2018/09/02

The Stoic Virtues

The Stoic Virtues



The Stoic Virtues


The student who assays the Stoic philosophy for the first
time is apt to be engulfed in the repetitions of the later followers of Zeno who
concentrated on things in our power and things not in our power. By
the time he has waded through the Stoic concept of physics and has come to grip
with the metaphysics the detail of the argument, the frequent circular motion
of the discourse and the obvious paradoxes and contradictions can engender a
feeling of helplessness. Is there anything to be gained by filling the mind
with such a complex dialectic which leads to so harsh and rigid a set of rules?(1
¶ 1)

There is great gain to be found here, however. And in the
twentieth century, a visit to the painted veranda of Athens might provide
inspiration for a people who have an enormously advanced technology and
methodology without an accompanying conviction respecting ultimate value and
purpose.
Zeno, the acknowledged founder of the Stoic philosophy, was
born about 340 B.C. in Citium, a city in Cyprus. He prospered as a merchant,
but on a voyage ending in shipwreck he lost all his worldly goods. He turned to
study and philosophy. Finally, convinced that the existing philosophic schools
were not fulfilling their proper mission, he began to expound his own theories
on the variegated porch (stoa) of the Poecile in Athens. The porch
was adorned with the paintings of Polygnotus, depicting scenes from the Trojan
War. Zeno taught his doctrine amid these pillars, it is said, for fifty0eight
years. His followers were called the philosophers of the
porch, hence, Stoics.
It is already commonplace to observe that, as a people,
Americans have made astonishing breakthroughs in scientific and technological
areas whereas, in the field of the humanities, an almost stationary positionh
as been taken if there has not, indeed, been retrogression. We know a great
many things about the physical properties of the world in which we live, and
almost nothing about why we should seek this knowledge, what we are to do with
it, and if there is, in fact, any purpose or value in life or in knowledge
about life.

When we consider the physical sciences, man has reason to
argue that enormous progress has been made since the Renaissance, notably in
the last hundred and fifty years. When we consider what we know of ourselves
and what we understand that will give us purpose and value, one can wonder if
there isn't some truth in the assumption that man is a fallen angel and is
presently on a descending path. Today, there is an overriding possibility that
some highly emotional politician will press that button by means of which terra
may become the nucleus in the formation of a nova.
The principal merit of the Stoics is that they glimpsed the
value of human life and saw a purpose in life needing no justification. In
contradiction to the Platonic and Sophist schools, which were preoccupied
with society and the formation of successful working arrangements for
groups of persons, the followers of Zeno saw in the individual the potential of
perfection and encouraged self-discipline whereby the individual could attain
personal virtue and peace of mind.

It is unfortunate that the writings of Zeno, the founder of
the school, are lost to us. We are left to ponder the works of his followers,
some of whom were prolific in the extreme. Chrysippus, who is
principally credited with organizing Stoic philosophy into logic, natural
science and ethics, is said to have written more than 700 major works although
it is conceded that a number of his later efforts were merely revisions of
earlier treatises.
I shall not concern myself with the natural science of the
Stoics which in the present world would be viewed only as an intellectual
museum piece, but shall confine myself to a portion of the ethical system and
the merit I believe it contains.

Here, in the ethical realm, the Stoics performed a major
service while engaged in perpetrating a monstrous disservice. Indeed, scholars
have found so many things to criticize in the doctrine that it is not necessary
for me to add to the weight of their judgments. And certainly I do not mean to
try to reverse them. The Stoics were thoughtful pagans, but the data from which
they worked was incomplete at best. What is marvelous is not their paganism,
their superstition, their metaphysics nor even their natural science. What is
magnificent and astonishing is the splendor of their ethical view. Their
flirtation with mysticism preserved the concept of an interventionist
anthropomorphic deity, and may have contributed to what remaining superstition
and belief in magic and miracle is still with us. But their preoccupation with
self-discipline, dispassionate objectivity, frugality, forgiveness and mercy
produced the finest men of the centuries which saw the Stoic influence at its
crest. My purpose is to extract from it the pearl of great beauty, the concept
of a moral absolute.

Will Durant says (The Life of Greece, p.
656): Stoicism was a noble philosophy and proved more practicable than a
modern cynic would expect…. Actually, it created men of courage, saintliness,
and good will like Cato
the Younger
Epictetus,
and Marcus Aurelius ….
Whitney J. Oates, in contrasting Stoicism with Epicureanism,
finds both doctrines individualistic yet Stoicism more practical. The two
systems are alike in that they attempt to give men peace and inner calm. But it
is an extraordinary paradox that the hedonistic system should recommend an
ascetic withdrawal from the world, a retirement into the garden, in
order to gain that peace, while in contrast the Stoic system, a stern and rigid
moralism, maintains that the peace must be found in the midst of the world's
confusions for, after all, all men are brothers. (The Stoic and
Epicurean Philosophers
, Modern Library edition, p. xxiv.)

Albert Schwegler, in his History of Philosophy (translated
from the German by Julius H. Seelye), sums it up this way: The merit of
the Stoic philosophy … is that in age age of social ruin it held fast to the
moral idea, and by separating politics from morals, established the latter as
an independent science.

Sixty years ago, R. Drew Hicks, fellow and lecturer, Trinity
College, Cambridge
, summed up his view of Stoicism in an early edition of
the Britannica as follows: It was Stoicism, not Platonism, that filled
men's imaginations and exerted the wider and more active influence upon the
ancient world at some of the busiest and most important times in all history.
And this was chiefly because before all things it was a practical philosophy, a
rallying point for strong and noble spirits contending against odds.
Nevertheless, in some departments of theory, too, and notably in ethics and
jurisprudence, Stoicism has dominated the thought of after ages to a degree not
easy to exaggerate.

The merit these and other scholars have found in the ethic
of Stoicism, in the practical nature of that ethic, should summon a
re-examination in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Today, only a few identify themselves with the Sophists, the
Platonists, the Cynics, the Skeptics, or the Stoics. Today, it is all communism
or socialism, or liberalism, conservatism or sometimes fascism. The argument
today is not on moral values but on economic methods and political
possibilities. There is little concern about the nature of man; there is
considerable agitation over the question, Who gets to own how much of
what?
It is paradoxical that the Stoic ethic, which in itself
offered no understanding of economics and placed little value in material
things, actually laid the foundations for modern capitalism by encouraging the
formation of individual character sufficiently austere to make thrift and the
accumulation of risk money possible and even meritorious.

The popular image of the capitalist as a man lusting to
spend his money in new and gratifying ways is ripe for revision. The true
capitalist is a Stoic, willing to deny himself virtually every luxury and even,
at times, necessities, in order to accomplish a major investment or to hold his
industry or business together against a running tide of competitive forces and
hostile regulative measures. Without a compelling urgency toward frugality,
thrift and endurance, modern capitalism could never have been born.
Man is always at his most vigorous as he begins his
endeavors. And it is Stoicism that encourages the self-denial which makes
beginnings possible. It stimulates that part of man which causes him to
withdraw his energy from a hundred pleasurable pursuits so that it can be
concentrated in the single objective; then, with zeal like a consuming fire,
the energy can be released to conquer worlds. Thus, Stoicism is unworldly in
its withdrawal, but worldly in its concentrations. There is a high-mindedness,
a nobility, a singleness of purpose about it which will attract nearly everyone
who longs for truth and who is willing to endure much to attain either inner
assurance or capitalist objective.

Two of the most famous Stoics whose writings have come down
to us are linked chronologically in the second century. Epictetus died and Marcus Aurelius was
born in it. The outer circumstances of their lives were as sharply different as
fate could arrange, for one was a slave, born into that condition (or possibly
sold into it--sources differ); the other, the nephew and adopted son of an
emperor who himself became the emperor of Rome. In the Stoic philosophy the
beliefs of both men took root. And the writings they have left us, while
differing in style, could otherwise have been written by either of them.

In Epictetus we
find the teacher, the ascetic. Here is a man whose observations were recorded
for him by a faithful Boswell named Arrian. Epictetus, it is said,
wrote not a word. The slave of an officer in Nero's guard, he finally
obtained his freedom and, travelling to Nicopolis in Epirus, he established his Stoic
school where he taught many years.

That Epictetus influenced Marcus Aurelius is
not doubted; that the doctrine of Stoicism was probably spread more rapidly by
the expanding Christian community than by either is evident. Christianity
absorbed much from the Greeks and the contributions of Platonism and Stoicism
are apparent although divergent.

But while Epictetus taught and
lived a gentle, remote and scholarly life, Marcus Aurelius acted.
No philosopher was ever plummeted into a more chaotic and perplexing cauldron
than he. He was confronted with the impending collapse of a great society, the
errors of which he inherited but could not control. Faced with barbarian
invasion, economic ruin, internal revolution, state policies at odds with his
own personal concept of virtue, he struggled manfully and with great personal
calm until a plague virtually decimated the realm. While on a military
excursion in Pannonia,
March 17, 180 A.D., he died while stoically doing what he believed to be his
duty.
The characters of these two men, forged in far different
furnaces, were remarkably similar. Epictetus spoke with
epigram and parable. He is a theorist, abstract, clear, cool as a mountain
lake. Aurelius spoke
directly of himself, not from theory but from actual application of Stoic
principles. In spite of the vortex in which he lived, he remained a
disciplinarian of himself. We read Aurelius and suddenly we know him; he is
human, making effort, having his problems but committed to rigorous
self-examination and correction.

Matthew Arnold speaks of Marcus Aurelius as perhaps
the most beautiful figure in history. He is one of those consoling and
hope-inspiring marks, which stand for ever to remind our weak and easily
discouraged race how high human goodness and perseverance have once been
carried, and may be carried again. (Essay on Marcus Aurelius, The
Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers
, Modern Library series, edited by W. J.
Oates.)
These are the best known of the Stoics for their writings
have been most available. And, suddenly, after the death of Aurelius, the Stoic
philosophy descended from the zenith and plunged below the horizon. Traces remain,
but most who remember some of the Stoic principles do not know that they are
Stoic and cannot identify the source; nor do they understand the framework of
thought into which they fit and from which they were extracted. The ethics of
Stoicism do not deserve oblivion. Although much of the philosophy can be
discounted, the central theme is important and will prove of eternal value.

