And it is not in the power

of an Apostle to bring such a man back to the 'right road', because

the man is already on the 'right road'.

A certain Sufi of the highest rank once said to Mas ter 'Abd al-

Razzâq: Go and ask Master Abü Madyan, after salutations, 'O Abü

Madyan, why is it that nothing is impossible tous, while everything is

impossible to you? And yet here we are, aspiring to your spiritual

stage, while you do not care for our spiritual stage. Why?' 14

In fact, the situation was exactly like that (i.e., Abü Madyan really

showed signs of'powerlessness') in spite of the fact that Abü Madyan

had, beside this state (i.e. the state of 'powerlessness'), the other state

(i.e., that of free disposai of things by means of himmah).

We (i.e., Ibn' Arabi himself) are even more complete as regards the

state of 'weakness' and 'powerlessness'. But ( even though Abü

Madyan did not show so much of 'weakness' as we do) the afore-

mentioned Sufi of the highest rank said to him what he said. (How

much more should we be worthy of such a remark, if the same Sufi

were to criticize us.) In any event, however, Abü Madyan's case

clearly exemplifies that kind of thing (i.e., the showing of 'weakness'

because of a deep knowledge of the truth).15

Ibn 'Arabi goes on to argue that even this state of 'weakness' or

refraining from exercising himmah should not properly be taken as

a willful act on the part of the 'knower'. The true 'knower' puts

himself entirely in the hands of God; if He commands him to

exercise his himmah he does, if He forbids him to do so he refrains

from it, and if God Himself gives him a choice between the two he

chooses refraining from the exercise of himmah.

Abu al-Su'üd (Ibn al-Shibl) once said to his followers: Verily God

gave me the power of the free disposai of things fifteen years ago. But

I have refrained from exercising that power for the sake of courtesy

(tazarrufan) toward God.

This saying implies too much bold familiarity ( toward God). I myself

do not refrain from exercising himmah for the sake of courtesy,

because such an attitude would imply a willful choice on my part. No.

I refrain from it because of the perfection of knowledge. The true

knowledge of the matter does not require refraining from the exer-

cise of himmah by way of willful choice. Whenever a 'knower' does

exercise his himmah in this world, he does soin obedience to a Divine

Command; that is to say, he does so because he is constrained to do

so, not by way of willful choice. 16

The position of an Apostle regarding this problem of 'refraining' is

somewhat more delicate than that of a Saint.17 Properly speaking

the fonction itself of' apostleship' requires his exercising himmah in

282 Sufism and Taoism

order that his being an Apostle be made clear to the people. For

only when he is accepted as such by the community, is he able to

spread the true religion of God. The Saint perse has nothing to do

with such a mission.

And yet, even the Apostle (Mul)ammad) did not try to show

prophetic 'miracles' (mu'jizat). For one thing, he refrained from

exercising his himmah because of his compassion for the people. He

did not go to extremes in ma nif esting the conclusive evidence of his

'apostleship' because it would have brought destruction to them. He

spared them by not showing them too strong evidences of his

'apostleship'. Besides this, Mul)ammad had another reason shared

by all true Saints for refraining from working miracles; namely, his

knowledge that a 'miracle' can never change the eternally fixed

course of events. Whether a man becomes a Muslim or not is

determined by his archetype; it is not something which can easily be·

changed by the Apostle accomplishing before his eyes a 'miracle'.

Thus even the most perfect of all Apostles (akmal al-rusul),

Mul)ammad, did not exercise himmah. There was actually a practi-

cal need for showing 'miracles', and he was unquestionably

endowed with such a power. And yet he did not exercise his spiritual

power in that way. For, being the highest 'knower', he knew better

than anybody else that 'miracles' were, in truth, .ineffective.

The most ideal state of the Perfect Man is a spiritual tranquility and

quietude of an unfathomable depth. He is a quiet man content with

a passivity in which he confides himself and every thing else to God's

disposai. The Perfect Man is a man who, having in himself a tre-

mendous spiritual power and being adorned with the highest know-

ledge of Being, gives the impression of a deep cairn ocean. He is

such because he is the most perf ect image, in a concrete individual

form, of the cosmic Perfect Man who comprehends and actualizes

all the Names and Attributes of the Absolute.

Notes

1. Taskhir literally means 'forcing somebody to compulsory service, controlling

something at will'. In discussing the problem of the 'compulsory' force of the

permanent archetypes we have already corne across the word taskhir in the form of a

'mutual taskhir' between the Absolute and the world.

2. Fu.!i., p. 199/158.

3. Fu$., p. 90/88-89.

4. Again Ibn' Arabï goes back to the case in which the' knower' main tains spiritually

all the forms of an object on all the levels of Being by actually concentrating on one of

the levels.

The Magical Power of the Perfect Man 283

5. Fu.!i ., p. 91189-90.

6. On the difference between 'gathering' (qur'àn) and 'separating' (fu.rqàn) see

above, Chapter II.

7. Fu.!i., p. 91190.

8. Cf. Fu.!i., p. 92/90.

9. Fu.!i., p. 148/121.

10. Fu.!i., p. 156/127.

11. The verse reads: 'God is He who creates you of weakness, then puts (ja'ala) after

weakness strength (quwwah), then again puts weakness after strength.'

12. Fu.!i., p. 157/127-128.

13. Fu.!i., pp. 157-158/128.

14. It means: We can freely accomplish 'miracles', but you apparently cannot. And

yet we want to attain to your spiritual stage, while you do not show any sign of being

desirous of attaining to our spiritual stage.

15. Fu.!i., p. 158/129.

16. Fu.!i., p. 159/129-130.

17. ibid.

Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch16XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

===

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

The preceding chapter has revealed that the moment we begin to

consider Man on the individual level, we are faced with the exist-

ence of several degrees among men. We have seen also that the

highest of ail human degrees is 'saintship' ( waliiyah). The Saint

( waliy) is the highest 'knower' of God, and consequently (in terms

of the world-view of Ibn' Arabï) of the essential structure of Being.

Otherwise expressed, the Saint is the Perfect Man par excellence.

The central topic of this chapter will be the concept of 'saintship' .1

We may begin by remarking that, in Ibn' Arabï's understanding, the

concept of Saint comprises both Prophet (nabiy) and Apostle

(rasül). Briefly stated, the Saint is the widest concept comprising

Prophet and Apostle; next is the concept of Prophet which com-

prises that of Apostle; and the Apostle is the narrowest of ail. As

al-Qâshânï says, 'every Apostle is a Prophet, and every Prophet is a

Saint', but not vice versa.

On the relation between the three concepts, there is a consider-

ably long passage in the Fu$Ü$ 2 in which Ibn 'Arabï develops his

thought. The argument is very entangled and somewhat confusing,

but the gist of it may be clarified in the following way.

The first point to note concerning the concept of Saint is that

waliy is properly a Divine Name. The fact that waliy is one of the

Names of God implies that it is an aspect of the Absolute. In this

respect, the Saint is radically different from the Prophet and the

Apostle because the words nabiy and rasül are not Divine Names;

they are peculiar to human beings. 'Waliy is a Name of God', as Ibn

'Arabi says, 'but God has neither called Himself nabiy nor rasül,

while He has named Himself waliy and has made it one of His own

Names' .3

Thus waliy is a Divine Name. But even a man, when his know-

ledge of God attains to its highest point, becomes entitled to be

called by the same name; he is a waliy. However, the human waliy

himself, being so keenly conscious of his 'servant-ness' ('ubüd-

ïyah) does not like to make the name publicly his own. For he knows

1111

1 !'

111

1

264 Sufem and Taoism

that the word waliy properly belongs to God alone, and that when a

human being becomes a waliy he is supposed to have transcended

his position of 'servant-ness' and have put himself in the position of

Lordship (rubübïyah ). But, whether he likes it or not, it does

sometimes happen that a mystic transcends his position of

'servant-ness'. This occurs by a mystic being completely drowned in

the Absolute and losing the consciousness of his own

'servant-ness' .4

lt is to be remarked that, since waliy is a name common to God

and Man, the walayah never ceases to exist. As God exists everlast-

ingly, the 'saintship' will exist forever. As long as there remains in

the world even a single man of the highest spiritual power who

attains to the rank of 'saintship' - and, in fact, such a man will

certainly exist in every age -the 'saintship' itself will be kept intact.

In contrast to this, the prophethood and apostleship are histori-

cally conditioned, and can, therefore, be intermittent or even disap-

pear completely. 5 As a matter of fact, we know that the chain of

prophethood has historically corne to an end at Mu])ammad, the last

of all authentic Prophets. After Mu])ammad, there does not exist

any longer a Prophet, who is at the same time a Law-giver

(musharri'). After Mu])ammad we have only what Ibn' Arabi calls

'general prophethood' (nubuwwah 'ammah ), i.e., prophethood

without institution of Law, which is nothing other than 'saintship'.

