Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P2.Ch07 VII The Way

SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

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Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

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VII The Way

Up to this point we have been following the footprints of Chuang-

tzu as he tries to describe analytically the process by which a vision

of the Absolute is revealed to the Taoist Perfect Man, 

opening up in

his mind a new vista of the whole world of Being which is totally

different from, and radically opposed to, that shared by ordinary

men on the level of common sense. 

In so doing we have discarded Lao-tzu except in a few places. 

Nor have we analyzed in a systematic

manner the philosophical thought expressed in the Tao Tê Ching.

We have adopted this course for several reasons, the most impor-

tant of them being that 

---

Chuang-tzu, as 1 have pointed out a number

of times, is vitally interested in describing the epistemological

aspect of the problem of the Tao, 

while Lao-tzu is almost exclusively interested in giving the result of the experience of the Absolute, i.e., what comes after, and out of, that experience.

---

We have seen in the preceding chapter how Chuang-tzu submits

to an elaborate theoretical analysis the process of the graduai

development of the human mind toward a Taoist perfection. 

He

attempts to give an accurate description of the Taoist variety of

metaphysical or spiritual experience by which man' ascends' toward

the Absolute until he becomes completely unified with it. 

Certainly,

Chuang-tzu is equally interested in the 'descending' movement of

the mind, from the state of ekstasis back to the level of daily

consciousness, that is, from the stage of the absolute Unity back to

that of 'essential' Multiplicity. 

But even then, his description of the

Descent is epistemological as well as ontological. 

That is to say, his

description is made so that to each objective stage of Being there

corresponds a subjective stage of spiritual experience, so that the

ontological system, in the case of Chuang-tzu, is at the same time a

complete epistemological system, and vice versa. 

Moreover, it is

typical of Chuang-tzu that these two aspects are so completely fused

together that it is at times difficult for us to decide whether a given

passage is intended to be a description of the subjective side of the

matter or of the objective, ontological structure of things. 

The 'sitting in oblivion' is an example in point.

376

Lao-tzu, on the contrary, does not seem to be very much

interested in the experiential stages which precede the ultimate

vision of the Absolute. 

He does not take the trouble to explain how

and by what process we can obtain the vision of the Absolute. 

He seems to be more interested in the questions: 

(1) What is the Absolute, i.e., the Way?; and 

(2) How is the 'sacred man' expected to behave in ordinary circumstances of social life on the basis of his vision of the Way? 

From the very outset he utters his words in the name of the Absolute, as a representative of those who have already attained to the highest stage of Taoist perfection. 

Behind the pages of the Tao Tê Ching we feel the presence of a man who has experienced the most intimate union with the Absolute, who, consequently knows

what the Absolute is.

Quite abruptly Lao-tzu sets out to talk about the Way. 

He tries to impart tous his personal knowledge of the Absolute, and his strange

- so it seems to common sense understanding -vision of the world.

If it were not for Chuang-tzu, we would hardly be able to know for sure what kind of experiential background this extraordinary vision of the world has as its unstated 'prehistory'. 

This is why we have up till now intentionally refrained from turning systematically toward an analysis of Lao-tzu's thought, and confined ourselves to the task

of clarifying this 'prehistory' in the light of what Chuang-tzu says

about it.

But the particular situation which we have just mentioned con-

cerning Lao-tzu's basic attitude would seem to suggest that the Tao Tê Ching is the best possible thing for us to have recourse to, if we want to obtain a clear understanding of the Taoist conception of the Absolute, its reality and its working.

 As we shall realize immediately, the Absolute as conceived by Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu is by its very nature beyond all verbal description. Despite that, Lao-tzu does endeavor to describe, at least symbolically, this ineffable Something. 

And he succeeds marvellously. In point of fact, the Tao Të Ching is a remarkable work in that it attempts to delineate to the utmost limit of possibility the Absolute which is essentially indescribable. 

This is why we shall be greatly dependent in the present chapter upon this book for elucidating the metaphysical structure of the Absolute. .

We must remark, however, that here again, Lao-tzu does not explain how and why it is ineffable, and indescribable. 

He simply states that the Way is 'nameless', 'formless', 'imageless', 'invisible',

'inaudible', etc., that it is 'nothing' (wu wu) 1 or Nothing (wu) 2 • 

As to the psychological or logical process by which one reaches this

conclusion, he says nothing positive. 

377

This process is clarified in an interesting way by Chuang-tzu in a passage which

bears ample witness to his being an excellent dialectician. 

Let us begin by reading the passage in question as an illuminating

theoretical introduction to Lao-tzu' s conception of the Absolute.

Chuang-tzu is keenly conscious of the fact that the Way, or the

Absolute in its absoluteness, defies all verbalization and reasoning;

that, if brought down to the level of language, the Way will immediately and inevitably turn into a concept. As a concept, even the Absolute is exactly in the same rank as any other concept. He makes this observation the starting-point of his argument. People, he says, distinguish between 'right' and 'wrong' in all matters and thus take the position of there being a fundamental distinction between 'right' and 'wrong'. 

Chuang-tzu, on his part, puts forward the thesis that there is no distinction between 'right' and 'wrong' .3 Ordinary people and Chuang-tzu are in this respect diametrically opposed to each other. And yet, he goes on to say, as a logical proposition, 'there-is-no-distinction-between-right-and-wrong' is no less a logos4 than the opposite proposition: 'there-is-a-distinction-between-right-and-wrong'. In this respect, both belong to one and the same category .5

In reality, the two propositions refer to two completely different

levels of discourse. The difference, as we already know, cornes out

only when one realizes that the positive statement is a statement

typical of the empirical level of discourse, while the negative one is

orginally intended to represent the ontological 'chaotification'

which is experienced by the Perfect Man in the moments of his

ecstatic union with the Absolute. As an expression of this original

experience, the statement is not a logical proposition except in its

outward form. But as long as it does have a logical form, it is a logical

proposition; and as such, it does not properly represent the unique

experience of 'chaotification', being as it is nothing but the con-

tradictory of the proposition: 'there-is-a-distinction-between-

right-and-wrong'. If such is the case, could there be any other

attitude for us to take than maintaining a complete silence? 'Despite

this', he says, 'I would dare to discuss the problem (on the logical or

conceptual lev el).' With these preliminary remarks, he sets out to

develop an extremely interesting argument in the following way.

The argument, in brief, establishes that the Absolute in its original

absoluteness is conceptually the negation-of-negation-of-negation,

that is, the negation of the Absolute's being Nothing which, again, is

the negation of Being. And that is the furthest limit to which our

logical thinking can go in its venturesome attempt at grasping the

Absolute on the level of concepts.378

We have seen in the preceding chapter how Chuang-tzu, in

describing the stages of the spiritual development of 'sitting in 

oblivion', mentions as the ultimate limit of ecstatic cognition the

view that 'nothing has ever existed from the very beginning'.

What is the ultimate limit of Knowledge? It is the stage represented

by the view that nothing has ever existed from the very beginning.

This is the furthest limit (of Knowledge), to which nothing more can

be added. 6

'Nothing has ever existed from the very beginning' appearing in this

quotation is the key-phrase for the right understanding of the

passage we are going to read. 7 lt is important to keep in mind,

however, that in this latter passage we are no longer concerned with

the epistemological question of the utmost limit of human cogni-

tion. Our problem here is essentially of a metaphysical nature. For it

concerns the ultimate origin of Being, or of the Universe. The

'beginning' here in question means the beginning point of the world

of Being. Whenever we think logically of the formation of the world

of Being, we have to posit a 'beginning'. Our Reason cannot con-

ceive of the world of Being without imagining a point at which it

'began' to exist.

So we posit Beginning. (But the moment we posit Beginning, our

Reason cannot help going further back and) admit the idea of there

having been no Beginning. (Thus the concept of No-Beginning is

necessarily established. But the moment we posit No-Beginning, our

logical thinking goes further back by negating the very idea which it

has just established, and) admits the idea of there having been no

'there-having-been-no-Beginning'. (The concept of 'No-No-

Beginning' is thus established.)

The concept of Beginning, i.e., the initial point of the whole world of

Being, is but a relative concept. lt can be conceptually pushed

further and further back. But no matter how far we may push it

back, this conceptual process does not reach an end. In order to put

a definite end to this process we have to transcend it atone stroke by

negating the Beginning itself. As a result, the concept of No-

Beginning is obtained.

However, the concept of No-Beginning is, again, a relative one,

being as it is a concept that subsists only by being opposed to that of

Beginning. In order to remove this relativity and attain to the

absolute No-Beginning, we have to transcend the No-Beginning

itself by negating it and establishing No-No-Beginning. The

No-No-Beginning - which must be articulated as No-[No-

Beginning] - is, however, a concept whose real significance is dis

closed only to those who are able to understand it as signifying a

metaphysical state of affairs which is to be grasped by a kind of

metaphysical intuition. 379

And this would seem to indicate that No-No-Beginning, although it is something that has been posited by Reason, lies beyond the grasp of all logical reasoning.

In the same manner, (we begin by taking notice of the fact that) there

is Being. (But the moment we recognize Being, our Reason goes

further back and admits that) there is Non-Being (or Nothing). (But

the moment we posit Non-Being we cannot but go further back and

admit that) there has not been from the very beginning Non-Being.

(The concept of No-[Non-Being] once established in this way, the

Reason goes further back and admits that) there has been no 'there-

having-been-no-Non-Being' (i.e., the negation of the negation of

Non-Being, or No-[No Non-Being]).

This concept of No-[No Non-Being] or No-No-Nothing represents

the ultimate logical stage which is reached by our negating - i.e.,

transcending - the negation itself of the opposition of Being and

Non-Being. This is the logical and conceptual counterpart of the

Way or the metaphysical Nothing which is nota simple 'nothing',

but a transcendent Nothing that lies beyond bath 'being' and 'non-

being' as ordinarily understood.

We have thus seemingly succeeded in conceptualizing the Way as

an absolutely transcendent Nothing. However, does the Absolute

th us conceptualized mirror faithfully the reality of the Absolu te? To

this question, we can say neither Yes nor No. As in the case of the

concept of No-No-Beginning, we must remark that the concept of

No-No-Nothing does justice to the reality of the Absolute only

when we transcend, in understanding it, the sphere of logical think-

ing itself into that of ecstatic or mystic intuition. But when we do so,

the concept of No-No-Nothing will immediately cease to be a

concept. And we shall end up by realizing that all the logical

reasoning that has preceded has in reality been futile and of no use.

If, on the contrary, we refuse to transcend the lev el of reasoning, the

concept of No-No-Nothing will remain for ever an empty concept

devoid of all positive meaning and, therefore, in no position to do

justice to the reality of the Absolu te. Thus, either way, the concep-

tualizing activity of the mind proves powerless in grasping the

Absolute as it really is.