To encapsulate the philosophy: Stoicism is the belief in the
supreme value of the individual person, the integrity of his will, the primacy
of his own right judgment. In this sense, Stoicism is a system of values which
elevates rational man to such an exalted position that all other things or
conditions are viewed as valueless in comparison. The system of values has
obvious draw-backs, including a down-grading of any and all kinds of material
property. In a way it is ultra-submissive, almost a philosophy made for slaves
rather than free men.

But there is a ring of steel in the flexibility which
appears to be its chief distinction. The Stoic conviction of the value of the
will, in contrast to the value of material things, creates the kind of
character that can and does master the things of this world. Holding material
goods in disdain, the Stoic will is disciplined, regular and resourceful. It
sternly disapproves of pleasure for its own sake, but does not seek pain.

There is a modern school of economics which seeks to divide
all property into two classes: primary and secondary. This school holds that
ideas, the products of the mind, are the primary items of ownership, including
life itself. Strength for this view could be found in Epictetus and Aurelius, if one will
go beyond the product of the mind to the mind itself and evaluate reason and
self-discipline to primary position. Yet Epictetus would have disclaimed
possession of ideas as property and contended that the only real property over
which any man had undisputed sway is the property of his will, his judgment,
his reason:

But as things are, though we have it in our power to pay
heed to one thing and to devote ourselves to one, yet instead of this we prefer
to pay heed to many things and to be bound fast to many—our body, our property,
brother and friend, child and slave. Inasmuch then as we are bound fast to many
things, we are burdened by them and dragged down…. We must make the best of
those things that are in our power, and take the rest as nature gives it.
… What? Am I to be beheaded now, and I alone? Why? Would you have had
all beheaded, to give you consolation?

And here is advice to guide the most stringent believer in
private property of all sorts: What then must a man have ready to help him
in such emergencies? surely this: he must ask himself, What is mine, and
what is not mine? What may I do, what may I not do?
Then the central theme of Stoic moral supremacy over the
affairs of the world: I must die. But must I die groaning? I must be imprisoned.
But must I whine as well? I must suffer exile. Can any one then hinder me from
going with a smile, and a good courage, and at peace?

A taste of this Stoic self-control is reported by the
careful Arrian:
It was in this spirit that Agrippinus used to say--do you
know what? I will not stand in my own way! News was brought
him, Your trial is on in the Senate! Good luck to it, but the fifth
hour is come—this was the hour when he used to take his exercise and have a
cold bath—let us go and take exercise. When he had taken his exercise the
came and told him, You are condemned. Exile or death? he
asked. Exile. And my property? It is not confiscated. Well
then, let us go to Aricia and
dine.

The employment of the rational faculties is
elevated: To the rational creature that which is against reason is alone
past bearing; the rational he can always bear …
But is it not intolerable to hang oneself?
At any rate, when a man comes to feel that it is rational,
he goes and hangs himself at once. In a word, if we look to it we shall see
that by nothing is the rational creature so distressed as by the irrational,
and again to nothing so much attracted as to the rational.
And the use of the independent will in the line of
controlling one's self and adhering to the path of duty is illustrated:
Priscus Helvidius too saw this, and acted on it. When Vespasian sent to him
not to come into the Senate he answered: You can forbid me to be a
senator; but as long as I am a senator I must come in.
Come in then, he says, and be silent.

Question me not and I will be silent.
But I am bound to question you.
And I am bound to say what seems right to me.
But if you say it, I shall kill you.
When did I tell you that I was immortal? You will do your
part, and I mine. It is yours to kill, mine to die without quailing; yours to
banish, mine to go into exile without groaning.
Of one thing beware, O man; see what is the price at which
you sell your will. If you do nothing else, do not sell your will cheap.
What is important to the Stoic? Moral progress would be the
answer as Epictetus expressed
it:
What does virtue produce?
Peace of mind.
Who then makes progress? … Will you not show him what virtue
really means, that he may learn where to seek for progress? Miserable man,
there is only one place to seek it—where your work lies. Where does it lie? It
lies in the region of the will; that you may not fail to get what you will to get,
nor fall into what you will to avoid; it lies in avoiding error in the region
of impulse, impulse to act and impulse not to act; it lies in assent and the
withholding of assent, that in these you may never be deceived…. If you would
tremble and mourn and seek to escape misfortune, progress is of course
impossible.

The Stoic's view of politics and government in general is
disdainful yet penetrating. Here is Epictetus on the foibles
of those who seek political favor:
I know what was said to me by a man older than myself who is
now in charge of the corn supply in Rome, when he passed through here on his
way back from exile; he ran down his former life and made great professions for
the future, saying that when once he was back he would have no other interest
except to live out the rest of his life in peace and tranquility….
And I said to him, You will not do it; as soon as you
sniff the air of Rome you will forget all your professions….
Well, what did he do? Before he came to Rome, a dispatch
from the emperor met him, and as soon as he got it he forgot all he had said
and has gone on adding to his heap ever since….
What conclusion do I draw? do I say that the creature man is
not to be active? Heaven forbid! But what is it that fetters our faculty of
action? …
They do notihng all day long except vote, dispute,
deliberate about a handful of corn or an acre of land, and petty profits of
this sort. Is there any resemblance between receiving and reading a petition
such as this: I beg you to let me export a little corn, and a
petition such as this: I beg you to inquire from Chrysippus how the
universe is governed and what position the rational creature holds in it;
inquiry too who you are and what is good for you, and what is evil?
Epictetus is
never more incisive than in his advice concerning the treatment of
tyrants: The tyrant, for instance, says, I am the mightiest of all
men.
Well and what can you give me? Can you enable me to get what
I will to get? how can you? Can you avoid what you will to avoid, independent
of circumstances? Is your impulse free from error? How can you claim any such
power?
  • Tell me, on shipboard, do you put confidence in yourself or
    in the man who knows? And in a chariot? Surely in him who knows. How is it in
    the other arts? Exactly the same. What does your power come to then?
  • All men pay me attention.
  • Yes, and I pay attention to my platter and work it and
    polish it and I fix up a peg for my oil-flask. Does that mean that these are
    superior to me? No, but they do me some service, and for this reason I pay them
    attention…. For who pays regard to you as a man? Show me. Who wishes to become
    like you? Who regards you as one like Socrates to admire and
    follow?
  • But I can behead you.
  • Well said. I forgot, of course, one ought to pay you worship
    as if you were fever or cholera, and raise an altar to you, like the altar to
    Fever in Rome.
  • What is it then which disturbs and confounds the multitude?
    Is it the tyrant and his guards? Nay, God forbid! It is impossible for that
    which is free by nature to be disturbed or hindered by anything but itself. It
    is a man's own judgments which disturb him. For when the tyrant says to a
    man: I will chain your leg, he that values his leg says, Nay,
    have mercy.But he that values his will says, If it seems more profitable
    to you, chain it.
  • Do you pay no heed?
  • No, I pay no heed.
  • I will show you that I am master!
  • How can you? … You are master of my dead body, take it.
  • Do you mean that when you approach me, you pay no respect to
    me?
  • No, I only pay respect to myself; if you wish me to say that
    I pay respect to you too, I tell you that I do so, but only as I pay respect to
    my water-pot.
  • And on the question of obtaining fame and immortality
    through high office, Epictetus has
    short and pithy counsel:
  • Today one spoke to me about the priesthood of Augustus. I
    told him, Fellow, leave the thing alone; you will spend a great deal on
    nothing.
  • Well, but those who draw up contracts will record my name.
  • Can you be there when men read it and say to them, That
    is my name,and even supposing you can be there now, what will you do if you
    die?
  • My name will remain.
  • Write it on a stone and it will remain….
  • Freedom is viewed as the absolute dominion of the individual
    over his own will. This is the inner realm, which should be governed and over
    which no invading force has any power whatever: For he is free, for whom
    all things happen according to his will and whom no one can hinder.
  • What then? Is freedom the same as madness?
  • Heaven forbid! Frenzy and freedom have nothing in common.
  • But, you say, I want everything to happen as I
    think good, whatever that may be!
  • then you are in a state of madness, you are out of your
    mind. Do you know that freedom is a noble thing, and worthy of regard? But
    merely to want one's chance thoughts to be realized, is not a noble thing; it
    comes perilously near to being the most shameful of all things…. Are we to say
    then that in this sphere alone, the greatest and most momentous of all, the
    sphere of freedom, it is permitted me to indulge chance desires? By no means:
    education is just this--learning to frame one's will in accord with events.
  • The weakness of the Stoic philosophy is found in the area of
    property ownership and economics, generally; the strength is found in its depth
    of human understanding. While the Stoic character makes possible the
    development of capitalism, it is paradoxical that the Stoic system of values
    holds economic goods and material property in very low regard.
  • For all that, the concept of forgiveness runs high.
  • … why are we angry with the multitude?
  • They are thieves, he says, and robbers.
  • What do you mean by thieves and robbers?
  • They are gone astray and know not what is good and what is
    evil.





Ought we then to be angry with them or to pity them? Only
show them their error and you will see how they desist from their faults. But
if their eyes are not opened, they regard nothing as superior to their own
judgment.
What! you say. Ought not this robber and adulterer
to be put to death?
Nay, say not so, but rather, Should I not destroy this
man who is in error and delusion about the greatest matters and is blinded not
merely in the vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the judgment
which distinguishes good and evil? If you put it this way, you will recognize
how inhuman your words are; that it is like saying, Should I not kill this
blind man, or this deaf one? For if the greatest harm that can befall one
is the loss of what is greatest and a right will is the greatest thing in every
one, is it not enough for him to lose this, without incurring your anger
besides? Man, if you must need harbour unnatural feelings at the misfortune of
another, pity him rather than hate him; give up this spirit of offense and
hatred; do not use these phrases whic the backbiting multitude use.
And again—Why then are we angry? Because we admire the
material things of which they rob us. For only cease to admire your clothes,
and you are not angry with him who steals them; cease to admire your wife's
beauty, and you cease to be angry with the adulterer. Know that the thief and
adulterer have no place among things that are your own, but only among things
that are another's and beyond your power. If you let them alone and count them
as nothing, you have no one to be angry with any more.
I have set down in the foregoing some of the most pungent
and meaningful statements attributed to Epictetus by Arrian, his self-appointed
amanuensis.
It is worthy of note that what we often think of as
Christian forbearance and fortitude, Christian values, and so on, actually
derive from Stoicism, which had its birth in the third century before Christ.
But Stoicism has its drawbacks. There is, as Matthew Arnold observed,
little of joy in the philosophy. It is a stern and unyielding task-master, and
it is difficult to clasp it to our bosoms with a glad cry.
Yet, when we come to Marcus Aurelius, the
last of the great Stoics, we find in him the warmth, as well as the humility,
that exalts even as it gladdens the heart.