Only this name (i.e., waliy) remains forever among mankind, not

only in the present world but also in the Hereafter. As for the names

which are peculiar to Man to the exclusion of God (i.e., Prophet and

Apostle), they cease to exist with the cessation of prophethood and

apostleship. God, however, has shown special mercy upon his ser-

vants and has allowed to subsist among them 'general prophethood'

which is not accompanied by institution of Law. 6

This passage makes it clear that, in the conception of Ibn 'Arabi,

institution of Law (tashri') constitutes one of the characteristics of

the Prophet. From this particular point of view, he divides the

Prophets into two kinds: (1) those who institute Law (nabiy

musharri') and (2) those whose prophetic activity is done within a

given Law (nabiy musharra' la-hu). The first category is represented

by men like Moses, Jesus, and Mu])ammad, each one of whom

instituted a particular Law by a Divine Command. The second

category is exemplified by those who, like the successive Prophets in

Israel, live and fulfil their prophetic mission within the boundaries

of a given Law instituted by Moses.

Since, as we have seen, the Saint is the widest concept in terms of

extension and is the most basic one at that, there can be no Prophet,

no Apostle unless the' saintship' is first established. The Prophet is a

""'

Apostle, Prophet, and Saint 265

Saint who adds to his 'saintship' one more distinguishing mark;

namely, a particular knowledge of things unknown and unseen.

And the Apostle is a Saint who adds to his 'saintship' and 'prophet-

hood' one more characteristic; namely being conscious of the mis-

sion and capacity of conveying Divine messages to the people who

follow him.

From this we leam that the first requirement for a man to be a

Perfect Man is to be in the rank of a waliy, and that waliiyah is the

mostfundamental and most general attribute of all types of Perfect

Man. What, then, does walayah mean?

Waliiyah implies, first and foremost, a perfect knowledge of the

ultimate truth conceming the Absolute, the world, and the relation

between the Absolute and the world. 7 A man who has attained to

the rank of 'saintship' has a clear consciousness that he is a self-

manifestation of the Absolute, and that, as such, he is essentially

one with the Absolute, and, indeed, ultimately is the Absolute itself.

He is also conscious of the fact that, on the analogy of the inner

structure of himself, all the phenomenal Many are self-

manifestations of the Absolute and are, in the sense, one with the

Absolute. This precisely is the consciousness of the ultimate and

essential 'oneness of Being' (wa}Jdah al-wujüd).

This consciousness of the 'oneness of Being' he obtains only by

being 'annihilated' and completely immersed in the Absolute.

Through the experience of'self-annihilation' he transforms himself,

so to speak, into the 'inside' of the Absolute, and from there sees the

reality of all things by 'immediate tasting'. The concept of 'self-

annihilation' (fana') in this sense plays an exceedingly important

role in the theory of waliiyah. The 'self-annihilation' is, in fact, the

first item in the essential attributes of the Saint.

Ibn 'Arabi distinguishes three stages in 'self-annihilation' .8 The

first is the annihilation of the attributes. This stage is called by Ibn

'Arabi takhalluq. lt means that the mystic has all his human attri-

butes 'annihilated' and in their place 'assumes as his own' (takhal-

luq) the Divine Attributes. lt is, as Bali Efendi tersely describes it,9

'annihilating his attributes in the Attributes of the Absolute'. The

second stage is called tal)aqquq. It means that the mystic has his

essence (dhat) 'annihilated' and realizes (tal)aqquq) in himself his

being one with the Absolute. Bali Efendi 10 describes it as 'annihilat-

ing his essence in the Essence of the Absolute'. The third and the

last stage is called ta'alluq. The word ta'alluq, meaning literally 'firm

adherence', indicates that the man in this state remains firmly

attached to the essential property of walâyah so that he is never

separated from it no matter what he may do in the world of empiri-

cal existence. The state of ta'alluq corresponds to what is more

266 Sufism and Taoism

usually known as the state of 'self-subsistence' (baqâ') which cornes

after the state of fanâ'. In this spiritual state, the mystic regains his

self which he has once annihilated, but he regains it not in himself

but in the very midst of the Divine Essence. In his fully illumined

consciousness, there is no longer any trace of his old persona! ego.

He is only conscious that after having lost his life he now subsists in

the Divine Essence, and that, therefore, it is, in reality, not he who

exists but the Absolute itself. Whatever he does, it is not he but God

who does it. Bali Efendi describes it as 'annihilating his actions in

the actions of the Absolu te'. 11

'Saintship' cornes into existence only on the basis of the experi-

ence of 'self-annihilation' here depicted. And wide indeed is the

consciousness of the Saint who has passed through such an experi-

ence. For he witnesses the astonishing scene of all things merging

into the limitless ocean of Divine Life, and he is conscious that all

this is actually taking place in himself. At the very height of this

spiritual state, the consciousness of the Saint is identical with the

Divine Consciousness which has not yet begun to become split into

an infinity of 'determillations' (ta'ayynnât). 12 Such a man is the

highest 'knower'. And such a man naturally falls into deep silence

(suküt), 13 because the content of the deepest knowledge is ineffable.

Such is the existential ground on which stands 'saintship'. And on

this basis stands 'prophethood' with an additional property, and on

'prophethood' stands 'apostleship' with a further addition. The

Prophet and the Apostle are closely tied to the present world; their

fonctions concern the life in this world, for institution of Law always

aims at regulating the worldly life with a view to letting people

obtain the everlasting happiness in the next world. 'Saintship', on

the contrary, has no such essential relation to the present world.

Thus 'prophethood' and 'apostleship' can disappear from their

subjects, but the quality or title of 'saintship' never leaves its sub-

ject. Those from whom the titles of 'prophethood' and 'apostleship'

disappear become immediately Saints without any qualifications.

And sin ce, in the Hereafter, there can be no institution of Law,

everybody who is in the present world a Prophet or Apostle will

continue to exist in the next world in the rank of 'saintship' .14

As we have just remarked, the Prophet is a Saint with the addition

of a different qualification (i.e., the rank of 'saintship' plus the rank

of 'prophethood'), and the Apostle is a Prophet with the addition of

a further qualification (i.e., the rank of 'saintship' plus the rank of

'prophethood' plus the rank of 'apostleship'). So the Prophet uni tes

in one person two ranks, and the Apostle unîtes in himself three

different ranks. There are thus three different ranks recognized:

'saintship', 'prophethood' and 'apostleship'. The question is natur-

i •.

Apostle, Prophet, and Saint 267

ally raised as to which of them·is higher than which. With regard to

this question, the most problematic point, according to Ibn 'Arabï,

concerns the position of 'saintship'. Against those sufis who regard

'saintship' qua 'saintship' as higher than 'prophethood' and

'apostleship', he emphatically states that it is only when these two or

three ranks co-exist in one person that we can rightly regard his

'saintship' as higher than his 'prophethood' and 'apostleship'.

(When one and the same person unites in him these two or three

qualifications) the man in the capacity of a 'knower' or Saint is more

complete and more perfect than himself in the capacity of an Apostle

or in that of a man who has instituted a Divine Law (i.e., Prophet).

So whenever you hear a man belonging to the 'people of God' saying

- or whenever such a saying is conveyed to you through somebody

else - that 'saintship' is higher than 'prophethood', you must under-

stand him to mean what 1 have just remarked.

Likewise, when such a man declares that the Saint stands above the

Prophet and the Apostle, he is simply talking about one and the same

person. In fact, the Apostle qua Saint is more complete (and perfect)

than himself qua Prophet and Apostle. It is not the case, however,

that a Saint (i.e., a different person who happens to be a Saint) who

follows ( another person who happens to be a Prophet or Apostle in

the community) is higher than the Prophet or Apostle. 15

The last sentence of this passage points out the fact that in case the

three qualifications (Saint, Prophet, and Apostle) do not concern

one and the same person but three different persons, there is a

respect in which the Saint must necessarily follow and be subordi-

nate to the Prophet or Apostle. And this because the Apostle

possesses a knowledge of the particular Law (i.e., 'exterior know-

ledge' 'ilm zàhir) with which he has been sent to his community,

while the Saint has no such knowledge. In what concerns the regula-

tions of the Law, the latter must follow the Apostle of his age.

But there is also a certain respect in which the Saint is superior to

the Apostle. For the Saint not only possesses a complete knowledge

about God and the reality of things ('interior knowledge', 'ilm

bàtin) but also is conscious of the fact that he has that knowledge.

But neither the Apostle nor the Prophet is conscious of it, although

they, too, do possess the same knowledge.

From the fact that 'apostleship' is based on three different con-

stituents there naturally follows that there are differences among

the Apostles regarding their degrees. This is the conception of the

'difference in degrees among the Apostles' (tafâ<J,ul al-rusul).

All Apostles, in terms of their 'saintship', are equal and stand on

the same level, but in actuality they must necessarily differ one from

the other because of their intimate relations with the concrete

11111

1

268 Sufism and Taoism

situations of the age and country in which they live. And the same is

true of the Prophet. The nature and rank of an Apostle is decisively

affected by the conditions, material and spiritual, determining the

situation of the nation of which he happens to be the Apostle.