(When Reason begins to be active), ail of a sudden we find ourselves

confronted with 'being' and 'non-being'. (Since, however, these are

relative concepts in the sense that 'being' at this stage turns into

'non-being' at the next stage, and so on and so forth), we can never

know for sure which is really 'being' and which is really 'non-being'.

Now 1 have just established something (that looks) meaningful, (i.e.,

1 have established the Absolute as No-No-Nothing). But 1 do not

know whether 1 have truly established something meaningful or

whether what 1 have established is, after ail, nothing meaningful.

380 S

At this point, Chuang-tzu suddenly changes the direction of his

thinking and tries another approach. This time he turns to the aspect

of Unity which, as we have seen earlier, is one of the most salient

features of the Absolute. But before discussing the problem on the

lev el of logical reasoning, he reminds us by way of caution of what is

to be understood by the statement that the Absolute is 'one'. The

Absolute, he says, is 'one' as a coincidentia oppositorum. We have

already examined in Chapter IV Chuang-tzu's position conceming

this problem. The key-term is 'equalization' of all things in the

Absolute.

The Way or the Absolute, according to Chuang-tzu, is the

metaphysical state of Heavenly Equalization, that is, the absolute

One which 'equalizes' all oppositions and contradictions. At this

stage, the smallest is at the same time the biggest, and a moment is

eternity.

(The state of Heavenly Equalization defies common sense and

reason, for we admit at this stage that) there is in the world nothing

bigger than the tip of a hair of an animal in autumn, while Mount Tai

(which is usually mentioned as an example of a very big thing) is

considered extremely small. No one lives longer than a child who dies

before coming of age, while P'êng Tsu (who is related to have lived

800 years) is considered to have died young. Heaven and Earth

endure for the sa me length of time as 1 do (i.e., the eternal duration of

Heaven and Earth is equivalent to the momentary duration of my

individual existence in this world). And the ten thousand things are

exactly the same as my own self.

Thus, from the viewpoint of Heavenly Equalization, all things

become reduced to a single unity in terms of both time and space.

How does logical reasoning grasp such an absolu te Oneness? That is

the question we are faced with now.

AU things (at this stage) are absolutely 'one'. But if so, how is it

possible for us to say something? (i.e., Since all things are absolutely

'one', there is no longer anything whatsoever opposed to anything

else whatsoever. And since there is no opposition, it is meaningless

even to say: 'one').

(But in order to reason, 1 have to posit something). So 1 have said:

'one'. But how could 1 judge that (it is, or they are) 'one' without

explicitly positing the term (i.e., word or concept: 'one')? However,

(the moment 1 posit the term 'one'), the (original) 'one' (i.e., the

absolu te One which is a coincidentia oppositorum) and the term (or

concept of) 'one' necessarily make 'two'. (This would mean that the

least amount of reasoning makes the original One split itself into Two

and thus produces dualism.)

Then, these 'two' (i.e., the two-term judgment: 'The Way is One')

together with the 'one' (i.e., the absolute One which is prior to any

judgment) make 'three'.

381

And from this point on the process ex tends endlessly, so much so that

even a talented mathematician will not be able to count out the

number, much Jess ordinary people.

If, in this way, moving from Non-Being to Being leads us inevitably to

(at least) 'three', where shall we get if we move from Being to Being

(i.e., if, instead of starting from the absolu te One, we take a relativist

point of view and begin to pursue the individual things which go on

being endlessly diversified)? Better not to make any move (i.e.,

better not to exercise reasoning concerning the Absolute and the

things). Let us content ourselves with abiding by the (great) Yes

(which transcends ail oppositions and contradictions, and leaves

everything as i t is) !

Thus after developing an elaborate reasoning on the nature of the

Absolute, Chuang-tzii, ironically enough, ends by asserting the

futility of reasoning. He advises us to abandon all logical thinking

about the Absolute and to remain immersed ecstatically in the

absolute intuitive Knowledge. For only by doing so can we hope to

be in direct contact with the absolute One.

Thus the highest stage of Knowledge is remaining motionless in what

cannot absolutely be known (by reasoning). Is there anyone who

knows the Word which is no longer a 'word'? Is there anyone who

knows the Way which is not even a 'way'? If there is a man who knows

such a thing, he deserves to be named the 'Treasury of Heaven' (i.e.,

he who is in possession of the key to the limitless treasure house of

Being. Nay, he is the same as the 'treasury' itself). (The Treasury of

Heaven with which such a man is completely identical and unified is

like an unbounded ocean); no matter how much you pour water into

it, it will never become full; and no matter how much you dip up

water therefrom, it will never run dry. And no body knows how and

from where all these (limitless) things corne into being.

It is the Knowledge of such a man that is properly to be called the

'shaded Light'.

Thus by following step by step Chuang-tzu's argument we have

been led to the conclusion that the Way or the Absolute in its

ultimate reality transcends all reasoning and conceptualization.

This conclusion forms the starting-point for the metaphysical think-

ing of Lao-tzii. As 1 remarked at the outset of this chapter, Lao-tzu

does not take the trouble of explaining the logical or epistemologi-

cal process which underlies his metaphysical system. But we are

now in a position to understand the background against which this

metaphysics must be set.

Qui te naturally, the metaphysics of Lao-tzu begins by mentioning

negative attributes of the Way. The Way, to begin with, is

'nameless' .8

382

The Way in its absolute reality (ch'ang) has no name. 9

Interminably continuous like a thread, no name can be given to it. 10

The Way is hidden and nameless. 11

That the Way is 'nameless' implies that the very name 'Way' (tao) is

nothing other than a makeshift. Lao-tzü forcibly calls it 'Way'

because without naming it he cannot even refer to it. This fact is

clearly indicated by the very famous opening sentence of the Tao Tê

Ching.

The 'way' which can be designated by the word 'way' is not the real' 2

Way.

The 'name' which can be designated by the word 'name' is not the

real 12 Name.'3

It is interesting and important to remark that this passage, besides

being a clear statement to the effect that the Absolute is 'nameless',

is designed to be an implicit criticism of Confucian realism. The

'way' which is here said to be not the real Way is the human (or

ethical) 'way' as understood in the Confucian school. And the

'name' which is said to be not the real Name refers to the so-called

'names' of the Confucianists, su ch as' benevolence', 'righ teousness',

'wisdom', etc., which the Confucianists consider cardinal virtues.

Asto the meaning of the word 'way' (tao) as it was originally used

by Confucius himself and his circle, authentic information is fur-

nished by the Lun Yü ('The Analects'). Entering into the fine details

of the problem would lead us too far beyond the scope of the present

study. Here I shall confine myself to giving a few examples just to

clarify the most essential characteristics of the Confucian concept of

tao.

Master Yu (one of the disciples of Confucius) once remarked: Those

who are by nature filial and fraternal (i.e., those who behave with an

inborn goodwill toward their parents and eider brothers) at home are

seldom inclined (in public life) toward comporting themselves

against the will of their superiors. And (of th ose who do not comport

themselves against the will of their superiors) none, indeed, has ever

wanted to stir up confusion (in society).

(The observation of this fact makes us realize that) the 'princely man'

should strive (to establish) the root, for the root once established, the

'way' (tao) will naturally grow up. The right attitude toward parents

and eider brothers may, in this respect, be considered the root of

'benevolence' (or 'human love'). 14

It is contextually clear that the 'way' in this passage means the

proper ethical attitude of man toward his brethren in society. The

argument is typical of Confucianists. 383

It recognizes man's inborn

goodwill toward those closest in blood as the 'root' or 'origin' of

human morals. This inborn goodwill, when expanded into a univer-

sal goodwill toward all fellow-members of society, turns into the

highest principle of ethical conduct, the 'way', as exemplified by the

virtue of 'benevolence'.

Clearly, the conceptual structure of the argument is based on the

terms 'filial piety', 'fraternal respect', and 'benevolence'. The word

'way' is mentioned almost in a casual way. It is not even a key term

in the real sense of the word.

The Master (Confucius) said: 0 Shên, 15 my 'way' is a unity running

through (all forms of my behavior). Master Tsêng respectfully

replied: Yes!

When the Master left the place, the other disciples asked (Master

Tsêng) saying: What did he mean?

Master Tsêng said: Our Master's 'way' consists in 'loyalty' (i.e., being

loyal or faithful to one's own conscience) and, 'kindness' (i.e., being

thoughtful for others, as if their problems were one's own). 16

In this passage, the 'way' means again the leading principle of

ethical conduct. By the statement: 'my way is a unity running

through' Confucius means to say that although his behavior appears

concretely in various forms, there underlies them all a unique

ethical principle. The 'way', in other words, is here the unifying

principle of all forms of moral conduct.

The Master said: In case the 'way' prevails in a state, you may be

daring in both speech and action. But in case the 'way' does not

prevail, you may be daring in action, but you should be reserved in

speech. 17

Confucius often speaks of the 'way' prevailing in astate - or more

literally 'a state's possessing the way' .18 What is meant by the word

in such contexts is too clear to need elucidation.

The Master said: The 'way' of the 'princely man' is (manifested) in

three (forms). But I myself am equal to none of them. He who is

really virtuous does not worry. He who is really wise is never per-

plexed. He who is really bold does not fear.

Master K'ung (one of the disciples of Confucius) said: Master, these

precisely are your own 'way'! 19

The interpretation of the word tao may vary more or less in accor-

dance with contexts, but the fondamental meaning is observable in

all the uses of the word. It means the right or proper 'way' of acting

in social life. The 'way' for Confucius is the highest principle of

ethical conduct.

It would be going too far to assert that this Confucian concept of

the 'way' is exclusively human. For, although it is essentially human

and ethical in its concrete manifestation, the concept would seem to

have in the moral consciousness of Confucius something cosmic as

its metaphysical core. 384

The 'way' in its original metaphysical form is  the all-pervading supreme law of Being. The supreme law govern-

ing the working of the universe in general, and governing man as a

part of the whole universe in particular, is called 'way' when it is

comprehended by, or reftected in, the consciousness of man. The

highest principle of ethical conduct is, in this sense, nothing other

than a particular manifestation of the universal law of Being in the

form of the supreme law governing the right forms of human life.

The principle of ethical conduct is, for Confucius, by no means a

man-made rule, or set of rules, regulating from outside the behavior

of man. It is a reftection in the human consciousness of the highest

law of the universe. And as such, it is the 'internalized' cosmic law

regulating human behavior from within.