Perhaps the most famous of the Emperor Aurelius's writings
are found right at the beginning of his first book of meditations wherein he is
rejoicing in the fact that he has adopted the virtues as his guide for
life. George
Washington
, our first president, has left us a booklet, engaging as it is
ingenuous, in which he sets forth the precepts of good behavior in company. It
is a charming recitation of manners and morals which is a revelation of the
eighteenth century. But Aurelius is equally demanding of himself and at a
greater depth of character. Summarized here are the qualities which Aurelius
claimed for himself and for which he obviously struggled as a youth.

  1. Good
    morals and the government of his temper.
  2. Modesty
    and a manly character.
  3. Piety
    and beneficence. Abstinence from evil deeds and evil thoughts. Simplicity
    in life far removed from ostentation.
  4. Gladness
    in having avoided public schools and joy in having had good, private
    tutors.
  5. A
    disinclination to take sides politically. Endurance in labor. To desire
    little for himself. To work with his own hands. Not to meddle in the
    affairs of others. An unwillingness to listen to gossip or slander.
  6. Not
    to be concerned with trifles. Not to believe in superstition. Not to breed
    quails for fighting. To endure the freedom of speech of others. To have
    become familiar with philosophy. To have studied with diligence.
  7. Not
    to be led astray by the Sophists. Not to write speculatively nor to make
    brash and hortatory speeches. Not to seek praise by showing off that he
    practiced self-discipline, or benevolent acts. Not to engage in rhetorical
    display. Not to walk about inside the house in outside garments. To write
    simply and directly. To be easily disposed to reconciliation with those
    who have wronged him, verbally or otherwise. Not to read superficially,
    but to seek deep understanding in books.
  8. Freedom
    of the will and undeviating steadiness of purpose. To also seek reason. To
    be always the same either in joy or sorrow, in pain or pleasure. To
    receive favors from friends without either showing humbleness or letting
    them pass unnoticed.
  9. A
    benevolent disposition. To look after the interests of friends. To
    tolerate the ignorant. Never to show anger or other passion but to be free
    of passion. Also, to be affectionate without noisy display.
  10. To
    be free of fault-finding. And in conversation, when another has used an
    incorrect word or expression, to deftly introduce the correct word or
    expression without correcting the one in error.
  11. To
    recognize the envy, duplicity, and hypocrisy that tyrants practice.
  12. Never
    to take refuge in the excuse of lack of time when called upon for
    assistance or correspondence.
  13. To
    listen when friends find fault, even when they are in error. To speak well
    of teachers and to be truly fond of one's own children.
  14. To
    love one's kind, truth and justice, to understand equality of rights, to
    favor a policy which respects the freedom of the governed. To seek
    consistency, a disposition to do good, to be generous and optimistic, to
    be candid both with friends and enemies, not to dissemble.
  15. Self-government.
    Cheerfulness, sweetness and dignity. To refrain from complaining. To show
    no amazement or surprise, to refrain from haste and never to
    procrastinate. To refrain from falsehood. To be humorous in an agreeable
    way.
  16. Mildness
    of temper. Unchangeable resolution. No pride in honors bestowed. Readiness
    to listen. Release of friends from social obligations. To make thorough
    investigation before forming a conclusion. To manage expenditures well. To
    check applause and all flattery. Not to seek favors by giving gifts. To be
    neither flippant nor pedantic. To honor philosophers. To be easy in
    conversation. To take reasonable care of one's health without being
    obsessed by fear of ill health. To recognize exceptional skills and
    talents in others and to give them due credit for their attainments. To
    look to what ought to be done and not to the reputation one might win for
    doing what ought to be done. To avoid excessive interest in buildings,
    food or clothing. To be neither harsh nor implacable, but to be vigorous
    and consistent in an orderly way with great steadiness.
Throughout the foregoing, Marcus Aurelius displays
the most solemn gratitude, not that he has attained to virtue, but that he has
been taught these virtues which he is striving to acquire. There is some
repetition and this rendition, for purposes of brevity, has not been more than
a broad summation; but it will serve.
To get a real taste of the sweetness of Aurelius, here is a
quotation: Begin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the
busy-body, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these
things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil.
But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of the bad
that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, that it is akin to me,
not only of the same blood or seed, but that it participates in the same
intelligence and the same portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured by
any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my
kinsman, nor hate him. For we are made for cooperation, like feet, like hands,
like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. to act against one
another then is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be
vexed and to turn away.
Epictetus is
the master teacher, a trifle unearthly, yet practical enough. Aurelius is the
master scholar, putting the precepts of his teachers to use and being grateful
for them as he seeks to manage the burdens thrust upon him by the high office
he held and the demands of a rigorous self-discipline. In these two men, the
high and the low, the emperor and the slave, the full range of the Stoic vision
has play.
In our own time and country, we cannot afford to let the
Stoic qualities of character move into eclipse. What is significant and of
lasting value is the emphasis upon the individual, the recognition that it is
not the things of the world that matter, but man's judgment and control of
himself in the presence of the world that does matter. If individual men can be
made right, society, a mere gathering of men, will be right of necessity. The
emphasis, in the face of our gigantic riddles of the twentieth century, is of
necessity upon the individual.
Plato and many others of various schools of thought, ancient
and modern, have sought to subordinate or even to eclipse the individual in
favor of a perfect or a perfectable society. The method has
been related to organization, structure, procedure, the modus operandi. Let us
turn to the Stoics and see with them that all these things are secondary.
We can, perhaps, join with Emerson in his
essay, Politics, when
he said: Hence, the less government we have, the better; the fewer laws,
and the less confided power. The antidote to this abuse of formal government is
the influence or private character, the growth of the individual; the appearance
of the principal to supersede the proxy; the appearance of the wise man, of
whom the existing government is, it must be owned, but a shabby imitation.


Epictetus and Stoicism | Sam de Brito



Epictetus and Stoicism | Sam de Brito



Slave to our thoughts
Sam de Brito

LinkGuess who?

There was an interesting piece in the Saturday Sydney Morning Heralda few weeks ago by University of London researcher Jules Evans about cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and the philosophy of the Stoics.

CBT, if you've not encountered it "is a form of treatment for emotional and psychological problems where a person talks with a mental health professional such as a psychiatrist, psychologist or counsellor ... to help change unhelpful or unhealthy thinking habits, feelings and behaviours," according to the Victorian government's Better Health website.

It's used to treat a variety of problems including anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, uncontrollable anger, substance abuse and eating disorders by observing and slowly trying to transform the way patients think about certain circumstances.

If I may be so bold, it's somewhat summarised by the famous quote from Shakespeare's Hamlet where the titular character says: "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."

In other words, you can be unfairly imprisoned for 27 years - like Nelson Mandela was - but it's entirely up to whether you see this as a negative or a positive and go on to change your country for the better when you get out of the hoosegow.

Jules Evans, who once suffered terrible social anxiety, says CBT worked so well for him he decided to research it.

"I went to New York to interview the psychologist who had invented it, Albert Ellis, and asked him where he had got the idea," writes Evans.

"He told me he had been directly inspired by ancient Greek philosophy, particularly by a line from the Stoic philosopher Epictetus: 'Men are disturbed not by events but by their opinion about events.'

"Ellis, like the Greeks, suggested our emotions always involve beliefs or interpretations of the world. Our interpretations may often be inaccurate, irrational or self-destructive, and this will make us emotionally sick.
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"In my case, I had a value system that put a huge emphasis on popularity and social performance, and this flawed belief system had caused me to suffer," writes Evans.

Epictetus (55 CE - 135 CE) taught you could separate the world into two general parts - things you can control and those you cannot - which you might recognise popping up in the famous Serenity Prayer co-opted by Alcoholics Anonymous.

God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change,
The courage to change the things I can,
And wisdom to know the difference.

The fascinating thing not mentioned in the SMH piece*, which strikes me as crucial to Epictetus's world view, is that he was born a slave - so he had no choice but to accept there were many things in his life he could not change.

As historian Will Durant wryly observed back in 1926: "Nothing in all literature is so depressing as the 'Dissertations' of the slave, unless it be the 'Meditations' of the emperor."

Says Epictetus in his Dissertations: "Seek not to have things happen as you choose them, but rather choose that they should happen as they do; and you shall live prosperously."

Durant then shares a famous tale that illustrates how strictly Epictetus lived by this maxim: "Story has it that Epictetus' master, who treated him with consistent cruelty, one day took to twisting Epictetus' leg to pass the time away.

"'If you go on,' said Epictetus calmly, 'you will break my leg'."

"The master went on and the leg was broken.

"'Did I not tell you,' Epictetus observed mildly, 'that you would break my leg?'"

Put in its' historical context, Stoicism (bought to Athens by the Phoenician merchant Zeno about 310 BCE) found fertile ground in a "despondent and decadent" Greece subjugated by Rome.

"The introduction of the Stoic philosophy was but one of a multitude of Oriental infiltrations. Both Stoicism and Epicureanism - the apathetic acceptance of defeat, and the effort to forget defeat in the arms of pleasure - were theories as to how one might yet be happy though subjugated or enslaved; precisely as the pessimistic Oriental stoicism of Schopenhauer and the despondent epicureanism of Renan were in the nineteenth century the symbols of a shattered Revolution and a broken France," writes Durant.

