Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation - Oxford Scholarship
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Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation
Richard Sorabji
ABSTRACT
The Stoics (Chrysippus, Seneca, Epictetus) tell us how to get rid of unwanted emotions by re-evaluating situations (cognitive therapy). In their view, an emotion is a pair of value judgements that harm or benefit if at hand, and that it is appropriate to react. Bodily and mental shocks (e.g., crying) are not part of the emotion. One Stoic, Posidonius, protested that such judgements are neither necessary nor sufficient for emotion, not necessary, for example, for emotion produced by melody, or in animals. Seneca replied that what is produced by music and the arts, or in animals, is only preliminary shocks or ‘first movements’. Others (Galen) suggested that bodily factors are important and need separate physical treatment, and recent brain studies (LeDoux) explain why. But the Stoics are right that cognitive therapy can often on its own remove unwanted emotion. Moreover, their two judgements are the right targets for re-evaluation, and it is a muddle to be sad (William James) because I cry. Crying is only a shock. We need not share the Stoic ideal of apatheia — freedom from all emotions — just freedom from unwanted ones. Some Christians (Origen, Evagrius) took up the idea of first movements and converted them from preliminary shocks into preliminary ‘bad thoughts’, which act as temptations. They worked out a whole art of nipping them in the bud to achieve the Stoic ideal of apatheia. But Augustine favoured Aristotle's emotion in moderation, except for example for lust, which he saw as disobedient to will.
Keywords: Aristotle, Chrysippus, Posidonius, Galen, Augustine, first movements, judgement, apatheia, Seneca and Epictetus
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Print publication date: 2002 Print ISBN-13: 9780199256600
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.001.0001
AUTHORS
Affiliations are at time of print publication.
Richard Sorabji, author
Wolfson College, Oxford
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Contents
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Front Matter
Introduction
Part I Emotions As Judgements Versus Irrational Forces
1 Emotion As Cognitive and Its Therapy
2 The Emotions As Value Judgements In Chrysippus
3 Seneca's Defence
4 Seneca's Defence
5 The Arts
Aristotle, Philodemus, and the Stoics
6 Posidonius On the Irrational Forces In Emotion
7 Posidonius
8 Posidonius
9 Aspasius and Other Objections To Chrysippus
10 What Is Missing From the Judgemental Analysis?
Part II Value Of the Emotions, Cognitive Therapy, and the Role Of Philosophy
11 The Role Of Analytic Philosophy In Stoic Cognitive Therapy
12 Stoic Indifference: A Barrier To Therapy?
13 The Case For and Against Eradication Of Emotion
14 The Traditions Of Moderation and Eradication
15 How the Ancient Exercises Work
16 Exercises Concerned With Time and the Self
17 Physiology and the Non‐Cognitive Galen's Alternative Approach to Emotion
18 Sex, Love, and Marriage In Pagan Philosophy and the Use Of Catharsis
19 Catharsis and the Classification Of Therapies
Part III Emotional Conflict and Structure Of the Mind
20 Emotional Conflict and the Divided Self
21 The Concept Of Will
Part IV From Stoic Agitations To Christian Temptations
22 First Movements As Bad Thoughts
23 From First Movements To the Seven Cardinal Sins Evagrius
24 First Movements In Augustine
25 Christians On Moderation Versus Eradication
26 Augustine On Lust and the Will
End Matter
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