Thus to know the 'way' does not consist merely in learning the

formai mies of good manners and correct behavior. It consists in

man's coming into contact with the all-pervading metaphysical law

of the Cosmos through becoming conscious of it. The following very

forceful and passionate statement would sound absurd or even

ridiculous if the Confucian 'way' were merely a matter of etiquette

and correct behavior.

The Master said: If a man hears (i.e., understands the profound

meaning of) the 'way' in the morning, he may die contented in the

evening. 20

In this 'cosmic' aspect, the Confucian conception of the 'way' might

be said to have something in common with the Taoist counterpart.

The difference between the two, however, is far more conspicuous

and essential than the point of contact, as we shall see presently.

There is, in any case, a conscious attitude noticeable on the part of

Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu to reject the 'way' as understood by Con-

fucius and his followers. The 'way', Lao-tzu says, which can be

recognized as the 'way' by ordinary people - Confucius and his

followers being their representatives - is not the real Way. The real

Way, or the Absolu te in its absoluteness, is not something which an

ordinary mind can become conscious of. How could one 'know' it?

How could one 'hear' it? It is by nature something unknown,

unknowable and inaudible.

Being essentially unknown and unkowable, the Way is 'name-

less'. Here agin we encounter Lao-tzu consciously taking up a

position against the Confucian attitude toward the 'names'.

Certainly, Lao-tzu too speaks of 'names'. The 'nameless' Way,

he says, goes on assuming various 'names' in its process of

self-determinations.

The Way in its absolute reality has no 'name'. lt is (comparable to)

uncarved wood. 21 

 Only when it is eut out are there 'names' .22

 385

But there is a basic difference between Lao-tzu and Confucius with

regard to 'names' in that Lao-tzü does not regard these 'names' as

absolutely established. As we have learnt from the explanation

given by Chuang-tzu of 'chaotification' as well as from Lao-tzü's

thesis that everything in this world is 'relative', all 'names' - and

ultimately the 'things' designated by the 'names' - are but of a

relative nature. Confucian 'realism' on the contrary, takes the posi-

tion that behind every 'name' there is a corresponding objective and

permanent reality. And to the highest Names there correspond the

highest realities. These Names represent the cardinal virtues:

'benevolence', 'righteousness', 'decorum', 'wisdom', 'truthfulness'.

Against this, Lao-tzu puts forward the view that-these 'names which

may be mentioned as names' are not real 'names'. In his mind, the

Names, or the cardinal virtues, which are so highly valued by the

Confucians are but so many symptoms of degeneration and corrup-

tion, that is, symptoms of men's having alienated themselves from

the Absolute.

Only when the great Way declines, do 'benevolence' and 'righteous-

ness' arise. Only when cleverness and sagacity make their appear-

ance do wiles and intrigues arise. Only when the six basic kinship

relations (i.e., the relationships between father and son, eider and

younger brothers, husband and wife) are out of harmony do filial sons

make their appearance. Only when the state falls into confusion and

disorder, do loyal subjects make their appearance. 23

lt is only after Virtue is lost that 'benevolence' becomes prominent. lt

is only after 'benevolence' is lost that 'righteousness' becomes prom-

inent. And it is only after 'righteousness' is lost that 'decorum'

becomes prominent.

Indeed, 'decorum' emerges in an age in which 'loyalty' and 'faithful-

ness' have become scarce. It marks the beginning of disorder (in

society). 24

Far from being real values as the Confucians assert, all these so-

called Names are but signs of man's alienation from Reality. In the

very establishment of these Names as absolute and permanent

values there is an unmistakable indication that the Absolute bas

been lost sight of. Speaking more generally, no 'name' is absolute.

For, as Lao-tzu says, a 'name which can be designated by the word

"name" 'is not the real Name. The only 'real Name' (ch'ang ming)

which is absolute is the Name assumed by the Absolute. However,

that absolute Name is, paradoxically, 'Nameless', or as we shall see

presently, the 'Mystery of Mysteries', the 'Gate of all Wonders'.

I have just used the phrase: 'the Name assumed by the Absolute'.

And in fact, as Lao-tzu himself explicitly admits, the 'nameless'

Way does assume a more positive 'name' at its very first stage of

386 Sufism and Taoism

self-manifestation or self-determination. That first 'name' assumed

by the Absolute in its creative activity is Existence (yu). 25 Lao-tzii,

making a concession to popular parlance, sometimes calls the latter

Heaven and Earth (t'ien ti). 26 Strictly speaking, the Way at this stage

is not yet actually Heaven and Earth. It is Heaven and Earth only in

potentia. It is that face of the Absolu te by which it turns, so to speak,

toward the world of Being which is to appear therefrom. It refers to

the Absolu te as the principle of eternal and endless creativity.

The Nameless is the beginning of Heaven and Earth. The Named is

the Mother of the ten thousand things. 27

But before we go into the details of the problem of the Named, we

must pursue further the 'nameless' aspect of the Way.

With a view to making a fresh start in the consideration of this

aspect of the Way, we may conveniently begin by recalling the

opening words of the Tao Tê Ching, which has been quoted above28

and which has led us into a sort of long digression on the fondamen-

tal diff erence between Confucianism and Taoism regarding the

understanding of'way' (tao) and 'name' (ming). The passage reads:

The 'way' which can be designated by the word 'way' is not the real

Way. The 'name' which can be designated by the word 'name' is not

the real N ame.

The same conception of the Way is expressed by Chuang-tzii in a

somewhat different way as follows.

If the Way is made clear, it is no longer the Way. 29

He means to say by this that a thing which can be pointed to as the

Way is not the real Way. And again,

Is there anyone who knows the Way which is not a 'way'? 30

This, of course, means that the real Way has no visible form by

which one could designate it by the word 'way'.

To say that the Way or the Absolute in its absoluteness is 'name-

1,ess', that it refuses to be designated by any 'name' whatsoever, is to

say that it transcends all linguistic comprehension. And this is the

same as to say that the Way is beyond the grasp of both thought and

sense perception. The Way is of such a nature that Reason cannot

conceive of it nor the senses perceive it. The Way, in other words, is

an absolute Transcendent.

Even if we try to see it, it cannot be seen. In this respect it is called

'figureless'. 31

Even if we try to hear it, it cannot be heard. In this respect it is called

'inaudibly faint'.

Even if we try to grasp it, it cannot be touched. In this respect it is

called 'extremely minute'.

'9f

The Way 387

In these three aspects, it is totally unfathomable. They merge into

One. 32

(Ordinarily, the upper part of a thing is brightly visible, while the

lower partis dark and obscure. But this is not the case with the Way.)

Upward, it is not bright. Downward, it is not dark.

It continues interminably like a thread, but no name can be given to

it. And (this interminable creative activity) ultimately returns to the

original Nothingness.

Shall we describe it as a shapeless Shape, or imageless Image? Shall

we describe it as something vague and undeterminable? Standing in

front of it, we do not see its head. Following behind it, we do not see

its rear. 33

Thus the 'namelessness' of the Way is the same as its being Non-

Being. For whatever is absolutely imperceptible and inconceivable,

whatever has no 'image' at all, is, for man, the same as 'non-

existent'. It is 'Nothing' (wu). 34

It is important to notice that the Way appears as 'Nothing' only

when looked at fromourpoint of view. It is Nothing for us because it

transcends human cognition. It is, as Islamic philosophers would

say, a matter of i'tibar or (human) 'viewpoint'. Otherwise, the Way

in itself is - far from being 'nothing' - Existence in the fullest sense

of the term. For it is the ultimate origin and source of all Being.

For ordinary human consciousness the Way is Nothing. But it is

not 'nothing' in a purely negative sense. It is nota passive 'nothing'.

It is a positive Nothing in the sense that it is Non-Being pregnant

with Existence.

It goes without saying that this positive aspect of the Way is far

more difficult to explain than its negative side. Properly speaking it

is absolutely impossible to exp Iain it verbally. As we have just seen,

the reality of the Way is indescribable and ineffable. And yet

Lao-tzii does try to describe it, or at least to give some hints as to

how we should 'feel' its presence in the midst of the world of Being.

Qui te naturally, the hints are extremely dim and obscure. They are

of necessity of a symbolic nature.

The Way in its reality is utterly vague, utterly indistinct. 35

Utterly indistinct, utterly vague, yet there is within it an Image.

Utterly vague, utterly indistinct, yet there is within it Something.

Utterly profound, utterly dark, yet there is within it the purest

Essence.

The purest Essence is extremely real.

(Eternally and unchangingly its creativeness is at work, so that) from

of old till now its Name36 has never left it. Through this Name it

governs the principles of ail things.

How do we know that it is so with the principles of ail things? From

what I have just said. 37

388 

Thus the Way in its purely negative aspect which is absolutely

beyond human cognition is Nothing and Non-Being. In this aspect

the Way has no 'name' whatsoever. Even the word 'way' (tao) is

properly inapplicable to it. lt is 'nameless'.

This absolutely intangible and impenetrable Mystery steps out of

its own darkness and cornes a stage doser to having a 'name'. lt is, at

this stage of self-manifestation, a faint and shadowy 'Image'. In the

Image we feel vaguely the presence of Something awful and mys-

terious. But we do not yet know what it is. lt is felt as Something but

it has still no 'name'.

In the first part of the present study we saw how, in the metaphys-

ical system of Ibn' Arabi, the Absolu te in its absoluteness is 'name-

less'. We saw how the Absolute in such astate is even beyond the

stage at which it is properly to be designated by the name Allah.

Likewise in Lao-tzii, this Something is made to be antecedent even

to God (lit. the heavenly Emperor).

Unfathomably deep it is like the ancestor of the ten thousand things

Like a deep mass of water it is (and nothing is visible on the surface),

yet Something seems to be there.

1 know not whose son it is. 38

It would seem to be antecedent even to the Emperor (i.e., God. 39

This 'nameless' Something, in its positive aspect, i.e., in its eternal

and everlasting creativeness, may be 'named' provisionally the

'way'. Lao-tzii himself admits that it is a provisional 'name'. But of

all the possible provisional 'names', the 'way' is the representative

one. Actually, Lao-tzii proposes several other 'names' for the Way,

and points out several typical 'attributes', each one of which refers

to this or that particular aspect of the Way .40

There is Something, formless but complete,41 born before Heaven

and Earth.

Silent and void, it stands alone,42 never changing. It goes round

everywhere, never stopping.43 It may be considered the Mother of

the whole world. 44

1 know not its 'name'. Forging a pseudonym, 1 call it the 'Way'.

Being forced to name it (further), 1 call it 'Great'.