In other words, Stoicism is a great philosophy to observe when you have few choices.

The English philosopher and statesman, Francis Bacon, was neither enslaved or subjugated and had plenty of choices but he wrote around 1600 CE that: "How many things be there which we imagine are not? How many things do we esteem and value more than they are?

"These vain imaginations, these ill-proportioned estimations, these be the clouds of error that turn into the storms of perturbations."

Again: "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."

Or as the Buddhists say: "As it is".

So what does all this ancient navel-gazing offer for the contemporary reader?

Well, I would not be the first or 1001st writer to suggest the fate of the modern "wage slave" sometimes feels very much out of her or his hands - despite the proliferation of choice at the supermarket and on TV.

Many of us feel constantly buffeted and provoked by far flung causes and effects, our jobs under threat, our welfare at the mercy of "faceless men" in gargantuan bureaucracies; tiny, voiceless gears in the machinery of globalisation.

I'd suggest then, we can learn something from a Roman slave who lived 2000 years ago, by deciding what is important to us and not being suckered in by the dictates of culture and society that see us as consumers first and people second.

If you want what the rest of the world wants, you've got some stiff competition. However, if you do not and you're instead happy with what you've got, you're actually in a position most would find enviable.

It's all in how you look at it.



Read more: http://www.executivestyle.com.au/slave-to-our-thoughts-2prbx#ixzz5PvR73kv3
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[펌] 끔찍스러운 진보경제학계의 ‘사회학과 정치학’



[펌] 끔찍스러운 진보경제학계의 ‘사회학과 정치학’




[펌] 끔찍스러운 진보경제학계의 ‘사회학과 정치학’

작성자 : 토리고고 작성일 : 2006년 12월 19일







내 책상 위에는 지금 세 권의 책이 있다. 윤소영의 [일반화된 마르크스주의 개론] (2006, 공감), 정성진의 [마르크스와 한국경제] (2005, 책갈피), 그리고 김수행, 김공회의 [한국의 좌파 경제학자들] (2005, 서울대학교 출판부). 

이 페이퍼는 위 책의 내용들과는 직접적인 상관이 없다. 그냥 방금 윤소영의 [일반화된 마르크스주의 개론]을 다 읽고 서평을 쓸까 하다가, 서평에 쓰기도 뭐한 문제고… 하지만, 아무래도 짚고 넘어가야 서평에서 말이 꼬이지 않을 것 같아 따로 몇 자 적어두기로 한다.



10명의 경제학자들을 선정해서 다루는 [한국의 좌파 경제학자들]의 저자들은 논란거리를 피하기 위해 애초부터 이 10명의 선정은 지극히 주관적인 것이라고 한 수 접고 시작한다(iv). 그러나 이 열 명에 신식민지국가독점자본주의론을 통해 종속심화-독점강화 테제를 들고나와 한 시대를 풍미했던 윤소영이 들어 있지 않은 것에 의구심을 품은 이가 비단 나 뿐이었을까? 윤소영의 [일반화된 마르크스주의 개론]은 이 의구심을 심증으로, 그리고 정성진의 [마르크스와 한국경제]는 이 심증을 확신으로 바꾸어 놓았다.





윤소영-김수행



윤소영은 자신이 관계하고 있는 과천연구실의 어떤 대학원생이 김수행 교수에게 박사논문을 제출했는데, 논문 주제의 유일한 전공자였던 정운영 교수를 김수행 교수가 기피했다는 일화를 들면서 다음과 같이 쓴다. “마르크스주의 경제학의 전통…이 단절된 것이 반드시 부르주아 경제학 탓인지 반성해야 할 것입니다. 제 생각으로는 안병직 교수에 이어 김수행 교수도 만만찮은 기여를 했거든요. 진보경제학계의 ‘사회학과 정치학’은 정말 끔찍스럽습니다” (윤소영 2006: 105). 이 때까지만 해도 이게 앞서도 몇번 나온 김수행 교수에 대한 지은이의 유감 표명(65쪽, 81쪽)의 연장이려니 했다. 그러다 책의 맨 뒤에 실린 정운영 선생 추도문을 보면서 이 끔찍한 사회학과 정치학이 더욱 궁금해졌다. 403쪽에서 지은이가 언급한 [민중언론 참세상]에 실린 김수행 교수의 글("이 못난 사람아! 왜 먼저 죽어!")은 이번에 처음 보았는데, 중앙일보로 옮긴 뒤 정운영 교수의 논조를 못 마땅해 하는 나였지만, 정운영 교수들 두고 “당신은 경제학자보다는 신문기자에 더 적성과 소질이 맞다”고 계속 생각해왔다는 그 이상한 추도사는 나를 아연실색케 하였다. 정운영 교수와의 옛 정이나, 글솜씨나 감수성에 대한 칭찬, 변절에 대한 책망, 그리고 먼저 떠난 이에 대한 원망 등이 뒤엉켜 있는 이 글의 형편없는 글솜씨는 충격이 컸거나 시간이 없기 때문이었으리라 좋게 생각한다 해도 글에는 드러나지 않은 무언가가 있었다. 뭔지 모르겠으나, 김수행 교수가 정운영 교수에 대해 어떤 미안함이나 컴플렉스 같은 것을 가졌던 것은 아니었을까?



하여간 김수행 교수의 이 글에 충격을 받은 윤소영 교수는 [밥자유평등평화] (http://bob.jinbo.net) 자유게시판에 다음과 같은 글을 남긴다.



“김수행 교수처럼 정 선생을 추모한답시고 변절 운운하는 것은 김 교수의 생각(저는 김 교수가 마르크스주의자라고 생각한 적이 단 한 번도 없습니다)이나 두 분의 관계(자신은 정통 마르크스주의자이고 정 선생은 저널리스트일 따름이라는 단정은 명예훼손급의 망언입니다)를 잘 알고 있는 저로서는 정말이지 어처구니 없는 짓입니다.”



게시판의 또 다른 글에서 윤소영 교수는 김수행 교수가 언제 “단 한 번이라도 자신의 입장이라는 것이 있었는 지” 모르겠다는 말을 남기면서 격한 감정을 숨기지 않는다.



자신은 김수행 교수를 마르크스주의자라고 생각했던 적은 한 번도 없으며, 그가 언제 입장 같은 게 있었냐는 윤소영 교수의 댓글은 김수행 교수의 추도사 만큼이나 뒤에 무언가가 숨겨져 있다는 느낌을 갖게 한다. 그 숨겨져 있는 무언가의 일단은 윤소영의 이 책에서도 나온다. 지은이에 따르면, 서사연 해산 이후, 이전의 한신경제과학연구소와 비슷한 성격의 연구소를 만들려는 흐름이 있었으나, 연구소 창립이 구체화되는 단계에서 김수행 교수가 참여를 거부하고, 다른 교수들(정운영, 김기원, 정성진, 김성구)도 시큰둥해 하자, 자신 혼자 과천연구실을 시작하게 되었다고 한다 (65쪽). 물론 이것말고 다른 일들도 많을 것이다.



어쨌든 정리하면, 김수행은 윤소영을 무시하고, 윤소영은 김수행을 물어뜯는다.





윤소영-정성진



김수행, 김공회의 [한국의 좌파 경제학자들]은 맨 마지막에 정성진을 다룬다 (122-137쪽). 그 정성진 교수는 자신의 책에서 윤소영 교수에 대한 유감을 다음과 같이 적나라하게 드러낸다 (정성진 2005: 221-222쪽).



“짜골로프의 [사회주의 정치경제학 교과서]를 선전하는 데 앞장섰던 윤소영도 얼마전부터 소련 국가자본주의론으로 개종했다. 비록 문제점투성이의 ‘일국적’ 소련 국가자본주의론이기는 하지만, 이는 일단 환영할 일이다. 그런데 윤소영 (2004)은 이 같은 자신의 이론적 입장의 수정 혹은 변화와 관련된 자기비판이나 해명 대신, 엉뚱하게도 지난 10여년 이상 소련을 일관되게 국가자본주의라고 비판해온 나와 트로츠키주의를 공격하는 것으로 자신의 과거의 오류를 은폐하려 하고 있다. 윤소영은 이미 14년 전부터 소련 국가자본주의 논쟁을 소개해온 나의 글들은 전혀 언급하지 않고, “정성진 교수는 마치 클리프 그룹이 국가자본주의론을 대표하는 것처럼 호도하지만 이는 무지의 소치일 따름”이라는 등으로 비난하는데, 이것이야말로 사실 “호도”이고 역사의 날조다. 게다가 윤소영 (2002)의 소련 국가자본주의론은 … 뒤죽박죽의 이론적 기회주의를 반영한 것이다. “마르크스주의의 역사”를 잡식재단하면서 자신의 “무지” 콤플렉스, ‘트로츠키주의 알레르기’를 달래는 것은 자유이지만, 스탈린주의와 반공주의의 폭압과 개량주의의 포섭에 맞서 노동자계급 자기 해방에 헌신해 온 고전 마르크스주의 전통을 멋대로 왜곡하는 것은 도리가 아니다.”



사실 정성진의 이러한 분노가 전혀 근거가 없는 것은 아니다. [일반화된 마르크스주의 개론]에서도 윤소영은 정성진 교수가 활동하고 있는 트로츠키주의 그룹 ‘다함께’에 대해 가소롭다는 반응을 보인다. 윤소영에 따르면, 트로츠키주의의 부활은 남한이나 그리스에서만 볼 수 있는 다소 특이한 현상이며, 이들의 “‘나는 잘못한 것이 없다’는 식의 알리바이”는 “정말 기가 막히는 태도”란다 (39쪽). 더 나아가 윤소영은 정성진을 다음과 같이 약올린다. 아래에는 “다함께”라고 나오지만, 이는 사실 정성진이다.



“[역사적 마르크스주의]를 발표한 후에 제 생각에 공감하는 사람들도 늘어났지만, 그러나 다함께 같은 데서는 적대감이 더욱 심해졌는지 논쟁을 해보자고 덤벼들곤 하지요. 그런데 미안하지만 저는 그런 논쟁은 사절입니다. 완전히 시간 낭비일 따름이기 때문이에요. 모든 논쟁에는 동지적인 신뢰나 적어도 정직성과 분별력이 있어야 하는데, 다함께에게는 그런 것을 기대할 수 없기 때문이지요.