Likewise, the rank of a Prophet is gravely affected by the amount of

knowledge he actually has.

Know that the Apostles qua Apostles - not qua Saints or 'knowers' -

stand in different degrees, each according to the state of his commun-

ity. For the a mou nt of his knowledge concerning his own apostolic

mission is exactly measured to what his community needs, no more,

no less. And since communities differ from each other in terms

of relative superiority, the Apostles also are higher and lower in

terms of the knowledge of their mission in exact accordance with the

difference that exists among the nations. And to this refers the saying

of God: 'Those Apostles, We have made some of them superior to

others'. (II, 253)

Likewise, (the Prophets) diff er in rank among themselves in accor-

dance with their individual capacities with regard to their persona!

knowledges and judgments. 'And to this refers the saying of God:

And We have made some of the Prophets superior to others'. (XVII,

55)16

In the preceding chapter we have seen that the Perfect Man on the

cosmic level is the 'vicegerent' of God. The same is true also of the

Perfect Man on the individual level. Here on the level of individual

persans, the idea of the Perfect Man is embodied by Saint, Prophet,

and Apostle. These three are the 'vicegerents' (khulafa') of God

because they are the most perfect and most complete loci of

theophany on the earth. 11 They are concrete manifestations of the

'Reality of Mub.ammad' (al-}Jaqiqah al-mu}Jammadiyah) which we

have discussed in the previous chapter. 18

The term khalifah meaning 'vicegerent' is a little ambiguous,

because we ordinarily use it to designate the political head of the

Muslim community, the Caliph. 19 In view of this fact, Ibn 'Arabï

strictly distinguishes between two kinds of khalifah: (1) the 'vice-

gerent of God' (khalifah Allah, or khalifah 'an Allah) and (2) the

'vicegerent (or successor) of the Apostle' (khalifah al-rasül, or

khalifah 'an al-rasül). The 'vicegerent' in the sense of the Perfect

Man (1) is totally different from the Caliph, the historical and

political head of the Muslim community, who assumes the same

name khalifah (2).

God has His 'vicegerents' on the earth; they are the Apostles. As for

the Caliphs we know today, they are ('vicegerents' or 'successors') of

the Apostles, not of God, because a Caliph governs (the community)

strictly according to the dicta tes of the Law of an apostolic origin, and

never goes beyond it. 20

Apostle, Prophet, and Saint 269

There are, however, exceptional cases in which a Caliph, i.e., a

'vicegerent' succeeding the Apostle, is in touch with the very source

from which the latter has drawn his knowledge, and govems the

community according to the inner Law which he receives direct

from God. Such a man is outwardly a khalifah of the Apostle, but

inwardly is a khalifah of God.

Su ch a man is outwardly a follower (muttabi', namely, of the Apostle)

in the sense that he conforms himself (to the Law) in governing the

community: Jesus, for example, when he will corne down to the earth

and govern the world. 21 Another example is the Prophet Mul)am-

mad. And to this refers the saying of God: 'These are the men whom

God has given guidance. So follow their guidance' (VI, 90). A man of

this sort is, in virtue of the way in which he derives (his knowledge)

and of which he is conscious, both 'specially privileged'

and 'conforming' (muwafiq). 22 In this respect he is somewhat in the

same position as the Prophet (Mul)ammad) who, confirming as he did

the Law of the Apostles who had preceded him, confirmed it in his

own name, so that we, his followers, actually follow him (accepting

the Law) as his own, and not as a Law established by some of his

predecessors. In like manner, the 'vicegerent of God' obtains (his

knowledge) from exactly the sa me source as the Apostle.

Such a man is called, in mystic terminology, 'the vicegerent of God',

but, in ordinary (non-mystic) terminology, 'the vicegerent of the

Apostle of God'.

This is the reason why the Apostle of God (Mul)ammad) died with-

out explicitly designating anyone as his khalïfah. He acted in this way

because he knew that among the believers there would appear some-

one who would receive 'vicegerency' directly from his Lord and

thereby become a 'vicegerent of God', while conforming himself

perfectly to the given Law ( established by the Apostle).

One of the key-terms of Ibn 'Arabï' s theory of walayah is the' Seal'

(khatam), meaning the ultimate and final unit of a series. 1 should

like to close this chapter by a brief consideration of this concept,

although the problems it raises mostly go far beyond the scope of

the present book which aims at elucidating the ontological structure of

Ibn' Arabï's world-view.

The term khàtam appears in two phrases: ( 1) the Seal of the

Prophets (khàtam al-anbiyà') or Seal of the Apostles (khàtam al-

rusul), and (2) the Seal of the Saints (khàtam al-awliyà'). In conformity

with the commonly-accepted usage in Islam, the first phrase 'Seal of

the Prophets' designates the Prophet Mub.ammad himself. The phrase

in itself has nothing original aboutit; it is an expression often used in

accordance with the common belief in Islam that the Prophet

Mub.ammad represents historically the last ring of a long chain of

Prophets, there being absolutely no possibility of an authentic Prophet

appearing after him.

270 Sufism and Taoism

By the second phrase: 'the seal of the Saints', which is naturally more

problematic, Ibn 'Arabi means most probably himself, at least as long

as the present world lasts,23 although he does not say so explicitly in the

As Affifi points out,24 Ibn 'Arabi, besides hinting at the idea in

man y places of his writings by ambiguous expressions as, for example,

'the Seal of the Mul)ammadan saintship ( waliiyah mulJ,ammadiyah) is a

man of noble Arab birth, living in our own time' etc., declares in one

passage of the FutulJ,iit al-Makkiyyah: '1 am the Seal of the saintship, no

doubt, (the Seal of) the heritage of the Hashimite (Mul)ammad) and

the Messiah'.

But whether or not Ibn' Arabï really means by the Seal himself,

the problem is merely of a peripheral significance to us. For the

specific purposes of the present work, what is important is the

concept of Seal itself.

The problem turns round the ultimate source of the highest know-

ledge peculiar to the class of the highest 'knowers'.

This (highest) knowledge properly belongs only to the Seal of the

Apostles and the Seal of the Saints. No one of the Prophets and

Apostles obtains this knowledge except from the sacred niche of the

Last Apostle,25 and no one of the Saints obtains it except from the

niche of the Last Saint. 26

The last sentence might suggest the wrong idea that Ibn 'Arabï is

speaking here of two different 'niches'. In truth, however, there is

only one ultimate 'niche' from which ail obtain the highest know-

ledge. For, as al-Qâshânï says,27 if ail the Apostles obtain it from the

Seal of the Apostles, the latter obtains it from his own innermost

'niche', in the very capacity of the Seal of the Saints,28 so that all the

Apostles and the Saints ultimately obtain their Light from the Seal

of the Saints.

As to the relative superiority between the Seal of the Apostles

and the Seal of the Saints, Ibn' Arabi gives his view as follows: 29

It is true that the Seal of the Saints follows externally what the Seal of

the Apostles has established, namely, the Sacred Law. This, how-

ever, does not minimize in any way the spiritual rank of the Seal of

the Saints. Nor does this contradict what I have said above ( concern-

ing ail Apostles obtaining their esoteric knowledge from the 'niche'

of the Seal of the Saints). For (it simply means that) the Seal of the

Saints is in a certain respect lower in rank (than the Seal of the

Apostles) but is higher in another respect.

This interpretation is confirmed by what actually took place in our

religion, namely, by the fact, (for instance) that 'Umar proved to be

superior (to Mul)ammad) in his decision about the right treatment of

the prisoners of Badr and also regarding the fertilization of the

date-palm. A 'perfect' man need not be superior to others in every

Apostle, Prophet, and Saint 271

matter and in every respect. What the (spiritual persans) consider

important is superiority in terms of knowledge about God. That only

is the central point. As for worldly affairs, they are of no importance

at all in the minds (of spiritual persons).

In connection with the problem of the relation between the Seal

of the Saints and the Seal of the Apostles, Ibn 'Arabï refers to a

famous Tradition in which Mul;lammad compares himself to the one

last brick that finishes and completes an entire wall. Then he corre-

lates this Tradition with a vision he had at Mecca in the year 599

A.H.

In this vision Ibn' Arabï saw the Ka' bah, the House of God. The

Ka' bah was built of gold and silver brick ('sil ver brick' being a

symbol of the Prophet, and 'gold brick' of the Saint). The wall of the

Ka' bah as he saw it still lacked two final pieces of brick, one gold and

another silver. Ibn 'Arabï, in the dream, keenly felt that the two

missing bricks were no other than himself. And the construction of

the Ka'bah was brought to completion when he filled the place of

these two bricks.

The Prophet (Mul)ammad) once compared the 'prophethood' to a

wall made of brick which was complete except in one place which was

to be filled by a piece of brick. Mul)ammad himself was that brick.

The important point is that he saw, as he says (in this Tradition), only

one single piece of brick still missing.

As for the Seal of the Saints, he would surely have visions of a similar

nature; he would surely see what the Prophet symbolized by a wall.