Being 'Great' would imply 'Moving-forward' .45 'Moving-forward'

would imply 'Going-far' .46 And 'Going-far' would imply 'Turning-

back' .47

In the passage just quoted Lao-tzii suggests the possibility of the

Absolu te being named in various ways. At the same time, however,

he makes it clear that all these 'Names' or 'attributes' are provi-

sional, relative, and partial. For instance, he proposes to call the

Absolute the 'Great'. He is justified in doing so because the Abso-

The Way 389 lute or the Way is 'great'. But it is, we have to remember, 'great' only in a certain sense, from a particular standpoint. To look upon the Way as something 'great' represents but one particular point of view which we human beings take with regard to the Absolu te. This naturally implies that there is also a certain respect in which the Way should be called 'small'. It can be considered 'great'; it can be considered 'small'. Both 'names' are right, but neither of them can do full justice to its reality. In this respect, the Way is comparable to a water plant adrift, turning this way or that. lt has no fixity. Having no fixity, it accepts any 'name', but no 'name' can represent it perfectly. The great Way is like a thing drifting on the water. It goes every- where, left and right. The ten thousand things owe their existence toit. And yet it does not boast (of its own creative activity). It accomplishes its work, yet makes no daim. It dothes and nourishes the ten thousand things, yet never domineers over them. Being absolutely free of desire, it may be called 'Small'. The ten tho-usand things go back toit, yet it makes no daim to being their Mas ter. In this respect, it may also be called 'Great' .48 This difficulty which we inevitably encounter in attempting to give a proper 'name' to the Absolute is due not only to the fact that it is essentially 'nameless' but also to the fact that the Absolute is nota 'thing' in the sense in which we usually understand the term 'thing'. The descriptive power of human language is tragically limited. The moment we linguistically designate a state of affairs, whether metaphysical or empirical, by a noun, it becomes reified, that is, it turns into a 'substance' in our representation. We have earlier referred to the Absolute as Something; but 'Something' is in our imagination some substance, however mysterious it may be. And exactly the same is true of such 'names' as 'Mother', 'Way', etc., or even 'Nothing'. The Absolute which we designate by these 'names', however, is nota 'substance'. And it should not be understood as a 'substance'. This is the reason - or at least one of the main reasons -why Lao-tzii emphasizes so much that all the 'names' he proposes are nothing but makeshifts. Whatever 'name' he may use in referring to the Absolute, we should try not to 'reify' it in understanding what he says about it. For as a 'thing' in the sense of a 'substance', the Absolute is 'nothing'. How cana thing be a 'substance' when it is absolutely 'formless', 'invisible', 'inaudible', 'intangible', and 'taste- less' ?49 The Absolu te is 'Something' only in the sense of an Act, or the act of Existence itself. Scholastically we may express the concep- tion by saying that the Absolu te is Actus Purus. 

390

lt is Actus Purus in

the sense that it is pre-eminently 'actual', and also in the sense that it

exists as the very act of existing and making 'things' exist. The

following words of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu makes this point clear.

Lao-tzu says:

He who goes through the world, holding in hand the great Image,50

wherever he may go will meet with no harm. 51 Safe, tranquil and calm

he will always remain.

Beautiful music and delicious food will make wayfarers stop. The

Way, on the contrary, uttered in words is insipid and ftavorless.

One looks at it, and finds it unworthy to be seen.

One listens to it, and finds it unworthy to be heard.

Yet when one uses it, one finds it inexhaustible. 52

The loudest sound is hardly audible.

The greatest Image has no form.

The Way is hidden and has no name. And yet it is the Way alone that

really excels in bestowing help and bringing things to completion. 53

And Chuang-tzu:

The Way does have a reality and its evidence. 54 But (this does not

imply that it) does something intentionally. Nor does it possess any

(tangible) form. Soit may be transmitted (from heart to heart among

the 'true men'), but cannot be received (as in the case of a thing

having an external form). It may be intuited, but cannot be seen.

It is self-sufficient. It has its own root in itself.

It existed even before Heaven and Earth existed. It has unmistakably

existed from ancient times. 55

It is the thing that confers spirituality upon the Spirits. And it is the

thing that makes the Heavenly Emperor (i.e., God) divine.

It produces Heaven. It produces Earth.

It exists even above the highest point of the sky. And yet it is not

'high' .56 It exists even beneath the six directions. 57 And yet it is not

'deep'.

It was born before Heaven and Earth. And yet it is not 'ancient'. It is

older than the oldest (historical) time. And yet it is not 'old' .58

Thus Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzii agree with each other in asserting

that the Way is actus. lt goes without saying that actus exists. But it

does not existas a 'substance'. lt should not be 'reified'. In order not

to reify it, we have to intuit it. For we cannot possibly imagine,

represent, or conceive the Absolute without turning it into a kind of

'substance'. Metaphysical or ecstatic intuition is the only possible

means by which we can approach it without doing serious harm toits

image. But an intuition of this sortis open only to those who have

experienced to the utmost limit what Chuang-tzu calls 'sitting in

oblivion'.

391

Toshihiko Izutsu Sufism And Taoism P2.Ch06 Against Essentialism

  SUFISM AND TAOISM: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts

by Toshihiko Izutsu 1983

First published 1983 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo
This edition is published by The University of California Press, 1984,
Rev. ed. of: A comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 1966-67.

=====

Contents

Preface by T. Izutsu

Introduction

Part II - Lao-Tzii & Chuang-Tzu

I Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu

II From Mythopoiesis to Metaphysics

III Dream and Reality

IV Beyond This and That

V The Birth of a New Ego

VI Against Essentialism

VII The Way

VIII The Gateway of Myriad Wonders

IX Determinism and Freedom

X Absolute Reversai of Values

XI The Perfect Man

XII Homo Politicus

Part III - A Comparative Reftection 

I Methodological Preliminaries

II The Inner Transformation of Man

III The Multistratified Structure of Reality

IV Essence and Existence

V The Self-evolvement of Existence

===

VI Against Essentialism

Toward the end of the preceding chapter I pointed out the fact that

in the Chuang-tzu, the stages of the 'sitting in oblivion' are traced in

two opposite directions: ascending and descending. The first con-

sists in starting from the lowest stage and going up stage by stage

toward the ultimate and highest one. A typical example of this kind

of description has just been given.

The second, the descending course, is the reverse of the first. It

starts from the highest stage and cornes down to the lowest. As a

proper introduction to the main topic of the present chapter, we

shall begin by giving in translation a passage• from the Chuang-tzu

in which the stages are described in this way. In this passage,

Chuang-tzu, instead of speaking of 'sitting in oblivion', <livides

human knowledge of Reality into four classes which constitute

among themselves a chain of successive degrees. These degrees are

the epistemological stages corresponding to the ontological stages

which Lao-tzu in his Tao Tê Ching distinguishes in the process by

which all things in the world of Being issue forth continuously from

the absolute Unity of the Way.

What is the ultimate limit of Knowledge? It is the stage represented

by the view that nothing has ever existed from the very beginning.

This is the furthest li mit (of Knowledge), to which nothing more can

be added.

As we saw in the previous chapter, this is the ultimate stage to which

man attains at the end of 'sitting in oblivion'. Here the man is so

completely unified with the Way and so perfectly identified with the

absolu te Reality, that the Way or the Reality is not even felt to be

such. This is the stage of Void and Nothing-ness in the sense that has

been explained above.

About this stage Kuo Hsiang says: 2 'The man at this stage has

completely forgotten Heaven and Earth, has put all existent things

out of his mind. In the outside, he does not perceive the existence of

the whole universe; in the inside, he has lost all consciousness of his

own existence. Being limitlessly "void", he is obstructed by nothing.

T

Against Essentialism 355

He goes on changing as the things themselves go on changing, and

there is nothing to which he does not correspond.'

Next is the stage at which there is the consciousness of 'things' being

existent. But (in this consciousness) 'boundaries' between them have

never existed from the very beginning.

At this second stage, the man becomes conscious of the Way which

contains all things in a state of pure potentiality. The Way will

diversify itself at the following stage into 'ten thousand things'. But

here there are no 'boundaries' yet between them. The 'things' are

still an undivided Whole composed of a limitless number of poten-

tially heterogeneous elements. They are still an even plane, a

Chaos, where things have not yet received 'essential' distinctions.

Next (i.e., the third) is the stage at which 'boundaries' are recognized

( among the things). However, there is as yet absolutely no distinction

made between 'right' and 'wrong'.

Here the Chaos begins to disclose the definite forms of the things

which it contains within itself. All things show their own demarca-

tions, and each thing clearly marks its own 'boundary' by which it

distinguishes itself from others. This is the stage of pure 'essences'.

The original Unity <livides itself, and is diversified into Multiplicity,

and the Absolute manifests itself as numberless 'relative' existents.

As a result, the Reality which has previously been beyond the ken of

human cognition cornes for the first time into the limits of its grasp.

And yet, even at this stage, the distinction is not made between

'right' and 'wrong'. This indicates that at this third stage we are still

in touch with the Way in its original integrity, although, to be sure,

the contact with the Way is already indirect, because it is made

through the veil of the 'essences'. We may recall the myth of the

Emperor Chaos (Hun Tun), which we read in Chapter II, who <lied

as soon as his friends bored holes in his 'featureless' visage. In the

light of the present passage, there is in this myth an oversim-

plification. For Chaos does not 'die' simply by 'holes' (i.e., 'essen-

tial' distinctions) being made in it. The true death of the Chaos

occurs at the next stage.

As soon as, however, 'right' and 'wrong' make their clear appear-

ance, the Way becomes damaged. And as soon as the Way is thus

damaged, Love is born.

With the appearance of 'right' and 'wrong', Chaos loses its natural

vitality and becomes fossilized as 'essential forms' stiff and inflex-

ible as corpses. As Wang Hsien Ch'ien says: 'When "right" and

"wrong" are recognized, the "chaotic" integrity of the Way is

immediately injured' .3

356 Sufism and Taoism

And no sooner this happens than Love is born. The birth of Love

symbolizes the activity of such human emotions as love and hate,

like and dislike. This is the last and lowest stage of Knowledge.

Of course there is another aspect to the problem. The Way is here

said to die with the appearance of human emotions like love and ha te.

But this is so only when one considers thè situation in refence to the

original 'chaotic' integrity, i.e., the original 'undifferentiation' of

the Absolute. Otherwise, everything is a particular manifestation

of the Way itself. And as such even a fossilized 'essence' is nothing

other than a 'self-determination' of the Absolute. This aspect of the

matter, however, is irrelevant to our present topic.