사실 다함께는 아주 특이한 기질을 갖고 있는 것 같아요. 다함께를 보면 한 손에는 코란 또 한 손에는 칼을 들고 지하드에 나서는 이슬람 시아파 전사가 생각날 정도이지요. 게다가 제가 듣기로 다함께는 노동자의 힘과 만나도 늘 그렇게 으르렁댄다고 합니다. 무슨 시아파가 수니파와 싸우는 것 같아요. 제 말이 정 의심스러우시다면, [이론] 4호에 소개된 캘리니코스의 만델 비판을 한번 읽어보세요. 어떻게 같은 트로츠키주의자에게도 그렇게 적대적일 수 있는지 알다가도 모를 일입니다” (윤소영 2006: 344).



정성진이 보는 윤소영은 은폐된 스탈린주의자이며, 사실을 호도하고, 역사를 날조하며, 이론적 기회주의자이며, “무지” 콤플렉스에 시달리는 넘이다. 반면, 윤소영에게 정성진은 나는 잘못한 게 없다고 오리발이나 내밀면서, 동지적 신뢰는 커녕 정직성과 분별력도 없고, 지들끼리도 껀수 잡아 싸우는 데 바쁜 한심하면서 질까지 안 좋은 넘이다. 정성진은 윤소영 한 번 걸리기만 해보라며 이를 빠득빠득 갈고 있고, 윤소영은 똥이 무서워서 피하냐 하는 식으로 실실 쪼개고 있는 셈이다.





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하지만 바로 여기에서 눈여겨 봐야 할 것이 있다. 윤소영에게 시비를 걸고 있는 정성진은 바로 김수행에게 시비를 걸고 있는 윤소영의 모습이다. “본래 남성이란 밴댕이 소갈딱지”라는 윤소영의 말(363쪽)은 우리나라에서 난다긴다 하는 이 좌파경제학자들 – 김수행, 윤소영, 정성진 – 모두에게 해당되는 말이다라고 한다면 이들은 왜 자기가 거기 들어가야 하느냐고 하며 억울해 할까? 그 밴댕이 소갈딱지들 갖고 사회성격논쟁에 다시 불을 지피기는 상당 기간 동안은 힘들 것 같다. 우울한 현실이다.



사실 이 세 경제학자들은 남한의 좌파 경제학자들이 21세기에 어떻게 활동하고 있는가를 보여주고 있는 각기 다른 전형들이다. 김수행 교수의 경우는 서울대학교 경제학과에서 마르크스 경제학을 담당하고 있으며, [자본]의 국역자이다. 일단 마르크스주의 경제학 비판에 관심을 갖게 되면, 제일 처음 접하게 되는 이름이고, 행여 그 부분을 전공으로 삼을라치면 거쳐야할 큰 스승의 위치에 있다.



물론 윤소영 교수는 이렇게 생각하지 않을 것이다. 서울대의 학생은 일류이지만, 교수는 이류일 뿐이고, 비봉판 [자본]은 대학원생들 도움을 받아 개역을 했다고는 하지만, 북한판을 남한말로 옮긴 것에 지나지 않는다. 윤소영 교수는 80년 광주항쟁을 전후하여 마르크스주의로 전향한 이래, 자신의 입장을 갖고 PD론을 정초했으며, 절친했던 선배인 이병천이 중진국론에서 포스트마르크스주의로, 또 발전국가론으로 널뛰기를 하고 있을 때, 알튀세르-발리바르 계열의 마르크스주의의 한 길을 걸어왔다. 한신대라는 좌파 대학에 자리잡고 있으면서, 현실 운동에서는 한 걸음 떨어져 과천연구실을 꾸리고 있다. 그는 87년 이후 선거에 참여하지 않고, (자신의 연구실에 나오는 후학들이 행여 선거에 참여하여 민주노동당이라도 찍을까봐) 과천연구실 MT 출발을 선거당일 아침 6시에 했다는 얘기를 저서에서 자랑스럽게 한다.



이런 윤소영은 정성진 교수에게는 파렴치한 스탈린주의자일 뿐이다. 정성진 교수 또한 경상대라는 좌파 대학 경제학과에 자리잡고 있고, 교수라는 점잖은 직책에도 불구하고 다함께라는 정치조직에 투신하고 있다. 트로츠키주의자로서 자신의 정체성을 분명히 하면서도 동시에, 남한 마르크스주의 르네상스를 위해 학진의 후원을 받는 [마르크스주의 연구]라는 반년간 학술지의 편집장이기도 하다.



이들 말고도 다른 전형들을 들 수 있다. 민주노동당 부설 진보정치 연구소의 장상환, 참여연대나 대안연대에서 활동하는 교수들, 그리고 재야의 채만수 등등...



밖에서 보기엔 그 물이 그 물이고, 우리 힘 한 번 합해서 뭐 한 번 해봐야 하는데... 꼰대들이라 완전 콩가루다. 뭐 거창하게 단결투쟁을 하자는 것도 아니다. 인간에 대한 예의를 갖고 제대로 된 토론문화 한 번 만들어 보는 게 그렇게 어려울까? 모두들 상대방만을 탓하고, 자기가 문제의 일부분이라는 사실은 애써 외면한다. 아니면 이제 연세들이 드셔서 거기까지는 생각이 못 미치는 것인지도 모르겠다.



그 선생들 밑에 있는 대학원생들은 어떨까? 그 사회도 줄을 서야 할텐데... "나는 바담풍 하더라도 너는 바람풍 해야 한다"고 가르칠 수 있을까? 또 이 양반들이 쓴 책을 사볼 어린 학생들이나 노동자들은 또 뭐라고 생각하겠는가? 역시 우리 윤소영... 역시 우리 정성진... 이럴까? 또 그런다고 한들 공부하는 양반들인데, 그게 또 자기한테는 무슨 득이 되겠는가?



안 그래요? 선생님들?

1705 박노자. ‘레닌주의’는 신주단지인가?



‘레닌주의’는 신주단지인가?

‘레닌주의’는 신주단지인가?다른세상을 향한 연대 변혁 재장전
2017.05.23
박노자(노르웨이 오슬로대 교수·한국학)


[이 글은 최근 레닌주의에 대한 재평가를 둘러싸고 벌어진 논쟁에 관한 글이다. 박노자 교수는 이 글에서 레닌주의에 대한 비판적 재평가에 경직된 태도를 보이면서 신성불가침의 영역으로 여기는 태도를 비판하며 이론적 혁신의 자세를 강조하고 있다. 자신의 블로그에 올린 글(http://blog.hani.co.kr/gategateparagate/92734)을 옮겨 싣도록 허락해준 박노자 교수께 감사드린다.]

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이 포스트는 <노동자연대> 분들의 정성진 선생님 비판 (https://wspaper.org/article/18693 )에 대한 제 반박입니다. 저는 레닌주의를 진정으로 따르자면 기존 레닌주의의 미비점, 결점부터 보완하여, 레닌이 다 못한 이론적 작업들을 해내야 한다고 생각합니다.

저희 불가에서 하는 말로 逢佛殺佛逢祖殺祖(부처를 만나면 부처를 죽이고 조사를 만나면 조사를 죽인다)인지라,진정으로 불조의 혜명을 이어받자면 "지금, 여기에서" 하화중생할 수 있는 부처를 나나 타자 안에서 발견해야 되고, 굳이 이미 죽은 글자들에 옭매일 일은 없습니다.

마찬가지로 레닌주의의 혁명 정신을 창조적으로 계승하자면 "지금, 여기에" 맞는 혁명의 논리를 지금 여기 상황에 맞게 개발해야 하고, 죽은 레닌의 글자 하나하나에 옭매일 일은 없을 겁니다. 오히려 정성진 선생님처럼 이 글자들을 비판적으로 볼 줄 아는 건 진정한 혁명정신에 훨씬 가까운 거죠.

레닌은 과학기술 맹신은 좀 심했습니다. 그뿐만 아니고 제2인터네셔날의 카우츠키 등 당대의 많은 사회주의자들은 기술발전과 "진보"를 동일시했죠. 사회주의를 "쏘비에트 권력과 전국 전기 보급"이라고 한 것은 바로 그 단적 사례입니다. 그런데 우리에게 짐 필요한 건, 전기를 덜 쓰면서 사는 환경적 삶의 방식을 개발하는 거죠.

레닌은 당위론적 "여성해방"의 지지자이었지만, 젠더 문제를 이론화한 적은 거의 없죠. 그런데, "지금 여기"의 대한민국은 희대의 반여성적인 사회입니다. 마초적인 병영문화와 여성 비정규직들에 대한 초과착취를 축적의 주된 원천으로 삼는 신자유주의가 유기적으로 결합된, 여성으로서 인간다운 삶을 구조적으로 영위할 수 없는,그런 사회죠.

이 사회의 젠더적 갈등의 원리를 이해하는 것은, 착취구조를 이해하는 만큼 중요합니다. "사회주의적 테일러주의"를 주장했던 레닌은 규율에 대한 맹신을 가졌지만, 이미 규율화가 지나친 병영사회에서는 이 부분은 해방성이 그다지 없습니다. 그러니까 정말 혁명가 레닌의 정신을 계승하자면, 레닌주의에 대한 수정도 보완도 필요하죠. 레닌주의는 신주단지가 아니고 늘 상황에 따라 발전돼야 하는 혁명의 과학입니다.

며칠 전에 노동자연대라는 클리프주의(구 동구권이나 중국, 북조선 등을 "국가자본주의"로 규정한 트로츠키주의의 별파; 트로츠키 자신은 쏘련을 "왜곡되고 관료화된 노동자국가"라고 규정했음) 단체의 기관지에서 제 학계 동료이신 정성진 선생님에 대한 이 기사를 읽고 (https://wspaper.org/article/18693) 상당한 충격에 휩쌓였습니다.