(The only difference would, however, be that) he would see in the

wall two bricks still missing, the entire wall being built of gold and

silver bricks. And he would notice that the two bricks that were

lacking in the wall were one gold and the other sil ver. Further, he

would surely see in the vision himself just fit to be put into the place of

these two bricks. Thus he would see that what was meant by the two

bricks completing the wall was no other than the Seal of the Saints.

The reason why he must necessarily see himself as two bricks is as

follows. He is, externally, a follower of the Law established by the

Seal of the Apostles. This fact was (symbolized in the vision by) the

place for the silver brick. But this is only the 'external' side of the Seal

of the Saints, concerning as it does only the legal regulations about

which he simply follows the Seal of the Apostles. But, on the other

hand, in his innermost heart, he obtains directly from God that very

thing in which externally he is a simple follower (of the Seal of the

Apostles).

All this because he sees the state of affairs as it really is. So he cannot

but see the matter in this way. And in this capacity he corresponds,

internally, to the place for the gold brick, for he obtains his know-

ledge from the same source from which the angel (Gabriel) obtains

that which he conveys to the Apostle.

272 Sufism and Taoism

If you have understood what 1 have here indicated metaphorically

you have obtained an extremely valuable knowledge about everything.

Thus every Prophet, (in the long historical chain of 'prophethood')

beginning with Adam and ending with the last Prophet, invariably

obtained his (prophetic Light) from the 'niche' of the Sea! of the

Prophets, although the corporeal existence of the latter was posterior

to others. This because MuJ:rnmmad, in his Reality ,30 was existent

(from eternity). To this refer his words (in a Tradition): 'I was a

Prophet even while Adam was still between water and clay' .31

On the implication of this passage al-Qâshâni makes an interesting

remark. 32 Ibn 'Arabi' s description might be taken to imply the

superiority of the Seal of the Saints to the Prophet Mubammad,

because the position of the latter is symbolized only by one brick,

whereas that of the Seal of the Saints is symbolized by two bricks,

one of silver as the sign of his 'external' subordination to Mubam-

mad, and the other of brilliant gold as the sign of his own Light.

Against this understanding al-Qâshâni warns the reader and points

out that, according to the Tradition in question, the Ka'bah had

lacked one single piece of brick, and that when Mubammad filled

the place the building was completed. This means, he says, that

Mubammad was de facto the Seal of the Saints. Except that

Mubammad himself appeared only as a Prophet-Apostle, and did

what he did only in that capacity, not in the capacity of a Saint. He

did not, in other words, manifest the form of waliiyah.

The vision which Ibn 'Arabi saw in Mecca was formed in the

world of Imagination on the basis of this historical fact. Mubammad

was de facto the Seal of the Saints, but since he did not manifest

himself as such, there still remained the necessity for another persan

to appear as a historical phenomenon in the capacity of the Seal of

the Saints. Otherwise expressed, the 'saintships', with Mubammad,

remained to the last 'interior'. This 'interior', i.e., hidden, 'saintship'

has corne to light only with the appearance of the Seal of the Saints.

Regarding the difference between the Seal of the Saints and the

rest of the Saints, Ibn' Arabi remarks that in the former the 'saint-

ship' is something essential while in the latter it is something that

must be 'acquired' first. And this is the reason why ( according to

al-Qâshâni) 33 the 'saintship' of the former is called 'solar saintship'

(waliiyah shamsiyah) while that of the latter is called 'lunar saint-

ship' ( waliiyah qamariyah).

Notes

1. In this book I use provisionally the words 'saint' and 'saintship' as the English

equivalents of waliy and walâyah respectively. Whether the meaning of the Arabie

word waliy is covered by the English word 'saint' is another question.

Apostle, Prophet, and Saint 273

2. Fu$., pp. 160-169/135-136.

3. Fu$., p. 168/135. See for example the Qoran (II, 257) where we read: 'God is the

waliy (close, protecting Friend) of those who believe'.

4. Fu$., p. 167/135.

5. Cf. also FU$., p. 34/62.

6. FU$., p. 167/135.

7. The concrete content of such a knowledge is precisely what we have analytically

discussed throughout the preceding pages.

8. FU$., pp. 168-169/136.

9. p. 168.

10. ibid.

11. p. 169.

12. FU$., p. 89/88.

13. FU$., p. 34/62.

14. FuL p. 169/136.

15. Fu$., p. 168/135-136.

16. Fu$., p. 162/132.

17. Fu$., p.259/207.

18. Cf. Chapter XIV, (IV).

19. The English word Caliph is itself nothing but an Anglicized form of khalïfah.

20. Fu$., p. 204/162-163.

21. The reference is to the eschatological figure of Jesus. According to the Muslim

belief, Jesus will descend from Heaven once again at the end of the present world,

and will govern the world by the Sacred Law of Islam. In that state, Jesus will be

formally a 'vicegerent' of Mul)ammad, while deriving his knowledge from the same

source from which Mul)ammad received his Law. Jesus will be, in that state, the Seal

of the Saints.

22. 'Specially privileged', because he is conscious of the fact that he has received

directly from Godan inner Law by which he governs the community, but 'conform-

ing', at the same time, because outwardly he owes his Law to his predecessors.

23. 1 say 'at least as long as the present world lasts' because, as we saw above (cf.

note 21), at the very end of the present world, in the eschatological situation, Jesus

will corne down to the earth and assume the function of the Seal of the Saints. This

latter is called the 'general saintship' (walâyah 'âmmah) as distinguished from the

274 Suftsm and Taoism

'Mul)ammadan saintship' (waliiyah mulJ,ammadïyah). Regarding this distinction, see

the relevant passages quoted from the Futû/:tiit by Dr Osman Yahya in his edition of

al-Tirmidhï: Khatm al-Awliyii, Beyrouth, 1965, p. 161, Footnote 53.

24. Philosophy, pp. 100-101.

25. 'Niche' (miskhiit) symbolizes the Divine Light in the deepest core of the saintly

heart; the Divine Light is nothing other than the 'Reality of Mul)ammad'.

26. p. 34/62.

27. p. 34.

28. We have observed above that by the 'Sea! of the Saints' Ibn 'Arabi means

himself. But here al-Qâshâni seems to be saying that the Sea! of the Apostles, i.e.,

Mul)ammad, was also the Sea! of the Saints. This, however, is nota contradiction. As

we noticed before in discussing the 'Reality of Mul)ammad', in the consciousness of

Ibn 'Arabi, 'Mul)ammad' is not only a historical individual person but a cosmic

principle of creation, and the two aspects seem to be constantly present in bis mind

when he speaks about 'Mul)ammad'.

29. pp. 34-35/62-63.

30. Reference to the above-mentioned 'Reality of Mul)ammad'.

31. p. 35/63.

32. p. 36.

33. ibid.

Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P1.Ch15XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

 SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part I - Ibn 'Arabi

1 Dream and Reality

II The Absolute in its Absoluteness

III The Self-knowledge of Man

IV Metaphysical Unification and Phenomenal Dispersion

V Metaphysical Perplexity

VI The Shadow of the Absolute

VII The Divine Nam es

VIII Allah and the Lord

IX Ontological Mercy

X The Water of Life

XI The Self-manifestation of the Absolute

XII Permanent Archetypes

XIII Creation

XIV Man as Microcosm

XV The Perfect Man as an Individual

XVI Apostle, Prophet, and Saint

XVII The Magical Power of the Perfect Man

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

===

XV The Perfect Man as an lndividual

At the outset of the preceding chapter 1 pointed out that Man, in the

thought of Ibn' Arabi, is conceived on two different levels, cosmic

and individual. The present chapter will be concemed with the

second of these two levels.

Man on the first level, or - logically - Man as a species, is in the

intermediary stage between the Absolute and the world, and, as an

intermediary, occupies the highest position in the hierarchy of the

created beings. As soon as we begin to consider Man on the indi-

vidual level, however, we cannot help noticing the existence of

many degrees (mariitib ). Otherwise expressed, on the cosmic level

Man himself is the Perfect Man, but on the individual level not all

men are 'perfect'; on the contrary, only a few deserve the title of the

Perfect Man.

How is it possible that a such a fondamental difference should

occur between the two levels? Any man, as long as he is a 'man', is

expected to have the 'comprehensiveness' actualized in him,

because the ontological 'comprehensiveness' belongs to the very

nature of the human species. There can be no possible exception in

this respect. Ontologically, there can be no difference in this respect

between one individual and another. All this is certainly true. But

individual differences arise in accordance with the degrees of lucid-

ity in the mind of those who become conscious of this very fact. All

men are naturally endowed with the same ontological 'comprehen-

siveness' but not all men are equally conscious of the 'comprehen-

siveness' in themselves. They are variously conscious of it, ranging

from the highest degree of lucidity which cornes very close to that of

the Divine Consciousness of the Names and Attributes, down to the

lowest which is practically the same as complete opaqueness. And

only at the highest degree of lucidity can the human mind play the

role of a 'polished mirror'. Only at the highest degree of lucidity can

Man be the Perfect Man. This is the gist of the whole problem.