As I remarked before several times - and it is particularly important

to recall it once again for the right understanding of the philosophi-

cal position Chuang-tzü takes against 'essentialism' - the descrip-

tion just given of the four stages is not an abstract theory; it is a

description of an experiential fact. It is a phenomenological descrip-

tion of the experience of ekstasis. In the passage which has just been

quoted, the process of ekstasis is described in a descending order.

That is to say, Chuang-tzü describes the 'return' of consciousness.

He starts from the highest stage of contemplation at which the

'oblivion' has been completed, and goes down step by step until he

reaches the stage of normal consciousness.

What is to be kept in mind in connection with this problem is that

the whole process of ekstasis, whether considered in a descending or

ascending order, is composed of two aspects which exactly corres-

pond to each other. One is the subjective aspect, which we might

call 'epistemological', and the other is the objective, or 'metaphysi-

cal' aspect.

Take, for example, the highest stage. On its subjective side, it is,

as I have just said, a stage at which the contemplative in actual

contemplation bas consummated the ekstasis. He is now in com-

plete 'oblivion' of everything, the world and himself included. This

would naturally mean that he is in the state of Nothing-ness,

because he is conscious of nothing, because there is no 'conscious-

ness'. And this subjective Nothing-ness corresponds to the objec-

tive Nothing-ness of the Way. For the Way, too, is in its original

absolute purity Nothing-ness, a -state 'where nothing bas ever

existed from the very beginning', that is, a metaphysical state where

nothing whatsoever is distinguishable as..;in existent.

From such astate of perfect Void, subjective and objective, the

contemplative starts coming back toward the daily state of mind.

There begins to stir something in himself. Consciousness awakes in

him to find 'things' existent. The consciousness, however, is still at

this stage a dim and subdued light. It is not yet the glaring brilliance

Against Essentialism 357

of full daylight. It is the crepuscule of consciousness, a twilight in

which all things are only indistinctly and confusedly observable.

Such a description of the situation might strike one as a negative

evaluation. The state of consciousness at this stage is described as

being a dim light merely because the description is made from the

point of view of the' normal' consciousness of an ordinary mind. For

the latter, the light of the ecstatic consciousness looks dim and

indistinct because it does not distinguish and discriminate things

from each other. In reality, however, su ch indistinctiveness is, for a

Chuang-tzü, Reality as it really is.

And since the real state of Reality is itself 'dim' and 'indistinct',

the consciousness must of necessity be correspondingly 'dim', and

'indistinct'. Only with such a dim light can Reality in its integrity be

illumined. The glaring and dazzling light of normal consciousness

does cast a strong spotlight on this or that particular object. But by

concentrating the light on the particular object, it makes all the rest

of the world sink into darkness. Referring to this point Chuang-tzü

remarks: 4

Therefore, the diffused and indistinct Light is what is aimed at by the

'sacred man'. He does not, however, use this Light (in order to

illumine particular things), but lends it to all things universally. This is

what is called 'illumination'.

The phrase here translated as 'diffused and indistinct Light' 5 means

a kind of light of which one cannot be certain as to whether it exists

or not; a light which, instead of being concentrated upon this or that

particular object, is 'diffused' and pervades all. It is not a glaring,

dazzling light. It is a dim, indistinct light, neither bright nor dark. In

reality, however, it is the Universal Light which illumines every-

thing as it really is.

Chuang-tzü calls this kind of spiritual Light also the 'shaded

Light' (pao kuang). 6 The word pao means 'to cover', 'to conceal

within'. As Ch' êng Hsüan Ying explains: '(The mind of the "sacred

man") forgets (to distinguish between things) and yet illumines all.

And as it illumines them, it forgets them. That is why it shades and

obscures its light, yet becomes ever more brilliant.'

The corresponding 'objective' side of this stage is ontologically the

most important of all stages for Chuang-tzü. For this precisely is the

stage of 'chaotification'. In the subdued and diffused Light of the

consciousness of the contemplative, the 'ten thousand things' loom

up as if through the mist. They appear dim and indistinct because

there are no 'boundaries', i.e., definite 'essences' or 'quiddities', to

differentiate them one from the other.

I say that this is ontologically the most important stage for

358 Sufism and Taoism

Chuang-tzü, because the higher stage, that of the Absolute in its

absoluteness, is properly speaking beyond all thinking and reason-

ing,7 while the lower one is the stage of 'essences' or 'quiddities',

where all things appear to the consciousness distinctly separated

from each other through their 'boundaries'. And Chuang-tzü fights

against the view that this latter stage does represent Reality as it

really is.

Thus we see that the stage of 'chaotification', at which all things

are observed in their original 'undifferentiation', that is, beyond and

apart from their 'essences', constitutes the pivotai point of Chuang-

tzü's metaphysics. We might call this metaphysics 'existentialism',

taking the word 'existence' (existentia) in the same sense as wujüd in

the metaphysical system of Ibn 'Arabi.

From the very outset 1 have been emphasizing implicitly as well as

explicitly the 'existentialist' attitude of Chuang-tzii. 1 think 1 have

made it sufficiently clear by now that its real meaning becomes

understandable only when we relate it to the second stage (from

above) of the 'sitting in oblivion'. It is a philosophical position based

on the vision of Chaos. In this respect it stands opposed to the

position taken by 'essentialism' which is based on a vision of Reality

peculiar to, and typical of the epistemological-ontological stage

where the 'ten thousand things' appear, each with a clearly marked

'boundary' of its own. In terms of the process of 'sitting in oblivion' -

the Return process from the complete ekstasis back toward the

'normal' world of corn mon sense - the' essentialist' position belongs

to the third stage explained above.

Thus in the framework of such an experience, 'existentialism'

represents a vision of Reality which is a stage higher than 'essential-

ism'. It is important to note that the latter is regarded as the third

stage in the Return process of the ecstatic contemplation only as

long as it is considered within this particular framework. In reality,

however, the contemplative, when he cornes down to this stage and

becomes conscious of the things with clear 'boundaries', he is actu-

ally already on a par with any ordinary man who knows nothing

about the experience of ekstasis. His view of Being at this particular

level is nothing unusual from the standpoint of common sense. On

the contrary, it is a view of Being corn mon to, and shared by, all men

who are at all endowed with a 'sound' and 'normal' mind. 'Essential-

ism', in other words, is the typical ontology of common sense.

This statement, however, should not be understood as implying

that, for a Chuang-tzii or a Lao-tzü, 'essentialism' is a wrong and

mistaken view of Being, and that it distorts and disfigures the real

structure of things. For 'essentialism' does represent and corres-

pond to a certain definite stage in the evolving process of the

'/1,

Against Essentialism 359

Absolute itself. Besides, on its subjective side, 'essentialism' consti-

tutes, as we have just seen, the third stage of the 'sitting in oblivion'

in the Return process of the contemplation. And as such, there is

nothing wrong about it.

The serious problem arises only when the common sense refuses

to see any difference in terms of ontological 'levels' between 'exis-

tentialism' and 'essentialism' and begins to assert that the latter is

the right view of Being. It is only then that a Chuang-tzü rises in an

open revoit against 'essentialism'. Since, however, it is of the very

nature of common sense to view the things in an 'essentialist' way,

Chuang-tzii and Lao-tzii constantly find themselves forced to mani-

fest the attitude of revoit against such a view. Their philosophy, in

this respect, may properly be characterized as a revoit against the

'tyranny' of Reason.

Chuang-tzii sees a typical exemplification of the 'essentialist'

position in the moral philosophy of Confucius. Confucian philos-

ophy is, in Chuang-tzu's view, nothing but an ethical elaboration of

ontological 'essentialism'. The so-called cardinal virtues of Con-

fucius like 'humaneness', 'justice', etc., are but so many products of

the normal activity of the Mind which naturally tends to see every-

where things rigidly determined by their own 'essences'. The Real-

ity in its absoluteness has no such 'boundaries'. But a Confucius

establishes distinctions where there are none, and fabricates out of

them rigid, inflexible ethical categories by which he intends to

regulate human behavior.

Stop! Stop approaching men with (your teaching of) virtues!

Dangerous, dangerous, indeed, is (what you are doing), marking off

the ground and running within the boundaries! 8

Ontological 'essentialism' is dangerous because as soon as we take

up such an attitude, we are doomed to lose our natural ftexibility of

mind and consequently lose sight of the absolute 'undifferentiation'

which is the real source and basis of all existent things. 'Essential-

ism' will not remain in the sphere of ontology; it naturally grows into

a categorization of values which, once established, begins to domi-

na te our entire behavioral system.

Chuang-tzu in the following passage 9 gives with keen sarcasm a

symbolic picture of those people who are vainly engaged in ani-

mated discussions over the 'values' of things, considering them as

something absolute, something unalterably determined.

The spring has dried up, and the fish are ail on the g{.Ound. (In the

agonies of death) they are spewing each other with moist breath and

trying to moisten each other with froth and foam. It would be far

better for them if they could forget each other in a wide river or sea.

Likewide, the people praise a 'great man' and condemn a 'bad man'.

360 Sufism and Taoism

But it would be much better if they could forget both ('good' and

'bad') together and be freely 'transmuted' with the Way itself.

'Essentialism' would seem to be a philosophical position which is

most suitable to the human mind. At any rate the Reason and the

common sense which is. but a vulgarized form of Reason naturally

tend to take an 'essentialist' position. And the latter is that upon

which our ordinary thinking depends.

The gist of the 'essentialist' view may be concisely presented as a

thesis that ail things are endowed with 'essences' or 'quiddities',

each thing being clearly marked off by its 'essence' from ail others.

A table is a table, for example, and it can never be a chair. The book

which is upon the table is 'essentially' a book, and it is 'essentially'

different from, or other than the table. There are 'ten thousand',

i.e., innumerable, things in the world. But there is no confusion

among them, for they are separated from one another by clear-cut

lines of demarcation or 'boundaries' which are supplied by their

'essences'.

As 1 have said before, this 'essentialist' ontology in itself is

nothing to be rejected. It gives a true picture of things, if it is put in

the right place, that is to say, as long as one understands it to be the

picture of things at a certain ontological level. Chuang-tzu takes no

exception to this. The point he wants to make is that 'essentialism'

should not be regarded as the one and ultimate view of things. And

he does rise in revoit against it the moment one begins to make such

a daim. For he is convinced that it is not the ultimate view of things.

From the standpoint of a man who bas seen things in a different

light in his ecstatic vision, there is ontologically a stage at which the

'essences' become annihilated. This would simply mean for a

Chuang-tzu that there are 'from the very beginning' -as he says-no

such things as 'essences' in the sense of bard and solid ontological

cores of things. In any event, the so-called 'essences' lose, in this

view, their solidity, and become liquefied. 'Dream' and 'reality'

become confused in the vast, limitless world of 'undifferentiation'.