사실 정선생님은 제가 수업하면서 맨날 하는 일과 똑같은 일을, 발표하면서 하신 거죠. 즉, "사회주의" 사회에 대한 레닌의 여러 시기의 주장들을 종합하여 이 문제에 대한 레닌의 생각이 몇 번 커다란 변화를 겪었다는 사실,그리고 많은 면에서 ("무산계급 독재"하에서의 국가자본주의를 "사회주의의 초보적 단계"로 본다든가, "무산계급 독재" 국가의 통제하의 신경제정책 시기의 시장경제도 사회주의로의 통로라고 보는 측면에서라든가) 맑스의 사회주의관과 다르며 차라리 카우츠키 류의 경제결정론의 영향을 더 많이 받았다는 점을 명확히 하신 겁니다.

글쎄, 저도 대체로 수업하면서 그런 작업을 하곤 하죠. "아세아적 생산양식" 지배하의 아세아가 스스로 자본주의로 진입할 수 없다고 보면서도 중국의 태평천국이나 인도의 무장독립투쟁에 적극적인 의미를 부여하기도 한 마르크스의 아세아관의 자기모순 등을 학생들에게 설명하곤 하죠. 역사학자에게는 맑스도 레닌도 무엇보다는 비판적 검토의 대상물들입니다.

그리고 그런 검토를 가하여 인류의 스승인 이 분들이 각종의 자기 모순 속에서 결국 당대의 유럽중심주의적, 오리엔탈리즘적 편견들을 그래도 상당부분 극복하여 보다 현실적이고 급진적인 세계관을 분투 속에서 형성해나간 궤적을 추적하는 것입니다. 자기 모순들의 극복과정이야말로 사상적 발전의 원천이죠.

레닌은 위대한 사상가이자 실천가인데, 굳이 방점을 찍자면 후자에 찍어야 할겁니다. 특히 1917년10월 집권 이후에는 인민위원 위원회(Sovnarkom, 국무원) 위원장이 된 레닌의 첫째 급선무는 "사회주의"에 대한 올바른 정의라기보다는 무엇보다는 혁명의 생존이었습니다.

러시아와 비슷한 시기에 사회주의 지향적 혁명의 시도들은 헝가리, 핀란드, 바예른 (뮌헨) 등에 있었으며 북의태리나 애란, 노르웨이 일부지역에서까지도 소비에트를 만드는 시도들이 있었는데, 다 진압을 당하고 패배를 당하고 말았죠. 러시아만 빼고요.

학살을 피한 핀란드나 헝가리 사회주의 혁명가들이 모스크바로 망명할 수라도 있었는데, 모스크바까지 함락됐다면 레닌과 그 동지들이 망명할 수 있는 나라는 이 지구별에서는 존재하지 않았습니다. 학살을 방지하기 위해서는 혁명이 살아남아야만 했고, 혁명의 생존을 위해서는 레닌과 그 당은 집권초기부터 "사회주의"와 아무 관계도 없는 일들을 막 해대야 됐습니다.

이상적이지만 당장에 "효율"을 내지 않는 노동자들의 공장관리 대신에 전국적인 중앙집권적 산업경영이 이루어지고, 볼셰비키들의 비판을 받아온 제정정권의 비밀경찰 (Okhranka)보다 더 막강한 권력을 가진 소련 비밀경찰(Cheka)이 세워지고, 사회주의자들이 반대해온 징병제로 운영되며 그 장교 중에서는 구 제정군대의 장교가 약83%나 차지하게 된 엄청난 규모의 붉은 군대가 편성되고, 대부분의 중앙정부 부서의 중하급 기술관료들이 다"노동자 국가"의 행정관료로 재임용되고 말았습니다.

역사학적 입장에서 본다면 레닌과 그의 당이 제정러시아 국가를 인수인계하여 몇배로 보강시킨 거죠. 전국적인 배급제가 실시된 "전시공산주의"의 현실적 모델은 제1차대전시절 독일의 전시계획-배급경제이었습니다. 레닌도 그 사실을 숨기려 하지도 않았고요.

이 모든 일들은 1917년의 <국가와 혁명>에서 이야기한 "국가의 사멸"이라든가, "상비군을 민병제로 대체하여 생산을 직접생산자의 통제하에 두자"는 맑스나 엥겔스 시대의 사회주의의 이해와 아무 관계도 없었습니다. 일당제의 국가가 사실상의 시장경제를 관리하는, 오늘날 중국이나 베트남, 북조선 모델의 원형이 된 1921년 이후의 신경제정책도 마찬가지죠.

참고로, 신경제정책은 실업이라든가 가시적 격차, 성매매 등 사회악들의 복원을 의미했으며 그 당시 많은 당원들을 아주 강하게 실망시켰죠. 그렇다면 레닌이 이끈 혁명에 아무런 의미가 없었느냐 하면 절대 그런 것은 아닙니다. 제정시절의 봉건제(황제, 귀족, 귀족들의 농장, 국교 따위)는 흔적없이 날아갔으며, 어차피 자주적 근대화 능력이 없었던 자본계급을 대신하여 당/국가가 내포적 근대화의 견인차 역할을 맡은 겁니다.

이 당/국가의 관료기구들은 평등주의적 이상을 가진 농노계급 출신들로 충원됐으며, 과거에 비해 훨씬 더 업적주의적, 실력주의적 방식으로 운영하게 됐습니다. 대부분 기층민 출신인 당원 관료들은 개발 위주로 움직이는 신사회에서는 당연히 "사회주의"를 실행할 수 없어도, 적어도 계몽주의적인 "위민"(爲民)정치를 충분히 실시할 수는 있었죠.

스딸린 시절에 들어 우여곡절들이 생겼지만, 일단 1920년대에 국내소수자들이 많은 권리들을 획득했으며, 중국, 조선을 포함한 여러 국외 해방운동들이 상당한 방조를 받아 제국주의 세계체제의 파괴에 기여했습니다.

스딸린 때에 가장 보수적인 스딸린의 파벌이 승리하여 좌파적인 그룹들을 숙청시켜 사회 전체를 다시 보수화시켰지만, 사실 이미 1920년대초반에 공고화된 당/국가의 틀들이 스딸린 집권 이후에도 계속 계승돼온 거죠. 그 명암들을 고스란히 다 간직한 채요.

레닌은 <국가와 혁명>에서는 이상적인 사회주의적 사회의 청사진을 그렸지만, 세계체제(준)주변부의 한 국가에서 국가권력을 장악한 이후로는 당연히 그 구상을 실천할 수 없었습니다. 처음 전시배급경제를 만들었다가 나중에 일당제 국가 관리하의 시장경제로 갔다가 결국 스딸린 치하의 국가독점적 "적색 개발주의" 모델을 구성해 발전시켰지만, (레닌과 같은) 급진적 방식으로든 (스딸린과 같은) 보수적 방식으로든 러시아의 통치자인 이상 개발주의 이외에 할 수 있는 게 아무것도 없었던 거죠.

한데 평등사회인 사회주의를 지향하는 당을 이끄는 입장에 서 있는 이상, 또 그 동시에 배급경제든 국가관리하의 시장경제든 국가독점계획경제든 다 "사회주의로의 통로", "사회주의로의 이행기", "사회주의의 첫단계"라고 말하지 않을 수 없었습니다.

대민 기만? 꼭 그런 것만은 아닙니다. 사회주의야 아니더라도, 결국 스딸린의 공포통치 등 엄청난 곡절을 겪은 뒤에 쏘련에서 생겨난 사회는 사람으로서 살기에는 오늘날 대한민국보다 훨씬 좋은 사회이었습니다.

완결된 복지국가가 태어난 측면도 그렇지만, 인간과 인간 사이에 경쟁 대신 협동적인 관계가 지배적이었다는 점이라든가, 개인에게 여유가 많았다는 점에서 개개인 차원에서 (일과 돈의 압박으로부터의) 자유가 있었다든가,이런 차원에서는 소련사회에는 오늘날 제가 경험하는 한국 내지 서방 자본주의보다는 훨씬 인간적이었습니다.

그게 엄격한 의미에서는 맑스의 사회주의는 아니었다 해도 저는 만약 지금 타임머신을 타고 그 사회로 돌아갈 수만 있었다면 저는 당장에 그렇게 했을 겁니다. 그리고 레닌은 그때그때 임기응변으로 사회주의와 아무 관계 없는 사회 형태들(배급경제, 신경제, 계획경제, "무산계급독재" 즉 일당지배사회 등등)을 억지로 "사회주의"와 연결시키는 견강부회를 저질렀다는 점을 알아도 저는 레닌을 대단히 존경합니다.

그러나 또 존경하는 만큼, 레닌의 한계도 뛰어넘어야 한다고 보기도 합니다. 과학기술이 인제 지구를 거의 망가뜨린 이 시대에는 레닌의 과학기술맹신은 전혀 맞지 않으며, 인간의 소외라든가 젠더 문제 등에 대해 레닌이 거의 이론화적업을 하지 않은 것도 사실입니다. 맑스나 레닌의 결점을 보완하는 작업을 우리가 해야죠. 이거야말로 창조적인 맑스-레닌주의라고 봅니다.