In a passage of the Ibn 'Arabi writes: 'God has brought to

light their various degrees in him (i.e., Adam)' .1 Here the pronoun

11ll 1

248 Sufism and Taoism

'their' refers to the sons of Adam. Thus the meaning of this short

sentence may be paraphrased as: 'God bas made clear the existence

of various degrees among men within Adam, i.e., the same one

species of Man'.

The cause which brings into being such degrees among individual

men is explained by Ibn 'Arabi through the metaphor of colored

glass, a metaphor which we have met in an earlier context. Just as

one and the same light is variously colored as it passes through

pieces of glass of various colors, the same Form of the Absolute is

differently manifested in different men with different capacities. 2

A man who has 'actualized in himself the Absolute' (al-

mutaljaqqiq bi-al-l}aqq) is completely permeated by the Absolu te,

so much so that each of his bodily members is a self-manifestation of

the Absolute. And yet, when such men - the people of God (ahl

Allàh) - obtain knowledge by 'immediate tasting', one and the same

knowledge becomes variously inflected according to the capacities

of individual organs.

Know that all mystical knowledges which, originating from the

ontological level of the Name Allah, are actualized in the people of

God, differ from each other according to the differences in the

cognitive faculties through which they are actualized, although all

these knowledges are derived ultimately from one source. This last

point is proved by the fact that God Himself declares (in a well-

known Tradition): 'I am his hearing with which he hears, his sight

with which he sees, his hand with which he seizes, his foot with which

he walks', God declares in this way that His He-ness (huwiyah) is

the very bodily members, which, in their turn, are the man himself.

The He-ness is one, and the bodily members (of the man in whom the

He-ness is actualized) are diverse. And each of his bodily members

has a special knowledge by 'immediate tasting' which is peculiar toit

and which is derived from the unique source (from which ail the other

bodily members obtain their peculiar knowledges). Thus (the same

knowledge coming from one source) becomes differentiated by the

different bodily members. 3

In the passage just quoted, Ibn' Arabi is speaking of the inflection of

one and the same intuitive cognition in one and the same man

through his different bodily members. He is not talking about

differences in intuition among different 'men of God'. He describes

here simply how one knowledge coming from one source becomes

differently modulated in one man according to which of bis faculties

is used. But if in one and the same man the situation is like that, it is

naturally to be expected that even greater differences should arise

in different individuals. In bis commentary on this passage, al-

Qàshani understands it in this sense and says: 4

The Perfect Man as an lndividual 249

Knowledges by 'immediate tasting' are differentiated by the differ-

ence of natural capacities (lit. 'preparedness'), because the 'people of

God' do not all stand on one level. And this causes a difference in

their 'tasting' experiences and (the resulting) knowledges ... just as

one and the same person obtains different knowledges through dif-

ferent faculties. Differences arise (in both cases) in spite of the fact

that all these knowledges go back to one single source, which is the

He-ness of the Absolute.

Ibn 'Arabï himself explains this phenomenon by comparing it to

water which may have different tastes despite the oneness of its

reality.

This may be understood by the example of water. Water is every-

where one single reality, but it has different tas tes according to

places. Here it is sweet, there it is salty and bitter. And yet water is

water in all the states; its reality does not become different however

different its tastes may be.5

The above explanation gives the ontological cause from which all

differences and degrees occur among men. In addition to this, Ibn

'Arabi gives another, theological cause for the same phenomenon:

the 'jealousy' (ghayrah) of God.

The idea of God being 'jealous' (ghayür) goes back historically to

a very old Semitic conception of God. And it plays also a consider-

ably important part in Sufism.

Now 'jealousy' in reference to God is capable of being under-

stood in various meanings. God is 'jealous', for example, because

He does not like the secret between Him and His servants be

disclosed to others. Or God is 'jealous' in the sense that He forbids

that anything other than Himself be adored and worshipped. Ibn

'Arabi understands the idea of Divine 'jealousy' in terms of the

concept of 'self-manifestation' (tajallï).

The Absolute, he says, manifests itself endlessly; it freely dis-

closes and reveals its inner mysteries. And yet the Absolute is,

paradoxically enough, 'jealous' of its mysteries, in the sense that it

conceals them from the eyes of ordinary men. From this particular

point of view, Ibn 'Arabi goes even to the extent of calling the

Divine self-manifestations fawàl}ish (sg. fal}ishah meaning literally

'shameful thing' 'something scandalous or disgraceful'). Here he is

looking at the whole matter from, so to speak, the subjective view-

point of the Absolute itself. God's feeling, Ibn 'Arabi surmises,

would be that He should not have disclosed his secrets, that He

should rather have kept them forever hidden in Himself. On the

human level, it is always an act of shamelessness for man to disclose

to the eyes of the public what he should keep concealed.

Furthermore, Ibn' Arabi exercises here again bis favorite method

250 Sufism and Taoism

of thinking by phonetic associations, and connects the wordghayrah

(jealously) with ghayr ('other').

God admits that He has the Attribute of' jealousy' (ghayrah). It is out

of 'jealousy' that He 'has forbidden the shameful things (JawâfJ,ish)'

(V, 33).

But 'shameful' is only that which has been made openly manifest

(while in truth it should have been kept concealed.) Asto what is kept

within, it is 'shameful' only to those who can see it.6

The last sentence would seem to need a few explanatory words.

Here Ibn 'Arabi <livides the 'shameful things', i.e., the self-

manifestations of God, into two kinds. The first consists of those

things that are openly manifest to our senses, in the world of

concrete reality. The second refers to the 'inner' (batin) self-

manifestations of the Divine Essence in the form of the permanent

archetypes. These are not manifest to the eyes of ordinary people,

and in this respect they are not 'shameful'. And yet they are

nonetheless manifested forms, and as such are clearly visible to

those who have the proper eyes with which to perceive them. They

are, to that extent, equally 'shameful' .7

Thus God 'has forbidden the shameful things', that is, God has

forbidden the reality to be known openly; namely, the fact that He is

nothing other than the ( created) things. So He has concealed the

reality with the veil of 'jealousy' -'other-ness' (ghayrah). 8 And (the

'other') is yourself (i.e., your ego which is conscious of being some-

thing independent and different from the Absolute). (This connec-

tion between 'jealousy' and' other-ness' is natural) because ghayrah

cornes from ghayr.

As a result of this, the 'other' judges that this (particular act of)

hearing, for instance, is the hearing of such-and-such an individual

persan, while the 'knower' of the truth judges that the hearing (i.e.,

ail particular acts of hearing) is the very (act of) the Absolute. And

the same is true of ail human faculties and bodily organs.

Thus not everyone knows the Absolute (in the same degree). There

are superior men and inferior men, and a number of ranks are clearly

discernible among them. 9

The highest rank, according to Ibn 'Arabi, belongs to a man who

throws himself wholly into the act of (dhikr) - that

is, not only with his tongue and heart alone - and becomes internally

unified with the Absolute.

It must be kept in mind that 'remembrance' (dhikr), for Ibn

'Arabi, does not simply mean the act of remembering God with

one's tangue and heart; the word is rather synonymous with mysti-

cal 'self-annihilation' in God. The dhikr in this meaning is a spirituar

state in which a mystic concentrates ail his bodily and spiritual

powers on Godin such a way that his whole existence is united with

The Perfect Man as an Individual 251

God completely, without any residue. When a mystic attains to this

state, the distinction between the subject (who exercises the con-

centration of the mind) and the abject (upon which his mind is

concentrated) naturally disappears, and he experiences the immed-

iate tasting' of the essential unity with the Absolute. The ordinary

kind of dhikr which consists in merely 'remembering' the

Absolute with tongue or mind without a total existential involve-

ment of the person represents a lower degree of dhikr-experience.

When a dhikr of the highest rank actually occurs in a mystic, the

natural perfection of Man is completely realized, and he occupies a

position in the world higher than that of other creatures, including

even angels. Of course ail creatures manifest the glory of God each

according to its degree of dhikr, but it is only in Man that this

experience can be heightened to that of the essential unity with God.

The real value of the human existence which is ours is known only to

those who 'remember' Godin the proper way of 'remembering'. For

God is the intima te Companion (jalïs) of th ose who 'remember' Him,

and those who 'remember' Him do witness the Companion. As long

as a man who 'remembers' does not witness God who is his Compan-

ion, he is not 'remembering' (in the proper way).

The 'remembrance' of God (when it is real) runs through ail the parts

of a man, unlike the case in which a man 'remembers' only with his

tangue. For in the latter case, God happens to be only momentarily

the Companion of the tangue exclusively, so that the tangue alone

sees God while the man himself does not see Him by means of the

sight by which he is properly supposed to see.