There is no longer here any marked distinction to be drawn between

a table and a chair, between a table and a book. Everything is itself,

and yet, at the same time, all other things. There being no 'essences',

all things interpenetrate each other and transform themselves into

one another endlessly. Ali things are 'one' -in a dynamic way. We

might properly compare this view with Ibn' Arabï's concept of the

Unity of Existence, wa}Jdah al-wujüd. And we know already that

this is what Chuang-tzu calls Chaos.

Ibn 'Arabi could speak of the Unity of Existence because he

looked at the world of Multiplicity, the illimitable existents, as so

many self-determinations or self-manifestations of the Absolute

Against Essentialism 361

which is itself the absolute Unity. In a similarway, Chuang-tzu came

to the idea of the 'chaotification' of things because he looked at

them from the point of view of the Way, which is also the absolu te

metaphysical Unity.

In contemporary Western philosophy, special emphasis bas often

been laid upon the 'tyrannical' power of language, the great forma-

tive influence exercised by linguistic patterns on the molding of our

thought. The influence of language is particularly visible in the

formation of the 'essentialist' view of things.

From the point of view of an absolute 'existentialism', there are

no watertight compartments in the world of Being. Man, however,

'articulates', that is, cuts up - arbitrarily, in most cases - this origi-

nally undivided whole into a number of segments. Then he gives a

particular name to each of these segments. A segment of Reality,

thus given a name, becomes crystallized into a 'thing'. The name

gives it an 'essential' fixity, and th us ensures it from disintegration.

For better or for worse, such is in fact the power of language.

Language, in other words, positively supports 'essentialism'.

Once a 'thing' is established with a definite name, man is easily led

into thinking that the thing is essentially that and nothing else. If a

thing is namedA, it acquiresA-ness, that is, the 'essence' of beingA.

And since it is A 'by essence', it can never be other than A. One

could hardly imagine un der such conditions the thing' s being B,

Cor D. The thing thus becomes something unalterably fixed and

determined.

This fondamental relation between 'essentialism' and language is

noticed by Chuang-tzu. He notices it because he looks at the matter

from the point of view of the absolute Way in which, as we have

repeatedly pointed out, there is not even a trace of 'essential'

de termina tians.

The Way has absolutely no 'boundaries'. Nor has Ianguage (which

produces and expresses such 'boundaries') absolutely any perma-

nency.10

But (when the correspondence becomes established between the

two) there arise real ( essential) 'boundaries'. 11

Referring to the sophistic logic of the school of Kung Sun Lung,

Chuang-tzu points out that this kind of logic is a product of linguistic

'essentialism' .12

Rather than trying to prove by means of 'finger' that a 'finger' is nota

'finger', why not prove by means of 'non-finger' that a 'finger' is nota

'finger'?

The meaning of this passage will become clear only when we under-

stand it against the background of the sophistic logic which was

362 Sufism and Taoism

prevalent in Chuang-tzu's time. The argument of the Sophists of the

school of Kung Sun Lung may be summarized as follows. The

concept of 'finger' comprises within itself the concepts of the thumb,

the index, the middle, the third, and the little fingers. Actually there

is no 'finger' other than these five. That is to say, the 'finger' must

necessarily be one of these five. And yet, if we take up any one of

them, the 'index finger' for example, we find it negating and exclud-

ing all the rest, because the 'index finger' is not any of the other four

fingers. Thus it cornes about that the 'index finger' which is a real

'finger', is not a 'finger', because its concept applies exclusively to

itself, not to the others.

Against this Chuang-tzii remarks that such an argument is simply

a shallow and superficial piece of sophistry. We do not gain anything

even if we prove in this manner that a 'finger' is not a 'finger'.

However, there is a certain respect in which a 'finger' is properly to

be considered a 'non-finger'. And this latter view - although

superficially it gives the same conclusion; namely, that a 'finger' is

nota 'finger' - is nota piece of sophistry. It is a view standing on the

'chaotification' of things, and it goes to the very heart of the struc-

ture of Reality.

The term 'non-finger' which appears in the second half of the

above-quoted statement is not intended to be the logical contradic-

tory of 'finger'. It means something like a 'super-finger', or an

ontological state in which a 'finger' is no longer a 'finger'. 'Why not

prove by means of "non-finger"?', Chuang-tzu asks. He means to

say: instead of wasting time in trying to prove by logical tricks - as

Kung Sun Lung and his followers are doing - that 'a finger is nota

finger' on the very level of 'a finger is a finger', we had better

transcend at a stroke the ontological level of 'essential' distinctions

and see with the eye of 'illumination' the reality of the situation.

For, in fact, on the level of 'chaotification', a 'finger' is no longer

necessarily a 'finger', it is no longer so solidly fixed that it can never

be anything other than itself. All things are one, and we have no

reason to stick obstina tel y to the idea that sin ce A is A, it cannot be

anything other than A. Thus the statement: 'a "finger" is not a

"finger" ' is found to be true; but, this time, on a higher level than

the one on which the Sophists are trying hard to establish the same

statement.

Chuang-tzu gives one more example, that of a 'horse' not being

a 'horse', which was also a notorious topic of the Sophists of his

time.

Rather than trying to prove by means of' horse' that a' horse' is not a

'horse', why not prove by means of 'non-horse' that a 'horse' is nota

'horse'?

Against Essentialism 363

The structure of the argument is exactly the same as the previous

one. The Sophists daim that a 'horse' is nota 'horse' on the basis of

the following observation. The concept of 'horse', they say, must be

applicable to horses of different colors like 'white horse', 'yellow

horse', 'black horse' etc., and no 'horse' which is actually existent is

colorless. Every actually existent horse is either white, or black, or

yellow, etc. And there can be no exception. Let us take a 'white

horse' as an example. The 'white horse', being white, naturally

excludes all horses of other colors. The concept cannot apply to a

'black horse', for instance, or a 'yellow horse'. And the same is true

of any horse of any color. Since, however, the concept of 'horse'

must be such that it applies to all horses of all colors, we must

conclude that no actually existent horse is a 'horse'.

The Sophists in this way establish, or daim to establish, that a

'horse' is nota 'horse'. Against this, Chuang-tzu takes the position

that, even admitting that they are right in this argument, the conclu-

sion which they reach thereby is devoid of real significance. As in

the case of the preceding argument about 'finger', Chuang-tzu

points out that there is a respect in which exactly the same conclu-

sion can be maintained, but with an entirely new meaning. Here

again the term 'non-horse' refers to the metaphysical level at which

all 'essential' distinctions are eliminated through 'chaotification'.

Once we put ourselves on such a level, we perceive that a 'finger'

is a 'finger' and yet, at the same time, is nota 'finger', that a' horse' is

a 'horse' and yet is not a 'horse'. And the same holds true of

everything else. We can even go to the extreme of asserting that the

whole world is a 'finger', and the whole world is a 'horse'.

Heaven and Earth (i.e., the whole universe) are a 'finger'. Ali things

are a 'horse'.

Heaven and Earth with 'ten thousand things' that exist therein are

but an 'undifferentiated' whole, in which all things ontologically

interpenetrate one another. In such astate, a 'horse' is not unalter-

ably a 'horse'; it can be else. Looking at this particular

situation from the reverse side we could say that all things are

entitled to be regarded as a 'horse' or 'finger', or indeed, anything

else.

From such a standpoint, Chuang-tzu goes on to criticize the

'essentialist' position in the following manner. 13

(Instead of looking at the matter from the viewpoint of 'non-finger'

and 'non-horse', people <livide up the originally undifferentiated

whole of Being into various categories which, again, they classify into

'right' and 'not-right') and insist on the 'right' being unalterably

'right' and the 'not-right' being unalterably 'not-right'. (The distinc-

tion, however, between 'right' and 'not-right', far from being

iJ 364 Sufism and Taoism

something 'essential', i.e., something based on the very nature of

Being, is but a matter of custom and habit, just as) a road is formed

(where there was none before) merely by people walking constantly

upon it. Likewise, the 'things' are formed by their being designated

by this or that particular name (simply by virtue of a social custom or

convention). 14

(And once the 'things' are thus crystallized, they are considered as

either 'right' or 'not-right', 'so' or 'not-so'). On what ground does

man judge a thing to be 'so?' He judges to be 'so' whatever ( other

people or 'society' by custom) judge to be 'so'. On what ground does

man judge a thing to be 'not-so'? He is merely judging it to be 'not-so'

because (other people) judge it (by custom) to be 'not-so'.

(However, from the viewpoint of 'illumination', the reality of things

can only be grasped when one puts oneself on a higher level of

non-discriminating acceptance which transcends all such relative

distinctions. And viewed from such a place) there is a certain respect

in which everything without exception is to be regarded as being 'so'

(i.e., affirmable and acceptable), and everything without exception is

to be regarded as 'right'. There is nothing that is not 'so'. There is

nothing that is not 'right'. Whether a stalk of grain or a great pillar,

whether a Ieper or a (beautiful lady like) Hsi Shih, however strange,

bizarre, ugly and grotesque things may be, the Way makes them all

one.

The Reality perceived on such a level is called by Chuang-tzii

Heavenly-Equalization, 15 or Walking-Two-Ways (at the same

time). 16 The former term means a 'natural' metaphysical state in

which all things, without being disturbed by the distinctions be-

tween 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong', etc., repose in their

original harmony or equality. And since, as Ch' êng Hsüan Ying

observes, the 'sacred man' always sees things in such a state of

Equality, his mind too reposes in an etemal peace, being never

disturbed by the distinctions and differences among things. The

second term, literally meaning 'going both ways', refers to the same

metaphysical state in which 'good' and 'bad', or 'right' and 'wrong',

are both equally acceptable; a state, in other words, in which all

opposites and contradictories become acceptable in the ultimate

Unity of coincidentia oppositorum.

It is highly signifi.cant that the second chapter of the Chuang-tzu is

entitled Ch'i Wu Lun, 11 i.e., 'Discourse on Equalizing (All) Things'.

The chapter is so entitled because it is mainly concemed with the

view according to which all things are 'equal', that is, ultimately

One. And since, according to this view, such 'equalization' of things

is justifiable only at the lev el of 'existence', not at that of 'essences', 1

consider this theory rightly comparable with Ibn' Arabï's Unity of

Existence.

Against Essentialism 365

'Essentialism', if it is to be a philosophical view of existents, must be

able to explain the whole of the world of Being. And it does intend -

and does daim, implicitly at least - to be comprehensive enough to

caver all things. But how, in actual fact, could it be so when its very

nature consists in isolating single ontological units, making them

'essentially' independent of one another? If one makes such an

approach to things, and yet wants to comprehend all of them, one is

forced to have recourse to the method of enumeration and addition.