(기사 등록 2017.5.23)

What Is Ancient Philosophy? by Pierre Hadot


What Is Ancient Philosophy? New Ed Edition
by Pierre Hadot (Author), Michael Chase (Author)
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“First published in France in 1995, Hadot's overview of ancient philosophy…is quite possibly one of the best one-volume works on the subject to have appeared in English in a very long time, not only for the clarity with which it is written…but also for the point of view Hadot takes. In keeping with Socrates' dictum that the unexamined life is not worth living, Hadot places each philosopher or movement discussed firmly within its cultural and intellectual context and shows that philosophy was not simply a process for creating theories but, more importantly, a way of life for many.”―Terry Skeats, Library Journal

“Pierre Hadot is determined to change our view of ancient philosophy, and by extension, of philosophy as a discipline… Like Hadot's hero Socrates, What is Ancient Philosphy? is a triumph of irony: a meticulous historical survey that ends by inspiring the reader to actually do philosophy. Handsomely designed, with useful bibliography and chronology, it's a compact text for the 'never-ending quest.'”―Thomas D'Evelyn, Christian Science Monitor

“Hadot's account moves gracefully from the beginning of philosophy among the Greeks, though its transformation under the Romans, and the encounter with Christianity, also touching on the relation between Eastern and Western philosophy. Profound learning stylishly worn makes the whole book, and the whole sweep of philosophy's first 1,000 years, accessible to any reader interested in what philosophy was like before it was taken over by the professors.”―Barry Allen, Globe & Mail

“Pierre Hadot deserves to be better known to English-language readers―and not just because he was a favorite of Michel Foucault's and is the man largely responsible for introducing Wittgenstein to the French. Hadot is a historian of ancient philosophy, a professor emeritus at the prestigious Collège de France. But it is more accurate to say that he is a philosopher who makes use of the ancients for his own ideas… In What is Ancient Philosophy? Hadot brings all his concerns together in a small volume of extraordinary erudition and surprising…clarity of prose… It is the summa of a distinguished career.”―Barry Gewen, New York Times Book Review

“This is a stimulating book. Thinking comparatively about what philosophy was and is will surely enrich the field.”―R. Kamtekar, Choice

“In its sweep and clarity of presentation, I would compare this book with some of the great syntheses of an earlier generation―for instance, Werner Jaeger's Paideia. At the center of the study is the strikingly original notion of the spiritual exercise, which Professor Hadot here and elsewhere shows to lie at the heart of Greek Hellenistic thinking about man, morality, and the universe.”―Brian Stock, University of Toronto

“Hadot's What Is Ancient Philosophy? is a wonderful book. It strives to persuade us to revise our view of philosophy―to think of philosophy, as the ancients did, as crucially involving a philosophical way of life.”―Michael Frede, Oxford University

“This book is a masterpiece of erudition and insight―it combines Pierre Hadot's extraordinary textual knowledge, his profound and original philosophical vision, and his famously lucid prose to give us a new way of approaching ancient philosophy. Beyond this, it proposes a conception of the tasks of philosophy that will be of abiding interest to philosophers and nonphilosophers alike.”―Arnold Davidson, University of Chicago
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Pierre Hadot was Professor Emeritus at the Collège de France. His books include Philosophy as a Way of Life and Plotinus.


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Paperback: 384 pages
Publisher: Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press; New Ed edition (March 15, 2004)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0674013735
ISBN-13: 978-0674013735
Product Dimensions: 5.5 x 1 x 8.5 inches
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Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars 27 customer reviews
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#175 in Books > Politics & Social Sciences > Philosophy > Greek & Roman
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Washu-chan

5.0 out of 5 starsGreat one-volume summary of Western philosophical traditionNovember 22, 2016
Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase

This book provides an excellent summary of the nature, purposes, and evolution of major Greek and Roman philosophical schools and their descendants through the medieval era. As such it is an excellent one-volume introduction to many of the traditions and personalities involved in those schools, and includes tidbits that you will not get from a typical university course. (Did you know that Plato's school included at least a couple of women, one of whom initially snuck in disguised as a man?) A major theme of the work is that the definition of philosophy has changed dramatically in recent centuries. Philosophy is usually now seen as an academic profession devoted to scholarly discussion of selected texts and concepts. In the classical and medieval eras, philosophy was primarily a way of life, which (at least for some schools) might be sought after by people in any walk of life. For those of us who still have an interest in the latter definition, this work is inspiring.



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ColNel

5.0 out of 5 starsand am so glad I bought this bookJuly 31, 2017
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It is a fair length of time since I have read any philosophy, and am so glad I bought this book. I had not read, nor even heard of Pierre Hadot until now, am halfway through this book and have already ordered the one on Marcus Aurelius. Hadot writes very clearly, discusses and analyses the terrain seemingly easily, as does someone who knows their field and was obviously used to helping others traverse it with him. This has reignited my love for the ancient philosophers.

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Greg Taylor

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5.0 out of 5 starsFrom the sage to the professor.May 26, 2009
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Hadot's What is Ancient Philosophy is the summation of a lifetime of research and practice in philosophy.
His thesis is fairly simple. Ancient philosophy begins in an existential choice. That choice is based on a vision of the world and a way of life based on that vision. It results in both a philosophical practice and a philosophical discourse. The practice has become largely ignored in favor of focusing on the discourse and this has resulted in a fairly complete misunderstanding of ancient philosophy.
I am not claiming that Hadot's presentation of ancient philosophy is completely correct. I think there are some problems with his formulation but before I get into that, I want to broadly outline his thesis.
First, when Hadot say ancient philosophy he means Greek and Roman philosophy- in spite of some other reviewers he is very cautious about comparisons to other traditions, such as Buddhism, Judaism or Taoism.
He sees that tradition of philosophy as largely composed of the Platonic Academy, Aristotle's school, Epicureanism and Stoicism. He also talks about the Cynics and the Pythagoreans although not in as much detail.
At the end of the book (p.278) he suggest that these schools represent fundamental alternatives toward human existence. All cultures can probably be shown to exhibit some variant of these alternatives.
Each of these schools posits an ethics, a physics and a theology. These three components were mutually supportive and served to explain the role of humanity in the cosmos and the role of the individual in the city, with their family and in the development of their own soul. The expression of these three components made up the philosophers discourse.
But that discourse was just empty words without the philosophers practice.
This practice took many forms some of which were specific to one school but many of which were common to all the schools. There was frequently a social component which might be the dedication to philosophical dialogue (as exemplified in Plato and some of the writings of Cicero), or to living together as a group following rules and regulations (which likely heavily influenced the monastic orders that Christianity developed). There were spiritual exercises that served to distance the individual philosopher from her everyday point of view. For example, she might be encouraged to develope the "view from above" which tried to see all of her life as if from a great almost cosmic distance. From this perspective, all her hopes, disappointments, stivings as well of those of others seemed equally petty and small. All events and all things seemed of equal value. She became detached from her everyday human ties to these things.
Or she might be encouraged to be mindful of the omnipresence of the possibility of her death. From this perspective, each moment became incredibly precious, an unfolding experience that she must give herself over to with all her being.
I want to throw in a personal aside here. I studied philosophy at Sir George Williams University in Montreal, Quebec in the '70s. I do not want to diminish in any way what I learned there. I took a year long seminar in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason from Prof. Vladimir Zeman that changed my life and taught me what little I know about being a scholar.
But the sort of exercises that Hadot describes as being the core of the daily life of the ancient philosopher were completely unheard of in what I was taught. Or, I suspect, in what most of our universities teach. Hadot dissects the meaning of the word philosophy as the lover of wisdom- not she who is wise but she who persues wisdom.
As Hadot points out, that lack of focus on philosophical practice distorts that history. By focusing on theoretical discourse and its most coherent expression, we lose sight of the possibility that these things were not what was most valued in ancient philosophy. Ancient philosophers were trying to work with their friends, their associates, their families and their communities to effect changes in their souls. Their written material was teaching material designed to be used by different types of students. Consistancy is not to be expected (p. 274) Aporiai happen.
So what are the flaws in this account? Let me suggest two. First, Hadot like many others, sees the ancients as too much of a piece for my taste.
Read Part Two of his book carefully. He had wonderful sections devoted to each school- to their fundamental outlook, their ethics, physics, theology and their spiritual exercises. Read the section on Aristotle and his school. They were a little different. They come across in Hadot's narrative almost like a research program a là Lakatos (I am showing my philosophical age). In other words, they do not come across as particularly spiritual. They read more like a bunch of secular humanist scientists out to destroy Christmas. More seriously, they don't sound interested in spiritual practices. Their practice was to accumulate knowledge. I think Hadot tries a little too hard to force them into his framework.
Which segues into my second issue with Hadot. He sees philosophy as necessarily a rational enterprise. It seems to me in my investigations into spiritual practice that at some point one is brought face to face with the ineffable. Not the irrational but the ineffable. One is brought into contact with that which cannot be spoken, let alone put into a propositional logic. To the extent that ancient philosophy is grounded in rationality is the extent to which it cannot deal with this.
But I think that some of the spiritual exercises Hadot discusses are designed to bring our friend the philsopher face to face with just that. If I am reading Hadot correctly, I believe that he gets this aspect of the history wrong.
These are minor complaints about what is a magnificent work. I have been strongly influenced by my readings in Strauss of late. There are many similarities (the insistence on philosophy as a way of life) and many differences to explore between these two. More universally, Hadot is a challenge to almost everyone's approach to ancient philosophy. His work simply has to be faced and learned from.
Anyone who reads the Greek and Roman philosophers and who tries to learn from them has much to gain from this book. It is one thing to read Cicero or Seneca or Plato. It is another to try to live one's life based on such reading. Hadot just might inspire you to try.
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O. David Gold

5.0 out of 5 starsAs a old non-academic philosopher, I just prize this book.February 25, 2013
Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase

Recently, at the age of 82, I became aware of this wonderful book. It is written so wonderfully since it is one of the few philosophy books that a non-academic can understand. His emphasis on the need to become personally involved in philosophy -"tasting the cooks recipe" - is so important to me.

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Thorwald Westmaas

5.0 out of 5 starsMust read for philosophy newbiesSeptember 9, 2014
Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase

I'm pretty new to philosophy and particularly liked Pierre Hadot's vision of philosophy as a way of life instead of some abstract discipline.

The book is easy and enjoyable to read compared to some in this genre. I find it an excellent start for people new to philosophy.

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StrawberryPinch

4.0 out of 5 starsRequired readingDecember 8, 2013
Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase

I got this book for a philosophy class I am taking. It's not the most interesting required text I've read, but it certainly is informative.



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Dr. Mark Abrahams

5.0 out of 5 starsFive StarsMarch 24, 2016
Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase

I recently discovered Pierre Hadot's work and I love this one!

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Penguins

5.0 out of 5 starsGood bookMarch 5, 2014
Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase

If your looking for a comprehensive guid on Ancient Philosophy this is the way to go. Hadot writes well and communicates overall themes to the reader in an enjoyable manner.