You must understand (in the light of this explanation) the following

mystery concerning the 'remembrance' of those who are not serious

enough. Even in a man who is not serious enough, the (particular

bodily organ) which happens to be 'remembering' Him is doubtless in

the presence of God, and the abject of 'remembrance' (i.e., God) is

its Companion and it does witness Him. But the man himself, as long

as he lacks seriousness, is not exercising 'remembrance' (as he

should), and consequently God is not his Companion (in the real

sense).

Ali this cornes from the fact that man is 'many' (i.e., composed of

many parts); he is not one single (non-composite) reality. The Abso-

lute, on the contrary, is One in its essential reality although it is Many

in its Divine Names. But man is 'many' with his parts, so that, even if

one of his parts is engaged in 'remembrance', it does not necessarily

follow that other parts, too, are 'remembering'. The Absolute hap-

pens to be the Companion of that particular part of his which is

actually engaged in 'remembrance', but his other parts are being

negligent of 'remembrance' .10

Such being the case, it is naturally to be expected that there should

arise many degrees among men regarding the capacity for knowing

God and the mystery of Being. On the basis of this fact Ibn' Arabi

252 Sujism and Taoism

classifies men in several different ways, each classification having its

peculiar standard. 1 have already introduced some of them. Here 1

shall give three typical classifications.

The first classification <livides men into two categories: (1) those

whose minds have an otherworldly structure and (2) those whose

minds are of a worldly structure. The first category is represented by

a man who, pure of mind and heart, free from all bodily desires, can

see through things and grasp immediately the realities underlying

them. A man like this knows God by 'unveiling' and 'immediate

tasting', not by Reason. Of course, he, too, exercises his Reason

within its proper domain, but never pushes it beyond its natural

limits. Rather, he readily goes beyond the realm of Reason, and

follows the judgments given by mystical intuition. Such a man is a

'knower' ('arif) and a 'servant of the Lord' ('abd rabb).

The second category, on the contrary, is represented by a man

whose mind is deeply involved in bodily attachments, who is com-

pletely under the sway of desires, and who, consequently, cannot

see the reality of things. In trying to know God, such a man depends

exclusively upon Reason. He cannot step over the boundaries of

logical thinking. Even such a man may taste, on rare occasions,

something of the experience of' unveiling'. In su ch cases, his Reason

recognizes the fact that he is experiencing something unusual. But

this he knows only by Reason. So as soon as the experience ends, he

falls into confusion, and ends up by submitting himself to the

judgment of Reason. Such a man is nota 'servant of the Lord'; he is

rather a 'servant of reasoning' ('abd nazar).

lt must be noticed that Ibn' Arabi does not simply disparage and

deprecate Reason. lt has its own field in which to work prop-

erly. But it has its limitations. A real 'knower' is one who assigns to

Reason a proper place and restrains it from overstepping its

domain. The prophets and apostles are not people devoid of

Reason. On the contrary, they are pre-eminently men of Reason.

But they have a wider field at their command which lies beyond the

reach of Reason.

In fact, no one is more reasonable than the apostles. But (in addition

to Reason) they are (endowed with another capacity by which) they

bring informations directly from God.

Thus the apostles admit the authority of Reason ( within its proper

domain), but add toit something which Reason cannot grasp by its

own power, and which Reason rejects it at first; it is only in the Divine

self-manifestation (i.e., during the time in which the mind happens to

be actually experiencing it by 'unveiling') that it admits that it is true.

However, as soon as the experience of the Divine self-manifestation

leaves the mind, the latter falls into confusion concerning what it has

The Perfect Man as an lndividual 253

just seen. If the man in such a case happens to be a 'servant of the

Lord', he immediately subjugates his Reason to Him, but if the man

happens to be a 'servant of reasoning', he subjugates the truth to the

judgment of Reason.

This state or affairs, however, occurs only as long as the man remains

in the worldly dimension of existence, being veiled from the other

worldly dimensions (which is realized) in the very midst of the

present world.

Even the 'knowers' of the truth look in this world as if they were in a

form peculiar to the present world because of the earthly properties

appearing in them. In their 'interior', however, they have already

been transported by God to the state of being which is peculiar to the

Hereafter. There can be no doubt aboutit. So they are not recogniz-

able outwardly except to those whose spiritual eyes have been

opened by God to see through things. In reality, every true 'knower'

of God, (who knows God) through the experience of (His direct)

self-manifestation in himself, is actually living in a mode of being

peculiar to the Hereafter. Such a man has, already in the present

world, been resurrected from the dead and brought to life from his

tomb. So he sees what others cannot see and witnesses what others

cannot witness. This is a result of a special favor which God grants to

some of His servants. 11

The second classification which Ibn 'Arabi proposes consists in

dividing men into three type: (1) 'knower' ('ârif), (2) 'non-knower'

(ghayr 'arif) and (3) 'ignorant' (jâhil).

He defines 12 the first type as 'a man who sees the Absolute from

the Absolute, in the Absolute, and by the Absolute itself'. The

second, the 'non-knower', is 'a man who sees the Absolute from the

Absolute, in the Absolute, and by his own self'. The 'ignorant' is 'a

man who sees the Absolute neither from the Absolute nor in the

Absolu te, and who expects to see the Absolu te (in the Hereafter) by

his own self'.

The 'knower' is a man who completely identifies himself with

Godin very possible respect and sees God with God's own eyes

from the very viewpoint of God. Since he sees God with God's eyes,

all the self-manifestations of God are within his sight. He actually

witnesses the whole world of Being as it pulsates with Divine Life.

As to the 'non-knower', though he sees the Absolute in the

Absolute and from the viewpoint of the Absolute, the eye with

which he sees is his own. So the reality cannot but be deformed by

his sight.

The 'ignorant' is by no means in a.position to see the Absolute as

it really is. His mind is naturally restricted in an extreme degree.

Each 'ignorant' adores and worships God only in a form peculiar te

a particular religion which he happens to hold, and denies all othe:

forms of worshipping God.

111111

,:1111,

1111111

254 Sufism and Taoism

Generally speaking each man (i.e., of the class of the 'ignorant')

necessarily sticks to a particular religion ('aqïdah, i.e., religion as a

system of dogmas) concerning his Lord. He always goes back to his

Lord through his particular religious belief and seeks God therein.

Such a man positively recognizes God only when He manifests Him-

self to him in the form recognized by his traditional religion. But

when He manifests Himself in other religions, he ftatly refuses to

accept Him and runs away from Him. In so doing, he simply behaves

in an improper way towards God, while imagining that he is practis-

ing good manners toward Him. Thus a man who sticks to the belief of

his particular religion believes in a god according to what he has

subjectively posited in his mind. God in ail particular religions

(i'tiqâdât) is dependent upon the subjective act of positing (ja'l) on

the part of the believers. Thus a man of this kind sees (in the form of

God) only his own self and what he has posited in his mind. 13

The last paragraph of the passage just quoted discloses in a daring

and outspoken way Ibn' Arabï's fondamental position regarding the

etemal Religion and various historical religions. As we have

observed in an earlier context, 14 it is his unshakeable conviction that

ail religions are ultimately one because every religion worships the

Absolute in a very particular and limited way. Whatever one wor-

ships as God, one is worshipping through that particular form the

Absolute itself, nothing else, because there is nothing in the whole

world but particular self-manifestations of the Absolute.

In this connection, Ibn' Arabï draws our attention to a famous

Tradition that depicts one of the occurrences of the day or Resur-

rection. It reads: 'On the day of Resurrection, God will appear to

the creatures in a strange form and say, "1 am your Lord, the

Highest". The people will say, "No, we take refuge with God from

thee!" Then He will make Himself manifest in a form familiar to

them in their religions. Thereupon the people will cry out, "Glory

be to Thee, o God" '. Ibn 'Arabï observes that this is not only a

matter of the day of Resurrection, for exactly the same thing is

actually happening in the present world. 'Behold how the degrees of

men conceming their knowledge of God correspond exactly to their

degrees conceming the seeing of Godon the day of Resurrection'.

And he closes the passage by giving us the following waming and

advice:

Beware of being bound up by a particular religion and rejecting ail

others as unbelief! If you do that, you will fail to obtain a great

benefit. Nay, you will fail to obtain the true knowledge of the reality.

Try to make yourself a (kind of) Prime Matter for all forms of

religious belief. God is wider and greater than to be confined to one

particular religion to the exclusion of others. For He says: 'To

whichever direction you turn, there surely is the Face of God' (II,

115). God does not specify (in this verse) a particular place in which

The Perfect Man as an Individual 255

the Face of God is to be found. He only said: 'There is the Face of

God.'

The 'face' of a thing means its real essence. So God has admonished

by this verse the hearts of the 'knowers' so that they might not be

distracted by non-essential matters in the present world from being

constantly conscious of this kind of thing. For no human being ever

knows at which moment he will die. If a man happens to die at a

moment when he is forgetful of this, his position will certainly be not

equal to another who dies in the state of clear awareness. 15

The third classification of men which Ibn 'Arabï proposes is also a

tripartite division. According to this classification, the lowest degree

is represented by a man who relies upon Reason and who, there-

fore, is content with understanding both God and the world by

exercising his thinking power. The middle position is occupied by

men of 'imagination' (khayal), i.e., those who understand the Abso-

lu te according to the authentic imagery based on visions of

prophets. And the highest degree is of th ose who know the reality of

the things through the experience of 'unveiling' and 'immediate

tasting'.