But, however far one may go in this direction, one will never reach

the ultimate end. For no matter how many independent units one

may pile up one upon another, one will be left with an infi.nite

number of things still untouched and uncomprehended.

Thus 'essentialism' is by its very nature utterly incapable of

grasping the reality of the world of Being in its infinite complexity

and in its limitless development and transformation. In order to

comprehend the whole of the world of Being as it really is and as it

really works, we must, Chuang-tzii maintains, abandon the level of

'essential' distinctions, and, by unifying ourselves with 'existence'

itself which pervades all things, look at all things in their original

state of 'chaotification' and 'undifferentiation'. Instead of formulat-

ing this thesis in such a theoretical form, Chuang-tzii explains his

point through the concrete example of Chao Wên, a famous lute player.

That a thing can become 'perfect' and 'defective' (at the same time)

may aptly be exemplified by what happens when Chao Wên plays the

lute. That a thing can remain 'not-perfect' and 'not-defective' may

aptly be exemplified by what happens when Chao Wên does not play

the lute. 18

The meaning of the passage may be explicated as follows. Chao

Wên is a musician of genius. When he plays the lute, the particular

piece of music which he plays becomes actualized in a perfect form.

This is what is referred to by the expression: 'that a thing can

become perf ect'.

However, by the very fact that Chao Wên plays a particular piece

of music and actualizes it in a perfect form, the infinite number of

other pieces which are left behind become darkened and nullified.

This is what is meaJ?.t by the thing being 'defective' at the same time.

Thus a perfect actualization of one single piece of music is at the

same time the negation and nullification of all other possibilities.

Only when Chao Wên does not actually play, are we in a position to

enjoy all the pieces of music which he is capable of actualizing. And

only in such a form is his music 'perfect' in an absolute sense, that is,

in a sense in which it transcends the very distinction between 'per-

fection' and 'imperfection' (or 'defectiveness').

366 Sufism and Taoism

The 'equalization' of all things thus brings us into the very core of

the reality of Being. If, however, one sticks to this idea and discards

completely the phenomenal aspect of things, one falls into an

equally inexcusable error. For, after all, the infi.nitely various and

variegated phenomena are also an aspect of Reality. Certainly, the

music of Chao Wên is 'perfect' in an absolute sense, only when he

does not play his lute. But it is also true that the possibilities that lie

hidden in his ability are destined to be 'perfected' in a relative sense

and will never cease to work up their way from possibility to

actuality even to the detriment of one another. Both forms of

'perfection', absolute and relative, fundamental and phenomenal,

are essential to the reality of his music.

Likewise, in the ontological structure of things, both the original

'undifferentiation' and the phenomenal 'differentiation', or Unity

and Multiplicity, are real. If Chuang-tzu emphasizes so much the

former aspect, it is chietly because at the common sense level of

human experience the phenomenal aspect is so prominent and so

dominant that it is commonly considered the reality.

The root of Being is absolutely one. But it does not repose forever

in its original U nity. On the contrary, it belongs to the very nature of

Being that it never ceases to manifest itself in infinite forms. It goes

on diversifying itself into 'ten thousand things' which, again, go on

endlessly transforming themselves into one another. This is the

phenomenal aspect of Being. But by going through this very process

of ontological 'diversification' and 'differentiation' all things are

returning to their ultimate metaphysical source. The process of

'descent' and the process of 'ascent' are paradoxically one and the

same thing. The relation between Unity and Multiplicity must be

understood in this way. Just as Unity is not a static 'oneness' of

death and rigidity, but is a never-ceasing dynamic process of a

coincidentia oppositorum, Multiplicity is not a static 'differentia-

tion' of things that are rigidly fixed once for all, but is a constant life

process which con tains within itself the ontological tension of Unity

in Multiplicity.

If looked at from the viewpoint of 'differentiation', (nothing is the

sa me as anything else), and even li ver and gall (a typical example of

two things closely resembling each other), are as different and as far

apart as the country of Ch'u and the country of Yüeh.

However, looked at from the viewpoint of 'sameness', ail things are

one and the same. 19

Unfortunately, the eyes of ordinary men are dazzled by the pheno-

menal scintillations of Multiplicity and cannot perceive the pro-

found Unity that underlies the whole. They cannot, as Chuang-tzu

says, 'unify the objects of their knowledge' .20

,,.

Against Essentialism 367

The only right attitude we can take in such a situation is to 'let our

minds be at ease in the harmony of spiritual perfection' .21 The word

'harmony' (ho) here refers, as Ch'êng Hsüan Ying remarks, to the

fact that when we 'unify the objects of our knowledge' and 'chaotify'

all things, our mind enjoys a perfect peace, being no longer dis-

turbed by 'what our ears and eyes approve'; it refers also to the fact

that ail things at this level are peacefully together, there being no

'essential' oppositions between them. We must not be blind to the

phenomenal aspect of Being, Chuang-tzu says; but it is wrong for us

to remain confined in the same phenomenal world and observe the

Multiplicity of things exclusively from the phenomenal point of

view. We must transcend such a stage, go up to a higher level, and

looking down from that height observe the kaleidoscope of the

ever-shifting Multiplicity of things. Only when we do this, are we in

a position to know the reality of Being.

The dynamic relation between the original absolute Unity and the

phenomenal Multiplicity, that is to say, the process by which the

Absolute, stepping out of its metaphysical darkness, diversifies

itself into a myriad of things of the phenomenal world is something

which, as 1 have repeatedly pointed out discloses its reality only to a

mind in the state of ekstasis, or as Chuang-tzu calls it, 'sitting in

oblivion'. Particularly difficult to understand for a non-ecstatic

mind is the ontological status of 'essences'.

As the Absolute <livides itself through a process of ontological

evolvement into 'ten thousand things', each one of the latter does

seem to acquire a particular 'essence'. For, after all, what is the

meaning of talking about 'ten thousand things', if they are not

distinguishable from each other? How could they be distinguishable

from each other if they were devoid of 'essences'? When we recog-

nize A as being different and distinguishable from B, are we not at

the same time recognizing A as being endowed with an 'essence'

which is different from that of B?

From the viewpoint of Chuang-tzu, however, the things being

endowed with 'essences' and their being 'essentially' distinguish-

able from one another is simply a matter of appearance. Each of the

'ten thousand things' appears to have its own 'essence' unalterably

fixed once for ail. In fact, it merely appears or seems to have such an

'essence'.

But our picture inevitably becomes complicated by the fact that

thoseseeming 'essences' are not sheer nothing, either. They are not

mere products of hallucination. They do have an ontological status

peculiar to them. They are not ontologically groundless. The abso-

lute all-pervading 'existence' can take on an infinite variety of forms

because there is a kind of ontological basis for them. We cannot

368 Sujism and Taoism

certainly say that the 'essences' exist in the ordinary sense of the

world. But we cannot say either that they are absolutely non-

existent.

lt is at this point that Ibn' Arabi, as we remember, introduced the

concept of 'permanent archetypes' (a'yiin thiibitah) into his

metaphysical system. And the concept did work admirably well. For

Ibn 'Arabi succeeded thereby in philosophically settling the

difficulty raised by this paradoxical situation. The 'permanent

archetypes' are those metaphysical principles which can 'be said

neither to exist nor not to exist', and through which the all-

pervading divine Existence becomes inftected into a myriad of

'things'. But for him, too, it was not basically a philosophical ques-

tion; it was rather a matter of an ecstatic vision.

Chuang-tzu has no such philosophical device. Instead, he resorts

directly, as he often does, to a symbolic presentation of the content

of his metaphysical vision. As a result, we now have what is unanim-

ously acknowledged to be one of the most masterly descriptions of

Wind in Chinese literature. lt is not, of course, a mere literary piece

of work. lt is a philosophical symbol which Chuang-tzu uses for the

purpose of expressing verbally what is verbally inexpressible.

Furthermore, the whole passage is philosophically of supreme

importance, because, as we shall see immediately, it constitutes

what we might call a Taoist 'proof of the existence of God'.

The beginning part of the passage is purely symbolic. lts real

philosophical meaning may best be understood if, in reading it, one

keeps in mind that the Cosmic Wind symbolizes 'existence', or the

Absolu te in its all-pervading actus, and that the hollow 'openings' of

the trees symbolize 'essences'.

The Great Earth eructates; and the eructation is called Wind.22 As

long as the eructation does not actually occur, nothing is observable.

But once it does occur, ail the hollows of the trees raise ringing

shouts.

Listen! Do you not hear the trailing sound of the wind as it cornes

blowing from afar? The trees in the mountain forests begin to rustle,

stir, and sway, and then ail the hollows and holes of huge trees

measuring a hundred arms' lengths around begin to give forth differ-

ent sounds.

There are holes like noses, like mouths, like ears; some are (square)

like crosspieces upon pillars; some are (round) as cups, some are like

mortars. Sorne are like deep ponds; some are like shallow basins.

(The sounds they emit are accordingly various): some roar like

torrents dashing against the rocks; some hiss like flying arrows; some

growl, some gasp, some shout, some moan. Sorne sounds are deep

and muffled, some sounds are sad and mournful.

As the first wind goes·away with the light trailing sound, there cornes

the following one with a deep rumbling sound. To a gentle wind the

Against Essentialism 369

hollows answer with faint sounds. To a stormy wind they answer with

loud sounds.

However, once the raging gale has passed on, ail these hollows and

holes are empty and soundless. Y ou see only the boughs swaying

silently, and the tender twigs gently moving. 23

As 1 said before, this is not intended to be a mere literary description

of wind. Chuang-tzu's real intention is disclosed by what follows this

passage. The philosophical intention of Chuang-tzu may be formu-

lated in the following way. The 'hollows' and 'holes' of the trees

imagine that they are independently existent, that they emit these

sounds. They fail to notice that they emit these sounds only by the

active working of the Wind upon them. lt is, in reality, the Wind that

makes the 'hollows' resound.

Not that the 'hollows' do not exist at all. They are surely there.

But they are actualized only by the positive activity of the Wind. As

is evident, this is a very apt description of the ontological status of

'essences', which was mentioned earlier.

It is also evident that the Wind here is not an ordinary physical

wind. It is the Cosmic Wind corresponding exactly to Ibn' Arabi's

concept of sarayiin al-wujüd, lit. the 'spreading of Existence'. It is

interesting and, indeed, extremely significant, that both Ibn 'Arabi

and Chuang-tzu conceive of 'existence' as something moving -

'blowing', 'ftowing', or 'spreading'. For both of them, 'existence' is

actus.