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2018/09/01

Amazon.com: The Heart of Wisdom: A Philosophy of Spiritual Life (9781442221161): Richard White: Books


 Heart of Wisdom: A Philosophy of Spiritual Life 1st Edition
by Richard White (Author)
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In a time when so many philosophical works on religion are predictable and simplistic, Richard White's The Heart of Wisdom is fresh and invigorating. By approaching the topic of spirituality in light of the virtues, White is able to ask new questions (or perhaps lead a new readership to ask very old questions), and the answers he discovers are full of wisdom. This is a delightfully insightful book.(Richard L. Kyte, Viterbo University)

White (Creighton Univ.) provides an investigation into the spiritual life and takes the uncommon, higher-elevation viewpoint of an overview of spirituality itself and its manifestation through different religions without overtly promoting one over the other. Rather than providing yet another critique of spiritual ideas, White gives a scaled-down phenomenological account of how people interact with each other and the world in a larger, deeper way; this is the essence of spirituality. What makes this approach interesting is that he focuses on the themes in the "order of their emergence at the conceptual and experiential level." The book starts with suffering: a passive reaction to the world that brings people face to face with the limits of existence. It then travels through compassion, generosity, forgiveness, reverence, and finally joy. By placing spirituality as a basic shared condition of existence, White is able to pull from a wide range of authors and faith traditions (while excluding the "occult" or New Age wisdom that "grasps alternate realities"). He ends by affirming that philosophy has a wider breadth than spirituality, which in turn is part of what entails a full and rich philosophical understanding of the human condition. Summing Up: Recommended. Lower- and upper-level undergraduates; general readers (CHOICE)
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About the Author


Richard White is professor of Philosophy at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska. Born in London, U.K., he earned a B.A. in Philosophy and Literature at Warwick University and a Ph.D. at SUNY, Stony Brook. He is the author of four previous books, including Radical Virtues (2008) and Love's Philosophy (2001).


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Hardcover: 160 pages
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; 1 edition (December 19, 2012)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 144222116X






























What Is to Be Done? (novel) - Wikipedia



What Is to Be Done? (novel) - Wikipedia



What Is to Be Done? (novel)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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For other uses, see What Is To Be Done? (disambiguation).
What Is To Be Done?
1905 title page
Author Nikolai Chernyshevsky
Original title Что дѣлать?
Country Russian Empire
Language Russian
Genre Novel

Publication date 1863

Published in English 1886
Media type Print (Hardback & Paperback)


What Is To Be Done?(Russian: Что делать?, tr. Chto délat'?; also translated as What Shall We Do? and literally translated as "What To Do?") is an 1863 novel written by the Russian philosopher, journalist and literary critic Nikolai Chernyshevsky. It was written in response to Fathers and Sons(1862) by Ivan Turgenev. The chief character is a woman, Vera Pavlovna, who escapes the control of her family and an arranged marriage to seek economic independence. The novel advocates the creation of small socialist cooperatives based on the Russian peasant commune, but oriented toward industrial production.

The author promoted the idea that the intellectual's duty was to educate and lead the laboring masses in Russia along a path to socialism that bypassed capitalism. One of the characters in the novel, Rakhmetov(Рахметов), became an emblem of the philosophical materialism and nobility of Russian radicalism despite his minor role. The novel also expresses, in one character's dream, a society gaining "eternal joy" of an earthly kind. 

The novel has been called "a handbook of radicalism"[1]and led to the founding of the Land and Liberty society.[2]

When he wrote the novel, the author was himself imprisoned in the Peter and Paul fortress of St. Petersburg, and he was to spend years in Siberia. Chernyshevsky asked for and received permission to write the novel in prison, and the authorities passed the manuscript along to his former employer, the newspaper Sovremennik, which also approved it for publication in installments in its pages. Lenin, Plekhanov, Peter Kropotkin, Alexandra Kollontay, Rosa Luxemburg, and also the Swedish writer August Strindberg[3] were all highly impressed with the book, and it came to be officially regarded as a Russian classic in the Sovietperiod.[4][5]


Contents
1Plot introduction
2Reactions
3Interesting facts
4References in other work
5Footnotes
6References
7External links


Plot introduction[edit]

Within the framework of a story of a privileged couple who decide to work for the revolution, and ruthlessly subordinate everything in their lives to the cause, the work furnished a blueprint for the asceticism and dedication unto death which became an ideal of the early socialist underground of the Russian Empire.


Reactions[edit]

The book is perhaps better known in the English-speaking world for the responses it created than as a novel in its own right.

  Fyodor Dostoevskymocked the utilitarianism and utopianism of the novel in his 1864 novella Notes from Underground, as well as in his 1872 novel Devils

Leo Tolstoy wrote a different What Is To Be Done?, published in 1886, based on his own ideas of moral responsibility.[6] 

Vladimir Lenin, however, found it inspiring and named a 1902 pamphlet "What Is To Be Done?". Lenin is said to have read the book five times in one summer, and according to Professor Emeritus of Slavic and Comparative Literature at Stanford, Joseph Frank, 'Chernyshevsky's novel, far more than Marx's Capital, supplied the emotional dynamic that eventually went to make the Russian Revolution.'[7]


Interesting facts[edit]

The novel mentions (in the 4th dream of Vera Pavlovna) aluminium as the "metal of the future". In fact aluminium became widely used only starting with World War I (1914).

The "Dame in mourning" appearing at the end of the novel is Olga S. Chernyshevskaya, the author's wife.


References in other work[edit]

Characters with the last name "Kirsanov" also appear in Ivan Turgenev's Fathers and Sons.

Dostoyevsky argues with Chernyshevsky's ideas in Notes from Underground. In particular, he responds negatively to Chernyshevsky's idealization of The Crystal Palace, a theme which is referenced throughout Russian literature.

American playwright Tony Kushner referenced the book multiple times in his play Slavs!.

The main character of Gide's Les caves du Vatican (En. Lafcadio's Adventures), Lafcadio, resembles Rakhmetov.

In the book Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical, author Chris Matthew Sciabarra claims that What Is to Be Done? is one of the sources of inspiration for Rand's thought.[8] For example, the book's main character Lopuhov says "I am not a man to make sacrifices. And indeed there are no such things. One acts in the way that one finds most pleasant."

Vladimir Nabokov's final novel in Russian, The Gift, ridicules What is to Be Done? in its fourth chapter.

Nikolay Chernyshevsky - Wikipedia



Nikolay Chernyshevsky - Wikipedia
Nikolay Chernyshevsky
Никола́й Черныше́вский

Born July 12, 1828
Saratov, Imperial Russia
Died October 17, 1889 (aged 61)
Saratov, Imperial Russia


Nikolay Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky[a] (12 July 1828 – 17 October 1889) was a Russian revolutionary democrat, materialist philosopher, critic, and socialist (seen by some as a utopian socialist). He was the leader of the revolutionary democratic movement of the 1860s, and had an influence on Vladimir Lenin, Emma Goldman, and Serbian political writer and socialist Svetozar Marković.


Contents
1Biography
2Ideas and influence
3Works about Chernyshevsky
4Works
5References
6External links
Biography[edit]

The son of a priest, Chernyshevsky was born in Saratov in 1828, and stayed there till 1846. He graduated at the local seminary where he learned English, French, German, Italian, Latin, Greek and Old Slavonic. It was there he gained a love of literature.[1] At St Petersburg university he often struggled to warm his room. He kept a diary of trivia like the number of tears he shed over a dead friend. It was here that he became an atheist.[2]

He was inspired by the works of Ludwig Feuerbach and Charles Fourier. After graduating from Saint Petersburg University in 1850, he taught literature at a gymnasium in Saratov. From 1853 to 1862, he lived in Saint Petersburg, and became the chief editor of Sovremennik (“The Contemporary”), in which he published his main literary reviews and his essays on philosophy.

In 1862, he was arrested and confined in the Fortress of St. Peter and Paul, where he wrote his famous novel What Is to Be Done? The novel was an inspiration to many later Russian revolutionaries, who sought to emulate the novel's hero Rakhmetov, who was wholly dedicated to the revolution, ascetic in his habits and ruthlessly disciplined, to the point of sleeping on a bed of nails and eating only raw steak in order to build strength for the Revolution. Among those who have referenced the novel include Lenin, who wrote a work of political theory of the same name.

In 1862, Chernyshevsky was sentenced to civil execution (mock execution), followed by penal servitude (1864–72), and by exile to Vilyuisk, Siberia (1872–83). He died at the age of 61.
Ideas and influence[edit]

Chernyshevsky was a founder of Narodism, Russian populism, and agitated for the revolutionary overthrow of the autocracy and the creation of a socialist society based on the old peasant commune.

Chernyshevsky’s ideas were heavily influenced by Alexander Herzen, Vissarion Belinsky, and Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach. He saw class struggle as the means of society’s forward movement and advocated for the interests of the working people. In his view, the masses were the chief maker of history. He is reputed to have used the phrase “the worse the better”, to indicate that the worse the social conditions became for the poor, the more inclined they would be to launch a revolution.

There are those arguing, in the words of Professor Joseph Frank, that “Chernyshevsky’s novel What Is to Be Done?, far more than Marx’s Das Kapital, supplied the emotional dynamic that eventually went to make the Russian Revolution”.[3]

Fyodor Dostoyevsky was enraged by what he saw as the simplicity of the political and psychological ideas expressed in the book,[4] and wrote Notes from Underground largely as a reaction against it.
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Works about Chernyshevsky[edit]

Vladimir Nabokov’s The Gift has the protagonist, Fyodor Godunov-Cherdyntsev, study Chernyshevsky and write the critical biography The Life of Chernychevski which represents Chapter Four of the novel. The publication of this work caused a literary scandal.[5]
Paperno, Irina, Chernyshevsky and the Age of Realism: A Study in the Semiotics of Behavior. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
Pereira, N.G.O., The Thought and Teachings of N.G. Černyševskij. The Hague: Mouton, 1975.
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Works[edit]

Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality [1] From:Russian Philosophy Volume II: The Nihilists, The Populists, Critics of Religion and Culture, Quadrangle Books 1965;
Essays on the Gogol Period in Russian Literature
Critique of Philosophical Prejudices Against Communal Ownership
The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy
What Is to Be Done? (1863)
Prologue
The Nature of Human Knowledge