Let us begin with the lowest class, that is, men of Reason. These

people blindly believe in Reason, do not recognize anything as truth

unless it is acceptable to Reason, and refuse to admit anything

which happens to be in conftict with Reason. They do not know that

Reason, in matters conceming the Absolute, is utterly powerless,

and that it can never go deep into the reality of Being. In various

passages of the Ibn' Arabï emphasizes the narrow limitations

and the essential powerlessness of Reason in contrast to the 'unveil-

ing' (kashf) which is for him the highest form of human cognition.

He sees in the Theologians (mutakallimün) a typical example of the

men of Reason.

As an illustration, he adduces a Qoranic verse: 'thou (Mu\lam-

mad) wert not the one who threw when thou threwest, but God it

was who really threw' 16 (VIII, 17). This verse, according to Ibn

'Arabï, is a most concise symbolic description of the essential rela-

tion between the Absolute and the world. The verse begins by

negating that Mu\lammad 'threw'. Then it affirms that he did throw

- 'when thou threwest' - and finally Mu\lammad's having thrown is

again negated, and the verse ends by establishing that the real

thrower was God Himself. All this is reducible to the proposition:

'the real thrower is God, but it is Godïn the phenomenal form of

Mu\lammad'. The verse, thus understood, expresses nothing other

than the truth about the self-manifestation of the Absolute.

However, only a real 'knower' is capable of interpreting the verse

in this sense. As for the Theologians, its true meaning is completely

out of their reach. In confusion they interpret it arbitrarily

256 Sufism and Taoism

according to the dictates of their Reason. As a result, their conclu-

sion clashes with that of' immediate tasting'. And in most cases they

go to the extreme of declaring impossible and absurd what mystical

intuition recognizes as true.

This and similar verses can be rightly understood only by those

who are possessed of an infini tel y flexible mind. On the basis of this

single verse one can say, 'it was Mul;iammad who threw', just as one

can say, 'it was not Mul;iammad who threw'. Likewise, one can say,

'it was God who threw', just as one can say, 'it was Mul;iammad who

threw, not God'. The verse, in this way, is liable to produce various

statements that seemingly contradict each other. For, after all, the

question is one of different relations and viewpoints. One and the

same event can be looked at variously according to various possible

viewpoints. And yet all this variation takes place within the

infinitely wide Reality which comprises everything and every poss-

ible viewpoint. All are ultimately the activity of the Absolute. But

Reason which by nature is one-sided, rigid, and inflexible, cannot

accept such a view.

As another good example aptly illustrating the natural and essen-

tial deficiency of Reason, Ibn 'Arabï considers the problem of the

relation between 'cause' and 'caused'. The Theologians and

Philosophers, who try to understand everything in the light of what

Reason tells them, often discuss the concept of' cause' ('il/ah). The

reality of 'cause', however, can never be revealed to their minds as

long as they remain so utterly dependent upon logical thinking.

As an illustration disclosing the natural weakness of Reason in its

reasoning activity we may mention the judgment given by Reason

concerning 'cause': that a 'cause' cannot be the 'caused' of that of

which it is the 'cause'. This is evidently what Reason judges. But in

the light of knowledge obtained by mystical illumination, we must

assert precisely this proposition (which is rejected by Reason);

namely, that a 'cause' does become the 'caused' of that of which it is

the 'cause' .17

The judgment given by Reason can be made (more) correct through

theoretical elaboration within the boundaries of logical thinking.

But, even so, the ultimate limit to which Reason can go, when it is

actually faced with a state of affairs which contradicts the evidence

furnished by logical proof, is to think that - admitting the essential

unity of Reality through all the multifarious forms of things in the

world-(this unique Reality), in so far as it actually and positively acts

as a 'cause' in the form of some concrete thing (A, for example) and

causes some other concrete thing (B), it can never be the 'caused' of

that very thing (B) which it (A) has caused as long as it is the 'cause'.

The truth of the matter, Reason will think, is rather that, as the

Reality changes its form (fromA to C, for example, and enters into a

different relationship with B), its capacity may also change in such a

The Perfect Man as an Individual 257

way that it (now in the form of C) could very well be the 'caused' of

what (B) it has caused (in the capacity of A), so that, as a result, the

'caused' may become the 'cause' of its own 'cause'. This, 1 say, is the

furthest limit to which Reason can go even when it perceives the

reality (of Being, by perceiving one single Essence underlying all the

things and events that stand in 'cause' -'caused' relations), and steps

beyond the proper domain of logical reasoning. 18

The latter half of this passage may be explicated as follows. Properly

speaking, Reason has a very narrowly limited domain of its own. As

long as it remains within the strict limits of this domain, Reason

cannot even see that everything is but a different self-manifestation

of one single Reality, the Absolute. But if Reason does stretch itself

forcibly to the furthest possible limit and goes beyond the domain of

its natural capacity, it will be able to see that the Many in the

possible world are ultimately so many different forms of one and the

same Reality. Of course, such a cognition itself goes against the

judgment of Reason in its normal activity. But at least this mu ch

may be conceded by it if it succeeds in extending its capacity in the

way just described.

Reason, once it has admitted that the Many, i.e., all things and

events in the world of concrete reality, are ultimately One and are

but so many phenomenal forms assumed by one single Reality, must

necessarily admit also that the distinction usually made between

'cause' and 'caused' is merely a relative matter, because bath are

two different forms assumed by one and the same thing. And in this

particular sense, Reason will have to admit that a 'cause' can be a

'caused'.

However, even at this stage, Reason is limited by its own logic. lt

will still assert that so long as a certain concrete thing (A) actually is

the 'cause' of another concrete thing (B), A remains a 'cause', and

will never be a 'caused' of B. A, in the capacity of B's 'cause', can

never be a 'caused' of B .A can rightly be a 'caused' of B only when it

is considered from a different angle in a different capacity, i.e., no

longer exactly as A but rather as something different,. C.

Thus it is the final judgment of Reason, even at its unusually

extended limit, that a 'cause', unless it be considered in terms of a

different relationship, cannot be caused by its own 'caused'. This is

the self-evident and primary truth of reason which it can never

abandon as long as Reason remains Reason.

However, if we look at the matter in the light of the intuition

gained by the experience of 'immediate tasting', we find immedi-

ately that a 'cause' can possibly be a 'caused', just as a 'caused' can

possibly be a 'cause'.

It is worthy of notice that the thought pattern that underlies this

conception is very characteristic of Ibn 'Arabï; we have already met

258 Suftsm and Taoism

with it in the preceding in various forms. The idea, for example, that

the creatures are 'food' of God, just as God is 'food' of the crea-

tures, or the idea of the mutual taskhir between God and the

creatures, namely, that the creatures make God 'subservient' to

themselves, just as God makes the creatures 'subservient' to Him -

these and similar 'daring' ideas are structurally of the same category

as that of the mutual causal relationship between God and the

creatures.

How, then, can a 'caused' act positively upon its own 'cause' in

such a way that it makes the latter its own 'caused'? The answer runs

as follows. 'The 'cause-ness' ('illïyah) of a 'cause' ('illah) is incon-

ceivable without the 'caused-ness' (ma'lülïyah) of the 'caused'

(ma'lül), nor can the first actually exist without the latter. The

'cause-ness' completely depends upon the 'caused-ness' of the

'caused'. 'Cause', in this sense, contains in itself 'caused-ness', just

as 'caused' contains 'cause-ness'. Moreover, all things, in Ibn

'Arabi's view, are but different phenomenal forms of one single

Existence. So everything is in one aspect 'cause', and in another

'caused'.

Representing the people of 'immediate tasting', al-Qashani for-

mulates the right answer in the following terms: 19

The one single Reality appearing in two different forms (i.e., 'cause'

and' caused') is apt to receive the two qualifications according to ( our

subjective) points of view. That is to say, it has, when it is in the state

of being a 'cause', the aptitude to be a 'caused', and when it is in the

state of being a 'caused', it has the aptitude to be a 'cause'. For the

one Reality comprehends in itself both 'cause-ness' and 'caused-

ness' with ail the properties peculiar to both. Thus one and the same

thing is a 'cause' in its 'cause-ness', and a 'caused' in its 'caused-ness'.

It has in itself all these and similar aspects (which i.t manifests)

according to particular circumstances.

Exactly the same holds true of the phenomenon of the self-

manifestation. For (such distinctions as) the 'self-manifester', the

locus of self-manifestation, the act of self-manifestation, the being of

the self-manifester a self-manifester and the being of the locus a

locus, etc. ( - ail these are simply [reftections of our] subjective

viewpoints.) In reality they are nothing other than the Absolu te

which is essentially One and which appears in these various capacities

according to our subjective perspectives. These are all notions con-

ceived by our discriminating Reason, the distinctions existing only in

our Reason. They are ail matters of relative forms, supposed rela-

tions secondarily derived from the one single Reality. This Reality is

God, the One and the Unique. There is nothing in Being except God!