(One and the same Wind) blows on ten thousand things in different

ways, and makes each hollow produce its own peculiar sound, so that

each imagines that its own self produces that particular sound. But

who, in reality, is the one who makes (the hollows) produce various

sounds?24

Who is it? In order to give the right answer to this crucial question,

we must remark first of all that the Cosmic Wind has no sound of its

own. The 'sound of Heaven' (t'ien lai) is soundless. What is audible

to our physical ears are only the ten thousand sounds produced by

the hollows of the trees. They are not the sound of Heaven; they are

but the 'sound of Earth' (ti lai). But, Chuang-tzu insists, we must

hear the soundless sound of Heaven behind each of the ten

thousand sounds of Earth. Rather, we must realize that in hearing

the sound of Earth we are really hearing nothing other than the

sound of Heaven. The infinitely various sounds which the hollows

emit are no other than the one, absolute sound of Heaven.

It is to be remarked that exactly the same question: 'Who is it?' can

and must be asked of what actually is observable in the 'interior'

region of our own being. Just as the 'hollows' of the trees emit all

370 Sufism and Taoism

kinds of sounds as the Wind blows upon them, the 'interior' of man

is in a state of constant turmoil. Who causes all this commotion?

That is the central question. Are the minds of men themselves

responsible for it? Or are the stimuli coming from external things its

causes? No, Chuang-tzu answers. But let us first see how he

describes the inner 'hollows' interminably producing noises and

sounds.

Even while asleep, the souls of men are (tormented) by coming into

touch with variousthings (in dreams). When they wake up, the bodily

functions begin to be active; they get entangled with external things,

and all kinds of thoughts and emotions are aroused in the m. And this

induces them to use their mind every day in quarreling with others.

Sorne minds are idle and vacant. Sorne minds are abstruse. Sorne are

scrupulous. Those who have petty fears are nervous; those who are

assailed by great fears are simply stupefied.

The way they argue about the rightness and wrongness of matters

reminds us of those who shoot arrows and missiles (i.e., they are

extremely quick and active). They endeavor to secure a victory (in

disputes) as if they had sworn before the gods. The way they go on

consuming (their mental energy) day by day reminds us of (the leaves

of trees) fading away in autumn and winter.

They have gone so far into delusion and perlexity that it is no longer

possible for them to be brought back. The way they fall deeper and

deeper into infatuation as they grow older reminds us of minds firmly

sealed with seals (of cupidity). Thus, when their minds draw near to

death, there is no means of bringing them back to youthful bright-

ness.

lndeed (the movements of human minds are infinitely various as are

the sounds produced by the hollows of the trees): joy, anger, sadness,

and delight! Sometimes they worry about the future; sometimes they

vainly bewail the irretrievable past. Sometimes fickle, sometimes

obstinate. Sometimes ftattering, sometimes self-conceited. Some-

times candid, sometimes affected.

They remind us of all kinds of sounds emerging from the empty holes

(of a flute), or mushrooms coming up out of warm dampness. Day

and night, these change's never cease to replace one another before

our eyes.

Where do these (incessant changes) sprout from? No one knows their

origin. It is impossible to know, absolutely impossible! It is an unde-

niable fact, however, that morning and evening these things are

actually happening (in ourselves). Yea, precisely the fact that they

are happening (in ourselves) means that we are alive! 25

After describing in this way the endless psychological events which

are actually taking place in our minds day and night, Chuang-tzu

proceeds to an interpretation of this bewildering phenomenon.

What is the real and ultimate cause of all this? He asks himself

whether the ultimate cause of this psychological turmoil is our 'ego'.

l < J

; Against Essentialism 371

To say that the 'ego' is the cause of all this is nothing other than

recognizing - indirectly - that the stimuli coming from the external

world are the causes of our psychological movement. He describes

this relation between the external stimuli and the changing states of

our minds in terms of a relation between 'that' (i.e., the objects) and

'ego'.

Without 'that', there would be no 'ego'. Without 'ego', 'that' would

have nothing to lay hold of. (Thus our 'ego', i.e., the whole of our

psychological phenomena, would seem to owe its existence to exter-

nal stimuli). This view appears to corne close to the truth. And yet it

still leaves the question unanswered as to what really does make ( our

minds) move as they do. 26

Chuang-tzu admits that external stimuli do excite commotions in

our minds. Such a view, however, does notreach the very core of the

matter. Those who imagine that this view is capable offully account-

ing for the psychological changes that are taking place in ourselves

are comparable to the 'holes' and 'hollows' of the trees that naively

imagine that they themselves are producing the sounds they pro-

duce, without paying attention to the activity of the Wind.

Beyond the stimuli coming from the external objects, there is

Something which is the ultimate cause, Something which induces

external objects to act upon our minds and thereby cause the latter

to become agitated. Beyond and behind all these phenomena there

seems to be a real Agent who moves and controls all movements

and all events in our minds, just as there is a Wind behind ail the

sounds produced by the 'holes'. However, just as the Wind is

invisible and impalpable, so is this Agent unknowable and unseen.

But just as we can feel the existence of the Wind - although it is

invisible - through its activity, we can feel the existence of the Agent

through His actus.

It would seem that there is some real Ruler. 21 It is impossible for us to

see Him in a concrete form. He is acting - there can be no doubt

about it; but we cannot see His form. He does show His activity, but

He has no sensible form. 28

It is philosophically very important that Chuang-tzu asserts that the

Absolute in its persona! aspect, i.e., as the absolute Agent, is only

accessible to our understanding as actus. The Absolu te in this aspect

is actus; it is nota 'thing'. Without having any sensible form, that is,

without being a 'thing', it never ceases to manifest its activity. We

can only follow its trace, everywhere, in everything. But we can

never see its form because it bas no form and because it is not a

'thing'. However, the human mind is by its own nature an 'essential-

ist'. It finds it extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible to

represent anything except in the form of a 'thing'. It cannot, except

372 Sufism and Taoism

in very rare cases, conceive of anything as Nothing. The conception

of the Absolute as Something which is Nothing is to an ordinary

mind simply an intolerable paradox, if not sheer nonsense.

In order to render this metaphysical paradox a bit more accept-

able, Chuang-tzu compares the situation with the complicated

functioning of the members and organs of the body, the whole

mechanism of which is governed and controlled by an invisible

'something' : the soul.

One hundred joints, nine openings, six entrails - these constitute a

human body. Now of all these, which one should we respect most

(i.e., which should we regard as the Ruler of the body)? Do you say

that you respect (as the Rulers) all of them equally? (No, that is

impossible). Th en, do you favor one of them as particularly your

own? (No, that again is impossible). But, if not (i.e., if neither all of

them nor any particular one of them is in a position to rule over the

body), is it the case that all of them are mere servants and maids?

(However, if they were ail servants and maids), how could the country

(i.e., the body) be kept in order? Oris it the case that they rule and

are ruled, occupying the positions of the Ruler and the subjects by

turns?

No, there does exist a real Ruler (who governs them all). And

whether or not man knows the concrete form of this Ruler, his reality

is never affected thereby; it neither increases nor decreases

thereby. 29

The true Ruler in this case is the soul whose concrete form is known

to no body. But of course this is here put forward as an image which

would clarify the relation between the Absolute and all events and

all phenomena in the world of Being. Just as the bodily organs and

members are under the domination of the invisible soul, all that

exists and happens in the world is under the dominion of the

unknown-unknowable Ruler.

As I pointed out earlier, it is highly significant that Chuang-tzu

here presents the 'true Ruler' of the world as actus. No one can see

the Absolute itself as 'something' existent, but no one can deny,

either, the presence of its actus. And that actus is philosophically

nothing other than Existence.

We have to notice also that the actus of the Absolute which, in the

earlier passage, was described as the Cosmic Wind, i.e., a cosmic

force, is here presented as something persona!- God. In the world-

view of Chuang-tzu, the Absolute or the Way has two different

aspects, cosmic and persona!. In its cosmic aspect the Absolute is

Nature, a vital energy of Being which pervades all and makes them_

exist, grow, decay, and ultimately brings them back to the original

source, while in its persona! aspect it is God, the Creator of Heaven

and Earth, the Lord of all things and events. As conceptions and

Against Essentialism 373

representations, the two are totally different from one another, but

in reality both point to exactly one and the same thing. The differ-

ence between Nature and God is merely a matter of points of view,

or the ways in which the human mind conceives of the Absolute

which is in itself wholly unknown and unknowable. To this ultimate

metaphysical mystery we shall try to corne doser in the following

chapter.

Notes

1. II, p. 74.

2. ibid., p. 75: f±,

ffiî#ŒrH!t!!.J.

3. ::t:Jt:?J, r

4. II, p. 75.

5.

6. II, p. 83 lî*tiili. OIJMffiîZ, :it3\:WAAJ, Il, p. 89.

7. Lao-tzu, however, does think and talk about this 'ineffable' Something. We shall

corne to this point in the following chapter.

8. Chuang-tzu IV, p. 183.

9. VI, p. 242.

10. i.e., the words which correspond to these 'boundaries' have no unalterable

semantic fixity.

11. Il, p. 83.

12. II, p. 66.

13. Il, pp. 69-70.

14. Note again how Chuang-tzu attributes 'essence'-forming power to language. A

thing which in its original state, is 'nameless', turns into something rigidly fixed and

unchangeable, once it is given a definite name.

15. t'ien chün p. 70. Ch'êng Hsüan Ying: 1 :kit-:J( = ::Ri!itt,

lflA., fi1t1'(HI\, p. 74.

16. liang hang ïifirr, p. 70.

17. This can also be understood as meaning 'Equalization of Various Views

on Being', i.e., the nullification of the opposition among various views on Being on

the level of absolute transcendence.

111'1,,11.1

111 :]

1 111'

11

1

1

374 Sufism and Taoism

18. II, p. 74.

19. V, p. 190.

20. V, p. 193. r lit. 'to unify what is known by the knowledge'.

21. V, p. 191 l:l8H .. Commenting upon this phrase Ch'êng Hsüan Ying

says: § 2.:§:, i\i(fjgiB'fiftîtz•, p. 192.

22. The issuing forth of the phenomenal things from the absolute One is here

compared to the great Earth belching forth the Wind. Note the remarkable similarity

of this mythopoeic image to that used by Ibn' Arabi when the latter tries to describe

the ontological inner tension of the Divine Names within the Absolute, which is so

acute that it cannot but be relieved by the Names 'bursting out'; see Pa'rt 1, pp.

125-126.

23. pp. 45-46.

24. Il, p. 50.

25. Il, p. 51.

26. Il, p. 55.

2 7. chên tsai,

28. Il, p. 55.

29. Il, pp. 55-56.