If we have gone into a considerably long digression on the problem

of the 'cause' - 'caused' relationship, it is partly because of its

intrinsic value as a theory of causality typical of Ibn 'Arabi. The

The Perfect Man as an Individual 259

main purpose, however, has been to give an illustration showing the

natural incapability of Reason to reach any deep truth about the

Absolute and the world of Being.

'He who knows himself (lit. 'his soul') knows his Lord' - this

famous Tradition is one of Ibn' Arabi' s favorite adages. Here again

he refers to it and declares that there has not been even a single

person, among the Philosophers and Theologians, who has grasped

his own 'self' (soul) in its real depth.

Of ail the men of knowledge no one has obtained a real insight into

the 'soul' and its reality except the divinely inspired Apostles and

great Sufis. Asto the men of reasoning and logical thinking, whether

the ancient Philosophers or the Theologians in Islam, not even one of

them has hit upon the truth in their discussions on 'soul' and its

quiddity. (This is but natural because) logical thinking can never

arrive at the truth in this matter. Therefore, he who seeks the true

knowledge of 'soul' by means of thinking is like a person who,

looking at a man with a tumor, thinks him to be fat, or like a person

who blows upon something which is not fuel.

People of this kind are precisely 'those whose effort goes astray in the

present world, being convinced that they are doing good work'

(XVIII, 14). For he who seeks anything by a wrong method is sure to

fail in achieving his aim. 20

Between the real 'knowers' and the men of Reason are situated the

people of Imagination (khayâl). These are men who try with sincer-

ity to approach the Absolute by the aid of the images given by their

Prophet and Apostle. Concerning the above-quoted Qoranic verse

about the 'one who threw', for example, the men of this kind believe

firmly that the true 'thrower' is God Himself, although the deep

meaning of the verse escapes their understanding. They readily

accept as true whatever their Prophet teaches them, and do not dare

to be critical of anything which they think contradicts Reason. Ibn

'Arabi calls these men 'people of Belief (or Faith)' (ah! al-ïmân).

The 'people of Belief are those who accept unquestioningly what-

ever the Prophets and Apostles convey from the Absolute. They

should not be confused with those who accept unquestioningly the

teaching of the (Philosophers and Theologians) who think by Reason

and who are not content unless they interpret any message (i.e.,

Qoranic verse or prophetic Tradition) that is transmitted to them in

the light of logical evidences.

To these people (of Belief) refers the Qoranic expression: 'or he who

lends his ear' (L, 37) to the Divine messages as they are conveyed

through the tongues of the Prophets. And such a man, i.e., a man who

tends his ear in this way, 'is a witness' (L, 37). God here refers to the

ontological dimension of Imagination and the proper use of the

faculty of Imagination. And this corresponds to the saying of the

Prophet (Muf)ammad) on the 'perfection of Belief'

260 Sufism and Taoism

(il;san ): ' 21 ••• that you worship Godas if you saw Him'. God is always

in the direction toward which man prays. This is why such a man is a

witness. 22

'Being a witness (shahid)' in this passage means, in Ibn Arabi's

interpretation, the spiritual state in which a man 'witnesses', i.e., is

present by his heart to the ontological plane of Imagination. lt is a

state at which the heart of a 'knower' perceives in sensible imagery

some of the things that properly belong to the world of the Unseen.

The heart of a' knower', when he reaches this stage, finds itself in the

world of Imagination and begins to witness in images various states

of affairs of the invisible world.

lt is worthy of notice that toward the end of the passage just

quoted, Ibn 'Arabi, referring to the famous Tradition about il)siin,

draws attention to the expression: ' ... that you worship Him as if

you saw Him'. In Ibn 'Arabi's interpretation, this describes the

lowest and weakest degree of the 'witnessing' here in question. lt is

the lowest degree of the mental presence in the ontological plane of

Imagination, for it is said: 'as if you saw Him'. As the very wording

of this phrase indicates, man is notas yet actually seeing God. There

is as yet no actual vision. Man only acts as if he had a real vision.

But when the heart of the 'knower' becomes strengthened and

mounts a step higher, the object of the 'witnessing' becomes visible

to the internai, spiritual eye (ba$irah), though as yet no vision occurs

to his physical eye. 23

As the 'knower' goes up to the next degree, the object becomes

visible to both his physical eye and his spiritual eye. And if he still

goes up and reaches finally the ultimate and highest stage, the one

who 'witnesses' and the object 'witnessed' become completely

unified. At this stage it is no longer the human heart that 'witnesses'

its object; but it is the Absolute itself 'witnessing' itself in itself. And

this is the stage of the 'saint' (waliy).

Thus when a man 'wakes up', and rises to the highest degree of

'saintship', he begins to witness an extraordinary phenomenon, for

his spiritual eye is now open to the reality of what we have described

earlier under the title of 'new creation'.

In the eye of a real 'knower', the Absolute (in whatever form it may

appear) remains always the 'recognized' one which is never denied. 24

The people who recognized the same Absolu te un der ail phenomenal

forms in the present world will do exactly the same in the Hereafter,

too.

This is why God ( speaking of a man of this kind) says 'for whomever

has a heart (qalb)' (L, 37). For (such a man) knows the constant

changing of the Absolute in various forms; he knows this judging by

The Perfect Man as an Individual 261

the fact that his 'heart' is constantly changing from one form to

another. 25

Thus such a man cornes to know his .own 'self' through (the know-

ledge of the constant transformation of) himself. (And from this he

obtains the real knowledge about the Absolute, for) his own 'self' is

nothing other than the He-ness of the Absolute, (and his knowledge

thus obtained is easily extended to everything because) everything in

the world of Being, whether present or future, is nothing other than

the He-ness of the Absolute; indeed, everything is the He-ness

itself. 26

A real 'knower' who knows his 'heart' (qalb) sees with his own inner

eye how it changes constantly and transforms-itself (qalb or taqal-

lub) at every moment in a myriad of modes and states. He knows at

the same time that his 'heart' is but a self-manifestion of the Abso-

lute, and that it is nothing other than the He-ness of the Absolute.

Of course his 'heart' is the only thing in the whole world whose inner

structure he can know through introspection. But he is well aware

also that all other things must be exactly of the same structure as his

'heart'. Thus a man who knows his own 'heart' from inside knows

also the Absolute as it goes on transforming itself moment after

moment in all the possible forms of the world.

The category to which such a 'knower' belongs constitutes the

highest degree on the scale of humanity. The subject of the next

chapter will be this highest category of men.

Notes

1. FU'f., p. 26/56.

2. FU'f ., p. 118/114. The whole passage has been given in translation in Chapter IV.

3. FU'f., pp. 125-126/107.

4. p. 126.

5. FU!i., p. 126/107.

6. FU'f., p. 130/109-110.

7. Cf. Affifi, FU'f., Corn., p. 126.

8. As I have remarked above, the word ghayrah meaning 'jealousy' is, in the

linguistic consciousness of Ibn' Arabi, directly connected with ghayr meaning 'other'.

So the sentence: 'God covered or concealed the reality with ghayrah' not only means

that He concealed it with 'jealousy', but at the same time that He has concealed the

reality by an infinite number of particular 'determinations', ail of which are regarded

as 'other' than God Himself, so that in this view everything appears as something

1111

: 11:

1111

I'

1

1

11.J

!I

262 Sufism and Taoism

'other' than the rest of the things as well as' other' than the Absolute. And the view of

'other-ness' covers the reality of Being and hinders it from being perceived by the

eyes of ordinary people.

9. Fu$., p. 130/110.

10. FIJ-î., p. 211/168-169.

11. FU$., pp. 234-235/185-186.

12. FIJ-î., pp. 135-136/113.

13. ibid.

14. Cf. Chapter V, where the same idea is dealt with in connection with a different

problem, that of 'metaphysical perplexity'.

15. FU$., p. 136/113.

16. Wa-mâ rama y ta idh rama y ta wa-lâkinna Allâha ramà.

17. Suppose Ais the 'cause' of B, for instance.Bis of course the 'caused' of A. But

there is also a certain respect in which B must be regarded as the 'cause' of A. In this

latter respect, A would be the 'caused' of B.

18. FIJ-î., p. 233/185.

19. p. 234.

20. FU$., p. 153/125.

21. On the exact meaning of the word il]sân see my The Concept of Belief in Islamic

Theology, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 58-60.

22. FU$., p. 149/123.

23. Qàshànî, p. 150.

24 The reference is to the Tradition, which has been quoted and explained earlier in

the present chapter, concerning what will happen on the day of Resurrection.

25. By the 'etymological' way of thinking which, as we have observed several times,

is so typical of Ibn 'Arabî, he brings together the 'heart' (qalb) and 'change' or

'transformation' (qalb).

26. Fu$., p. 149/122.